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Introduction to the Series 
The Pakistan Institute of Deve lopmen t Economics has compi led a series 
of Readings on var ious aspects of the deve lopment p rob lems of Pakistna. 
These Readings consist of impor tan t studies relevant to the subject -mat ter 
to which the d i f ferent vo lumes in this series per tain. It is hoped that the 
studies presented in these vo lumes will go a long w a y to fill in the lacunae 
in the field of economic l i terature for Pakistan. 
All of the studies included in this vo lume were originally publ ished in 
the Institute's quar te r ly j ou rna l , The Pakistan Development Review. The 
Institute has n o w been in existence for over a decade and The Pakistan 
Development Review is in the n inth year of its publ ica t ion . D u r i n g this 
period, the Institute has made very significant cont r ibu t ion in various fields 
of applied economic research. The studies carried out at the Institute 
have been of immense value to the planners, researchers and academics. 
Most of these studies were published in one f o r m or the other in The Pakistan 
Development Review wh ich is widely recognized, bo th in Pakistan and 
abroad, as one of the outs tanding journa ls in the field of Deve lopmen t 
Economics. 
In recent times, we have been receiving suggestions f r o m outside and 
have been increasingly becoming aware ourselves of the desirability of 
compi l ing in a n u m b e r of volumes die significant cont r ibut ions of the 
Institute in part icular areas of research in deve lopment economics. We have 
come to recognize that this w o u l d be of significant use not only to those 
planners and researchers w h o would like to have impor tan t pieces of ana-
lyses in any part icular area to be collected in a single vo lume, but also 
to the teachers and students at the advanced levels at the universities w h o 
have been hand icapped in the teaching of courses in economics of Pakistan 
because of the lack of analytical and empirically oriented studies. It is in the 
hope of fu l f i l l ing these needs that we have embarked on the project of 
compi l ing books of readings selected f r o m the studies published by the 
Institute. 
It may be noted that we have conf ined ourselves to the studies actually 
under taken by the m e m b e r s of the research staff at the Institute. The Pakistan 
Development Review regularly attracts contr ibut ions f r o m eminent econo-
mists outside the Institute, bo th national and international. Many of these 
contr ibut ions are highly competen t and relevant . But we have f o u n d it 
useful to conf ine ourselves to the studies carried out at the Institute because 
one of our purposes is to highl ight the contr ibut ion of the Institute in 
specific areas of applied economic research. 
Nuru l Islam 
Director 
Pakistan Institute of Deve lopmen t Economics 
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Introduction 
Nurul Islam 
This volume reprints a number of articles published in The Pakistan Deve-
lopment Review over the last few years. They cover principally two broad areas: 
import policy and the strategy of import substitution, on the one hand, and 
export policy and problems and prospects of export expansion, on the other. 
These articles represent and have contributed in many different ways towards 
not only the evolution of economic thinking and analysis in the critical areas of 
trade policy but also depict and analyse significant changes in the realm of the 
government's economic policies in Pakistan in the last decade or so. 
Since early fifties, Pakistan adopted a policy of quantitative controls on 
imports. The two articles by Syed N. H. Naqvi [8 ; 9] on import policy and 
one by Philip Thomas [13] analyse the administrative apparatus as well as the 
economic implications and consequences of the import restrictions in terms of 
efficiency and equity. The import policy in Pakistan has been over the years 
used to help achieve a large number of objectives. The impact of import controls 
and import licensing on the allocation of resources is crucial. The differential 
structure of price and profit incentives which resulted f rom the import licensing 
during 1950's favoured the consumer-goods industries. However, towards 
the late fifties and sixties, an increasing domestic demand for intermediate and 
capital goods, given the general excess demand for foreign exchange, increased 
the profitability of investment in the latter sectors. The rate of growth of the 
capital- and intermediate-goods industries was accelerated during the latter 
period. 
Gordon Winston iti [14] discusses how best to quantify and analyse 
the alternative measures of import substitution and the relative degree of import 
substitution in the different industrial sectors. Whether the rapid pace of 
import substitution in the consumer-goods sector during 1950's, through an 
expanded domestic supply of consumer goods, might have militated against 
the required or intended increase in domestic savings has been often debated 
(A. R. Khan [7]). The precise method of quantifying or testing such a hypo-
thesis is far f rom clear. The quantitative evidence, so far as the import-sub-
stituting industries are concerned, refers to a very limited number of consumption-
goods industries. Moreover, the inability to expand export of the output of the 
domestic consumption-goods industry and hence to contribute to the mobilisation 
of savings is partly traceable to a weakness in fiscal and exchange-rate policy. 
The import substitution in the intermediate- and capital-goods sectors does not 
necessarily increase the rate of domestic savings; while it is true that cloth can be 
consumed and machine cannot be, in many cases the limitation of the domestic 
market and of the domestic-resource endowment, and the dearth of managerial 
and technical skill may result in low quality, inefficiency, and high cost of pro-
duction so that the increase in real income due to investment in capital-goods 
sectors is small. Furthermore, a relative scarcity of consumer goods vis-a-vis 
capital goods in the face of the unchanged domestic propensities to consume 
may result in inflationary pressure, and require a rigid control over consumption 
as well as on the allocation of domestic resources. If rationing and direct 
control over the allocation of resources is necessary to stimulate savings and 
capital formation in the context of a strategy oriented towards the capital-goods 
industries, they may equally well be resorted in order to restrain consumption 
by an expansion of export of the consumer-goods industries. 
Increasingly over the years there was a recognition of a number of limitations 
of the prevailing import-licensing system such as lack of competition in the 
domestic industry, excessive inventories due to the uncertainty of the import-
licensing policy, underpricing of foreign exchange and capital leading to under-
utilised capacity and an uneconomic use of scarce foreign exchange, and inequi-
ties imposed on small firms and regions far away f rom the location of the 
import control authorities, etc. This led to a gradual change in import policy 
in several directions, as indicated both by Philip Thomas [13] and Frank 
C. Child [2], The import-licensing system in Pakistan has undergone important 
changes over the years. There has been a movement in the direction of libera-
lisation of controls on imports and a greater reliance on price mechanism in 
the late fifties and during 1960's. Thus, the first steps in the process of import 
liberalisation were directed towards increasing the degree of competition in 
the import trade and thus distributing the excess profits of the importers among a 
larger number of traders. The scarcity margins on the imported goods are 
primarily related to the relative scarcity of imported goods. The scarcity 
margins are high, varying f r o m 30 per cent to 50 per cent above the landed costs 
of imports, depending upon the relative intensity of import licensing in respect 
of different items. The initial study of the scarcity margins in the domestic 
prices of imported goods by Mati Lai Pal [10] was extended subsequently to a 
larger number of items and to a later period and confirms the findings of the 
original study. These studies provide for the first time an empirical measure-
ment of the intensity or the restrictive effects of the quantitative controls on 
imports. 
The s ign i f i cant steps in the direction of restoration of the role of price 
mechanism in lieu of direct control over imports which mainly affected the 
imports of consumer goods and raw materials have been ably analysed by 
Philip Thomas [13]. However, beginning late 1965, consequent upon the Indo-
Pakistan war and an increase in defence imports and slackening of commodity 
aid flow, there was a setback to the process of liberalisation of imports. Not 
only the volume of imports in the free list was reduced but also they were subject 
to increasing administrative restraints. The process has been continued in the 
subsequent years, not so much in the form of expansion of free list as in 
the form of an increasing range of imports being placed on the bonus list. The 
cfsh-cww-bonus scheme introduced subsequently, and as explained by Frank C. 
Child [2] in his article, is not so much a component of import-liberalisation 
programme as that of raising the effective rate of exchange for a wide range of 
raw-material imports. The rationale of the import liberalisation in Pakistan 
deserves close examination. It has been conceived more in terms of allowing 
a flow of a greater quantum of imports rather than the restoration of the market 
machanism in the regulation of imports, irrespective of the quantity of imports. 
However, the initial relaxation of controls was associated with a large inflow of 
foreign commodity assistance to finance import of raw materials and consumer 
goods. The price mechanism has been considered appropriate only in a situa-
tion of a relatively larger supplies of foreign exchange through exports and 
foreign aid; with a shortfall in the availability of foreign aid and foreign-
exchange earnings, it is preferred to regulate imports by rationing rather than by 
raising price of foreign exchange, specially for raw materials and capital goods. 
Moreover, it is recognized that for some items such as food and essential con-
sumer goods a rise in the import price generates inequities, specially if they are 
important components of the cost of living of the poorer people. For certain 
other items, demand is considered to be highly inelastic so that high price is not 
able to restrict demand adequately and rationing through import licensing is the 
only effective method of restraining demand and conserving foreign exchange. 
How and under what circumstances these assumptions hold true requires fur ther 
analysis in the context of circumstances prevailing in Pakistan. 
Frank C. Child [2] legitimately asks the question as to whether the system 
of foreign-exchange allocation in Pakistan could not be rendered more efficient 
if bonus-voucher system is so generalised as to include all exports and imports 
excepting in the case of the trade under the barter agreements and the tied Joans, 
both of which require quantitative control on trade for their effective implemen-
tation or utilisation. It will allow the market to determine to a large extent the 
prevailing exchange rate. The movement f rom a complicated structure of 
multiple-exchange rates which results f r o m the quantitative restrictions on 
trade to a unified, more realistic fixed exchange rate in one single step implies 
not only a discontinuous change but also faces the additional difficulty of decid-
ing on the appropriate rate of exchange, i.e., appropriate to the demand and 
supply of foreign-exchange earnings in the absence of import controls, given 
the rate of investment and availability of foreign aid. The extent of departures 
f rom the appropriate exchange rate which are hidden in the maze of restrictions 
is difficult to fa thom or quantify while the latter is still in existence; a period of 
free, albeit fluctuating exchange rates may be helpful prelude to the determina-
tion of appropriate level of the exchange rate, if decision is taken to fix a 
new, in some sense an equilibrium, official exchange rate rather than relaying 
on a free-market determination of the exchange rate. 
One of the important effects of the quantitative controls on imports, as has 
been mentioned earlier, is the protection provided to the domestic manufactur-
ing industries. They overshadow the effects of tariffs. The efficiency of the 
import-substituting industries has been a subject of considerable analysis in 
Pakistan and in the Institute. The ex-factory prices of the Pakistan manufactur-
ing industries exceed in many cases the corresponding c.i.f. prices by 50-100 
per cent and in some cases by as much as 100-200 per cent [5], This measure-
ment of relative inefficiency does not allow for the fact that an important com-
ponent of the inefficiency or high cost in a particular industry is the result of 
high cost of inputs due partly to high import duties or scarcity margins on the 
imported input and partly to the inefficiency of the supplying industries. The 
measurement of the degree of effective protection enjoyed by the Pakistani 
industries, undertaken by [12] in a first study of its kind done in any develop-
ing country, indicates that the value added in world prices in many 
cases is very low and in some cases even negative. While it is undoub-
tedly true that this measurement of relative inefficiency includes the effect of 
a) overvaluation of exchange rate, b) the relative infancy of the Pakistani indus-
tries, and c) the existence of excess profits or rents, these findings do just i fy 
considerable concern about and consequentional efforts to improve the efficiency 
of industrialisation in Pakistan. This is particularly relevant while formulat ing 
the strategy of industrialisation for the fourth and subsequent plans. 
Simultaneously with the study of the nature, content and efficiency of the 
strategy of import substitution in Pakistan, the PIDE has devoted considerable 
attention to the study of export policies and potentials of Pakistan. 
Because of the peculiar geography of Pakistan, long distance and consider-
able transport costs between East and West Pakistan, interregional trade in 
Pakistan poses special problems and has features familiarised by the literature on 
the customs or economic unions. It has important implications for the pattern 
and magnitude of regional economic development as well as for the interregional 
transfer of resources in Pakistan. The study of interregional trade [6] raises 
and quantifies some of these problems. The article on the export potential of 
fine rice [3] provides a significant illustration, f r o m amongst a number of studies 
on the prospects of important export commodities in Pakistan, as to the range of 
problems which the emergence of a new export crop raises in terms of domestic 
as well as external economic policy relating to world and domestic supply and 
demand including its competitiveness in the world market and the opportunity 
costs of domestic production. Pakistan in its western province is on the thresh-
old of achieving a substantial agricultural surplus, specially of wheat and rice, 
owing to the rapid adoption of new technology. The analysis of the prospects 
of export of this surplus and of the appropriate price policy, both at home and 
abroad, in the light of their domestic resource costs, assumes a critical impor-
tance. This article illustrates the kind of considerations which are appropriate 
and the associated empirical analysis which is necessary for the formulat ion of 
sensible policy in this area. The manufactured exports of Pakistan have 
expanded very rapidly in the last several years not only in terms of exports of 
jute and cotton textiles but also in terms of a large number of minor manufactured 
exports. In many cases such as cotton, jute, and hides and skins, the manufac-
tured exports have substituted for the exports of raw materials which have 
declined in relative importance over the years. The three articles [1 ; 4 ; 11] 
analyse the extent to which the substitution of the exports of raw materials by their 
processed or manufactured counterparts, i.e., cotton cloth in place of raw cotton 
for example, contributes to net foreign-exchange earnings in view of the sub-
stantial export incentives which are granted to these exports. The import 
component of exports makes further drain on the net foreign-exchange earnings 
of the manufactured exports. The differential net foreign-exchange earning of 
different exports is only part of the considerations relevant to an appropriate 
pattern of manufactured exports, which assumes crucial importance as Pakistan 
aggressively pursues an expansion of her manufactured exports. The critical 
criterion is the domestic opportunity cost of earning foreign exchange in case of 
the individual exports. This also raises the question of the maintenance of an 
appropriate exchange rate directly or indirectly by taxes and subsidies which 
adequately reflects the relevant domestic resource costs. The rationale of the 
considerable degree of discrimination in terms of export incentives which is at 
present exercised between agricultural exports, on the one hand, and the manu-
factured exports, on the other, as well as between the individual commodities in 
each category has been analysed in these articles. The considerations behind dis-
criminatory export incentive schemes have been multiple and have not often 
been clearly distinguished and scrutinised. Once it is clearly recognised that 
the objective is not necessarily to maximise foreign-exchange earnings but to 
maximise real income, subject to the restraint of supply and demand for exports, 
the issues relating to an appropriate exchange-rate policy as well as to the whole 
list of widely different export-promotion measures now in operation in Pakistan, 
call for a systematic analysis. 
Pakistan's progress over the last two decades f rom a relative emphasis on 
import substitution to that on export expansion in the field of manufactur ing 
industries has many facets and aspects. Moreover, Pakistan's economic policy 
in this area has been governed by multiple considerations as well as by multiple 
instruments of policy. This is a process of development which richly deserves 
analysis and discussion; it not only has implications for fu ture progress but also 
it may provide guidelines for the formulat ion of fu ture policy and strategy in 
Pakistan as well as lessons of possible relevance in other developing countries. 
The articles contained in this volume have contributed, it is believed, not insigni-
ficantly to the process of understanding and analysis of this experience as well 
as indirectly to the formulation of policy in this area. 
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Part I 
Import Policy and Import Substitution 
Import Licensing and 
Import Liberalization 
in Pakistan 
philip S. Thomas 
This chapter originally appeared as an article in the Winter-1966 issue of 
The Pakistan Development Review. The research underlying this study took 
place at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics mainly during 1964, 
when the author was associated with the Institute in advisory capacity. This 
study would not have been possible without the cooperation of Mr. S. M, 
Shafiul Azam, C.S.P., the former Chief Controller of Imports and Exports 
(CCI&E), nor without the help of many other in the government and private 
life, too numerous to be named, who provided the data and who discussed at 
length many issues with the author and other members of the Institute staff. 
The author owes a particular debt to Mr. Mumtaz Ali, CCI&E Statistical Officer, 
and Mr. Afazuddin Ahmed, Deputy Controller, who spent many hours helping 
to collect the data and to explain the many complexities of the import-licensing 
system. Several members of the Institute staff have made extensive contribu-
tions to the compiling of the CCI&E data [25], upon which part of the present 
study is based: A. H. M. Nuruddin Chowdhury, M a n Omer Malik. Mohammad 
Aslam Khan, and Bruce Glassburner. 
The usual statement that the author alone is responsible for the presen-
tation of the data, for the interpretation and opinions given, and for the con-
clusions reached is peculiarly applicable in this instance, as many who have 
helped have expressed disagreement with one or another aspect of the argument. 
Although the author has tried to take account of these criticisms, in the last 
analysis he has, of course, had to use his own judgement . 
The author, now Chairman, Department of Economics, Kalamazoo 
College, Kalamazoo, Michigan, U, S. A., is presently associated with the 
Harvard University Development Advisory Service for Pakistan. 
Import Licensing and 
Import Liberalization 
in Pakistan 
philip S. Thomas 
INTRODUCTION 
Import policy has played a particularly important role in Pakistan's economic 
planning. The amount and allocation of imported machinery and raw mater-
ials have directly affected the nature and pace of both industrial and agricultural 
development. The composition of imports has had a very significant effect on 
internal relative prices which, in turn, essentially determine the allocation of 
investment in the private sector. Finally, imports have provided both the 
government- (in the fo rm of tariffs) and the private-sector (in the fo rm of profits) 
access to potential savings which, to a large extent, have been converted into 
investment during the last decade. While import policy should not be viewed 
completely in isolation, it is sufficiently important to merit careful and intensive 
study. 
Over the past several years, substantial research has been carried out 011 
two aspects of Pakistan's import policy: the description and analysis of the 
institutional arrangements; and the development of reasonably accurate statis-
tics. In terms of institutional arrangements, three contributions are especially 
worthy of mention. Naqvi [13] has presented a detailed description of the 
import licensing system, indicating the agencies involved and the ma jo r problems 
faced by them, as well as describing the mechanics of licence allocation. Hecox 
[7] has reviewed one important , yet neglected, aspect of the licensing system: 
the use of import licences to stimulate exports. Perhaps the most important 
6 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
recent publication in this area is the Manual of Imports and Exports Control [16], 
a compendium of regulations and forms, compiled by the Office of the Chief 
Controller of Imports and Exports (CCI&E), in the Ministry of Commerce. 
On the quantitative side, recent work has shed light on the allocation of 
actual imports (Khan [8], the Planning Commission [19 ; 20 ; 21]), the tariff 
structure (Radhu [27 ; 28], Soligo and Stern [29; 30]), and domestic prices of 
imported goods (Pal [24; 25]). The CCI&E has recently made available licensing 
data f rom the period 1953 through 1964, which have been compiled (and repro-
duced in mimeographed form) by the International Trade Section of the 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics [14]. Although much more quali-
tative and quantitative research needs to be done, we have gained, as a result of 
the aforementioned studies, an improved perspective on the nature of Pakistan's 
import policy, and we are in a much better position to assess its economic impact. 
A reappraisal based on the new "evidence" has already begun; it has been 
and is being carried out by the researchers mentioned above, and it has appeared 
as part of the analyses of overall investment allocation and productivity increases 
by Lewis and Soligo [11], Soligo and Stern [29 ; 30], and Lewis [10]. The 
present study focusses on Pakistan's import licensing system, describing the 
feature that distinguishes it f r o m most other underdeveloped countries: the 
evolution toward greater reliance on market forces conditioned by "indirect 
controls", and away f r o m the rigid, bureaucratic, direct controls that character-
ized it during much of the 1950's. For the first time, it is possible to discuss 
this import liberalization with supporting statistics which permit some appraisal 
of the quantitative significance of the changes that have been made. 
This paper analyses the liberalization trend only up to July 1965. The 
postponement of the Consort ium meetings and the war over Kashmir in 1965 
prevented the import policy for 1965/66 f r o m being carried out, and resulted in a 
return to more restrictive licensing. As liberalization is gradually restored, it 
will be important to compare these policies with the position in July 1965, when 
the previous level of liberalization reached its zenith. To assess these past trends 
and to facilitate fu ture comparative analyses are the purposes of this paper. 
II. EVOLUTION TOWARD IMPORT LIBERALIZATION 
In January 1965, the Government of Pakistan mg.de a major departure f r o m 
its previous import policy based on rigid import licensing. In that month it 
placed four iron and steel items on the "Free List", which meant basically that 
any businessman could import any amount of these items without restriction 
(although it was later qualified by restrictions, as indicated in Appendix B). 
This change was followed in July 1964 by an expansion of the Free List to 51 
items, which included essentially all imported raw materials required by domestic 
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industries. Free-list imports in 1964 accounted for about one-four th of all 
imports into Pakistan (see Row 11, Table A-10 in Appendix A ) 1 . This study 
is to explain and analyse this liberalization of Pakistan's import policy and to 
describe the process by which it came about. 
A. THE I M P O R T C O N T R O L SYSTEM P R I O R TO 1964 
The dominant feature of Pakistan's import policy in 1963 (as throughout the 
previous decade) was that virtually all imports were subject to licensing. Further-
more, al though tariffs were steadily increased throughout this period and were 
very high for certain goods (144 per cent for consumer luxuries in 1964) it is 
generally agreed that tariffs had essentially no impact on the volume or com-
position of imports. At the official rate of exchange, the excess demand for 
imports created such high internal prices that substantial (excess) profits could 
be made on imports even after covering all landed costs, including import duties 
and sales taxes (see Radhu [27 ; 28] and Pal [24 ; 25] for evidence supporting 
this statement). Consequently, all licences issued were utilized and the pat tern 
of imports was dictated by the decisions and actions of the licensing author-
ities. 
The Three Import Licensing Systems 
Foreign-exchange expenditure is regulated by a high-level Foreign Exchange 
Committee which prepares the Foreign Exchange Budget (subject to the approval 
of the Cabinet), allocating available foreign exchange to the public sector or semi-
public development corporat ions (PIDC, PICIC, IDBP), and to the private sec-
tor. Once these basic allocations are made, the actual detailed import decisions 
are affected by three distinct licensing systems. 
Government Imports 
Government imports are determined as part of the budgetary process itself. 
The various departments and agencies submit their import requests along with 
other expected expenses, and, within their final budget allocation, the import 
allotments are explicitly stated. (The Foreign Exchange Committee determines 
the amount of exchange to be allocated to each ministry [13, p. 52], although 
the actual government-account licences are issued by the CCI&E.) Gover-
nment imports have ranged f r o m 12 per cent (1951/52) to 56 per cent 
(1956/57) of total imports, but in recent years they have been about 30 per cent 
(Table A-l) . 
iThe sources for this and most other statistics used are given in the tables in Appendix A 
at the end of the paper. The amount of defenoe imports is not published and is, therefore, 
excluded from this study. 
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Capital Imports for Industry 
Import policy for capital goods for industrial expansion, either by existing 
firms or new firms, is determined as part of the broader industrial policy of the 
country. This latter policy is reflected in the Industrial Investment Schedule 
which lists the industries in which investment will be permitted, and indicates the 
amount of investment to be licensed in each. The main agency interpreting 
the Investment Schedule and granting permission for investment (and capital 
imports) is the Central Investment Promotion and Coordination Committee 
(CIPCC), made up of representatives of the Central Government, both pro-
vincial governments, and the major semi-autonomous bodies 2 . Within the 
provisions of the Investment Schedule, however, certain sanctioning decisions 
are made directly by the Department of Investment Promotion and Supplies 
(machinery imports under the Bonus Scheme, for example) and by the two 
development banks, PICIC and IDBP, which channel foreign aid to the private 
sector. (Although the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (CCI&E), in the 
Ministry of Commerce, actually issues the licences for these capital-goods imports, 
he does so automatically upon the authorization of one of these other agencies 
[13, p. 56].) Capital imports by private industry have been about 20 per cent of 
the total impor ts 3 . (Including government account, capital-goods imports have 
been about 45 per cent of the total in recent years 4 . ) 
Consumer Goods, Industrial Raw Materials, and Spare Parts 
The above two licensing systems have not been affected by the liberalization 
of imports. In fact, in recent years there has been an attempt to rationalize and 
extend direct controls over capital-goods imports, since this area of investment 
allocation is considered central to the whole planning process. It is in the third 
import licensing system, controlling essentially consumer goods, raw materials, 
"CIPCC, "which has the Minister of Industries as its Chairman, meets almost every 
month under fhr> Chairmanship of Vice-Chairman, Investment Promotion and Supplies. It 
now comprises Additional Chief Secretaries (Development) and Secretaries, Industries, of the 
two provincial governments besides the Managing Directors of the two financing institutions, 
PICIC and IDBP; Vice-Chairman, Export Promotion Bureau; Director-General, Defence 
Purchase; Chief of Industries, Planning Commission; Controller of Foreign Exchange, State 
Bank of Pakistan; and Joint Secretaries of the Ministries of Finance and Commerce. Chairman 
of the two PIDCs and Managing Director, National Investment Trust, also attend the meetings 
as observers" [18, Foreword, p. iv], (For a detailed description of this system of sanctioning 
capital machinery imports for the private sector, iee [4].) 
•>This is based on the data given in Tables A-l and A-2. CCI&E licensing, discussed in the following paragraph, averaged 70 per cent of private imports during the four years, 1960/61 through 1963/64 (Table A-2). The most important component of the 30 per cent remainder has been capital goods, imported largely under various aid agreements. Since some of the CCI&E licensing has included capital goods (under the bonus-voucher system, for example) and some of the remainder has not been capital goods, it can be roughly estimated that about 30 per cent of private imports have been capital goods. Since private imports have been about 70 per cent ot the total (Table A-l) , private capital-goods imports have been about 20 per cent of the total imports. 
Capital-goods imports averaged 45 per cent of the total during the years 1960/61 through 1962/63. This is based on the data in Table A-3. 
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and spare parts, that a significant degree of import liberalization has occurred. 
This system, centred on the CCI&E, controls about 50 per cent of total impor t s 5 . 
Most discussion of import licensing in Pakistan has focussed on this CCI&E 
licensing system (and the present study also concentrates on this aspect of the 
problem), but the relative importance of this portion of the total licensing of 
imports has not been widely known or fully appreciated. It has often been 
treated as if it encompassed all imports. Although it has been the single most 
important component of licensing (and it certainly merits careful study), it has 
allocated only about 70 per cent of private imports or only about half of the 
total imports during the past few years (Tables A-l and A-2). If defence imports 
were included in the total, CCI&E licensing would cover less than half of 
the total. 
The basis of the CCI&E licensing system, as it existed in 1963, was set in 1952 
when a crucial decision was made which largely determined the course of subse-
quent policy developments. In that year, a foreign-exchange crisis, caused by 
the rapidly declining prices of the two major exports (raw cotton and jute) , and 
some speculative increase in imports under the free open general licence (O.G.L.) 
system, then in force, required a drastic and immediate reduction in imports. 
Although there were a variety of alternative methods for restricting imports, the 
decision was made to introduce a system of rigid and detailed import licensing, 
with the government determining for every six-month "shipping per iod" the 
total value of licences to be issued and the allocation of licences by commodity 
and by importer. The advantages attributed to this system of control were that 
it could definitely keep imports within any desired (or required) limit and, in 
the light of the extreme scarcity of foreign exchange, it gave the government the 
power to ensure the import of those goods deemed most essential. The effec-
tiveness of licensing as a control over total imports can be seen in the decline 
of imports f r o m 2,237.3 million rupees in 1951/52 to 1,383.6 million rupees 
(1952/53), 1,118.0 million rupees (1953/54), and 1,103.3 million rupees (1954/55) 
(Table A-l) . 
Many countries faced with similarly urgent problems have resorted to the 
same type of answer— detailed physical controls. In general, such controls 
are successful when the crisis is widely felt so that a cooperative spirit prevails, 
when they are administered with efficiency and equity, and when they are short-
lived. When such controls persist for a long time, they do not keep pace with 
basic changes in the economy, blackmarkets develop, corruption and bribery 
•The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports is generally the spokesman for the various 
authorities and departments which make the import decisions in this sphere of consumer 
goods, etc. Therefore, we shall refer to this as the CCI&B licensing system and we will let the 
CCI&E stand for the decision-making authorities in this system, although the Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Industries, as well as others in the Ministry of Commerce, are also 
involved. One weakness in Naqvi's description of the CCI&E licensing system is that he 
attributes too much authority to the CCI&E himself [13], 
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increase, and the goals of the control system are subverted. Pakistan's experi-
ence is in line with that of other countries and, to a large degree, the development 
of import policy during the past decade can be explained as an attempt to move 
away f rom rigid controls and to make the import policy more flexible and 
responsive to the needs of a developing economy. 
One characteristic of this licensing "solut ion" to the foreign-exchange crisis 
was that at the official rate of exchange there existed a large excess demand for 
imports so that the internal prices were substantially above international levels. 
This price differential was not absorbed by government (through licence fees or 
import tariffs, for example), but rather it provided a source of excess monopoly 
profit to those who were granted import licences. In order to distribute licences 
quickly, efficiently, and with a minimum of corruption, it was decided that they 
would go to those firms importing during the two and one-half years prior to the 
cessation of the free OGL system. For each commodity a firm had imported, it 
was given a monetary "category" equal to its average imports per six-month 
shipping period during the base years. The amount of each item imported was 
controlled by changing the per cent of category for which licences were issued. 
These importers came to be called the "category holders" or "established 
impor ters" and the policy was referred to as the "category system" 6 . 
The interpretation of "essentiality" in the allocation of import licences was 
such as to give the lowest priority to consumer goods, particularly luxury items, 
and high priority to raw materials, spare parts, and machinery. This created a 
very protected and potentially profi table market for domestic production of con-
sumer goods, with the highest protection given to the least essential consumer-
goods industries. This protection, due basically to the pattern of licensing, was 
supported by the pattern of tariff duties. As shown in Table A-4, tariffs in 
1965/66 ranged f rom lows of 34 per cent on machinery and equipment and 39 
per cent on unprocessed raw materials to 180 per cent on consumer luxuries. 
Although all rates increased about 75 per cent during the past ten years, the 
pattern has remained the same (Table A-4), giving relatively more encouragement 
to the domestic production of less essential goods (see Soligo and Stern [30]). 
Further, as noted above, the scarcity of all imported goods created large 
profits for the category holders which were available for investment. Thus, 
there occurred during the mid-1950's a rapid increase in industrial investment 
and output (in, for example, cotton textiles, tobacco, and sugar), which was 
primarily due to investment by importers who had funds, entrepreneurial ex-
6 Although a record of importing during the two-and-a-half-year period was thought to 
be a clear-cut and definitive method for allocating the valuable import licences, in fact it turned 
out to be quite difficult to determine who had imported how much during that period. Appar-
ently, there were numerous cases where falsified letters of credit and customs receipts were pre-
sented as "evidence" of import performance during the base period. Given the profit to be 
made, such a result is not surprising. During the 1950's, much effort was expended by the 
CCI&E in ascertaining precisely who were legitimate importers, 
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perience and talent and who saw large potential profits in the protected con-
sumer-goods industries {see Khan [8] and Power [26]). Whereas initially 
almost all imports were handled by "commercial" importers for resale, the new 
industrialists were granted "industrial licences" for their raw materials and spare 
parts so that they could import directly at the low world market prices, which 
fur ther stimulated investment in industry. 
The amount of commercial and industrial licences issued each shipping 
period, f r o m 1954 to 1964, is given in Table A-2. Industrial licences increased 
f r o m less than 100 million rupees per shipping period in 1954/55 to over 400 
million rupees in 1962/63 and 1963/64. Prior to 1958, the value of industrial 
licences issued was less than that of commercial, but since January 1958 the 
reverse has generally been true. 
This increasing import support to domestic industry is shown even more 
clearly in Table A-3, in which is given the composition of all imports (public and 
private) f rom 1957/58 through 1962/63. Imports of raw materials and capital 
goods increased 142 per cent during this period, f rom 1,192 million rupees to 
2,886 million rupees. In 1957/58, these imports for domestic industry con-
stituted only 58 per cent of all imports whereas in 1961/62 and 1962/63 they 
accounted for over three-fourths. 
Although there was a pronounced bias favouring domestic investment in 
consumer goods, some intermediate-and capital-goods industries were stimulated 
by "backward l inkage" and were protected f r o m world competition by partial 
or complete bans on imports (and partly, by the general scarcity of all imports, 
including capital goods). Among these were industries producing paper, fer-
tilizer, chemicals, petroleum products, basic metals, non-metallic minerals, and 
machinery 7 . In addition, some intermediate industries were stimulated by 
the export marke t : jute textiles and leather. However, the dominant impact 
of the licensing system Was to create a price-cost-profit incentive structure which 
encouraged consumer industries and discouraged investment in producer-goods 
industries, since the latter goods were relatively freely imported (at very low 
duties). The import policy of the 1950's thus stimulated development in the 
private sector, but it contained serious weaknesses which became increasingly 
important in the late 1950's and early 1960's. 
TSee Lewis and Soligo [11] for a carefully constructed statistical study which reveals 
a surprisingly high rate of growth in the intermediate and producer-goods industries during 
the 10-year period under review. Although a complete explanation for this growth is not 
known, it has taken place in the face of a general policy hindering growth in these industries, 
except for the derived demand created by the expansion of the consumer-goods industries. It 
is most probable that this growth is due to specific bans (or quotas) on the imports of compet-
ing intermediate (and capital) goods, which has "exempted" these industries from the general 
policy. As noted in the text above, bans and quotas have been a prominent feature of the im-
port-licensing system. 
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Economic Weaknesses 
The rapid growth of many domestic consumer-goods industries between 
1954 and 1959 largely filled the vacuum existing in 1953 (created by the sudden 
drastic reduction in imported consumer goods), so that fu ture growth depended 
essentially upon the general expansion of the economy and the rise in per capita 
income. Further , whereas there had been initially a brake on consumption 
expenditure caused by the restrictions on imported consumer goods, domestic 
consumption of Pakistani goods rose very rapidly [8] putting pressure on the re-
sources available for investment. There emerged an increasing need for an 
economic policy designed, on the one hand, to retard the rate of growth of 
domestic consumer-goods industries and, on the other hand, to stimulate invest-
ment and product ion in export and producer-goods industries. 
A second economic problem area related to "dispar i ty" — the higher income 
and growth in West Pakistan vis-a-vis the more populous East Pakistan. While 
the nature and causes of disparity are complex, there is widespread agreement 
that during the 1950's the West Pakistan economy received about two-thirds of 
public and private investment and about the same ratio of total imports 
(Table A-7). 
Import policy contributed to disparity in several ways. Perhaps the most 
important factor was the "category system" which granted the very valuable 
import licences to those who happened to be importing in the base period f r o m 
January 1950 to June 1952. West Pakistanis were the most numerous and largest 
importers, and among East Pakistanis there were proportionately few Bengalis. 
Consequently, the profits earned tended to be invested in West Pakistan which 
had the additional important attractions of having the political capital, where the 
licensing authorities were located, and the major port in Karachi. 
Once the disparity of growth pattern was established, then the import 
authorities were confronted with different "absorptive capacities" for imports 
in the two provinces. The greatest demand for imports of all kinds and the 
greatest "need" for intermediate and capital goods was in West Pakistan, and 
the import authorities responded quite naturally to these pressures, as shown in 
Tables A-5, A-6, and A-7. The allocation of commercial and industrial licences 
by the three ma jo r centres, Karachi, Lahore, and Dacca, is given in Table A-5 
and Table A-6 for the years 1957 through 1964. The value of commercial 
licences issued to Karachi firms declined f r o m about 45 per cent in the late 
1950's to less than one-third (30.2 per cent) in January-June 1964. The West 
Pakistan (Lahore) share rose during this period f r o m about 15 per cent to 28 
per cent, and the East Pakistan share fluctuated f r o m 32 per cent to 46 per cent, 
but remained about the same on the average. This shift within West Pakistan 
f rom Karachi to Lahore is probably the result of specific policies designed to 
divert commercial and industrial activity to the interior. For example, under 
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the OGL "newcomers scheme", discussed below, new importers f r o m Karachi 
and other major industrial cities were excluded to facilitate the entrance of 
businessmen f r o m smaller centres (who would receive their licences f rom the 
Lahore office of the CCI&E)8. 
In the case of industrial licences, although there have been fluctuations f r o m 
year to year, each of the three areas have received about one-third of the total, 
with Karachi 's share usually being slightly higher. 
This licensing pattern is, of course, mirrored in the actual imports as shown 
in Table A-7. During 1957-65, East Pakistan imported about one-third of total 
Pakistan imports (Table A-7, Column (5)). In 1957/58 and 1958/59, 36 per cent 
and 35 per cent of the total went to East Pakistan whereas in 1963/64 and 
1964/65, the ratio was 33 per cent and 32 per cent, so that during this period the 
East Wing percentage declined somewhat. (Total volume of imports was rising 
sothat in absolute terms it increased in both provinces.) 
Although in the past few years, the rate of growth in East Pakistan has in-
creased, and is possibly even higher than that in the West Wing [9, Pp. 180. 
182-183 ; 21, p. 11], disparity in income and in imports has continued to be a 
primary political and economic problem 9 . 
A third economic problem was that the official exchange rate overvalued the 
currency with the consequent disadvantages resulting f rom importers (and 
potential importers) being confronted with a price for foreign exchange which 
was less than its true opportunity cost. Two types of misallocations resulted. 
First, the licensing authorities were swamped with applications (for raw-materials, 
intermediate-goods, and capital-goods imports, which were not under the com-
mercial category system), which they were inadequately staffed to process and 
evaluate. Since the large potential profits to the licence receiver could support 
substantial bribes, it is doubt fu l that all decisions were made on the basis of 
"social marginal products" . Second, those who received foreign exchange at 
the low official rate were not motivated to economize as much as they would 
have been motivated at a higher, more realistic rate. Large firms were favoured 
relative to smaller ones, and since these large firms had relatively easy access to 
credit at low interest, there was a tendency for them to invest in capital-intensive 
projects with capital-intensive foreign equipment. This investment was not 
efficient in the light of Pakistan's factor proportions, nor was it conducive to 
ssince "Lahore" firms may have actually been importing for the Karachi market, and/or 
Karachi firms may have been (illegally) buying the licences from Lahore "importers", this 
statistical shift within West Pakistan may not be significant. At least additional, supplementary 
evidence should be gathered before any firm judgment is made about the success of these 
policies. 
»The dynamics of the disparity issue are quite similar to Myrdal's "spread" and "backwash" 
effects [12], For an analysis of disparity in investment allocation in Pakistan during the first-
plan period (1956-61), see Eddison [5]. 
14 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
increasing employment (which has been a continual goal of Pakistani planning). 
Further, the import of foreign equipment at a price less than its scarcity value 
acted as an increasingly undesirable disincentive to the growth of the domestic 
producer-goods industry (which was being stimulated by the backward linkages 
noted above ) 1 0 . 
The final economic problem to be noted here is that the monopoly position 
of category holders came under increasing criticism. Although there had been 
initially substantial reinvestment of their profits, their high incomes also were 
used for luxury expenditures, perhaps the most conspicuous being housing. In 
addition, many category holders had actually stopped importing, and were 
living on the income f r o m the (illegal) sale of their licences. Further , with the 
growth of industry as a capitalistic-saving sector, there was less need to rely on 
commercial profits for industrial investment, so that a basic rationale of the 
category system was undermined. Finally, the growing industrial groups 
wanted more licences for direct import of raw materials as they found their 
licences, based on a one-shift output, to be inadequate, and they resented having 
to buy f r o m the commercial category holders at the high internal prices. All 
of these factors crcatcd a climate in which some reform of the category system 
was essential. 
Administrative Weaknesses 
The basic administrative problem has been mentioned above — the licensing 
authorities lacked adequate staff and informat ion to make wise priority decisions 
and to implement efficiently the decisions reached. The tasks involved were 
too numerous and too complex, with the result that many decisions were made 
which had adverse economic effects. 
One difficulty was that import licensing was expected to accomplish too 
many diverse goals, some of which could be better served by other policy in-
struments. In addition to keeping total imports in line with total foreign-
exchange availabilities, the licensing authorities were at tempting: i) to maintain 
fair and stable internal prices of imported goods, particularly those essential 
(like food and medicines) and used by the "common m a n " ; ii) to facilitate the 
development of new industries, and to permit the full-capacity output and 
expansion of existing industries by partial or complete bans on imports (tailored 
to the specific situation in each industry); in) to stimulate exports; and iv) to attain 
a better regional distribution of imported goods [13, Pp. 54-55]. In general, 
they wanted to ensure that the most "essential" goods were imported in the 
" p r o p e r " quantities, but there were different interpretations of "essential" and 
, "proper" . 
lOSee Dcsprcs [3] and Haq [6, Pp. 39-49] for more extensive explanations of the allocative inefficiency of rigid licensing and the more general need to use factor prices which reflect scarcity values. 
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Not only were there conflicting goals but there was a lack of timely data and 
incorrect interpretation of the data available, so that the numerous detailed 
licensing decisions were of ten hastily made and ill-advised. Consequently, 
policies would be announced only to be later withdrawn or substantially 
qualified; certain imports were banned to protect domestic industry, only to 
discover domestic product ion to be totally inadequate in quantity or quality ; 
initial licence decisions often permitted too much or too little importing for the 
maintenance of price stability; errors in judgment were of ten overcompensated 
for by a complete reversal of policy — too many imports in one shipping period 
resulting in a complete ban (and rapidly rising prices) in the next. Such changes 
in policy were not only disturbing to the commercial importers (who were 
naturally led to a speculative inventory policy which often accentuated price 
movements), but highly unpredictable changes in the list of eligible imports (as 
well as in the quantity of each) created serious difficulties for the industrial 
producer. On the one hand, he could never be certain whether competitive 
imports would suddenly be allowed, and on the other hand, he could 
not know even within wide limits the nature of fu ture raw-material avail-
abilities. 
All of these problems were an inevitable part of the detailed controls system 
operating in an economy undergoing change and growth. Gradually criticism of 
the system developed to such a point that the stage was set for import liberaliza-
tion. 
Initial Steps toward Liberalization 
Starting in 1959, the Government took several steps to meet some of the 
weaknesses in the import-licensing system. The Export Bonus Scheme of 1959 
introduced, in effect, partial devaluation and (partial) multiple, flexible exchange 
rates (see Bruton and Bose [2] and Ahmed [1] for an explanation and analysis 
of this scheme). Exporters (of about one-third of the total exports) have received 
various rates, f r o m 10 to 70 per cent above the official rate, and importers have 
paid approximately a 150-per-eent premium above the official rate. The licen-
sing authorities have listed (and revised) the export items covered by the 
scheme, the bonus on each, and the items which are permitted to be imported. 
However, for those items specifically placed on the import-bonus list, the mono-
poly of category holders was broken, and importers have been free to buy any 
amount of bonus vouchers at the prevailing market rate and to readily exchange 
these vouchers for import-bonus licences. As shown in Table A-2, Column (5), 
about 10 per cent of the total of CCI&E licensed imports have been made under 
this scheme (about 5 per cent of all imports), so it can only be considered a very 
marginal liberalization, but it has served as a safety valve for domestic prices of 
particular goods that have been in short supply. Stimulated to a large degree 
by this scheme, export earnings during the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) 
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rose about 34 per cent, f rom a level of 1,799 million rupees in 1960/61 to 2,408 
million rupees in 1963/64 [15]H. 
In early 1961, a second step toward liberalization was taken in the form of 
a new OGL system. Under the new OGL, two basic changes were made in 
commercial licensing {i.e., licensing to commercial f irms who resell): i) new-
comers were granted commercial licences, fur ther undermining the monopoly 
of category holders ; and ii) automatic repeat licensing was introduced. When 
an item was placed on the new OGL list, the category holders were permitted to 
continue importing it, but additional licences were given to new importers. 
The effect of this change was largely to redistribute the monopoly profits over a 
larger number of importers although it was also thought that competition was 
stimulated. In some specific cases prices did fall, but this was probably due 
primarily to the increase in licences issued, rather than the increase in the number 
of importers. Items placed on the new OGL list were generally those for which 
the CCI&E wanted imports to increase somewhat, and which tended to have 
relatively high internal prices and profits. Intermediate goods for industry 
dominated the l i s t 1 2 . 
Repeat (or "automatic") licensing was a ma jo r administrative step toward 
making the amount licensed more responsive to market demand. Previously 
all licences were issued for six months, and errors in estimating beginning 
inventories and market demands were generally not corrected until the following 
shipping period. Under repeat licensing, a limited amount of initial licences 
is issued at the beginning of the shipping period, but upon showing proof of 
utilization of this licence, the importer can automatically get another licence for 
an equal amount. (The extent to which repeat licences continue to be issued 
depends, of course, on the available foreign exchange.) For those goods in which 
relative prices and profi ts are high, importers are greatly motivated to import 
quickly and get repeat licences. Thus, the composition of licences issued during 
the shipping period should have more closely reflected the internal demand and 
supply situation. 
The data on the allocation of commercial licences to OGL newcomers and 
under repeat licensing are given in Table A-8, for the period 1961-64. Although 
initially the established importers dominated OGL, the importance of newcomers 
increased to two-thirds (65.38 per cent) of all OGL licences issued in the January-
i 'Exports have also been stimulated by the little publicized schemes of "additional" 
import licences based on "export performance" (see [7J for a description of these schemes). 
Table A - l l presents the data on licences issued under these export-performance schemes, 
and shows that during 1962-64, they were equal in amount to the import-bonus licences. More 
study is called for to ascertain the true significance of this export-performance licensing. 
12A Karachi price survey by Pal in 1964 [25] revealed an average markup of 58 per cent 
on OGL items, which was essentially the same as the average markup of 59 per cent for all 
items covered in the survey. This evidence suggests that OGL did not have much of a down-
ward effect on prices. 
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June 1964 shipping period (Table A-8, Column (7)). Newcomers accounted for 
over half (51.79 per cent) of all commercial licences which, in turn, was about 
one-third of all CCI&E imports. (In other words, commercial newcomers were 
issued licences for over one-sixth of all CCI&E i m p o r t s A . ) The big increase was 
in East Pakistan where OGL newcomers received in the January-June 1964 
shipping period 150 per cent more licences than in January-June 1963 [17], 
Automatic repeat licensing was also applied to some items remaining under 
the category system and to some imported by industries. Including OGL (to 
which repeat facilities were extended), all automatic licensing covered about 
40 per cent of CCI&E licences and about 20 per cent of all imports (Table 
A-9), 
The import bonus, newcomers, and repeat licensing schemes all contain 
elements of import liberalization; that is, they all introduce greater reliance on 
market forces in the allocation of imports. The quantitative importance of all 
these schemes together is shown in Table A-9. In the January-June 1960 ship-
ping period, the only liberalized imports were those coming in under the Bonus 
Scheme, and they amounted to 12.8 per cent of CCI&E licensing. Prior to the 
f ree list, the bonus and OGL schemes were considered the main components of 
liberalization and (as shown in Column (7), Table A-9) import licences issued 
under these two schemes accounted for over one-third (37.4 per cent) of CCI&E 
licensing in July-December 1963. Including the automatic licensing extended 
to the category holders and to industrial licence holders (Table A-9, Columns 
(8), (9), and (10)), import liberalization encompassed about half (Column (11), 
Table A-9) of CCI&E licensing just prior to the advent of the free list. (This 
amounted to about 20 per cent of total imports in this shipping periodic.) 
The Need for Further Liberalization 
Although definite improvements had been made by 1963, as discussed above, 
many problems still remained. Perhaps the most critical of these was in the area 
of raw materials. 
In determining the relative essentiality of imports, the licensing authorities 
apparently ranked capital goods as relatively more important than intermediate 
"The magnitude of the newcomer scheme under OGL was not appreciated until the 
licensing data were made available by the CCI&E. It was widely assumed that the old category 
holders continued to receive the bulk of commercial licences and that the impact of the new-
comers was only marginal. Naqvi, for example, writing in the Spring of 1964, stated: "Over 
90 per cent of commercial licensing is still done within the category system" [13, p. 61], 
An argument can be made that oil products (Table A-2, Column (3)) should be included 
with other liberalized imports. These were 12.2 per cent of CCI&E imports in July-Deoember 
1963, which would bring the total pre-free-list liberalization to 60 per cent of CCI&E imports. 
The Oil Companies Advisory Committee (OCAC) estimates the demand for various oil products 
in each shipping period and, essentially, the government authorizes the issuance of licences 
equal to this estimate. Hence, import licensing is not restrictive in this case. 
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or consumer goods, since the expansion of capacity proceeded at a faster rate 
than the availability of imported raw materials, so that capacity utilization was 
declining. Although raw materials were, in principal, licensed on the basis of a 
single-shift capacity, most firms experienced shortages, and there was some 
evidence that many firms were not able to operate steadily even at one-shift 
capacity. 
The essentiality ranking of the licensing authorities and the resulting shor-
tage of raw materials set into motion a perverse "vicious circle". Firms were 
motivated to expand capacity to qualify for raw-material licences (and also to 
take advantage of profi table accelerated depreciation policies). The licensing 
authorities were, thus, confronted with excessive demands for imported capital 
goods, which "justified" their diversion of relatively more of the (limited) avail-
able foreign-exchange resources into capital goods and relatively less into raw 
materials. As a consequence, during the three years, 1960/61 through 1962/63, 
imports of capital goods increased 50 per cent, while imports of raw materials 
were essentially constant (Table A-3). 
A concomitant of this situation was a thriving black market in imported 
raw materials. Although there was a general shortage, some firms had 
excessive licences for particular items because their output pattern had shifted, 
changing their requirements, or because the original licences were issued on the 
basis of inadequate surveys of the firms' needs. (Some firms had surplus 
licences granted under the very generous additional licences scheme based on 
export performance, but separate f r o m the Export Bonus Scheme [7].) The 
blackmarket probably improved the allocation of raw materials, permitting 
firms to meet their most pressing requirements, but the licensing-cwm-black-
market allocation mechanism was increasingly recognized as a highly inefficient 
one. 
So strong was the bias in the licensing system toward capital-goods imports 
that not even rising foreign-exchange reserves led the authorities to increase 
imports of raw materials. Starting in October 1962, reserves rose 40 per cent 
by June 1963 and remained relatively high well into 1964. In spite of the rise in 
reserves, CCI&E licensing was cut back 12 per cent f rom July-December 1962 to 
January-June 1963 and, although total CCI&E licensing increased somewhat 
(7 per cent) in the next shipping period, industrial licences were reduced an 
additionl 5 per cent in July-December 1963. The cost of the rising reserves, 
although not precisely measurable, must have been quite high in terms of the 
output foregone due to the lack of adequate raw materials. 
Although many of the problems discussed above remained unresolved, the 
primary one upon which attention focussed in 1963 was that of idle capacity 
and the volume and allocation of imported raw materials. The liberalization in 
1964 was a bold attempt to move toward a solution of this problem. 
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B. I M P O R T L I B E R A L I Z A T I O N IN 1964: THE F R E E LIST 
By the end of 1963, as indicated above, various import-liberalizing mea-
sures had been introduced which encompassed about half of CCI&E licensing 
(Table A-9). Yet, all of these measures still required the issuance of licences 
before import orders could be made, so that prior to 1964 virtually all imports 
were directly controlled by the import-licensing system. Because of the idle 
capacity, raw-material problem and other problems plaguing Pakistan's import 
policy, further import liberalization was widely discussed in both official and 
nonofficial circles. Although gradually there emerged f rom this discussion a 
general concensus that fur ther import liberalization was desirable, there remained 
substantial disagreement on how this was to be done. 
The Definition of Import Liberalization 
In part, the debate at this time was the result of a fundamenta l disagreement 
over the meaning of "import liberalization". In the present study, the phrase 
is defined as "changes in import policy placing greater reliance on market 
mechanisms in allocating foreign exchange". Repeat licensing was intended, 
in part at least, to distribute licences in response to the pattern of internal money 
demands for the various goods. The import bonus system permits, in its sphere 
of influence, the cost of buying foreign exchange to rise to ration imports among 
competing uses (and users). In broader terms, import liberalization (in this 
study) means less direct, physical controls over imports and importers, and 
greater emphasis on indirect, fiscal and monetary controls to influence (and 
regulate) business decisions on whether, what, and how much to import. 
There is another, entirely different meaning of "import liberalization" which 
is used by a substantial number of businessmen and officials: more imports. A 
"liberal" import policy is one under which a greater quantity of imports are 
permitted. Since more imports could be permitted under a rigid licensing 
system (by enlarging the amount of licences issued) or, alternatively, since tho 
same amount of imports could be allocated either by rigid licensing or by more 
indirect "market mechanism" controls, the two definitions are clearly distinct 
and separate. While there is essentially universal agreement that more imports 
are desirable (so in this sense almost everyone favours "import liberalization"), 
there has been (and continues to be) a lengthy debate about the nature and 
extent of controls over the allocation of imports. 
The confusion surrounding these two definitions has been enhanced by the 
fact that, chronologically, the introduction and spread of "market mechanism" 
controls in the allocation of foreign exchange has coincided with the expansion 
of imports. The import bonus scheme was started in 1959 and the OGL new-
comers programme and repeat licensing were added in 1960; both have steadily 
expanded since their introduction. During this same period, private-sector 
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imports, which averaged 533 million rupees during the two six-month shipping 
periods of 1959, rose quite steadily to 1,607.8 million rupees in July-December 
1963, three times the 1959 level. Consequently, between 1959 and 1964, both 
types of "import liberalization" were taking place at the same time. It is cer-
tainly understandable how the definitional confusion arose and why it persists to 
the present time. 
The simultaneous expansion of both types of "import liberalization" was no 
coincidence. In part , it was the result of the bonus scheme which directly 
linked a "market" system of import rationing (according to the willingness and 
ability to pay) to export bonuses. Exports have been greatly stimulated by this 
scheme [1; 2] and the increased foreign exchange has facilitated more imports. 
More important , however, was that the increasing availability of foreign ex-
change between 1959 and 1964, due to the rising export earnings and more foreign 
aid, encouraged the import authorities to experiment with less direct and rigid 
controls, which expanded the area within which market forces could operate. 
With wry limited foreign-exchange resources during 1953-59, it was felt that 
rigid controls were essential to make certain that the most pressing import needs 
were met. With the greater availability of foreign exchange after 1959, this 
important rationale for the detailed direct control of imports was gradually 
undermined. 
Although there has been this logical relationship between the two meanings 
of "import liberalization", they are conceptually distinct. In the remainder of 
the present study, the focus will be on import liberalization, defined as greater 
reliance on the market mechanism (influenced indirectly by fiscal and monetary 
policies) in the rationing of imports. 
The Free List 
Of course, the debate over further import liberalization was not due solely to 
the definitional confusion noted above. While there was an increasing desire 
in both business and government circles for the removal of onerous controls, 
this was tempered by the fear that freer-trade policies would not be consistent 
with the basic economic goals of keeping total foreign-exchange payments within 
required limits; encouraging and protecting domestic industry; and allocating 
foreign exchange so that the most essential goods are imported in the right 
quantities and are directed into desired geographical regions and into the proper 
industrial and consumer uses. Although there was widespread agreement on 
these goals (atvleast when they were stated in general terms), there existed some 
disagreement over whether they could best be attained by freer trade; and, even 
though the freer-trade forces were winning increasing support during the early 
1960's, there was debate within these forces as to precisely which steps toward 
import liberalization should be taken and in what sequence. Some argued for 
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relatively "free trade", with a combination of devaluation of the rupee and 
higher tariffs to achieve the desired rationing of foreign exchange. Others 
maintained that continued liberalization within the licensing system, with gradual 
expansion of the new OGL, automatic licensing, and the import-bonus scheme 
would be the safest course to follow. 
Out of this debate came the free list which was first announced in the 
import policy for January-June 1964: 
It has been decided to place M. S. Billets, Pig Iron, Tin Plate and Strips on 
free-list import against U.S. Loan without cover of any licence with 
immediate ef fec t ! 5 . 
A basic change, thus, occurred in Pakistan's import policy: certain goods (four 
iron and steel items) were allowed to be imported without licence. This experi-
ment with the free list was continued and expanded in the July-December 1964 
shipping period when 50 additional items were added to the free list [23, July 2, 
1964 and October 17, 1964], It was fur ther reinforced in July 1965 when four 
more items were added and a very important change was made in the length of 
the shipping period, extending it f rom six months to one year [23, July 5, 1965], 
Although it was a compromise among many views, and there were many excep-
tions and qualifications, the free list must be ranked as the greatest single step 
toward import liberalization taken since the imposition of detailed, licensing in 
1953. 
Initially the free list, in January-June 1964, was financed by U.S. Aid, and 
imports were limited to U.S. steel. Expanded aid resources were thought to be 
adequate to meet the anticipated increase in demand for steel, so no restrictive 
changes in tax or credit arrangements were introduced. In essence, U.S. com-
modity aid in steel was financing a very limited experiment in " f ree t rade". 
For imports other than steel, Pakistan continued its previous licensing policies, 
including expanded emphasis on the new OGL, import bonus, and automatic 
licensing. Imports under these three schemes increased f rom 432.3 million 
rupees in July-December 1963 to 666.5 million rupees in January-June 1964, a rise 
of over 50 per cent [14]. Including free-list imports of 354.8 million rupees [17], 
import-liberalization policies encompassed 1,021.3 million rupees of imports, over 
two-thirds of CCI&E imports (including free-list) for that shipping period 16, 
While this is a commendable continuation of the trend toward liberalization, the 
growth of the "old" methods of import liberalization made it appear that the 
free list was considered an additional method of liberalized imports, made 
A11 import policies, and amendments thereto, are published in The Gazette of Pakistan, 
Extraordinary [231. The free list was first announced in the "Import Policy for January-June 
1964", published in the Gazette of January 2,1964. (The above quote was on page 3.) 
"Including oil imports of 117 million rupees, liberalized imports constituted 74 per cent 
of all CCI&E imports for January-June 1964. See footnote 14 above. 
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possible by expanded foreign-exchange resources, and that it was not considered 
a general policy which would replace some (or all) of the schemes previously 
used. 
With the import policy of July-December 1964 [23, July 2, 1964 (amended 
and modified on October 17, 1964)], the nature of the government's inter-
pretation of and commitment to the free list became much clearer. First, the 
list of importable items was expanded by 50 additional goods. Second, al-
though the ma jo r part of the free list continued to be financed by foreign aid, 
Pakistan committed its own foreign-exchange earnings to finance 22 of the items, 
including one of the larger ones — maintenance spares — which encompassed 
about 3 per cent of free-list imports. (Iron and steel accounted for about 50 
per cent of free-list imports, with the next most important items accounting for 
only about 7 per cent (see Table A-10.)' 
In addition to this expansion of the list and commitment of Pakistan's for-
eign-exchange resources, a third significant change was made: fiscal and monetary 
policies were adjusted to help control foreign-exchange usage by indirect means, 
replacing to some degree the licensing controls that were being removed. Bet-
ween 1959 and 1963, import duties rose by about one-third, with increases 
ranging f r o m 11 per cent on certain processed raw materials to 115 per cent on 
semi-luxury consumer good (see Table A-4). Then, early in July 1964, the 
Ministry of Finance announced a "regulatory duty" on free-list imports [23, 
July 11, 1964], which ranged f r o m 5 to 20 per cent ad valorem (almost all 
increases were either 10 or 5 per cent). Since the Pakistan sales tax is charged 
on a base including import duties, the increase in cost to importers was some-
what higher than the rise in the duties, and averaged out to about 13 per cent 1 ?. 
In June 1965, duties on capital machinery imports were increased 12.5 
per cent ad valorem, f rom 12.5 per cent to 25 per cent in West Pakistan and 
f rom 7.5 per cent to 20 per cent in East Pakistan. In November 1965, a defence 
surcharge of 25 per cent of the existing tax rates was levied on both import duties 
and sales taxes. (All of these increases have been retained in the budget 
announced in June 1966.) Thus, the effective tax rate on imports has risen 
approximately another one-third since the advent of the free list, and stands 
about 75 per cent above the 1959-level when liberalization began (see Table 
A-4). 
Supplementing the tax increases, credit controls were tightened somewhat 
by the action of the State Bank of Pakistan in July 1964. Upon opening a letter 
of credit to initiate payment for goods, an importer was required to make a 25-
per-cent deposit. Further, once the goods arrived, the importer had to pay 
• R a d h u \ s estimate, reflected in Table A-4, is 13 per cent for "processed raw materials for 
capital goods" and 14 per cent for "processed raw materials for consumption goods". 
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40 per cent of their value; that is, he could borrow only up to 60 per cent of the 
value of free-list i m p o r t s 1 8 . 
Although these tax and credit changes might be considered only marginal 
adjustments in the light of the previous policies, they established a necessary 
precedent to the effect that direct controls cannot be meaningfully removed 
unless they are replaced by indirect controls to accomplish the desired objectives. 
In this instance, the mere removal of licensing would have led to an import 
splurge that could not have been financed; tax increases and credit restrictions 
served to restrict imports within necessary limits. 
Table A-10 shows the imports of items on the free list (the six ma jo r items 
and the total) during the period immediately preceding the introduction of the 
free list and up to the end of 1964. These imports grew substantially, rising by 
46 per cent f rom the last half of calendar year 1963 to the same period in 1964, 
while total imports increased by only 14 per cent (Row 8 and Row 9, Table 
A-10). The proport ion of free-list imports rose f rom about 20 per cent to over 
25 per cent of total imports (Row 11) (24, Pp. 556-557J. Of the 51 items on 
the list, steel accounted for about half, the six largest items accounted for 
over three-fourths, and the top 12 accounted for about 90 per cent of the 
total free-list imports in the last quarter of 1964. Eleven of these 12 are raw 
materials, and together they constitute the vast bulk of imported raw materials 
used by Pakistani industry. 
It is generally agreed that domestic prices of free-list imports fell relative 
to prices of licensed imports. A study by Pal [25], mentioned previously, 
revealed that in Karachi, in the summer of 1964, the average percentage mark-up 
on the sale of licensed imports was about 60 per cent. (The percentage mark-up 
is the ratio of internal market price less landed costs to landed costs. Landed 
costs are all costs inclusive of tariffs and sales taxes.). A second survey by Pal 
[24] of Karachi and Chittagong prices in the winter of 1964/65 indicated that the 
percentage markup on all items had fallen to about 44 per cent (46 per cent in 
Karachi), and that for free-list items, it was down to 28 per cent. Although the 
overall price indices were rising during this period [15], the prices of free-list items 
fell about 6-7 per cent [24]. Although Pal's research produced the first pub-
lished results on the price-cost relationship of imported goods, his conclusions 
were not unexpected; they confirmed the impression of many observers that the 
free list exerted a substantial downward pressure on prices. 
As noted in the previous section, one of the ma jo r aims of the free list was to 
facilitate a solution to the idle (excess) capacity problem, which was widespread 
in the private industrial sector. Although there are no published studies on the 
is See [22] for a presentation of the regulations governing imports under the free list, 
including credit controls. 
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use of capacity, there is agreement among informed observers that this goal of 
the free list was to a large degree achieved and that industrial production has 
increased markedly. Industrialists were able to get their raw materials more 
readily and more cheaply because they no longer had to buy f r o m high-priced 
commercial importers and blackmarket sources. The free list permitted some 
industries to import directly, for the first time, so that they were better able to 
import according to their specifications, improving both quality and quantity of 
their output. Because of this factor, production could be planned in a more 
rational fashion and frequent shutdowns were avoided. 
These favourable trends in imports, prices, and product ion seem to indicate 
that a primary objective of liberalization was achieved 1!'. However, it could 
be argued that the short-run results could have come about through expanded 
licensing under OGL (or even under the category system), since they were 
primarily due to expanded imports of raw materials. The unique feature of 
liberalization is not more imports, but an import policy relying more on the 
market mechanism. Although this characteristic is very difficult to appraise, 
there is some evidence of positive results. Since free-list imports are essentially 
for the private sector, and since they rose f r o m one-fif th to one-fourth of total 
imports, it might be concluded that the private scctor was stimulated and streng-
thened. Since there was more f reedom of entry into the import trade, previous 
monopoly (or quasi-monopoly) positions were weakened or destroyed. Many 
smaller industrial firms, with few or no import licences, were particularly bene-
fited since they now had easier access to cheaper raw materials. The business 
community, in general, noted (and in some instances, complained about) the 
increasing competition that came with the free list; they indicated that prices 
were reduced to meet this competition and that they tried to maintain profits by 
a larger volume of sales. Further, as stated above, the reliance on increased 
duties and restricted credit in lieu of licensing has been a most significant institu-
tional change toward freer t r ade 2 0 . 
The free list had two surprising, or at least, interesting, effects vis-a-vis East 
Pakistan. The discussion of "disparity" in income between the two provinces, 
in Section II-A above, indicated that two-thirds of import licences (and two-
thirds of imports) have gone to West Pakistan, probably because of its more 
rapid growth and greater "absorptive capacity". This type of analysis led many 
to expect that the introduction of freer trade would result in the continuation 
of this imbalance in imports or perhaps a fur ther deterioration with even more 
i»It is significant to note tliat the period of import liberalization from 1959-1965 coincided 
with a major increase in the growth rate of Pakistan's national income which rose at an average 
annual rate of only 2.4 per cent from 1949/50 to 1959/60, but increased at an average annual 
rate of 5.3 per cent from 1959/60 to 1964/65. Although one must be hesitant in drawing sweep-
ing conclusions about the causal relationship, import liberalization was certainly one of the 
factors contributing to the improved performance of the economy. 
'"Nevertheless, the free list has been a limited liberalization, as indicated below. 
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imports going to the West Wing. This expectation was not borne out by free-list 
imports during 1964 (Table A-10): East Pakistan received, on the average, 40 
per cent of free-list imports and in the case of iron and steel, it received over 
half. While overall free-list imports increased 46 per cent, those in the East 
Wing rose 64 per cent. Although part of this was due to the fact that certain free-
list items (such as cement) were restricted to East Pakistan, other factors were 
undoubtedly important . It may have been due to excessive inventory accumula-
tion (recent evidence of which is that many factories continued to operate during 
1965/66, despite severe cutbacks in imported raw materials). To some extent, 
it may be the result of the recent high growth rate in the East Pakistan economy 
[21, p. 11], which has brought about an enlarged "absorptive capacity" for 
i m p o r t s 2 i . Regardless of the causes, this was a surprising, and apparently a 
pleasing, aspect of import per formance under the f ree list. 
A highly controversial effect of the free list has been its impact on the new-
comers under OGL, particularly in East Pakistan, who were formerly importing 
the 51 items. As discussed above in Section II-A, OGL was very important to 
the Bengali businessmen because they had generally not been importing in 
1950-52 and, therefore, they were largely excluded f r o m commercial importing 
under the category system. After OGL was introduced in 1960, many relatively 
small businessmen were granted licences, and because of the scarcity conditions 
prevailing, these licences brought profit to their holders. Either they sold the 
' licence, reaping the profi t without importing, or they imported the goods and 
collected the premium prevailing between internal prices and landed costs. 
When these items were placed on the free list, the unearned profi t dis-
appeared. While an obvious effect was one of income redistribution, in which 
the former OGL licensees were hurt, a side effect was to eliminate some (possibly 
many) of the newcomers f r o m the import trade. With a valuable OGL licence, 
the newcomer was credit-worthy; he had no difficulty opening a letter of credit 
and importing. Without the licence, the newcomers have encountered difficulty 
in obtaining credit. Although there are no data to permit evaluation of the 
importance of this problem, the former OGL newcomers (particularly in East 
Pakistan) have been vociferous critics of the free list. 
Overall, however, there seems to be widespread agreement that the economic 
effects of the f ree list were very favourable. 
How "Free" is the Free List ? 
As mentioned above, the free list is an import policy of " f ree t rade" with 
qualifications and exceptions; and, while there are substantial reasons for 
ziSince publio and semi-publio agencies are permitted to import under the free list (see 
the end of Appendix B), their imports may partially explain the Bast Pakistan performance unde-
the free list. Also, West Pakistan nonfree-list imports have been so high that, overall, East 
Pakistan has continued to receive about one-third of total imports (Table A-10). Consequently 
i t isdif f iculttoappraisethetruesignif icanceoftheEastPakistan performance under the free lis , 
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believing that a significant step toward import liberalization was achieved, the 
qualifications are rather extensive 2 2 . 
There are five ma jo r restrictions surrounding the free list, which relate 
to: 0 who can import ; ii) the geographical region into which the import can 
come; Hi) the country f r o m which the import must be purchased; iv) the amount 
to be imported; and v) whether particular subtypes of goods can be imported 
and, if so, how much of each. In addition, as a result of these restrictions, 
problems of interpretation and administrative implementation have arisen 
which themselves have fur ther limited the move toward import liberalization. 
For example, powdered milk was placed on the f ree list in July 1964 but within 
a short time the aid allocation was used up and the opening of letters of credit 
for the import of powdered milk was not allowed. Powdered milk remained 
on the free list but no one could import it. Some cases arose where there 
existed confusion as to what could be imported under specific headings. Under 
"scientific instruments", for example, it was argued by certain importers that 
insect spray guns should be allowed; ultimately, after some debate and delay, it 
was decided by the CCI&E that these were not intended to be included as "scien-
tific instruments" under the free list. In other cases, imports of legitimate items 
were delayed until particular rulings had been handed down. (Although there 
were many examples of this type of problem, they have probably been reduced 
in number as a result of increased experience with the free list.) 
While this line of argument leads to the conclusion that the 1965 Free List 
wasn't very "f ree" , it must not be carried to the extreme. It has been an 
evolutionary change, rather than a revolutionary departure f rom the past, but 
it has been a change nevertheless; and on the basis of the reasons outlined in the 
earlier part of this section, one can justifiably conclude that a major step toward 
import liberalization has taken place. 
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
One of the primary purposes of this paper has been to describe the institu-
tional changes which occurred in Pakistan between 1959 and 1965 which, in 
the aggregate, have produced a liberalization of import policy that is probably 
unique among underdeveloped countries. There has existed some confusion 
about the meaning of "import liberalization", as well as about the nature and 
significance of its component parts. Hopefully, this study has shed light on 
these important questions by analysing the decline of direct controls and the 
rise of more flexible policies which permitted a greater play of market forces. 
Bonus-voucher imports, OGL, repeat licensing, f ree list, tighter credit, and 
higher duties have all played an integral part in this trend. 
"See Appendix B for a detailed description of the free-list restrictions. 
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In describing this trend, emphasis has been placed on the quantitative side 
of import licensing and import liberalization, based on the data made available 
by the CCI&E in 1964 and 1965. Several major statistical points stand out and 
are worth repeating, i) CCI&E imports (essentially consumer goods, raw mater-
ials, and spare parts) are only about half of total imports. (The remainder are 
government purchases and private machinery imports.) ii) Prior to the advent 
of the free list, substantial import liberalization had already been achieved in 
the bonus scheme, OGL, and repeat licensing, which altogether constituted 
about half of CCI&E licensing in 1963 (or one-fourth of total imports). Hi) 
Because of the OGL scheme, over half of the value of all commercial licences 
were granted to newcomers in January-June 1964 (over one-sixth of all CCI&E 
imports), substantially undermining the "monopoly" position of the old cate-
gory holders, iv) Whereas industrial licences were only about 37 per cent of 
CCI&E imports in the mid-1950's, they have grown to about 55 per cent in the 
mid-1960's. This change has fur ther weakened the position of the established 
commercial importers (whose licences were less than one-sixth of CCI&E imports 
in January-June 1964). v) The free list encompassed about 25 per cent of total 
imports in 1964. Including bonus imports, OGL, and repeat licensing with 
the free list, total liberalization covered over two-thirds of CCI&E imports and 
about 35 per cent of total imports in 1964. vi) During this same period, that 
licensing controls were being reduced, the indirect controls of fiscal and mone-
tary policy were being strengthened. Import duties were increased about one-
third f r o m 1959-63 and another one-third after the f ree list was introduced, so 
that altogether they have been raised, on the average, about 75 per cent above the 
rates prevailing in 1959. These facts highlight the quantitative dimension of 
import liberalization. 
A qualitative evaluation of liberalization is much more difficult. There 
has not been a simple, straightline trend, with the removal of direct controls 
and the substitution of indirect ones. Rather it has been a complex and con-
fusing movement and adjustment , with the introduction of new administrative 
policies (OGL, repeat licensing) which were still direct controls, but which were 
somewhat more flexible and market-oriented. Even the free list was not very 
"free" , but was hedged in by numerous restrictions (and is even more restrictive 
in 1966). 
This hesitant movement toward liberalization was due to various problems 
faced by Pakistani officials and planners; and it is necessary to briefly review 
these problems here not only to gain insight into the past development, important 
as that may be, but also because they still exist, to some extent, and frustra te 
fur ther moves toward a more liberal import policy. 
1) From the standpoint of government officials, perhaps the overriding 
problem is the maintenance of control over aggregate foreign-exchange expendi-
tures. The removal of licensing requires an alternative form of rationing to 
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prevent imports f r o m exceeding available foreign-exchange resources, and al-
though tariffs and credit controls have been increased, they were not, and they 
are not, adequate to reduce demand to the available supply of foreign exchange. 
Because of this balance-of-payments gap, because of the uncertainties on the 
supply side (due partly to the unpredictability of aid), and because of the cer-
tainty of some capital flight on the demand side, the government has proceeded 
slowly on the removal of direct controls. 
2) It is difficult to know what problem was the next most important, but 
f rom the number of restrictions scattered throughout recent import policies, 
it is probably "protect ion" (and encouragement) to domestic industry. That 
is, on grounds of basic industrial development strategy, export promotion, and 
import substitution, the government has encouraged (directly and indirectly) 
the development of a large number of firms in a variety of industries. Many 
of these firms cannot now compete in or against the world market at the official 
exchange rate of Rs. 4.76 per dollar. Thus, bans, quotas, and special licensing 
arrangements have been used to facilitate the birth and growth of these firms. 
J) Closely related to the protection problem is that of "priorities". Invest-
ment in certain "essential" industries is less profi table than in other fields. 
Further, imported raw materials tend to flow to some very profitable "non-
essential" industries. In an attempt to confine imported capital goods and raw 
materials to the "essential" industries, direct controls have been (and continue to 
be) utilized. 
4) The disparity of income within and between the two provinces has been 
the source of the retention (and, in some cases, the expansion) of direct import 
controls. It is felt that the smaller, weaker firms, sectors and regions need 
special protection and encouragement. 
5) Some of the direct controls over imports have been retained to ensure 
scarcity and adequate profitability, both to motivate investment and to provide 
funds for fu ture saving and investment. Paradoxically, this "incomes policy" 
has tended to favour the rich, who are apt to save and invest and, therefore, cer-
tain controls fostering this incomes policy run counter to other controls imposed 
to distribute income more equally (4 above). 
6) Almost all aid and barter agreements are tied both in source and in 
commodities permissible for import. These agreements create the need for 
numerous import restrictions. 
7) Finally, for certain goods, there are price differentials between Pakistan 
and neighbouring countries, particularly India. Because of Pakistan's import 
liberalization, many of Pakistan's prices are lower and, in some cases, substantially 
below those prevailing in India, which has led to smuggling (often associated 
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with capital flight, noted in 1) above. In order to reduce this smuggling, the 
government has imposed specific controls over which firms can import these 
"sensitive" items, and how much they can import. 
Pakistan has made substantial progress toward import liberalization, but 
the pace and qualitative nature of this development have been heavily influenced 
by these seven problems. Theoretically, for most of them, there exist "liberal" 
solutions, including taxes, subsidies, and investment and credit policies. These 
policies could influence prices, costs, and relative profitability and, thus, motivate 
resource owners and users to act in accordance with planning goals, so that 
direct import controls would not be necessary. For example, a foreign-ex-
change auction would facilitate the removal of licences without risking a balance-
of-payments crisis; a tariff policy could be developed which could serve the 
purposes of both protection and aggregate balance-of-payments control; an 
excise tax policy could be formulated which would discourage resources f rom 
being used in unessential industries by making them unprofitable, etc. In some 
cases, the difficulties may prove illusory and relatively easy policy changes might 
be made. (To some extent, the smuggling problem has already been solved by 
raising tariffs or putting the items on the bonus-import list; this increases the 
Pakistani prices and substantially removes the incentive for smuggling.) In 
most cases, the administrative and political problems in creating and implement-
ing effective liberal policies will be sufficiently difficult that rapid progress in the 
withdrawal of direct controls cannot be expected. An analysis of these seven 
problems and alternative solutions is beyond the scope of the present study; but 
until additional research is done, and until indirect controls are developed and 
implemented to solve them, these problems inhibit fur ther liberalization of 
Pakistan's import policy. 
Pakistan has moved f rom an import policy relying almost completely on 
administrative controls to a policy mix which includes substantial elements of 
indirect controls working through the market. The question has never been 
one of controls versus uncontrolled free trade, but rather it has been what type 
of import controls would be most efficient in facilitating Pakistan's economic 
growth. The evidence reviewed in this study indicates that the trend toward 
liberalization has had favourable effects on prices and markups, and on pro-
duction and utilization of capacity; the private sector was stimulated, particularly 
the smaller industrial firms. Although adequate evidence is not available to 
support a dogmatic conclusion, the facts suggest that the experiment with a 
liberal policy has been successful and that it should be continued and extended. 
Further progress, however, depends on solving the seven problems noted above. 
It is to these areas, therefore, that fu ture research should be devoted. 
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TABLE A-2 
PRIVATE IMPORTS: CCI&E LICENSING AND ACTUAL IMPORTS 
{ill million rupees) 
Period 
Licences issued by the Chief Controller" Actual private-sector imports 
Col. (6) as per ccnt of Col, (7) Commer-cial 
(2) 
OCACb Industrial Bonus import 
Total CCI&E licensing 
( 0 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Jan,-June 1953 __ 74.6 i 
July-Dec. 1953 _ — — — 309.8 — — 
Jan.-June 1954 •— — 311.9 — — 
July-Dec. 1954 153.9 94.9 — 248.8 506.6 49 
Jan.-Juno 1955 213.6 — 90.6 „ 304.3 415.6 73 
July-Dec. 1955 221.7* — 163.0c — 384,7c 522.2 74 
Jan.-June 1956 227,9 — 178.7 — 406.6 467,6 87 
July-Dec. 1956 312.6 — 106,3rf — . 418.9<f 515,7 81 
Tan.-June 1957 104.3 106.9 133.1 — 344,3 503.7 68 
.Tiily-Dec. 1957 128.5 100,0 171.1 — - 399,6 463.3 86 
Jan.-June 1958 134.8 81.1 186,2 — 402,1 476.3 85 
July-Dec. 1958 117.7 106.7 159.1 — 383.5 465.4 82 
Jan.-June 1959 125.1 105.1 161.2 16.1 407.5 374.3 109 
July-Dec. 1959 152.5 108.7 221.7 60,2 543,1 692.5 78 
Jan.-June 1960 156.9 107.3 215.3 70,7 550.2 989.4 56 
July-Dec. 1960 231.8 107.4 2.69.6 72.6 681.4 1088.4 63 
Jan.-June 1961 358.6 65.2 311.1 73.4 808.3 1032.4 78 
July-Deo. 1961 280.5 102,2 363.8 31.8 828,3 1076.0 77 
Jan.-June 1962 294.3 110.5 463.8 83.3 951.9 1182.9 80 
July-Dec, 1962 326.8 107.1 411,3 109,3 954.5 1535.4 62 
Jan.-June 1963 233.2 108.4 402.2 91.3 835.7 1264.4 66 
July-Deo. 1963 288.7 108.4 382.7 110,9 890.7 1607.8 55 
Jan.-June 1964 498.8 117.1 432,0 126.4 1174.3* 1589.4 75 
(>—) means not available. 
"Although these figures are based on the data supplied by the Office of the CCI&E, they should not be considered "official". The CCf&E generously sanctioned the release and use of the licensing data readily available in his offices, but unfortunately (yet understand-ably), these data are not entirely internally consistent—the detailed figures and the total do not agree in every case, and in some instances, several different total figures were given. Throughout its history, the Office of tho CCI&E has been understaffed to handle the demands placed upon it, and this has been particularly true of the statistical sections. Data have been collected and worked up by hand (especially in the earlier period) and the office has been "short-handed". Data coming from the regional offices to the main office have not always been clearly defined, and on occasions they have been misplaced—either lost in transit or filed in the wrong place when the main office moved from Karachi to Rawalpindi, In spite of these problems, the CCI&E recognized the potential benefit to be derived from making the data available to researchers working on the licensing system, in particular, or import policy in general. Figures in this table are from the compilation of CCI&E data made by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) [14]; although the data discre-
(footnate continued on next page) 
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TABLE A-3 
COMPOSITION OF TOTAL IMPORTS* 
(in million rupees at current prices) 
Imports for domestic industry Imports of consximer goods C * c 
Year (July-June) 
rJ> * A R C r RCj* Rupees 
As per cent of all imports (5H-(5)+{7) 
Rupees 
As per cent of all imports (7)-r (5)+(7) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ; . < 6 ) (7) (8) 
1957/58 717 323 152 1,192 58 858 42 
1958/59 629 300 165 1,094 69 485 31 
1959/60 989 439 305 i,V33 70 728 30 
1960/61 1,210 570 418 2,198 69 989 31 
1961/62 1,460 468 453 2,381 77 729 23 
1962/63 1,903 478 505 2,886 76 932 24 
Source: {19, Table 1, p. 22J. 
* Defence imports are excluded. 
** CA — capital goods; RCA = raw materials for capital-goods industries; 
RCo ™ raw materials for consumer-goods industries; Co — consumer goods. 
{from page 34) 
pancies are not very great, they are under investigation in both the Office of the CCI&E and the PIDE, and it is possible that at some future date more accurate statistics will become available. 
bOCAC imports are for the Oil Companies Advisory Committee, which has imported various oil products on behalf of all oil companies in Pakistan. These products have been listed separately in the CCI&E data and it is difficult to assign them under either the "commercial" or "industrial" heading, 
'This includes revalidation of 35,1 million rupees due to devaluation of the rupee in July 1955 [17], 
dThts excludes industrial aid amounts. 
^Including 354.8 million rupees of free-list imports, the total was 1529,1 million rupees, or 96 per cent of total private imports. 
Sources: i) Figures for the values licensed are from the unpublished records of the Office of 
the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (CCJ&E). Except for July-Dec,, 
1955, the data are taken from the PIDE compilation [14J. 
it) Figures for actual private imports arc from the Statistical Bulletin [15 j. 
TABLE A-4 
AVERAGE RATE OF DUTY ON IMPORTED GOODS BY TYPES OF COMMODITY 
LO Os 
Description 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65 1965/6< 
Consumption Goods 
a) Essentials 35 35 35 35 35 55 55 55 56 56 70 
b) Semi-luxuries 54 54 54 54 5 4 i n 111 111 116 118 148 
c) Luxuries 99 99 99 99 99 340 140 140 142 144 180 
Raw Materials for Consumption Goods 
a) Unprocessed 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 30 31 39 
b) Processed 43 43 43 43 43 50 50 48 51 65 81 
Raw Materials for Capital Goods 
a) Unprocessed 23 23 23 23 23 2S 2S 28 31 32 40 
6) Processed 38 38 38 38 38 40 40 39 42 55 69 
Capital Goods 
a) Consumer durables 71 71 71 71 8 1 85 85 85 89 91 114 
b) Machinery and equipment 14 14 14 14 14 17 17 17 17 22 34 
Source: The figures for 1955/56 to 1964/65 are based on [27, Table VI]. i he 1965/66 column, except for machinery, is 25 per cent larger than 1964/65, reflecting the defence surcharge. For machinery, in 1965/66,12.5 per cent has been added to the figure for 1964/65. 
? 
§ 
ci 
S' 
£ 
& 
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TABLE A-5 
COMMERCIAL LICENCES ISSUED BY AREA 
(January 1957 to June 1964) 
(per cent of total) 
West East Period Type of licence Karachi Pakistan Pakistan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Jan.-June 1964 
July-Dec, 1963 
.lan.-June 1963 
July-Dec, 1962 
Jan.-June 1962 
July-Dec. 1961 
Jan.-June 1961 
July-Dec. 1960 
Jan.-June 1960 
July-Dec. 1959 
Jan.-June 1959 
July-Dec. 1958 
Jan.-June 1958 
July-Dcc. 1957 
Jan,-June 1957 
f O G L J Automatic ] Others L Total 
fOGL J Automatic 1 Others L. Total 
f OGL ) Automatic ) Others [Total 
fOGL J Automatic 1 Others L Total 
("OGL J Automatic "1 Others [Total 
1 
f OGL J Automatic Others Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
Total 
30.87 40.92 26.59 30,15 
28.90 14.00 10.56 23.54 
42.24 45.08 62.84 46.32 
32.38 57.26 46,60 36.03 
27.04 10.82 16.25 24.37 
40.57 31.92 37.15 39.60 
36.28 77.12 41.58 41.26 
25,77 5.13 16.32 21.71 
37.96 17.75 42,09 37.04 
41.44 78.92 32.09 42.86 
22.73 3.11 14.26 18.76 
35.83 17.96 53.65 38.39 
37.98 60.11 30.91 36.92 
21.21 7.61 11.43 17.46 
40,81 32,28 57.66 45.62 
37.09 38.84 33.87 36.14 
19.41 9.63 15.13 17.83 
43.49 51.53 51.00 46.03 
40.92 12,76 46.32 
41.81 14.57 43.62 
47.55 20,31 32.14 
42.07 17.79 40.13 
48.93 15.27 35.81 
49,90 18.22 31.88 
48.81 18.27 32.91 
49.25 17.77 32.98 
44,78 13,17 42.05 
Source: [14], 
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TABLE A-6 
INDUSTRIAL LICENCES ISSUED BY AREA 
(January 19S7 to June 1964) 
(per cent of total) 
Period Karachi West Pakistan (Lahore) East Pakistan 
0 ) (2) (3) (4) 
January-June 1964 37.71 29.39 32.90 
July-December 1963 36.95 36.52 26.53 
January-June 1963 45.01 30.27 24.71 
July-December 1962 46.64 27.41 25.95 
January-June 1962 36.49 32.57 30.94 
July-December 1961 36.37 26.96 36.67 
January-June 1961 37.46 24.37 38.16 
July-December 1960 43.30 30,27 26.43 
January-June 1960 36.27 32.11 31.62 
July-December 1959 37.98 22.46 39.56 
January-June 1959 46.93 30,45 22.62 
July-December 1958 42.79 31.8?. 25.40 
January-June 1958 39.59 33.83 26.58 
July-December 1957 37.39 25.54 37.06 
January-June 1957 40.59 30.49 28.92 
Source: [14], 
TABLE A-7 
ACTUAL IMPORTS (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE) BY AREA 
(1957/58 through 1962/63) 
(in million rupees) 
Period West Pakistan East Pakistan 
Value Per cent Value Per cent 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1957/58 1,314 64 736 36 
1958/59 1,025 65 554 35 
1959/60 1,806 73 655 27 
1960/61 2,173 68 1,015 32 
1961/62 2,236 72 873 28 
1962/63 2,800 73 1,019 27 
1963/64 2,982 67 1,449 33 
1964/65 3,672 68 1,702 32 
Source: [15], 

TABLE A-9 
IMPORT LIBERALIZATION, 1960-64 
Shipping period 
(1) 
January-June 1960 
July-December 1960 
January-June 1961 
July-December 1961 
January-June 1962 
July-December 1962 
January-June 1963 
July-December 1963 
(in million rupees) 
• Total | ; value ' Import • licensed! bonus 
(2) f; (3) 
550.2 
682,9 
509.3 
838.1 
949.1 
954.6 
835.5 
890.7 
70.7 
72.6 
73.4 
81.8 
83.3 
109.3 
91.3 
110.9 
OGL 
I j Total ! Col. (3)-rCol. (4) Automatic licensing 
Total liberalization Col. (5)+Col . (9) 
| Amount 
i 
Per cent 
( 6 ) - ( 2 ) Com-mercial | Industrial Total Amount Per cent (10)-r(2) 
(4) j (5) (6) , (7) j (8) (9) (10) (11) 
— 70.7 32,8 — — — 70.7 12.8 
* 72.6 10.6 * * 72.6 10.6 
* 73.4 9.1 * 39.5 39.5 112.9 14.0 
192.6 274.4 32.7 36.6 28.1 64.7 339.1 40.5 
132.2 265.5 28.0 14.8 214.3 229.1 494.1 52.1 
216.1 325.4 34.1 31.6 139.3 170.9 496.3 52.0 
158.4 249.7 29.9 21.5 97.9 119.4 369.1 44.2 
222.5 333.4 37.4 1 0 .4 88.5 98.9 432.3 48.5 
(—) means nil. (*) means not available. Source: [14]. 
TABLE A-10 
GROWTH OF IMPORTS UNDER FREE LIST 4 
July-September 1963 October-December 1963 January-March 1964 
Some of the free-list items E.P. W.P. Total E.P. w . p . Total E.P. W.P. Total 
0 ) (2) (3) j (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Six Largest Free-List Items 
1. Iron and steel 50.5 85.0 135.5 48.3 71.5 119.8 50.2 62.0 112.3 
2. Chemicals 4.1 10.9 15.0 4.4 16.1 20.6 3.5 20.7 24.2 
3. Nonferrous metals 4.4 10.1 14.5 2.5 12.3 14.7 2.1 12.2 14.3 
4. Coaltar dyes 3.2 5.9 9.1 4.8 9.2 14.1 4.6 9.3 13.9 
5. Life-saving drugs and medicines .7 4.0 4.7 1.6 5.3 6.9 1.7 4.7 6.4 
6. Maintenance spares 1.5 9.1 10.5 2.1 8.1 10.2 3.4 10.8 14.2 
7. Total of six items 64.4 124.9 189.3 63.8 122.5 186.2 65.5 119.8 185.2 
8. Total free list 75.6 145.2 220.9 105.6 149.2 254.8 114.9 139.1 254.0 
9. Total imports 362.5 669.9 1,032.4 400.7 867.8 1,268.5 361.8 717.0 1,078.8 
10. Row 7 as per cent of Row 3 85.1 86.0 85.6 60.3 82.0 73.0 56.9 86.1 72.9 
] 3. Row S as per cent of Row 9 20.8 21.6 21.3 26.3 17.1 20.0 31.7 19.3 
(Contd.y 
23.5 
TABLE A-10 — (Concld.) NJ 
[ April-June 1964 S July-Sepember 1964 
i 
October-December 1964 
Some of the free-list items | i i E.P. w . p . Total | E.P. | W.P. | Total E.P. | W.P. Total 
(1) (11) | (12) (13) j (14) i | (15) 1 j (16) (17) | (18) (19) 
Six Largest Free-List Items: 
1. Iron and steel 44.3 76.4 120.6 68.5 132.4 200.9 97.5 93.3 190.8 
2. Chemicals 8.1 12.9 21.0 7.1 12.4 19.4 8.4 14.6 23.1 
3. Nonferrous metals 3.0 15.6 18.6 3.0 20.3 23.4 5.7 14.4 20.0 
4. Coal tar dyes 4.9 9.1 14.0 3.5 7.7 11.1 6.4 13.4 19.9 
5. Life-saving drugs and medicines 2.0 7.3 9.3 1.6 4.0 5.6 1.8 2.7 4.4 
6. Maintenance spares 4.2 11.9 16.1 4.0 1 1 . 0 15.0 3.6 17.0 20.6 
7. Total of six items 66.5 133.2 199.7 87.7 187.7 275.4 123.4 155.4 278.8 
8. Total free list 109.0 161.4 270.4 130.0 211.1 341.1 167.2 186.5 353.8 
9. Total imports 323.5 726.9 1,050.4 397.0 882.0 1,279.1 435.5 906.0 1341.5 
10. Row 7 as per cent of Row 8 60.9 82.5 73.8 67.4 88.9 80.7 73.7 83.3 78.8 
11. Row 8 as per cent of Row 9 33.7 22.2 25.7 32.7 23.9 26.6 38.3 20.5 26.3 
•The "Free List" import figures represent the imports of the fifty-one items on the free list during July-December 1964. For example, the figures in Row 8 for July-September 1963 indicate the value of imoorts of the fifty-one items which later were placed on the free list, (This was Rs. 220.9 million out of total imports of Rs. 1,032.4 million.) Imports of these items expanded tinder the free list to Rs. 353.8 million in October-December 1964. However, the total free-list (Row 8) figure for July-September 1964 (Rs. 341.1 million) undoubtedly includes some imports ordered prior to July 1964 (and therefore, ordered under OGL) which entered Pakistan during July-September. 
E.P. means East Pakistan: W, P. means West Pakistan. 
Source: Planning Commission, unpublished table; derived from CSO data. 
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Appendix B 
THE RESTRICTIONS SURROUNDING THE FREE LIST 
The purpose of this Appendix is to describe the specific types of restrictions 
that surround the free list, and for this purpose references will be made to the 
July-1965 Import Policyi. 
1) A major restriction is that only certain groups can import particular 
commodities; or, negatively, certain groups are prohibited from importing 
specific goods. Examples are given below: 
a) "Some items, even though on free list, will be available for import by 
industrial consumers concerned only" (p. 172). That is, commercial 
importers, who might wish to import for resale, are excluded f rom 
importing certain materials on the free list. Proof must be offered to 
the CCI&E that the importer is a legitimate industrial user of the item 
concerned, and the imports must be used by the industrial impor ter : 
they cannot be resold (p. 186). One example is "Fire Bricks with 
alumina content of 40% and above" (p. 188). A more restrictive case 
is one in which imports are restricted to "only such industrial consumers 
as have been licensed for the items in the pas t" (p. 175). (Wire rods 
are one example.) Most of the iron and steel items have similar limita-
tions, so that only those importers, industrial or commercial, who 
were importing in the past may import under the free list (Pp. 174-175). 
b) Certain imports can only be made by "Resident nationals of Pakistan 
and such firms, business houses, and institutions in which major shares 
or controlling interests are held by resident Pakistan nationals" (p. 174). 
Examples of this are cement (p. 188) and coal (p. 190). 
c) "Import of nylon twine (for fishing industry) under free list shall be 
confined to the following: i) Fishermen's Cooperative Societies; ii) 
Individual members of Fishermen's Cooperative Societies; Hi) Others 
on production of a certificate, either f r o m sub-Divisional Magistrate or 
iSpecifio page references in this July-1965 Import Policy [7, July 5, 1965] will be given 
in parentheses. Although this policy was never implemented, it contained an expanded free list 
of 56 items and it was the first 12-month policy. Thus, it probably enunciated the most liberal 
import policy since the beginning of rigid licensing in 1953 
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District Fisheries Officer or Deputy Director of the Marine Fisheries 
Department, that they were engaged in fishing" (p. 175). 
2) A second type of constraint is that certain commodities can only be 
imported into East Pakistan, such as cement (p. 188), soda ash (p. 188), caustic 
soda (p. 189), "coal, other than for domestic use" (p. 190), and raw agarwood 
(p. 192) As might be expected, re-export of such items to West Pakistan is 
prohibited (p. 178). 
3) In many cases, the geographical source is specified (generally due to aid 
agreements), such as follows : 
a) Aluminium ingots and copper rods must be imported f r o m Canada 
(p. 176). 
b) "Soda Bicarb, soda ash and caustic soda . . . imports shall take place 
f rom U . K . " ( p . 177). 
c) "Vats and soluble vats (dyestuff) imports shall take place f rom 
West Germany" (p. 177). 
d) Coal imports are limited to China (p. 177). 
e) Cement (Grey) imports must be f rom China and Russia (p. 177). 
/') Milk and eggs, many of the iron and steel items, and some other goods 
must be imported f rom the U.S.A. (Pp. 177 and 211). 
g) "No import will, however, be permissible f rom Israel and South 
Af r i ca" (p. 172). 
4) An important type of restriction pertains to the amount of imports 
allowable: 
a) "Minimum unit for import under Aid Loan f rom U.S.A. will be 5,000 
U.S. dollars. No letter of credit shall accordingly be established for 
an amount less than 5,000 dollars and no shipment shall be affected 
for an amount less than 1,000 dollars per individual invoice" (p. 172). 
Very similar to this are many cases where both minimum and maxi-
mum limits are set (see b) below). There are still other cases where 
the exact amount is given: "Letters of Credit for import of cement 
into East Pakistan shall be opened at a flat rate of Rs. 25,000 each" 
(P- 175). 
b) In many cases, importers under the free list are limited to an amount 
based on their previous licences, with an arrangement for additional 
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imports w h i c h is essentially identical to automatic licensing. One 
i m p o r t a n t example is the case of corrugated iron sheets and galvan-
ised corrugated sheets. "The established importers shall be eligible to 
affect import of 100 % of their category with minimum unit of Rs. 25,000 
and maximum of Rs. 1,00,000. OGL importers including newcomers, 
already admitted in iron and steel, shall be eligible to open letter of 
credit on the basis of Passbooks already issued to them by the regional 
licensing offices. They will be eligible to open fur ther letter of credit 
on product ion of bill of lading relating to imports against their earlier 
letter of credit" (p. 175). This "automatic licensing" type of regulation 
also applies generally to all commercial importing firms with over 50 
per cent ownership or control in the hands of non-Pakistanis (p. 174). 
e) "Recognized industrial units which were licensed in the past for Nail 
Wire/G.I. Wire can open letter of credit at 10 % of their half-yearly 
entitlement as shown in their Passbooks for Nail Wire/G. I. Wire" 
(p. 175). There are many other cases like this one which parallel the 
old category system — an initial licence without repeat facilities; ex-
amples are maintenance spares (p. 191) and barytes (snow-white grade 
only) (p. 191). 
d) Perhaps the most constraining of the quantitative restrictions on the 
f ree list was the use of quotas to limit the opening of letters of credit. 
Letters of credit for each free-list item under an aid or barter agree-
ment had to be channelled through a designated commercial bank, 
which was given a quota by the State Bank for that item. This quota 
was based on the bilateral agreement, and when it was reached (as it 
was quickly in the case of few popular items for which relatively low 
quotas were assigned), the bank stopped opening new letters of credit 
and notified the State Bank. Depending on the foreign-exchange 
position, the State Bank decided whether to issue a new expanded quota. 
To some extent at least, the previous direct rationing of imports under 
CCI&E licensing was replaced by implicit rationing by the commercial 
banks and the State Bank for free-list items. (Since the import policy, 
announced in July 1965, was suspended before it was really imple-
mented, this description of the quota system applies to the free lists of 
1964/65, and also 1966.) 
5) A final general restriction prohibits the importation of some goods and 
limits the amount of others: 
a) Much of Annexure V of the July-1965 Import Policy (Pp. 217-223) is 
devoted to listing the specific items which cannot be imported even 
though the general type of goods are on the free list, For example, iron 
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and steel is the biggest single item on the f ree list, but import of the 
following items (and many others) is illegal: S t ruc tu ra l—Angles upto 
4 " x 4 " x 1/2" in West Pakistan and upto 1-1/2" X 1-1/2" x 1/4" in East 
Pakis tan; galvanized water/welded pipes of 3" diameter and below; 
hoops and strings; cast iron plates; and prefabr icated structures. 
Similar lists of items excepted f r o m the free list are given for nonfe r rous 
metals and ferroalloys, chemicals and pigments, dry colours and 
painters materials. 
b) "Unless otherwise specifically permitted, second-hand or recondit ioned 
goods or factory rejects will not be permissible for impor t " (p. 172). 
c) The fol lowing goods can be imported within certain specified limits. 
i) In the case of chalk and clay, "not more than 2 0 % of the value of 
the L/c (Letter of credit) in East Pakistan shall be utilized for import 
of China clay" (p. 188). ii) For chemicals, commercial importers open-
ing L/c of Rs. 25,000 may import soda ash up to 4% of L/c value 
. . . only" (p. 189). That is 96 per cent of the chemical imports must 
be in other chemicals than soda ash. iii) In dyeing and tanning subs-
tances, "recognized tanneries may import sulphonated oils for not 
more than 10% of the L/c value" (p. 189). iv) Under scientific instru-
ments, "not more than Rs. 500 shall be utilized for import of clinical 
thermometers against individual letter of credit" (p. 190). And many 
other examples could be cited. 
As noted in the text of this paper, these five points relate to: i) who can 
import ; ii) the geographical region into which the import can come; iii) the 
country f r o m which the import must be purchased; /i>) the amount to be im-
por ted; and v) whether part icular subtypes of goods can be imported, and, if so, 
how much of each. In addit ion to these five areas, there are a miscellany of 
other points which should be noted in support of this general theme that the 
free list is definitely not a " f ree t r ade" import policy. 
Amongst the less impor tant "miscellaneous points" are the fol lowing two 
restrictions. " Import of items on free list will not be permissible by Air Freight" 
(p. 176). " Impor ts shall be affected at the most competitive rates and importers 
may be required at any time to submit documents for scrutiny concerning prices 
paid by them" (p. 179). 
Perhaps somewhat more important is that "the Public and semi-Public 
Sector A g e n c i e s . . . .are allowed to open Letters of Credit under the Free List" 
[22, p. 1], Since these agencies were not under the C C I & E licensing system, but 
rather had (and have) their imports determined by other government rat ioning 
m e c h a n i s m s 2 , it is very misleading to include their imports with those of the 
•.See the early part of Section II-A above for a brief description of the three seperate 
rationing systems. 
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private sector in any attempt to appraise the extent of import liberalization. 
The free list releases importers f rom the necessity of having a CCI&E licence. 
Since the imports of the public and semi-public agencies were never under 
CCI&E control, to "release" them f r o m such control is meaningless. Although 
they are now importing "under the f ree list", their imports are still determined 
by essentially the same rationing system as before. On the basis of available 
data, it is not possible to estimate the extent of free-list imports which are thus 
not really "free" , but the earlier argument based on the quantitative importance 
of free-list imports vis-a-vis other imports is somewhat weakened. 
Although by no means all of the free list qualifications have been stated in 
this appendix, a representative sample has been presented which supports the 
conclusion that the free list is definitely a limited import liberalization. 
The Allocative Biases of 
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amount between the public and private sectors. Import-licensing policy, 
f ramed and implemented by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, con-
cerns itself with allocating foreign exchange earmarked for the private sector 
among various uses and users. Both these policies, symptomatic of an over-
valued rate of exchange, are essentially "rat ioning" devices influencing mainly 
the import sector. 
The overvalued rate of exchange has, however, created serious problems for 
the export sector* Export-promotion policy, consisting mainly of the Export 
Bonus Scheme, is intended to grapple with these problems. Tariff policy, 
enforced by the Ministry of Finance, consists of import duties and export taxes. 
Though mainly used as a revenue-raising device, it is supposed to reinforce 
import-licensing and exchange-control policies. 
Each of these policies, taken by itself, may influence the composition of 
domestic investment in the private sector. Exchange-control policy influences 
the composition of domestic investment in the private sector by having exporters 
surrender, at the unfavourable official rate, foreign exchange that they could sell 
at a much higher rate in the market . This is a hidden levy on the exporters. 
Likewise, importers "receive" a premium in the f o r m of being able to purchase 
foreign exchange at a price below its scarcity value. 
Import-licensing policy, with a few exceptions, perpetuates these allocative 
biases of exchange-control policy favouring importers, insofar as import licences 
are granted at the low official rate of exchange. In addition, it has far-reaching 
effects on the composition of imports and domestic investment. By varying the 
percentage of the foreign exchange allotted to various classes of importers, the 
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports influences the level and composition 
of consumption, product ion and investment in the economy. 
Export-promotion policy, insofar as it is effective, tends to reverse the 
allocative biases of exchange-control and import-licensing policies: it subsidizes 
exporters at the expense of importers. 
Tariff policy, though primarily used as an instrument of fiscal policy, has also 
been used to influence the composition of imports, by imposing higher duties on 
"luxury" (the so-called nonessential items) goods and lower duties on capital 
goods and "essential" goods. 
How can, then, we determine the aggregate impact of all these "sub-policies" 
on the allocation of domestic investment in the private sector? At first sight 
it may appear that the effect of commercial policy is nothing but a summation of 
the effects of each of its "components" on resource allocation. But, on closer 
inspection, this turns out not to be the case. It can easily be shown that / / there 
exists an excess demand for imports at the existing ratio of foreign to domestic 
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prices including import duties, and if imported goods are concurrently subject to 
both quota restrictions and tariffs, then import tariffs do not have a separate 
effect on resource allocation since the domestic prices of imported goods are set 
by quota restrictions alone. Import tariffs, then, have a purely revenue-raising 
funct ion. This, by and large, has been the situation in Pakistan, at least in the 
fifties. 
It follows f r o m this argument that, when considering the allocative biases of 
commercial policy in Pakistan, we can neglect tariff policy. This leaves us with 
exchange-control policy, import-licensing policy, and export-promotion policy. 
However, the main impact of exchange-control policy on resource allocation in 
Pakistan is due to the overall "budget constraint" which it imposes on the level 
of imports rather than due to its allocative function, which is confined to allocat-
ing foreign exchange between the public and the private sectors of the economy. 
In sum, the main allocative instruments of commercial policy in Pakistan 
are import-licensing and export-promotion policies. Exchange-control policy 
sets the overall limits within which these two policies operate, while tariff policy 
largely has a revenue-raising funct ion. 
In the light of these considerations the discussion in the succeeding sections 
is confined to an examination of the allocative biases of import-licensing and 
export-promotion policies. 
II. THE ALLOCATIVE BIASES OF IMPORT-LICENSING POLICY: 1953-1963 
The purpose of this section is to present a quantitative analysis of changes in 
the composition of import licences issued by the Chief Controller of Imports and 
Exports (CCI&E) in order to determine the allocative biases of import-licensing 
policy during the 1953-63 period. 
It has been assumed throughout this section that the import licences issued 
by the CCI&E are fully used by importers. The basic reason for making this 
assumption is that because of the "scarci ty" of foreign exchange there exists an 
excess demand for almost every class of goods at the current official rate of 
exchange. A recent study has shown that domestic prices of imported goods are, 
on average, about 60 per cent higher than their landed cost — that is, the c.i. f. 
cost plus import duty and sales tax [7]. Another evidence of this excess demand 
is the existence of a large premium on import-bonus vouchers!. As a result, 
importers have a strong incentive to fully utilize the import licences allotted to 
them. 
iSee also next section on Export Bonus Scheme. On the average, the market premium on 
import-bonus vouchers has been 150 per cent. 
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It may be argued that since import trade is largely concentrated in the 
hands of holders of "categories" and " q u o t a s " 2 who have a monopoly in import 
trade, there is incentive fo r them to restrict imports to maximize their profi ts 
(or their importer ' s " rent" , to be more precise). However, this incentive does 
not exist when, as is the case in Pakistan, importers are uncertain about the size 
of their import quotas f r o m one shipping period to the next. Moreover , 
imported-goods can always be stocked. Thus, even though importers may 
withhold the supplies of imported goods f r o m the domestic market to raise 
domestic prices in order to make still greater profi ts , there is no reason why 
they should not import . However, it would still have been interesting to com-
pare the value of licences issued by the C C I & E with those actually used by im-
por ters ; unfor tunate ly , these data are simply not available 3 . 
Before we proceed to a quantitative analysis of the allocative biases of 
import-licensing policy, it will be useful to describe the techniques that we have 
used and note their rat ionale and limitations. 
A Note on Techniques 
The Classification Scheme; Our main problem was to classify a mass of 
unorganized data on import licensing A into an economically meaningful fo rm 
according to standard usage. In order to do that, f irst , broad commodity 
groups like " food , drugs and medicine", " t ransport equipment" , etc., had 
to be established. For this, we adopted the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) Scheme. However, some additional categories had to 
be created to include items that did not fit into the standard pattern. Second, 
we had to identify, cull, and aggregate scores of small but related items f r o m 
the "received" data. Third, each of these broad commodity groups then had 
to be classified into four main commodity groups: consumer goods, raw material 
for consumer goods, raw material for capital goods, and capital goods— 
referred to hereinafter as C„ Rco, Rca and C. respectively. As a result of this 
rather tiresome exercise, the import-licensing data are available for the first 
time in a standard, economically meaningful fo rm. This classification gives 
us an insight into the "workings" of import-licensing policy that could not be 
had by looking at the original data. 
The Rationale of Our Classification Scheme: To bring out the character-
istics of our classification scheme, it may be useful to contrast it with that used 
by the CCI&E ' s office. Broadly, they classify the import-licensing data into 
2See [4]. Up to 1959, these category-holders constituted a "closed" group since no new 
categories could be created. Although with the introduction of OGL, new importers are now 
allowed to import, import trade is still largely in the hands of "established" importers. 
3Some cases of the nonutilization if import licences have been reported in the past but 
these are exceptions. 
•These unclassified data have now been published (mimeographed) by the Pakistan Insti-
tute of Development Economics. See [6], 
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"industrial", "commercial", and OCAC (Oil Companies Advisory Committee) 
licences. With the introduction of "automatic", "OGL", and "request-basis" 
licences in 1960, the import-licensing data under "commercial" and "industrial" 
groups are further broken down by these subgroups. Moreover, the import 
licences issued against import-bonus vouchers are separately given since 1959, 
when Export Bonus Scheme was introduced5. 
This classification, although useful for understanding the structure of import-
licensing system, is based on the division of importers into industrial and com-
mercial importers — that is, it is a sort of an "institutional" classification; 
whereas what we need for our purposes is a "functional" classification. 
The greatest danger in using the "institutional" classification for our present 
purposes — that is, to study the allocative biases of import-licensing policy — is 
of misleading associations. For instance, the general impression that the term 
"commercial" licensing may give is that it stands for consumer-goods (C 0) 
imports, while the term "industrial" licensing may be taken as synonymous with 
the imports of R^, Rca and C 8 , but actually this is not so. These terms stand 
for imports made by commercial and industrial importers, and the same com-
modity may be, and is, imported by both classes of importers. 
To illustrate this point, the import-licensing data have been classified on both 
patterns for eleven shipping periods from July-December 1954 to July-December 
1959 in Table I belowC. 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF C 0 > R c o , Rca AND C a INTO COMMERCIAL 
AND INDUSTRIAL LICENSING: 1954-1959 
Import category 
July-December 1954 July-December 1959 Net change in 1959 over 1954 
Com-mer-cial 
Indus-trial Total 
Com-mer-cial 
Indus-trial Total 
Com-mer-cial 
Indus-trial Total 
Consumer goods (Co) 88 12 100 60 40 100 —28 + 2 8 
Raw material for consumer goods (Rco) 36 64 100 44 56 100 + 8 —8 
Raw material for capital goods (Rca) 95 5 100 95 5 100 ,— 
Capital goods (Ca) 23 77 100 28 72 100 + 5 —5 
Average: 62 38 100 53 47 100 —9 _|_9 
Source: Computed from the data provided by the CCI&E [6], 
sfor a description of each of these type of licences, see [41. 
6for details, see [5]. 
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It can be seen f r o m Table I that although the percentage share of industrial 
licensees in total licensing increased by 9 per cent, and that of commercial 
licensees fell by an equal amount over the 1954-1959 period, this was not 
associated with an increased share of industrial licensees in Rco, Rca and 
C„. As a matter of fact (contrary to what one may guess), whereas the relative 
share of industrial licensees in the C0 group increased by 28 per cent, it decreased 
in the rest of the three categories. 
This highlights the danger inherent in using a purely "inst i tut ional" classifi-
cation for studying the allocative biases of import-licensing policy. Only a 
" func t iona l " classification like ours, which disregards the agencies responsible 
for importing particular types of goods but concentrates on the composition of 
import licences and changes in them over time, can shed light on our problem. 
The Limitations of the Study 
It may be noted here that our classification scheme covers a period of only 
seven years, or fourteen shipping periods. The reason for this is that the break-
down by commodities of import licences issued to both industrial and commer-
cial licensees is available only up to 1959. For the period 1960-63, the indus-
trial-licensing data are available broken down by industries, whereas the 
commercial-licensing data are on the basis of commodities imported. 
For this reason, a different classification scheme had to be adopted for 
licences issued to various industries after 19597. Here we have followed, with 
minor additions, the industrial-classification scheme suggested by Chenery. 
Industries have been classified, first, into broad industrial groups like " food 
manufactur ing" , "paper manufactur ing" , and so forth, and then each of these 
industries has been classified into three classes: "consumer-goods", "inter-
mediate-goods", and "investmcnt-and-related-goods" industries. Here, again, 
we were faced with the problem of regrouping over two hundred small industries 
into thirty-six standard industrial groups, and then into the three groups men-
tioned above. The period covered is 1957-63. The data on commercial 
licensing for the 1960-63 period have been classified according to the SIT Classi-
fication that was used for the period 1953-59. Although these two classification 
schemes do throw additional light on the " funct ional" characteristics of 
industrial and commercial licensing for the 1957-63 period, we still cannot get 
the "unified" picture of the working of import-licensing policy that we have 
for the 1953-1959 period. For this reason, we have divided our analysis into 
i) 1953-1959 for total licensing, including commercial, industrial, and OCAC 
licences, ii) 1957-1963 for industrial licensing 8, and Hi) 1960-1963 for com-
mercial licensing. 
TSee II; 2; 3]. 
8The data on industrial licensing by industry breakdown are available since 1957. 
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Finally, it will be noted that we have not related changes in the licences 
issued for various items to such economic magnitudes as actual imports and 
domestic production. The reason for this is that it is nearly impossible to 
establish any such meaningful relationship. For instance, in the case of actual 
imports, there is almost the insoluble problem of finding a suitable "lag" between 
import licences issued and actual imports. Furthermore, actual import data 
are not available in published fo rm with the same breakdown as is used in the 
import-licensing data. Also, our import-licensing data are limited in coverage 
to private-sector imports. (The imports made on government account fall outside 
the purview of import-licensing policy.) Furthermore, imports of machinery 
under various aid agreements, which come to about 15 per cent of total imports, 
are also not covered by our data. This means that our figures regarding import 
licences issued for capital-goods imports are, in effect, underestimates. This 
must be borne in mind in interpreting our results. 
It may also be noted that we have not given a fur ther breakdown of the 
licences issued by the CCI&E into "cash" licences and "aid" licences, because 
we are concerned with the composition of total licences, irrespective of the 
agencies to whom they are issued, and irrespective of whoever (Pakistan or the 
United States or any other country) provides the foreign exchange to "back" 
these licences. For this reason, we have presented an "aggregated" picture of 
import licences issued in this period. 
The Allocative Biases of Import-Licensing Policy: 1953-1959 
The broad results of our study are given in Table II. Two main charac-
teristics of the data presented here are i) the sharp fluctuations in the relative 
shares of our four main commodity groups (see Figure 1), and ii) a gradual 
decline in the relative share of consumer goods in total licensing. There are 
occasional sharp upswings in the share of this group, as in the shipping periods 
July-December 1955 and January-June 1956, caused by heavy imports of food 
and cotton textile, but the general trend is downward. A still greater decline 
occurred in the licences given for importing R e . On the other hand, the 
relative shares of R„ and C. have increased over the period. 
A clearer idea about the direction of change in the relative shares of our 
four main commodity groups can be formed by comparing the beginning and 
the end points of this periods. 
It can be seen that whereas Co and R„ together claimed 43.4 per cent of 
total licences in 1953/54, their relative share in total licensing had declined to 
only 28.0 per cent by 1958/59. By contrast, the relative shares of C. and R„ 
increased over the same period. Also, the sharpest decline occurred in R„ , 
whilst the greatest increase occurred in Rc. 
9This procedure of comparing the beginning and the end points to measure changes over 
a period of time, though statistically crude, is quite legitimate for our purposes. 
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Figure 1. Fluctuations is the Relative Shares of Co, C co, Rca and C3 Group of Commodities in Total Licensing (Industrial plus Commercial plus OCAC) 1953-59 
TABLE II 
CLASSIFICATION OF IMPORT LICENCES ISSUED (INDUSTRIAL . COMMERCIAL, AND OCAC) DURING 1953-1959 
(in percentage terms) 
Import category j J-J 1953 J-D 1953 J-J 1954 J-D 1954 J-J 1955 J-D 1955 (heavy textile) 
J-J 1956 (heavyfood-grains) to 
I 
s? 
2 rS 5" 
Consumer goods (Co) 17. S 14.9 22.0 21.0 18.2 32.1 25.9 
Raw material for consumer goods (Rco) 22.6 23.9 26.0 25.7 26.3 31.6 21.23 
Raw material for capital goods (Rca) 5.4 3 4 .4 24.0 30.4 29.4 19.8 26.5 
Capital goods (Ca) 45.2 26.8 28.0 22.9 26.1 16.6 26.4 
Import category J -D 1956 J-J 1957 | J-D 1957 J-J 1958 J-D 1958 J-J 1959 (due to sugar) 
J-D 1959 (due to sugar) 
Consumer goods (Co) 21.3 13.0 15.0 16.6 12.3 16.6 16.4 
Raw material for consumer goods (Rco) 19.8 14.1 17.2 15.7 13.5 8.9 12.3 
Raw material for capital goods (Rca) 37.2 45.5 3 7 .4 32.2 40.1 38.3 36.6 
Capital goods (Ca) 21.7 27.4 30.2 35.5 34.1 34.2 34.7 
Note: J-J stands for January-June shipping period. J-D stands of July-December shipping period. 
Scurce: Computed from the data provided by the CCI&E [6]. 
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TABLE 111(a) 
RELATIVE SHARES OF BROAD COMMODITY GROUPS (C R,., Rca and C ) 
IN THE I M P O R T LICENCES (COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND OCAC) 
ISSUED BY THE CCI&E: 1953/54-1958/59 
(as percentages of total licensing) 
Import category 1953/54 1958/59 Net percentage difference 
Consumer goods (Co) 18.5 
Raw material for consumer goods (RCo) 24.9 
Raw material for capital goods (Rca) 28.9 
15.0 
13.0 
37.2 
—3.5 
—11.9 
+ 8.3 
Capital goods (Ca) 27.7 34.8 + 7.1 
Source: Based on Table II 1(b) in the Appendix. 
It will be interesting to see the "sources" of these changes. For this, we 
look at the behaviour of the individual "components" of each of the four com-
modity groups. This has been done in Table II 1(b) in the Appendix. In the 
C0 group, there is an all-round decrease in the share of each of the component 
items, except for small increases in " food" , "drugs and medicines" and the 
"miscellaneous" items. The heaviest decline occurred in "stationery and 
related items", followed by "textiles and clothing" and "cigarettes". 
Also the relative "weights" of different items changed over the period. In 
1953/54, "drugs and medicines", "stationery and related items", "textiles and 
clothing", " f o o d " and "cigarettes and tobacco" ranked highest in the CQ 
group, in that order. By 1958/59, this order had changed: though "drugs and 
medicines" still ranked the highest, the share of "stationery and related items" 
declined sharply. "Food" and "textiles" stood next to "drugs and medicines". 
It may also be noted that whereas in 1953/54 the six items noted above accoun-
ted for 88 per cent of the total licences issued to the CG group, in 1958/59 they 
accounted for a little over 78 per cent. It shows that, as compared with 
1953/54, import licences were more "thinly" distributed among a number of 
smaller commodities. 
In the Rco group, it can be seen that the sharp decrease in the licences issued 
to the "silk, cotton, yarn and thread" group (f rom 10.84 per cent of total licens-
ing in 1953/54 to 1.95 per cent in 1958/59) was the main factor responsible for 
the large decline in the relative share of the R„ group in total licensing. The 
other "notables" in this downward trend in the R„ group were "chemicals and 
gas", "dyes, paints and varnishes" and the "miscellaneous" subgroups. 
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The sharp increase in the relative share of the Rca group in total licensing 
was wholly due to the large "gains" registered by the "brake fluid and oil" group. 
(This includes allocations to the OCAC for imports of motor spirit and petro-
leum.) Other items registered a decline. 
The increase in the relative share of the Ca group in total licensing has been 
due mainly to higher allocation of import licences to the import of "metal 
products" and "transport equipment". 
The Allocative Biases of Industrial-Licensing Policy: 1957-1963 
As pointed out in the subsection on techniques above, our classification 
scheme could not be carried up to 1963 because f r o m 1960 onward the data on 
import licences issued to industrial licensees are not given by the commodities 
imported but by industries. It could not be ascertained which industry imported 
what. Hence, a different scheme had to be adopted, which classified industries 
into three broad groups: consumer-goods industries, intermediate-goods indus-
tries, and industries producing investment and related goods. The results of 
our classification are given in Table IV. 
We note, first, that there are considerable fluctuations in the licences issued 
to each of our industrial groups. Secondly, the relative share of consumer-
goods industries in total industrial licensing gradually declined over time. In 
contrast, the relative share of investment-goods industries gradually increased 
over time until it outstripped that of consumer-goods industries in July-December 
1963. Third, the share of intermediate-goods industries, after a continual decline 
f rom January-June 1958 to January-June 1962, increased continuously afterwards 
(see Figure 2). 
This can be seen more clearly by comparing the beginning and the end points 
of this period. 
It will be noted that, during the period under review, a radical shift had 
occurred in the relative positions of the three industry groups. By 1963, the 
investment-goods industries had taken the place of consumer-goods industries 
as the biggest holder of industrial licences. The share of intermediate-goods 
industries had also improved by 1963. 
This downward trend in the relative share of consumer-goods industries is 
mainly attributable to a relative decline in importance of cotton-textile industry 
over time, as the early tempo of import-substitution in cotton textiles tapered off. 
It is interesting to study the behaviour of the "components" of each of these 
industrial groups. This is done in Table VI. Here we have selected five top 
industries f rom each group (which together account for 80 per cent of total 
industrial licensing) for study. 
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TABLE V 
CHANGE IN THE RELATIVE SHARE OF C O N S U M E R - G O O D S , INTER-
MEDIATE-GOODS, A N D INVESTMENT AND RELATED-GOODS INDUS-
TRIES IN TOTAL INDUSTRIAL LICENSING DURING 1957-1963 
<n<;i Change in 1963 Import category 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 3 o v e r 1 9 5 7 
Consumer goods 60.4 36.6 —23.8 
Intermediate goods 28.1 30.3 + 2.2 
Investment and related goods 11.5 33.1 + 2 1 . 6 
j y -
Let us first look at the changes in the distribution pattern of industrial 
licences among these 15 industries. The relative share of consumer-goods 
industries in total industrial licensing has followed a downward trend over the 
period. The one significant exception has been the "soap, perfumes, cosmetics, 
etc.", industry group, whose share in total industrial licensing increased f rom 5.1 
per cent in 1957 to 8.4 per cent in 1963. Another thing to note is the change in 
the relative positions of the individual industries in the consumer-goods group. 
In 1957, the textile industry's share was the highest in the consumer-goods group; 
but by 1963 it had slipped to a third position. On the other hand, the "soap, 
perfumes, etc." group, which occupied four th position in this group in 1957, 
claimed the highest share in 1959. The "edible-oil" industry whose share was 
insignificant in 1957 ranked fourth in 1963. 
In sharp contrast to the downward trend in the relative shares of the con-
sumer-goods industries is the general increase in the share of every industry in 
the "investment-goods" group. The sharpest increase occurred in the "basic-
metal" industries — f rom 1 per cent in 1957 to 7.7 per cent in 1963. However, 
the relative positions of various industries in this group remained pretty much 
the same: the " t ransport-equipment" and "electrical-equipment" industries, 
occupying first and second positions respectively in 1957, continued to stay 
there in 1963. The only change was a reversal in the relative positions of "non-
metallic" ( f rom third to four th) and "basic-metal" industries ( f rom four th to 
third). The "metal-product" industry continued to retain the f if th position. 
The relative share of intermediate-industries group remained practically 
unchanged. The most significant "events" in this group are: /) a considerable 
decline in the share of the "weaving, spinning, etc." group f rom 10.8 per cent 
in 1957 to 6.8 per cent in 1963; ii) and an equally significant increase in the 
share of "chemicals and pharmaceuticals"; and ///) the emergence of the "paper 
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TABLE VI 
THE SHARE OF "TOP" IS INDUSTRIES (CLAIMING 81 PER CENT) IN TOTAL 
INDUSTRIAL LICENSING 
1957 percentage share in total licensing 
1963 percentage share in total licensing 
Percentage change in absolute amount licensed., in 1963 over ; 1957 
A. Industries Producing Consumer Goods 
Textile and clothing 2L03 Edible oils 10.12 Tobacco manufacturing 7.31 Soap, perfumes, cosmetics and other inner toilet requirements 5,05 Printing, publishing, etc. 3.57 Domestic hardware negligible 
4.33 S.24 2.37 
8.39 negligible 3.80 
negative negative negative 
365.74 
477,01 
Total: 47.08 26.13' 55.59 
(Per cent change in all consumer-goods industries = 69,74) 
B. Industries Producing Intermediate Goods 
Weaving, spinning, and thread spooling Chemicals and pharmaceuticals Rubber and rubber manufacturing Leather manufacturing Dyeing, dye-mixing and calendering Paper and paper manufacturing Paints and varnishes 
Total: 
10.80 6,76 5.50 5.78 8,54 314.63 3.36 negligible — 2.6 2.08 169.80 1.15 negligible — negligible 4.81 489.50 negligible 1.89 382.75 
23,78 24.08 183.97 
(Per ceut change in all intermediate-goods industries = 205,26) 
C. Industries Producing Investment and Related Goods 
Transport equipment Electrical equipment Non-metallic equipment Basic metals Metal products 
T o t a l : 
(Per cent change in all investment-goods industries — 695.69) 
15 Industries as per cent of totallicensiug 81.00 81.00 181.73 
5.04 9.50 428,63 2.17 8.23 965.67 1.38 3.51 610.47 i.01 7,7 f 2025,00 0.55 2.23 1046,66 
10.15 31,16 762.23 
Source : Computed from the data provided by the CCI&E (6]. 
66 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
and paper-manufacturing" industry, whose share increased f r o m a negligible 
amount (in percentage terms) in 1957 to 4.8 per cent of total industrial licensing 
in 1963, and of the "paints and varnishes" industry, whose share increased f rom 
a negligible amount to 1.9 per cent during the same period. 
It may be interesting to see the changes in the relative positions of various 
industries with respect to their relative shares in total licensing on an overall basis. 
In other words, instead of ranking industries by their percentage shares within 
their respective groups, we now rank them by their relative position in all the 
three groups taken together. This has been done by picking out five industries 
whose relative share in industrial licensing has been the highest. All industries 
whose relative position in overall ranking is less than fifth, are termed as "low". 
TABLE VII 
THE OVERALL RANKING OF INDUSTRIES BY THEIR RELATIVE SHARES 
IN TOTAL INDUSTRIAL LICENSING: 1957-1963 
1957 1963 
Textile industry 1 low 
Weaving and spinning 2 low 
Tobacco manufacturing 3 low 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 4 2 
Soap, perfumes and other toilet requirements 5 4 
Electrical equipment low 3 
Transport equipment low 5 
Basic metal low 1 
It can be seen that: i) whereas in 1957 consumer-goods industries were 
on top, in 1963 the investment-goods and intermediate-goods industries occupied 
the top position; ii) "chemicals and pharmaceuticals" rose f rom the fourth io 
the second posit ion; and iii) within the investment-goods industries group, the 
"basic metal" industries occupied the top position in 1963. 
These trends are "conf i rmed" when we look at the four th column of Table VI 
which gives the percentage rates of increase in the shares of various industries 
over the period. The basic-metal group recorded the highest rate of increase of 
2025 per cent. Also the highest "growth" rates are concentrated in the invest-
ment-industries group, ranging between 428 per cent for "transport equipment" 
to 2025 per cent for "basic metal" . Other significant increases occurred in the 
shares of "paper and paper manufactur ing" (489.5 per cent), "domestic hard-
ware" (477 per cent), "paints and varnishes" (382.8 per cent), "chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals" (314.6 per cent), and "leather manufactur ing" (169.8 per cent). 
Naqvi: Allocative Biases of Pakistan's Commercial Policy 67 
Before we conclude this section, it should, however, be emphasized that the 
picture emerging f rom this study is only partial, because many of these indus-
tries met their import requirements for capital goods and spare parts f r o m their 
bonus-voucher earnings. This is particularly true of cotton-textile and jute-
textile industries which have to meet a significant part of their import require-
ments in this fashion. 
It should also be noted that changes in the relative shares of different indus-
tries in total industrial licensing are not always accurate indicators of the relative 
growth rates of these industries; for not all industries are equally dependent on 
imports. This is particularly true of cotton-textile and jute-textile industries 
whose entire raw-material requirements are met f rom domestic sources. How-
ever, in the case of capital-goods industries, such an inference about relative 
growth rates is less objectionable, because all of these industries are largely 
dependent on imports. 
The Allocative Biases of Commercial Licensing Policy: 1959-1963 
We next turn to commercial licensing. The results of our study are given 
in Tables VI11 (a) and VIII(b). 
It can be seen f rom Table VI 11(a) that the relative shares of CG and R„ in 
total commercial licensing increased by 3 per cent, but that of Co remained 
almost constant. This reversal of trends occurred also in the case of Rca. But 
in the case of Ca there was a still greater increase. 
However, if we consider the entire 1955-1963 period, then there is the same 
tendency for the relative shares of R„ and CQ to decline and for those of R„ 
and Ca to increase. 
The details of these changes in the four broad commodity groups are given 
in Table VIII(b) in the Appendix. A comparison of the last three columns shows 
that whereas changes during 1955-1959 and 1955-1963 are similar in signs, there 
is a divergence between the direction of change in the 1959-1963 period and in the 
1955-1963 period. This " improvement" in the relative shares of C„ and R„ is 
probably due to the introduction of " O G L " licences in 1960, which were pre-
sumably biased in favour of C0 and Rco. The fall in the share of Rca is wholly 
attributable to a reduction in the licences issued for the imports of "brake fluid, 
etc." group. The trends in Ca are the same for all the three periods. 
Summary 
Our study of the allocative biases of import-licensing policy reveals an 
unmistakable trend towards a greater emphasis on capital goods and raw material 
for capital goods as compared to consumer goods and raw material for consumer-
goods group. This is what one would expect. As industrialization has pro-
TABLE V i n ( a ) 
PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN COMPOSITION O F I M P O R T LICENCES ISSUED UNDER COMMERCIAL LICENSING: 1955-1963 
Import category 
1955 as per cent of total commer-cial licensing 
1959 as per cent of total commer-cial licensing 
1963 as per cent of total commer-cial licensing 
Net change in 1959 over 1955 
Net change in 1963 over 1959 
Consumer goods (Co) 31.9 15.3 3.5.5 —16.6 +0 .2 
Raw material for consumer goods (Rco) 18.6 8.1 10.1 —10.5 +2 .0 
Raw material for capital goods (Rca) 35.2 57.7 40.3 +22.6 —17.4 
Capital goods (C a) 14.3 18.9 34.1 H-4.6 + 15.2 
Source: Table VIII(b) in the Appendix. 
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ceeded apace in Pakistan, the domestic demand for the imports of consumer 
goods and raw material for consumer goods has been increasingly met f r o m 
domestic production. At the same time, the requirements of domestic indus-
tries for the imports of capital goods and raw material for capital goods have 
increased. Import-licensing policy has reflected these trends in domestic pro-
duction. 
The trends in "industrial licensing" during 1957 and 1963 also conform to 
this pattern. The licences issued to capital-goods and intermediate-goods indus-
tries have increased over t ime; while the relative share of consumer-goods indus-
tries has decreased. Although this part of the study gives only a partial picturei° 
of changes in the import requirements of various groups of industries during 
1957-1963, yet this is what one would expect to have happened. Whereas the 
domestic requirements of consumer-goods industries for spare parts, etc., may 
be met by domestic capital-goods industries, the machinery and spare parts 
"needed" by these latter classes of industries have to be imported f rom abroad. 
All. THE ALLOCATIVE BIASES OF EXPORT-PROMOTION POLICY: 1959-1963 
/ 
In this section we propose to discuss, in the light of available data, the allo-
cative biases of Export Bonus Scheme, which remains the most important in-
strument of export-promotion policy in Pakistan. The object of the scheme, it 
will be recalled, is to secure an exportable surplus greater than would otherwise 
be for thcoming by subsidizing exporters of manufactured goods on a selective 
basis at the expense of importers. This subsidy is given in the fo rm of import-
bonus vouchers, which exporters can sell at a premium in the market . Thus, the 
subsidy, instead of being paid by the government, is provided by the importers 
who buy import-bonus vouchers. For example, if an exporter earns foreign 
exchange worth rupees 100, he will receive not rupees 100 but 100 [1 + 0 . 2 (1.5)J— 
130, if the rate of bonus is 20 per cent and the rate of premium on the bonus 
vouchers is 150 per cent. The importer on the other hand has to pay rupees 
(20 + 30) = 50 for an import entitlement of rupees 20. Thus, the importer pays 
a subsidy of rupees 30 to the exporter. Let us now investigate the ways in which 
the scheme can influence the composition of domestic investment. 
First, Export Bonus Scheme tends to raise the domestic prices of exports. 
This will normally be the case unless the domestic supply of exports is perfectly 
elastic. This will induce greater investment in export industries, but will at the 
same time repel consumers f rom buying the high-priced export goods. Both 
factors will work to increase the export surplus. 
Secondly, Export Bonus Scheme could influence investment flows by raising 
the domestic prices of imports. This is so because the cost of imports to the 
loit is partial because a considerable part of these requirements has been satisfied through 
imports under the Export Bonus Scheme and commercial licensing. 
70 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
importer is increased by the positive premium that he has to pay in order to obtain 
the entitlement to import. This, in turn, may lead to a lesser expenditure on 
imports by importer. However, this is unlikely to happen because, in view of 
the excess demand for imports, importers can make profits even after paying the 
higher price. A higher price of foreign exchange will, therefore, fail to deter 
importers f r o m spending the increased amount of foreign exchange made avail-
able to them through Export Bonus Scheme. 
It has also been argued that a positive premium per se tends to raise the 
domestic prices of imports. In other words, importers can successfully shift the 
burden of the higher cost of foreign exchange on to the consumer. Now, it is 
obvious that a positive premium by itself cannot cause the domestic prices of 
imports to rise, for a high rate of premium on import-bonus vouchers is merely a 
symptom of the excess demand for imports, which keeps their domestic price 
above the world prices. It is the high prices of imported goods which cause the 
high premium, not the other way round 11. The level of premium merely reflects 
the scarcity price of foreign exchange. Import-licensing policy, by giving foreign 
exchange to importers at the official rate, lets the scarcity premium—the difference 
between the lower foreign supply price and the higher domestic price—accrue to 
importers. The Export Bonus Scheme simply cuts into this importers "rent", 
which then accrues to exporters. 
Thirdly, Export Bonus Scheme may influence the composition of investment 
by bringing about a change in the composition of imports. As we know, exporters 
who get import-bonus vouchers have the option of either using them for their own 
imports or selling them in the open market at a premium. There is, thus, an oppor-
tunity cost (equal to the level of premium) associated with the "own-use" of the 
import-bonus vouchers. It has been argued that the high level of premium on 
import-bonus vouchers has induced exporters to sell them in the market, rather 
than using them to meet their own import requirements. Now, the general pre-
sumption is that this will encourage greater imports of consumer goods, particu-
larly of the "luxury" goods, since their supply being the most stringently curtailed 
under "normal" l icensing 1 2 , these goods promise high profits. On the other 
hand, if the exporter himself uses these vouchers, he will import capital goods 
and raw meterial or spare parts "required" by him. 
To examine this hypothesis, we have classified the imports under Export 
Bonus Scheme according to our classification scheme into CM R „ , Rca and C,, 
The changes in the composition of import licences issued are then compared with 
the changes in the average level of premium during 1959-1963. 
nit may be interesting to recall what Ricardo had to say 011 the causes of high rent in 
England. He wrote, " Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because 
the corn is high", see f8, p. 40], Later, on page 42, he calls liigh rent as "symptom" and not 
the "cause" of the high prices of corn. 
1 2 A I I licences issued by the CCI&E, except those issued against import-bonus vouchers, 
are called "normal" licences. 
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TABLE IX(a) 
THE LEVEL OF PREMIUM AND THE COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS UNDER 
EXPORT BONUS SCHEME: 1959-1963 
(in per cent) 
The average level of premium 
Composition of import liccnces issued for the import of " ^ 
1959 1963 Net per cent change 
163 144 — 19 
Consumer goods 24.3 14.1 — 10.2 
Raw material for consumer good;; 27.8 3t ,0 + 3.2 
Raw material for capital goods 8.1 9.1 + 1.0 
Capital goods 39.8 45.S j- 6.0 
Source: Table IX(b) in the Appendix. 
U can be seen that there has occurred a fall in the liccnces issued for con-
sumer-goods imports and a corresponding rise in the share of R c o , R c a and C a . 
This appears to "confirm" the view that the decline in level of premium induces 
the importers to import RM and Ca rather than CQ. 
But the evidence given in Table IX(a) should not be taken at its face value. 
Any such association is purely accidental. Our view is that the level of premium 
exercises little or no influence on the composition of imports. For one thing, the 
level of premium has fluctuated so widely from month to month that it is hard 
to believe that it could have exercised any definite and predictable influence on 
tbe composition of imports. 
Furthermore, the view thai Ihere is an opportunity cost associated with the 
own-use of import-bonus voucher ignores the important fact that an opportunity 
cost is associated with not using the bonus vouchers for "own-imports" also. 
This is the cost13 for exporters of not getting enough import licences to meet 
their own ''requirements", or having to buy them from the market at a higher 
price. Our view is that the composition of imports made against import-bonus 
vouchors is determined wholly or mainly by the relative excess demand for various 
classes of imports. This is, after all, the very rationale of the Export Bonus 
Scheme: to permit importers to import goods for which the excess demand is the 
greatest. 
UThis cost will be the higher the more restricted are the imports needed by the exporter under import licensing. 
TABLE X(a) 
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF LICENCES ISSUED UNDER EXPORT-BONUS SCHEME 
AND COMMERCIAL LICENSING: 1959-1963 
1959 
i 
1963 Net change 
i Import category [ 
| 
\ 
As % of total licensing under E.B.S. 
! As % of total i licensing j under CX. 
i 
As % of total licensing under E.B.S. 
| As % of total licensing ' under C.L. E.B.S 
I 
! C.L. 
1 
Consumer goods 24.3 15.3 14.1 15.5 —10.2 +0.2 
Raw material fox consumer goods 27 % 8.1 , 31.0 10.1 +3.2 +2-1 
Raw material for capital goods 8.1 57.7 9.1 40.3 + 1.0 —17.4 
Capital goods 39.8 1S.9 45. S 34.1 + 6.0 + 15.2 
Note: E.B-3. stands for export-bonus scheme. Source: Table X(b) in the Appendix for first and third C.L. stands for commercial licensing. columns; Table VXIX(a) for the second and fourth columns. 
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Table IX(a) should, therefore, be interpreted to mean that over the period 
1959-63, there was greater excess demand for R„ , R„ and C, than for C,. 
The decrease in the relative share of C, and an increase in that of R „ , under 
Export Bonus Scheme, are easily explained. During the 1959-63 period, the 
imports of consumer goods were greater than in the previous period under "com-
mercial" licensing. This was because of the introduction of open-general licences 
(OGL) in 1960. On the other hand, the licences issued for R„ declined sharply. 
The increase in R,, and C. took place even though greater allocations were also 
being made under commercial licensing. Table X(a) compares licences issued 
under the Export Bonus Scheme and commercial licensing. 
A detailed comparison is given in Table X(b) in the Appendix. The greater 
excess demand for R„ , Rco and C, is also indicated by the fact that most of 
domestic industries in the country had considerable excess capacity because of an 
insufficient supply of spare parts, etc. 
Summary 
We have considered in this section the various ways in which Export Bonus 
Scheme may influence resource allocation. It has been found that the scheme by 
itself does not have any independent effect on the composition of imports made 
against import-bonus vouchers. The sole effect of the scheme is to permit greater 
imports of the commodities in excess demand and, insofar as it enables the im-
porters to import R „ , Rca or C, , it premits the domestic industries (the export 
industries in particular) to work at fuller capacity. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the preceding sections, an empirical study of the allocative biases of Pak-
istan's commercial policy has been made. We have mainly concentrated on a 
study of import-licensing policy and Export Bonus Scheme. 
Our analysis of Export Bonus Scheme has shown that its funct ion is to induce 
the exporters "covered" by the scheme to export more than they otherwise would, 
Also, additional imports, permitted under the scheme, may allow domestic indus-
tries to operate more efficiently. But the scheme, by itself, does not exercise an 
independent influence on the composition of imports made against import-bonus 
vouchers. 
This leaves us with import-licensing policy. Our detailed study of Pakistan's 
import-licensing policy revealed that, during the 1953-63 period, there was an 
unmistakable tendency for the licences allocated for importing capital goods (Ca) 
and raw material for capital goods (Rca) to increase at the expense of consumer 
goods (Co) and raw material for consumer goods ( R „ ) " . Our study also revealed 
MA study of the distribution pattern of import licences issued under Export Bonus Scheme also revealed the same trend over the 1959-63 period (the scheme, it will be recalled, was introduced in 1959). 
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that, although the relative share of licences issued to consumer-goods industries 
was greater initially than the relative shares of intermediate-goods and invest-
ment-goods industries, the differences in their relative shares gradually narrowed 
over the 1957-63 period, and finally, in 1963, the share of investment-goods 
industries exceeded that of consumer-goods industries* 5 . 
If we consider these two sets of data together, the one relating to licences 
issued for importing Co, Rco, Rca and O type of goods, and the other pertaining 
to the licences issued to various types of industries — then it appears that import-
licensing policy, during 1953-1963, had sought to provide for an increasingly 
greater supply (domestic production plus imports) of capital goods and of raw 
material for capital goods. This was done by earmarking bigger chunks of 
import licences both for the direct import of finished capital goods as well as for 
the raw material and spare parts used as inputs in the home production of these 
goods, as compared with similar allocations for the direct imports and home pro-
duction of consumer goods. 
Insofar as these trends in the composition of import licences reflect a deli-
berate attempt by the CCI&E to influence the composition of domestic invest-
ment in the "desired" direction, such a policy seems to have been consistent 
with the overall development strategy. 
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Statistical Appendix 
TABLE IH(b) 
RELATIVE SHARE OF MAJOR COMMODITY G R O W S IN TOTAL LICENSING 
(INDUSTRIAL PLUS COMMERCIAL PLUS OCAC) 
(1953/54 —1958/59) 
j 1953/54 i 1958/59 Net percentage change in 1958/59 over 1953/54 
Commodity group | Amount j (million rupees) Per cent of total licensing Amount (million rupees) Per cent of total licensing 
A. Consumer Goods (C 0) 
Food 
Textile and clothing 
Cigarettes and tobacco 
Toilet requirements 
Beverages 
Drugs and medicines 
Stationery and related items 
Glass and glassware 
" Furniture 
Musical instruments 
Domestic hardware 
Clocks and watches 
Rubber manufacturing 
Miscellaneous 
Total (Co): 
11.24 1.81 18.74 2.40 +0.59 23.76 3.82 19.56 2.50 —1.32 7.82 1.26 1.71 negligible —1.00 3.20 negligible 2.07 negligible — 1.47 negligible 2.21 negligible — 
30.40 4.89 44.14 5.65 +0.76 26.32 4.24 7.50 0.96 —3.28 3.21 negligible 2.94 negligible — 
0.32 negligible negligible negligible — 0.13 negligible 0.37 negligible — 0.13 negligible 1.59 0.20 — 0.68 negligible 0.79 negligible — 
1.15 negligible 1.65 0.25 — 4.44 0.71 6.22 0.79 +0.08 114.26 18.49 102.47 15.00 —3.49 
-(Contd.y 
TABLE 111(b)—(Contd.) 
Commodity group 
1953/54 1958/59 
Amount | Per cent of total \ Amount i Per cent of total (million rupees) i licensing | (million rupees) licensing 
Net percentage change in 1958/59 over 1953/54 
B. Raw Material for Consumer Gooes (Rco) 
Oil and oilseeds and other seeds 7.50 1.21 11.74 1.50 +0.29 
Silk, cotton yarn and thread 67.35 10.84 15.25 1.95 —8.89 
Chemicals and gas 21.88 3.52 12.36 1.58 —1.94 
Rubber material 3.93 0.63 3.72 0.60 —0.03 
Film and photography 2.10 negligible 5.26 0.67 T 
Optical and optical instruments . 0.91 negligible 0.67 negligible 
Tobacco unmanufactured 2.76 negligible 6.20 0.79 T 
paper and paperbcard 6.78 1.09 7.86 1.00 —0.09 
Dyes and paints and varnishes 22.62 3.64 14.54 1.86 —1.78 
Miscellaneous 18.48 2.97 11.85 1.52 —1.45 
Total (Rcc): 154.26 24.86 85.78 13.00 —11.86 
•(Contd.)-
TABLE 111(b)—(Contd.) 
Commodity group 
1953/54 1958/59 Net percentage change in 1958/59 over 1953/54 
I 
Amount (jmillion rupees) Per cent of total licensing Amount (million rupees) Per cent of total licensing 
C. Material Chiefly for Capital Goods (Rca) 
Arms and ammunition 0.80 negligible 1.66 negligible — 
Building material 3.69 0.60 2.78 0.32 —0.28 
Rubber manufacturing 9.41 1.51 11.82 1.51 — 
Chemical material 3.88 0.65 2.67 0.34 — 
Cane, wood ana timber 7.34 1.18 5.63 0.72 —0.46 
Brake fluid, grease, oil, etc. (includes OCAC) 148.38 23.88 240.71 30.81 + 6.73 
Clay and glass material 4.46 0.72 4.74 0.61 —0.U 
Miscellaneous 1.27 negligible 1.01 negligible —0.26 
Total (Rca): 179.22 28,86 276.11 37.20 +8.30 
<Cnntd.\-
T A B L E IH(b)—(CoticM.) 
Commodxty group 
1953/54 1958/59 Net percentage change in 1958/59 over 1953/54 Amount {million rupees) Percent of total licensing Amount (million rupees) Per cent of total licensing 
D. Capital Goods (Ca) 
Metal products 13.10 2.11 49.51 6.34 +4.23 
Electrical equipment 18.97 3.05 17.69 2.62 —0.79 
Transport equipment 28.39 4.57 59.85 7.66 +3.09 
Non-metallic equipment 108.49 17.46 104.97 13.43 —4.03 
Miscellaneous 2.59 negligible 9.02 1.15 + 1.15 
Total (Ca): 170.84 27.69 240.84 34.83 +7.12 
E. Total Licensing: 621.42 781.30 
Note: The shares below 20 per cent are termed "negligible". Source: Computed from the data provided by the CCI&E [6]. 
TABLE Vm(b) 
COMPOSITION OF THE LICENCES ISSUED TO COMMERCIAL IMPORTERS: 1959-1963 
i 1959 1963 Net percent-age change in 1963 over 1959 
Net percent-age change in 1959 over 1955 
Net percent-
Commodity group | Amount j (million j rupees) 
i 
1 % of total I commercial j licensing 
Amount (million rupees) 
1 j % of total 1 commercial | licensing 
! 
age change in 1963 over 1955 
Consumer Goods (Co) e. 
Food 10.46 2.2 23.61 3.2 + 1.0 +0.3 + 1.3 
Textile and clothing 2.55 0.5 3.96 0.5 — —0.9 — 
Cigarettes and tobacco 0.25 — — _ — — 
Toilet requirements 2.48 0.5 1.72 0.2 —0.3 —0.4 —0.7 
Beverages 2.04 0.4 2.40 0.3 —0.1 — 
Drugs and medicines 43.18 8.9 64.28 8.8 —0.1 —1.9 —2.0 
Stationery and related items 7.62 1.6 12.05 1.6 — —0.4 —0.6 
Glass and glassware 2.02 0.4 1.72 0.2 —0.2 — . —0.2 
Furniture — — „ _ — — — 
Musical instruments 0.30 — 0.36 — — 
Domestic hardware 0.16 — 0.74 — — — — 
Clocks and watches 0.91 — — _ — — — 
Rubber manufacturing 0.25 — 0.35 — — — — 
Miscellaneous 2.06 0.4 2.44 —0.3 —0.1 —0.1 
Total (Co): 74.29 15.3 113.58 15.5 +0.2 —16.6 —16.4 
(Contd^i 
TABLE Vm(b)—(Contd.) 
Commodity group 
1959 1963 Net percent-age change in 1963 over 1959 
Net percent-age change in 1959 over 1955 
Net percent-age change in 1963 over 1955 
Amount (million rupees) 
% oftotal commercial licensing 
Amount (million rupees) 
% oftotal i commercial j licensing 
Raw Material for Consumer Goods (RCo) 
Oil and oilseeds and other seeds 5.64 1.2 9.34 1.3 +0.1 +0.5 +0.6 
Silk, cotton yarn and thread 2.15 0.4 1.42 0.2 —0.2 —10.3 —10.5 
Chemicals and gas 9.74 2.0 28.09 3.8 +1.8 +0 .6 + 1.4 
Rubber material 0.72 — 2.13 0.3 +0.3 — +0.3 
Film and photography 5.10 1.1 7.04 1.0 —0.1 +0.4 +0.3 
Qpticals and optical instruments 0.61 — 1.47 0.2 +0.2 — — 
Tobacco unmanufactured 0.70 - - 0.60 — — — — 
Paper and paperboard 1.64 0.3 — — —0.3 —1.4 — 
Dyes and paints and varnishes 10.43 2.2 29.20 4.0 + 1.8 +0.3 +2.3 
Miscellaneous 2.29 0.5 1.76 0.2 —0.3 —0.2 —0.5 
Total (Rco): ' 39.03 8.1 81.04 11.1 + 3.0 —10.5 —7.5 
(Contd) 
TABLE Vff l (b ) - {Concld. ) 
Commodity group 
1959 1963 ! s Net percent-1 Net percent-age change inlage change in 1963 over ! 1959 over 1959 1 1955 
Net percent-age change in 1963 over 1955 
Amount (million rupees) 
% oftotal commercial licensing 
Amount (million rupees) 
% of total commercial licensing 
Raw Material for Capital Goods (RCo) 
Arms and ammunition 1.41 0.3 0.49 —0.3 — — 
Building material 0.97 — 0.80 — — —1.3 —1.3 
Rubber material 13.89 2.9 27.25 3.7 + 1.2 +0.5 +1.3 
Chemical material 1.27 0.3 3.45 0.5 + 0.2 —0.2 — 
Cane, wood, timber, etc. 5.19 1.1 8.83 1.2 + 0.1 —0.1 - • -
Brake fluid, oil, etc. (includes allocations to OCAC) 250.98 51.8 234.63 32.1 —19.7 +23.5 —3.8 
Clay and glass material 5.20 LI 2.81 0.4 — 0.7 +0.1 —0.6 
Miscellaneous 0.66 — — — — — — 
Total ( R c a ) : 279.57 57.7 294.44 40.3 —17.4 -j-22.6 + 5.2 
Capital Goods (Ca) 
Metal products 20.74 4.3 108.12 14.8 + 10.5 +2.0 + 12.5 
Electrical equipment 10.84 2.2 6.11 0.8 — 1.4 +0.6 —0.8 
Transport equipment 27.34 5.6 71.19 9.7 + 4.1 + 1.2 +2.9 
Non-metallic equipment 32.64 6.7 7L54 9.8 + 3.1 + 3.0 + 6.1 
Miscellaneous — — — — — — — 
Total (C a): 91.57 18.90 256.97 35.14 + 16.24 +4.6 +20.8 
Total Licensing: 4 8 4 . 4 5 731.09 
Source: data provided by the CCI&E [6]. 

TABLE X(b)—(Contd.) 
CO 
Commodity group 
1959 1963 
Net change in 1963 over 1959 E.B.S. 
Net change in 1963 over 1959 C.L. Amount licensed E.B.S. 
% oftotal licensing under E.B.S. 
Amount licensed E.B.S. 
% of total licensing under E.B.S. 
B. Material Chiefly for Consumer Goods (Rco) 
Oil and oilseeds and other seeds 1.76 2.3 4.71 2.3 „ +0.1 
Silk, cotton, wool, yam and thread 3.66 4.S 51.38 25.1 -1-20.3 —0.2 
Chemicals and gas 10.24 13.7 3.63 1.8 —11.9 + 1.8 
Rubber material 0.72 0.9 negligible — —0.9 + 0.3 
Film and photography 0.10 — 0.35 — — —0.1 
Opticals and optical instruments 0.13 „ negligible — — +0.2 
Tobacco unmanufactured 0.10 — negligible — — — 
Dyes, paints and varnishes, etc. 3.59 4.7 0.57 negligible —4.7 + 1.8 
Paper and paperboard 0.20 — 1.72 0.8 +0.8 —0.3 
Miscellaneous 0.46 — 0.76 negligible — —0.3 
Total (Rco): 21.13 27.8 63.24 31.0 +3.2 +3.0 
C. Material for Capital Goods (Rca) 
Arms and ammunition 0.07 — 3.23 1.6 + 1.6 —0.3 
Building material 0.31 — 1.68 0.8 +0.8 — (Contd.) — 
5 
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TABLE X(b)—(Concld.) 
1 1959 | 1963 
Net change in 1963 over 1959 E.B.S. 
Net change in 1963 over 1959 C.L. 
X Commodity group Amount licensed E.B.S. 
% oftotal ! licensing ! under E.B.S. j 
Amount licensed E.B.S. 
% of total j licensing j under E.B.S. 
cT Ci 
<5 
to 
Rubber material negligible — 5.30 2.6 +2.6 + 1.2 5" 
1 
Chemicals 2.11 2.7 0.98 negligible —2.7 + 0.2 
Cane, wood, timber, etc. 0.14 — 0.54 negligible — +0.1 
Brake fluid, grease, oil, etc. — — — —19.7 2J, 
Clay and glass material 2.24 2.5 2.81 1.4 —1.5 —0.7 f-\ 
Miscellaneous 1.42 1.9 2.20 1.1 —0.8 - - ^ 
Total (Rca) : 6.15 8.1 18.64 9.1 + 1.0 —17.6 ri S' D. Capital goods (C a) 
Metal products 7.19 9.4 9.92 4.8 —5.4 + 10.5 g 
•5' Electric equipment 1.88 2.4 19.89 9.7 + 7.3 —1.4 
Transport equipment 1.02 1.3 45.63 22.3 +21.0 +4.1 
Non-metallic equipment 19.92 26.2 37.84 18.5 —7.7 + 3.1 
Miscellaneous 0.31 — 0.19 negligible — — 
Total (C a): 30.31 39.8 93.57 45.8 +6.0 +16.24 
Total ( A + B + C + D ) : 76.05 2P4.28 
Source: Computed from the data provided by the CCI&E [6]. 
CO 
Import Licensing 
in Pakistan 
Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi 
This chapter first appeared as an article in the Spring-1964 issue of 
The Pakistan Development Review and is the result of the research carried out 
by the author at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. 
The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. Philip S. Thomas, the 
then Research Advisor at the Institute, for helping him throughout the preparat ion 
of this paper. Helpful comments were made by Dr. Mark W. Leiserson, Dr. 
Stephen R. Lewis, Dr. Eric Gustafson, the then Joint Director, and Research 
Advisors, respectively. Special thanks are due to Mr. Afazuddin Ahmad, Assis-
tant Controller of Imports and Exports, with whom the author had several long 
discussions about the mechanics of the system. 
Because of the lack of published material about the import-licensing system, 
numerous conversations were required with persons in the import business and 
in government. While individual acknowledgement is not possible, the assis-
tance received is most appreciated. The only published sources used are the 
successive issues of Pakistan Trade for the years 1947-63, published monthly by 
the Department of Trade Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, Government of 
Pakistan for the three basic documents of the government: The Import Policy, 
the Explanatory Statements of Commerce Minister on the Import Policy, and 
the Basis of Licensing. 
The author alone is responsible for the views expressed herein and for any 
errors that still remain. I 
Dr. Naqvi is at present a Senior Research Economist at the Pakistan Ins-
titute of Development Economics. 
Import Licensing 
in Pakistan 
Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi 
INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan's import trade in the private sector is regulated by an elaborate 
licensing system. It is complex in its structure and detailed in its operation. The 
structural complexity of the system arises f rom the simultaneous operation of 
different types of licences which seek to regulate the import sector in micro-
scopic detail. It regulates the volume of imports, the composition of imports, 
and, in certain cases, even the sources of imports. 
This elaborate system is administered by the Chief Controller of Imports 
and Exports (CCI&E), in the Ministry of Commerce, who is the principal 
licensing authority in the country. His task is to assess import needs and then 
to allocate scarce foreign-exchange resources earmarked for the private sector. 
In arriving at his decisions, he is guided, on the one hand, by the latest market 
intelligence reports regarding the price trends of imported commodities as the 
indicators of what the market actually needs and, on the other hand, by official 
views of what the market should need, and in what proport ion, to conform to 
the broader scheme of ensuring an optimal allocation of domestic resources. 
The formulat ion of the semi-annual Import Policy, which is the sum-total of 
all these varied and complex decisions is, therefore, a momentous undertaking, 
and occupies a central position in the broader strategy of economic planning. 
It is the purpose of this study to present an analytical description of the 
working of the licensing system in Pakistan, and to raise questions concerning 
the implications of the system for resource allocation in the country. The study 
is divided into six sections. While the first section is introductory, in the second 
we describe the overall administrative framework within which the licensing 
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system operates. In the third section are discussed the main objectives of the 
licensing system and the nature of the decision-making process involved in 
translating these objectives into the import policy. The next section is concerned 
with a description of ways in which these decisions are implemented. In the 
fifth section, we focus our attention on the implications of a particular import 
policy on the allocation of domestic resources. The concluding section raises 
certain questions about the operation of the system which are important for 
policy decisions. 
II 
The licensing system in Pakistan is closely linked with the exchange-control 
system which regulates both the inflow and outflow of foreign exchange. On 
the one hand, exporters are required to surrender their entire foreign exchange 
earnings to the State Bank of Pakistan. The foreign-exchange expenditure on 
imports, on the other hand, is regulated by a high-level Foreign Exchange 
Committee, which is charged with preparing the annual Foreign Exchange 
Budget, and acting as watchdog on the foreign-exchange position of the country 
throughout the year 1 . 
The Foreign Exchange Budget, a secret document, is an uptodate, compre-
hensive record of the foreign-exchange position of the country. It includes a 
review of the past and an estimate for the future, on the receipts as well as 
on the expenditure side. Foreign-exchange expenditure in the budget period is 
limited by the expected accruals of foreign exchange during the year plus the 
extent, decided by the Committee, to which the foreign-exchange reserves are 
to be drawn down. A part of foreign exchange (about one-fifteenth) is auto-
matically designated for imports in the private sector made under the Export 
Bonus Scheme [1] (to be discussed below). The remaining foreign-exchange ex-
penditure is divided, in ratios determined by the Committee every year, between 
the public and private sectors 2 . (The proport ion in recent years has been about 
one-third public and two-third private.) The foreign-exchange allocation to the 
public sector is distributed among the various ministries by the Committee 
which fur ther specifies how much each ministry can spend on developmental 
and nondevelopmental imports. These allocations are made on the basis of 
budgets presented to the Committee by the various ministries, with high priority 
being given to on-going projects. 
'The Committee is composed of seven members, with the Finance Secretary acting as 
Chairman. The other members are Secretaries of the Ministries of Commerce, Industries, 
Agriculture, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and a representative of the Planning Commission. A 
representative of the State Bank of Pakistan is a consultant to the Committee. 
Separate allocations are made for the public and the so-called semi-public sectors, the 
latter including institutions like the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), 
the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), and the Industrial Deve-
lopment Bank of Pakistan (IDBP). 
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The allocation to the private sector is made on the basis of the estimates 
of private-sector needs presented to the Committee by the Ministry of Commerce, 
The Foreign Exchange Committee is, however, empowered to scale down these 
estimates if it thinks that these claims cannot be fully accommodated in view 
of the foreign-exchange position of the country. The Committee, however, does 
not further specify, as it does in the case of public-sector imports, how much of 
this allocation can be spent on developmental and nondevelopmental imports. 
This is left to the discretion of the CCI&E. 
The Foreign Exchange Budget is approved by the Cabinet af ter which the 
budgeted foreign-exchange expenditure cannot be exceeded without its prior 
approval. Although these allocations are tentatively made on yearly basis, 
utilization of these allocations (both in the public and private sectors) is 
authorised, again by the Foreign Exchange Committee, for only one six-month 
shipping period at a time. (The two shipping periods are January-June and 
July-December.) 
The actual disbursement of foreign exchange is done through the Exchange 
Control Department of the State Bank of Pakistan which maintains three 
separate foreign-exchange accounts. Account No. 1 is credited with 20 per cent 
to 40 per cent (depending on the permissible rate of bonus) of exchange earnings 
f rom the export of commodities included under the Export Bonus Scheme. 
The balance of foreign-exchange earnings is then credited to Account No. 2, 
for government imports and other payments, and to Foreign Exchange Account 
No. 3 for private imports and other payments, in ratios determined by the 
Foreign Exchange Committee. Although marginal adjustments between Account 
Nos. 2 and 3 may be made by the Committee, no such adjustment is allowed 
to take place between Account No. 1 and the other two accounts. 
After the Foreign Exchange Committee has completed its work, the 
CCI&E prepares the semi-annual Import Policy which is announced by the 
Commerce Minister on the eve of each shipping period. The Import Policy 
includes a general survey of the import position and presents a comprehensive 
list of the goods to be imported. (The detailed decision-making underlying this 
policy will be explained below.) 
It is the major responsibility of the CCI&E to issue licences to private 
importers against foreign-exchange accruals to Account No. 3. This is called 
"cash licensing". In addition, the CCI&E issues foreign-aid licences, called 
aid "sub-authorizat ions" against the Public Authorizations (PAs) issued by the 
Economic Affairs Division, President's Secretariat. Bonus licences are also 
granted by the CCI&E on the basis of import-bonus vouchers issued by the 
State Bank of Pakistan against accruals to Account No. 1. 
The above discussion indicates the limits of the jurisdiction of the Chief 
Controller of Imports and Exports and highlights his central task, namely, the 
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Committee in the Ministry of Commerce, of which the Secretary, Ministry of 
Commerce, is the Chairman, and the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports 
is a membeH. It is the j o b of the Committee, inter alia, to specify the commodi-
ties which are to be included or excluded f rom the import list in each shipping 
period. 
The decisions of the Chief Controller are also influenced by the recom-
mendations of the Import Advisory Council, in the Ministry of Commerce, 
chaired by the Commerce Secretary and on which the CCI&E also sits. This 
committee includes as members representatives f r o m Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry. The broad-based membership of the committee (numbering 
about 50) enables the Chief Controller to have a cross-section of official and 
nonofficial opinion on the advisability of making marginal changes in the import 
list, and tends to reduce the element of arbitrariness in such decision. 
The Chief Controller has also to decide on the commodities which should 
be taken off the import list permanently, i.e., "banned", if the country becomes 
"self-sufficient" in such commodities. In doing this, he is guided mainly by the 
recommendations of Tariff Commission. These recommendations are .generally 
accepted by the CCI&E, but lie can reject them, and he can even ban imports 
of certain items without the recommendation of the Tariff Commission, if in 
his judgement ample supplies of import substitutes are domestically available. 
The task of assessing the needs of industries is entrusted to the Directorates 
of Industries of East Pakistan and West Pakistan. If machinery is to be imported 
for the creation of new industrial capacity, the CCI&E seeks the advice of 
these Directorates of Industries, who, in turn, are guided by the general invest-
ment policy of the Central Permissions Committee in the Ministry of Industries 
(whose responsibility is to sanction new investment and determine its composi-
tion in every year). The investment policy of the Central Permissions Com-
mittee is influenced by the allocation for new investment made in the Indus-
trial Investment Schedule prepared by the Ministry of Industries. This Schedule 
sets ceilings on new investment and investment for balancing and modernization. 
Thus, in deciding on the imports of machinery required for setting up new 
industries, the Chief Controller has little independent discretion, for no new 
capacity can be created without the approval of the Central Permissions Com-
mittee. 
In deciding how much of each commodity is to be imported during a given 
shipping period, the Chief Controller assesses market "requirements" of the 
included commodities by observing price movements. If the price of a certain 
*The Committee consists of IS members: the Commerce Secretary (Chairman); the Chief 
Controller; the Controllers of Lahore and Chittagong; the Deputy Controller, Incharge, 
Karachi; the Secretary of Commerce, Labour and Industry, East Pakistan; Directors of 
Industries, East and West Pakistan; and representatives from the various ministries of 
the Central Government. 
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commodity has risen considerably in the previous shipping period, it is taken 
as an indication that this good is in 'short supply'. Imports of such commodities 
are liberalized within the limits of foreign-exchange availabilities. There is a 
Price Check Unit within the CCI&E's office, to keep a record of changes in 
the prices of imported commodities. Also, the Chief Controller regularly enter-
tains representations f r o m the importers of the included commodities and takes 
their views into account in allocating foreign exchange to various items. But 
again, the CCI&E reserves the right to reject or accept such applications. In 
the case of making changes in imports of machinery, raw materials, and spare 
parts, the Chief Controller, in practice, accepts the assessment of each importer's 
needs made by the provincial Directorates of Industries. In cases where the 
Tariff Commission recommend "partial protection" to certain industries, the 
Chief Controller takes their opinion into account in reducing the imports of 
such items. In this way, the Controller is in a position to combine in a certain 
fashion the market decisions (conveyed to him by the Price Check Units) and the 
official decisions of the Provincial Directorates of Industries and the Tariff 
Commission. 
In addition to these decisions, the Chief Controller has also to decide who 
should import the commodities included in the import list. He has full powers 
to include or exclude any person f rom the list of "eligible" importers. The 
manner in which the eligibility of importers is determined is explained below 
in connection with the description of commercial and industrial licensing proce-
dures. 
IV 
In addition to deciding what to import, how much to import, and who 
is to import, the Chief Controller has the task of i) allocating each of the imports 
on the import list to each eligible importer, and ii) to fix the monetary limit for 
both. (The monetary limit for each commodity is fixed to prevent excess imports 
of certain commodities to keep the relative price structure in a desirable rela-
tionship, and to satisfy the relative needs for consumption and investment; the 
limit for each importer is set to prevent an undesired degree of concentration of 
import trade in a few hands.) The Chief Controller has also to ensure that the 
import trade does not become the monopoly of a few regions. Again, all this 
has to be done for all importers in every shipping period. 
For the sake of administrative convenience, total private-sector imports 
are broadly divided between ' industrial ' and 'commercial ' imports. The former 
consist of machinery, spare parts, and raw materials, imported by 'industrial 
importers ' for their own use. The common characteristic of 'commercial* 
imports is that they are resold by the 'commercial importer ' , who is a middle-
man and not a final user. While the bulk of commercial imports are consumer 
goods, raw materials are also imported for resale. 
Naqvi: Import Licensing in Pakistan 95 
In implementing final licensing decisions, the CCI&E is assisted by three 
principal government agencies: i) Provincial Directorates of Industries; ii) the 
Central Ceilings Committee; and iii) three regional Licensing Boards. (Both ii) 
and iii) are under the Ministry of Commerce.) The allocation of industrial 
licences, to be explained below, is based essentially on the assessments made by 
the Provincial Directorates of Industries. The Central Ceilings Committee, besides 
participating in the decisions as to which goods should be imported, also helps 
the CCI&E in allocating the foreign exchange available for private-sector imports 
between industrial and commercial imports, among the various commodities as 
well as the various regions. It is then the task of the three regional Licensing 
Boards, located in Karachi , Lahore, and Chittagong, to determine the size of 
the licence (for every specified commodity) to be granted to each of the eligible 
importers located in their respective regions 5 . Each board consolidates its 
decisions in a "Basis of Licensing", which is published within a few days of the 
announcement of the Import Policy. The issuance of licences to importers, both 
industrial and commercial, is done after the publication of these Bases of 
Licensing. 
Commercial Licensing 
Once these Bases of Licensing are announced, the CCI&E and the regional 
controllers have the task of issuing licences to eligible commercial importers 
in each region in each shipping period. The difficult task involved in singling out 
the "eligible importers" f rom a large number of potential importers has entailed 
the adoption of "a rule of thumb" , which defines eligible importers as those 
who had import performance to their credit during the period July 1950-
November 1952, when there was essentially free importing under the Open 
General Licence (O.G.L.) system. 
Under this O.G.L. system, any importer f rom any part of the country 
could import any amount of the commodities put on the so-called "O.G.L. 
XI I I " list. By this notification, the CCI&E announced the commodities that 
could be imported in a particular shipping period. Importers could then open 
a letter of credit with their banks and order shipment of the goods. When the 
Korean War boom ended, Pakistan's export earnings fell rapidly and the 
O.G.L. system was suspended in November 1952. The Chief Controller im-
pounded all licences issued in the preceding shipping period (July-December 1952) 
and reissued them under the "category system" which remains the core of 
commercial licensing today. 
STtie Karachi Licensing Board has four members: the Chief Controller of Imports and 
Exports (Chairman), representatives of Central Ministries of Industries and Finance, and 
the Director of Industries, West Pakistan. The Lahore and Chittagong Licensing Boards also 
have four members each, with the regional Controllers of Imports and Exports as their Chair-
men. Other members are representatives of the Provincial Ministries of Finance, Commerce 
and Industries. 
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Under the category system introduced in January 1953, each importer of 
the O.G.L. period was given a monetary "category" for each type of goods 
that he imported. The monetary value of each category was determined by 
average imports during the five O.G.L. shipping periods between July 1950 and 
December 1952. A category is uot a definite commitment by the government 
to issue to the importer a licence of equivalent value, but rather it is in the 
nature of a standardized unit of account; the actual value of each licence, 
specified in the Basis of Licensing, is expressed as a certain percentage of the 
monetary value of each category. The variation in this percentage is the main 
instrument by which the CCI&E enforces a liberal or a stringent Import Policy. 
A category signifies that its holder is considered an eligible importer. Each 
"category holder" is entitled to only one regular licence for one specified com-
modity in a shipping period. (One importer, however, can hold more than one 
category if he imported several types of goods during the O.G.L. base-period.) 
It will be noted that the category system enables the CCI&E to determine 
simultaneously the commodities to be imported and the importers eligible to 
receive licences. It enables him to start the issuance of licences within a few 
days after the announcement of the Bases of Licensing. It was, however, felt 
that the category system tended to be overtly rigid with respect to both the 
commodities that could be imported and also the number of eligible importers 
in a given shipping period. To remedy these shortcomings of the system, two 
new types of licences have been introduced — automatic licences (also called 
"repeat" licences) and a new type of Open General Licence. 
Automatic Licensing 
The automatic licensing system is essentially an extension of the category 
system in that it enables the category holders to get more than one licence in 
one shipping period for the import of those items on regular licensing which are 
also on the automatic list. Under this system, an importer becomes entitled 
to another licence (a repeat licence) as soon as he had utilized the first licence (the 
initial licence). Repeat licences are issued at 100 per cent of the value of the 
initial licence. So long as the total foreign-exchange allocation is not exceeded, 
there is no limit to the number of repeat licences that an importer can get during 
one shipping period. It depends on how soon he utilizes them. As a proof of 
utilization,-the commercial importer has to furnish a bill of lading of a value 
equal to at least 75 per cent of the previous licences. Category holders can 
••Previously, a bill of entry was required. However, the policy has been to reduce the items for which the bill-of-entry requirement holds. When the scheme was started in 1961, a bill of entry was required as a proof of utilization for all the commodities allowed to be imported under the scheme, Furthermore, in order to discourage any speculative stock accumulation before issuance of any' licence, importers are required to submit a declaration that stocks held by them or by their banks on their behalf have been liquidated. This restriction applies to all types of licences. 
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receive automatic licences only for such commodities in respect of which they 
hold a category and only up to the value they are allowed under regular licensing. 
For instance, if a category holder is granted a regular licence of a value which 
is, say, 75 per cent of his category, he can apply for an automatic licence of 
that amount. 
The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports announces a list of commodi-
ties allowed to be imported under the automatic licensing system at the time 
of announcing the Import Policy 7 . He also fixes the maximum and minimum 
limits on the value of permissible imports of each of the included commodities. 
As under the category system, one licence is valid for only one commodity. 
However, one person can get more than one licence; in fact, as many 
automatic licences as he has categories, provided all of these items are also on 
the automatic list. 
The purpose of automatic licensing was to introduce flexibility into the 
rigid category system by allowing category holders to get more than one licence 
in one shipping period for those items which are on both the regular as well 
as the automatic list. The automatic system encourages a speedy utilization of 
licences and discourages speculative stock accumulation, since an importer can 
get another licence as soon as the existing one is utilized and the stocks sold 8 . 
Open General Licence (OGL) 
Perhaps the most heralded component of the commercial licensing system 
is the reintroduction of a new "O.G.L ." system in 1961. The purpose of the 
new O.G.L. is to allow new importers to have access to foreign exchange and, 
especially, to enourage new importers f rom regions of the country where 
there were no (or few) importers during the 1950-52 base-period. 
The present O.G.L. , however, is much more restricted than the old O.G.L. 
system. In order to encourage new importers, no industrial licence holder can 
'The list of items put on automatic licensing is published as an annexure to the Import 
Policy. 
sit is claimed for the system that it tends to lower the prices of the goods imported under the scheme by liberalizing imports and by promoting greater competition and efficiency in the import trade. However, contrary to the popular notion, the advantages arising out of the greater efficiency in the import trade may not be passed on to the consumer. For, given the amount of foreign exchange allocated to imports, the inclusion of new firms will reduce the quotas of others but, as the supply of imports remains the same, the prices of imported goods may not fall. The entry of new importers will, however, reduce the profits of the established importers. If more foreign exchange is allocated to an item when it is placed on automatic licensing, as is often the case, then the resulting fall in prices, if any, will be due to greater imports and not due to automatic licensing per se. The same results could be approximated under any system of licensing simply by allocating a greater amount of foreign exchange to private imports. Prices may, however, fall under the system as the importer will now have less incentive to carry large stocks as he can get another licence as soon as the previous licence is utilized. With any given amount of imports, a decline in the inventory-sales ratio would increase the effective supply and tend somewhat to lower prices. 
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apply for a new O.G.L. licence; and similarly, there is a prohibition against all 
commercial licencees with categories in excess of Rs. 1,000 during the July-
Decemper 1960 shipping period. Furthermore, a wider regional distribution of 
licences is promoted by excluding importers located in Karachi, Lahore, Dacca, 
Narayangan j and Chittagong f rom the list of those eligible to receive an O.G.L. 
licence. In addition, the Chief Controller fixes, in each shipping period, the 
items that can be imported against the O.G.L. and the monetary limit for each 
licence 9. Moreover, any existing or future restrictions placed on the import of 
any item automatically apply to licences issued under the O.G.L. system. For 
example, certain items can be imported only for East Pakistan. 
Within these limitations, which appear sizeable, anybody interested in 
importing an item placed under the O.G.L. should be able to get a licence for 
any item listed. The importer, however, has to get himself registered, for which 
he must fulf i l several formalities. The applicant has to apply on a prescribed 
form and must submit his application by a certain deadline, which is generally 
the end of February and July for the first and second shipping period, respec-
tively. However, once he is registered as an eligible importer, all he has to do 
thereafter is to open a letter of credit with his bank. His bank arranges the 
necessary licence for him (it is claimed) in 24 hours. Each O.G.L. importer is 
eligible for only one licence but repeat facilities are available (as under auto-
matic licensing). The O.G.L. licences are for one shipping period only, at the 
end of which the importer must reapply if he wants a licence for the following 
period. 
The scope of the new O.G.L. has been gradually enlarged by increasing 
the number of items allowed under this type of licence and by raising the 
minimum units admissible for various items. The O.G.L. list now consists of a 
variety of items, like iron and steel, tractors and tractor spares, spare parts for 
automatic vehicles, tyers and tubes, drugs and medicines, and books. It was 
claimed by the Commerce Minister that as a result of the introduction of the 
O.G.L. 'the newcomers outnumber the category-holders' [2]. This statement 
should not, however, be taken to mean that the total amount of foreign exchange 
licensed under the O.G.L. is larger than that licensed under regular licensing; 
exactly, the opposite is true. Over 90 per cent of commercial licensing is still 
done within the category system. However, a net addition has been made to 
the ranks of importers, and wider regional distribution of import licences has 
probably been achieved. 
Industrial Licensing 
In implementing his decisions regarding industrial licensing, the CCI&E 
is faced with a more complicated problem than in commercial licensing. As in 
9The O.G.L. list is published as an annexure to the Import Policy. 
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commercial licensing, he has to allocate foreign exchange to each industrial 
goods and to each industrial importer in every shipping period. In addition, he 
makes foreign exchange available separately for the "current requirements" of 
the existing installed capacity and for the creation of new capacity. He also 
makes a distinction between industries producing mainly for home production 
and those producing for exports. 
In tackling the first problem, the CCI&E has relied on the Provincial 
Directorates of Industries. The Directorates have evolved a "quota system" to 
routinize the issue of licences to industrial importers for the import of raw 
materials and spare parts. Under this system, each eligible industrial importer, 
called the "quota-holder", is assigned a quota signifying that its holder is an 
eligible importer and specifying his "requirements" for industrial raw materials 
and spare parts for one shipping period. This enables the Provincial Directorates 
to determine simultaneously the commodities (i.e, spare parts and raw mate-
rials) which should be imported, and the industrial importers who are eligible 
to import them in each shipping period. 
Most of the existing quotas were created on the basis of survey of industrial 
units, started in 1955/56. It was provided that similar industrial surveys would 
be regularly undertaken by the Provincial Directorates of Industies so that 
new quotas could be created. (It will be noted that unlike categories which have 
not been increased, the creation of quotas is a continuing process.) The Provin-
cial Directorates specify the percentage of his quota that each quota-holder 
will be allowed in each shipping period. Having done this, the Directorates 
issue to each quota-holder an "assessment certificate" which indicates his 
' requirements ' for raw materials and spare parts to operate on a single-shift 
basis. The CCI&E then issues industrial licences called 'regular industrial licences' 
largely 011 the basis of these assessment certificates. 
The CCI&E also issues licences for importing machinery for new industrial 
capacity in the country. However, as pointed out earlier, the Central Permissions 
Committee, in the Ministry of Industries, is mainly responsible for sanctioning 
the creation of new capacity and the balancing and modernization of the exist-
ing industries in the private sector. Accordingly, applications for new industries 
are received by the Central Permissions Committee. Upon their approval, appli-
cants become entitled to industrial licences which are automatically issued 
by the CCI&E. Furthermore, a person intending to establish a new industry, 
or planning to add to an existing one, also becomes entitled to an industrial 
licence if his loan application to the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporat ion or to the Pakistan Industrial Development Bank is accepted. 
The acceptance of a loan application implies the approval of the Central Ceilings 
Committee and, similarly, results in the automatic issuance of a licence by the 
CCI&E. 
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The CCI&E, thus, issues industrial licences exercising little discretion of 
his own for machinery, spare parts, and raw materials in each shipping period. 
These licences are not interchangeable (e.g., a machinery licence is valid only 
for the import of machinery; it cannot be used to import raw materials or 
spare parts). However, their actual issuance, as in the case of commercial licences, 
follows the announcement of the Bases of Licensing. These regular licences are 
issued only once in a shipping period. (However, applications for additional 
licences in the case of emergency replacements of machinery are always 
entertained.) 
Licences on Request Basis 
The CCI&E also issues licences on a request basis to encourage certain 
industries with an export performance or an export promise. For this purpose, 
in 1961 a survey was made of industries with an export potential or export 
performance, and licences were issued to eligible units within these industries 
to meet their requirements of balancing and modernization. Repeat facilities 
were extended to this group of industries, i.e., the "request importer" can get 
more than one licence in one shipping period under the system. At the beginning 
of each shipping period, the Controller announces a list of industries put 011 
the "Request Basis". According to the scheme, industries are divided into three 
subgroups: i) industries which are licensed on the basis of their request for 
the shipping per iod; ii) industries to which initial licences for each shipping 
period are given at 80 per cent of the value licences in the preceding shipping 
period (further licensing to this group depends on their export per formance) ; 
and iii) industries which are licensed on the same basis on which they were 
licensed in the preceding period 10. 
The industrial importer in the first group is required to make an assess-
ment of his requirements of raw materials and spare parts for the ensuing 
twelve months (instead of the usual period of six months). Licences are issued 
immediately for the amounts likely to be utilized in one shipping period and, 
for the balance, an imdertaking is given to the applicant that a licence or sub-
authorization will be issued to him, subject to the availability of foreign exchange, 
well before the commencement of the next shipping period. In this group are 
included nine industries, such as sports goods, surgical instruments, tanning and 
carpet-making, which are all established export industries. These industries 
fo rm the "request group proper" and get licences on the basis of their own 
assessment of their needs, so long as these estimates are not too unreasonable. 
Generally, a request which does not exceed the industries' requirements to 
operate on three-shift capacity is treated as reasonable. 
The licensing procedure for the request group requires the applicants to 
file with their applications for licences a schedule showing the dates for which 
lOThree separate lists of such industries are published as an annexure to the Import Policy. 
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confirmed irrevocable letters of credit will be established. Where the applicants 
do not operate on the basis of a letter of credit, they are required to indicate 
their programme of shipment. 
Provisions have been made to ensure that the industries falling in groups 
ii) and iii) fulfi l their export promise. The general procedure is to require proof 
of the utilization of the previous l icence 1 1 . Subsequent licences are then issued 
at 100 per cent o f f . o .b . value of exports. Those who fail to fulf i l their export 
undertakings have to surrender an equivalent amount of foreign exchange in 
bonus vouchers. (These restrictions do not apply to the first group of industries.) 
It may be noted that the scheme seeks to remove supply bottlenecks in 
respect of import requirements of only those small export industries which are 
established exporters, and not of any of those which may have an export promise. 
Import Bonus "Vouchers 
In addition to the commercial and industrial licences, a part of the private-
sector imports is made against import-bonus vouchers issued under the Export 
Bonus Scheme, introduced in 1959 as an additional incentive to exporter. 
Under the scheme, exporters are allowed to retain a specified part (usually 
between 20 per cent to 40 per cent) of their foreign-exchange earnings (called 
the bonus) in the form of "import-bonus vouchers". The State Bank of Pakistan 
is committed to issue bonus vouchers equal in value to accruals to Account 
No. 1 in a given shipping p e r i o d 1 A . Bonus vouchers are marketable and command 
a positive premium in the market . On the basis of these vouchers, the CCI&E 
is obliged to issue "bonus licences". The bonus importer is free to import any 
item, whether industrial or commercial, on the bonus list announced by the 
Chief Controller with the Import Policy. 
Import-bonus vouchers (and the bonus licences) are issued against Account 
No. 1 and, hence, formally fall outside the pale of the regular licensing system. 
Nevertheless, the Chief Controller regulates the effectiveness of the system 
in many important ways. First, as pointed out above, the import-bonus list is 
drawn up by the CCI&E, and he has the powers to expand or curtail it. More 
fundamental ly, the C C I & E also prescribes in every shipping period the rate 
of bonus which each exporter is allowed. He also has the power to include or 
exclude any exporter in the list of covered industries. Thus, although falling out-
side the scope of the regular licensing system, the bonus vouchers should be 
considered as a significant supplement to it. 
It is important to note that the system of import-bonus vouchers is based 
on principles entirely different f rom those on which the licensing system is 
nUtilization in this context means opening of irrevocable letter of credit for 100 per 
cent of the value of the shipment or, at least, 75 per cent of the value of earlier licences, 
12See page 91. 
102 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
based. Another important difference between the two systems is that whereas 
the licences issued under the latter system are granted at the official rate of 
exchange, those issued under the former can be bought only at the market rate 
(i.e., at a positive premium) which, due to the excess demand for imports, is 
substantially higher than the official r a t e 1 3 . 
v 
We have now before us a picture of the scope, structure, mechanics, and 
rationale of the licensing system. We must, however, take into account the 
direct and indirect effects that licensing policy may have on resource allocation. 
In our present study, we cannot say anything definitive about the actual effects 
that licensing policy has had. But it is important to note that there does exist 
a crucial relationship between licensing policy and the pattern of domestic 
resource allocation. 
Because of extensive controls over the import of capital, intermediate, and 
consumption goods in the private sector, the government influence directly the 
levels aud composition of consumption and investment in the economy and can 
also influence the pattern of investment by allocating larger or smaller amounts 
to particular types of industrial imports. The ultimate impact of these direct 
control measures, however, cannot be assessed without taking into account 
the fact that the licensing system has very important indirect effects on the 
investment choices between consumer-goods and capital-goods industries. The 
decision whether to import spare parts or raw materials or to produce them 
in Pakistan is influenced by the allocation of import quotas for the items them-
selves. These indirect effects flow f rom the protective aspects of the licensing 
system. Protection affects the relative profitabilities of undertaking various 
production activities and/or the per cent of capacity at which existing facilities 
are utilized. If smaller amounts of luxury consumer-goods imports were licen-
sed, the resulting high prices of such goods would increase the profitability 
of new investment in the luxury-goods industries. On the other hand, if capital 
goods, spare parts, and raw materials were liberally licensed, the lower prices 
of these goods would mean lower profitability and less domestic investment for 
the production of such goods. 
In addition to its effect on the relative profitability of investment in different 
industries, the licensing system also influences both directly and indirectly the 
basic investment choice between producing for the domestic market and for 
exports. The system of request licences, covering industries with an export 
"performance" and prescribing penalties for these who do not fulfil their 
promise, helps and encourages the covered industries. In addition, the Export 
I31t must, however, be pointed out that the rate of premium on bonus vouchers sold in 
the market does not measure the extent to which the rupee is overvalued. This would be so if 
all imports were made against bonus vouchers. It is, however, a rough indicator. 
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Bonus Scheme is a direct financial incentive to industries with an export 
promise. These direct effects are export-promoting. 
The indirect effects of licensing, however, strongly favour product ion for 
the domestic market. The regular licensing system not only has different indirect 
effects on various industries producing for the domestic market (as noted above) 
but, in general, the restriction on imports encourages production for the pro-
tected domestic market relative to exports. While these effects are generally 
recognized, it is seldom realized that the Export Bonus Scheme also has import-
ant protective effects. Whereas the rate of bonus determines the incentive to 
export, the height of the premium, besides being a determinant of the magnitude 
of the export incentive, is also a measure of the degree of protection 
provided to import substitution, actual and potential, of the goods imported 
under the scheme. Thus, by manipulating the rate of bonus and influencing the 
rate of premium, the licensing authorities affect the relative profitability of 
producing for exports or for domestic use. A high rate of bonus accompanied 
by a relatively low level of premium will provide a greater relative incentive to 
exports than to import substitution, compared with a high-level premium 
combined with a low rate of bonus. Thus, while a higher premium directly en-
courages exports, it gives a relatively larger indirect encouragement to import 
substitution 1 '*. 
VI 
The preceding sections have presented: the place of the licensing system 
in the broader setting of exchange controls; the objectives of the system and the 
fundamenta l decision-making required to give these objectives a practical 
shape; the mechanics of the system, indicating the mode of its implementation; 
and finally, the implications that licensing policy may have for resource alloca-
tion. Because this study has been essentially a detailed description of the licensing 
system, no summary will be attempted. Rather, this final section will stress 
certain aspects of licensing requiring fur ther research. 
One basic question concerns the administrative efficiency of the licensing 
system: how well is it performing the j o b for which it was designed? Do the 
various authorities involved have adequate staff and sufficient basic inform-
ation to per form their tasks effectively and to achieve their desired objectives ? 
From our description, it is clear that many agencies, officers, and committees, 
both central and provincial, are involved. How well are these groups coor-
dinated ? 
Another question relates to the actual impact of the licensing system on 
the composition of imports and the allocation of resources. Commercial and 
industrial licensing cover only a part of total imports. How large is this part 
HFor a more rigorous demonstration of this point, see [3]. 
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relative to other imports — public sector, semi-public, bonus-voucher, project 
aid, and c o m m o d i t y aid? What have been the past trends in imports of con-
sumer, intermediate, and capital goods ? Which industries have been encouraged 
by the direct and indirect effects of the licensing system? What are the policy 
alternatives to the licensing system: import surcharge, licence auctioning 
multiple exchange-rates, devaluation, etc.7 How will each of these policies 
ration foreign exchange among competing uses? 
Although our descriptive study does not provide answer to these important 
questions, a few comments on the effectiveness of the licensing system may be, 
in order, based on certain general characteristics of the system itself. There is a 
general realization in the government that the licensing system's reliance on 
rigid categories and quotas has undesirable effects. It is rigid both with respect 
to the number of the commodities that can be imported and the number of 
importers who can import them. A majo r part of the total import trade is con-
centrated in the hands of the category- and the quota-holders, and "monopoly" 
or "unearned" profits accrue to them due to the excess demand for imports 
at the current rate of exchange. Accordingly, the government has taken various 
steps, noted above, to introduce greater flexibility and competitiveness into the 
system. 
The limited experience with the reformed licensing system has not been 
particularly encouraging, however. The automatic licensing system seems to 
have stimulated a scramble for licences and the tendency to import even in 
excess of current requirements; and the facility to new entrants provided by 
the O.G.L. has flooded the CCI&E's office with new applications much in 
excess of the total foreign-exchange availability. Moreover, the system of request 
licences provides a strong incentive to the importer to present exaggerated 
requests. Furhermore, there is evidence that a blackmarket exists in import 
licences, which command a positive premium depending 011 the intensity of 
demand for the imported goods. The blackmarket may become all the more 
active because of the government 's efforts to encourage entry of smaller im-
porters into the import business and to ensure a wider regional distribution 
of import licences. For, the so-called small man, particularly the one situated 
in up-country, finds it safer to sell his import licence to the bigger importer 
(the big category-holder) who knows the import business better i-. 
The result has been increased burdens on the CCI&E to ensure that repeat 
licensing does not simply lead to large stocks of imported goods; to check that 
isApart from the social and moral considerations, blackmarketing in licences may be, to 
some extent, a good thing from an economic point of view. Those willing to pay a premium 
for the licence may well have greater need for the items to be imported than the licence-holder, 
or they may be able to put such items to a more efficient (or at least more profitable) use. 
Furthermore, a blackmarket may tend to cancel out the inefficiency involved in the govern-
ment's policy of encouraging very small importers who have to buy in small lots and who have 
little experience in import trade. 
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the requests for industrial licences are not 'too unreasonable' to make certain 
that export promises are fulf i l led; and to take special steps to discourage black-
marketing in import licences, etc. Thus, there is reason to believe that decisions 
tend to be more minute under the present so-called " re fo rmed" system than 
under the older category-cwm-quota system. A vicious circle, therefore, seems 
to exist, in which the attempt to "liberalize" the import trade creates a situation 
in which it has to be regulated still more rigorously. 
The basic problem is that, at the current rate of exchange, there exists an 
excess demand for imports. The licensing system had been introduced to ration 
foreign exchange in order of 'essentiality' among competing uses and the users 
at the fixed official rate of exchange. The category and the quota systems were 
devised to cope with the inevitable consequences of such a policy. In a situa-
tion where licences are riches, an attempt to relax controls may make things 
more difficult for CCI&E. This reflects the fact that it is the undervaluation 
of foreign exchange, as much as anything in the licensing system itself, which 
is responsible for making the system so difficult to administer. 
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Notes on the Concept of 
Import Substitution 
Gordon C. Winston 
"I meant by 'impenetrability' that vve've had enough of that subject, and 
it would be just as well if you'd mention what you mean to do next, as I 
suppose you don't mean to stop here all the rest of your life". 
"That's a great deal to make one word mean", Alice said in a thoughtful tone. 
"When I make a word do a lot of work like that", said Humpty Dumpty, 
"I always pay it extra" [2]. 
By these rules, " import substi tution" should be paid extra since it has been 
used to mean many different things. These notes are intended, therefore, to 
clarify or at least specify some of the issues and ambiguities surrounding dis-
cussion of import substitution in the hope that fu ture research and policy can 
thereby be more efficiently directed and these, sometimes muddied issues, can 
thereby be more clearly understood. Since its objective is to point up sources 
of conceptual confusion that have appeared in import-substitution studies and 
policies, distinctions will be drawn sometimes too sharply where this is useful , 
even at the risk of oversimplifying a complicated problem. Finally, it should 
be clear f rom the outset that the paper makes no pretence at ma jo r originality. 
There is wide agreement that import substitution means "the domestic pro-
duction of that which would otherwise have been impor ted" 1. But agreement 
here only pushes dissention back a step since few will agree on what " . . . would 
otherwise have been i m p o r t e d . . . " As with any game of What Would Have 
Been, the outcome is often determined by unspecified assumptions. So this 
phrase sets the outline of the ambiguities surrounding import substitution. 
lOr "an increase in . . ." , but that is not an issue here. 
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A. History or Strategy 
The most important variable in specific studies or questions of import 
substitution is their focus — whether they describe a-long run historical pattern of 
import substitution (coincidental with time, growth, increasing autarky or some-
thing) or whether they deal with a development strategy by which import sub-
stitution is to be induced. 
This distinction is critical in part because of the attention received by Che-
nery's attribution of an important place to import substitution as a cause of 
economic growth [3] 2. It has been too easy to suggest f rom his evidence that a 
strategy of import substitution can cause growth. Much of the persuasive 
appeal of this suggestion might have been avoided, had Chenery spoken of import 
substitution as "a concomitant" of economic growth or something else, rather 
than "a cause" — the smell of post hoc is awfully strong. 
But the issue is more than a logical nicety since the conditions under which 
import substitution occurs are very different in the two cases. Chenery's study 
referred to import substitution as a change in the pattern of a country's imports 
brought about by changes in comparative advantage. These, in turn, were the 
results of changing relative factor endowments, increasing labour skills and the 
economies of scale that result f rom expanding incomes. Import substitution 
induced by these long-run structural changes is a far cry f rom the import sub-
stitution that may be brought about by a policy of closely licensed imports under 
disequilibrium exchange rates and it is highly improbable that a relative increase 
in domestic product ion under these two very different circumstances would 
have the same effect on a country 's growth 3 . In short, import substitution may 
always accompany economic growth, yet a policy that tries to force import 
substitution may have repercussions that stifle growth. Whatever else we can 
learn f rom extant long-run historical or cross-section studies, they are not going 
to tell us whether an import-substitution strategy will encourage economic 
development. 
B. Growth or Autarky 
Accepting that our primary interest is in import-substitution policies, rather 
than history, the next question is the purpose of an import-substitution policy. 
Imports can be reduced relative to domestic product ion (or relative to What 
Would Have Been) in order a) to achieve a higher rate of growth of income, or 
b) to achieve a lesser "dependence on" or "vulnerability to" the uncontrollable 
actions of foreigners. 
2 This is no place to quibble about the historical applicability of cross-section results. 
3Infant industry arguments blur this useful distinction. To the extent that they are rele-
vant (and specific baby industries can be identified), and import-substitution policy may itself 
induce changes in comparative advantage by inducing scale- and time-economics. But other 
policies may do this more efficiently [11], 
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There is little question that our primary concern is economic growth and 
that autarky as a social goal may be antithetical to growth. But though the 
gospel of autarky itself may arise f rom political ideology, its recommendat ions 
will often parallel those of that large body of purely economic pessimists who 
see developing countries as facing declining export earnings (and capital flows) 
hence the necessity to reduce dependence on foreigners through import subs-
t i t u t i o n . Both are autarkic since each, for its own reason, ignores export ex-
pansion and tries, instead, to reduce imports. 
An apparently similar if less emotional kind of autarky rests on the idea of 
the "essentiality" of imports •— that dependence on foreign supplies per se may 
not be objectionable, but, due to weather, war, shipping strikes or business cycles 
in advanced nations, the country's export earnings will fluctuate uncertainly 
and—applying Stigler's classic point [13] to aggregates'*—any policy that reduces 
a country's ability to change its level of imports in this uncertain world carries 
an appreciable cost. In simplest terms, this cost is measured by the increase in 
required international reserves (in an assumed capital-poor country). 
Looking more closely at these apparently similar concerns, an interesting 
conflict appears. On the one hand, the traditional view that the exporter of 
primary products faces limited world demand for its exports (with or without 
declining terms of trade) sees the country as suffering an import (=expor t ) 
constraint to its growth. Given inadequate growth of imports, then adequate 
growth of domestic income obviously requires a reduction in the ratio of 
imports to domestic income. So on this basis, the desirable direction of more 
"independence" f r o m foreign trade lies in a reduction of import coefficients. 
On the other band, if a country "replaces imports" by the usual type of 
import-substitution pol icy—producing finished goods domestically, and using 
its imports to bring in goods at progressively "earlier" stages of production—it 
increases the proport ion of domestic value added that is supported by its imports 
and thereby reduces the flexibility of imports, i.e., it increases the domestic cost, 
in lost income, of any given reduction of impor ts 5 . It is obviously cheaper for 
a society to cut back §100 worth of finished rayon shirt imports that support §3 
of domestic income and retail employment than it is to cut back $100 worth of 
chemical cellulose that supports a §500 output of rayon shirts and $400 of 
domestic income and employment. In importing progressively less processed 
products, imports will have become more complementary to domestic income 
and employment, increasing the social cost of variations. This comes up again 
later in a critical way. 
•Which is, that lowest absolute cost output may be attained with a plant that is incapable 
of achieving these low costs over a wide range of operating levels. A different plant design 
might give somewhat higher minimum costs, but maintain these over a usefully wider range of 
outputs. 
s Unless substitutability with domestic production is increased concurrently, which seems most unlikely. 
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So the static or smooth equilibrium path argument discourages a country's 
dependence on imports per se, calling for lower import coefficients, while the 
emphasis on flexibility stresses a country's vulnerability to fluctuations in foreign 
demand, hence its "independence" f r o m trade is to be found by increasing the 
import coefficients so that any necessary change in imports is less magnified in 
its impact on domestic income and employment. 
Barring evidence to the contrary, however, the contradiction between these 
concepts of "independence" would not seem to require too much concern simply 
because too many factors are likely to modify the conclusions of this very sim-
plified sort of model. First, systematic "movement back" in the level of 
processing of the products imported will not affect all industries at the same 
time — it will proceed unevenly between industries (as it must in the light of 
interrelationships on the supply side). There would, on this count, be a residual 
of "11011- (or less-) essential" imports of finished goods which could be varied 
with little impact 011 income and employment*. This consideration would 
certainly recommend against concentrating all imports in intermediate goods, 
but it wouldn' t recommend against any or even most imports being made up of 
intermediate goods. 
Second, and more realistically, both Chenery's evidence [3] and Kindle-
berger's theoretical emphasis [7] suggest that by far the most important aspect 
of "import substitution" is the change in the pattern of imports and demand. 
The pattern of imports changes systematically not only because imports in-
creasingly consist of goods that are less highly processed, but also because of 
changes in the pattern of final use — new products are imported as the old ones 
are increasingly domestically produced. 
Both of these considerations reduce the threat of inflexibility in the process 
of "moving back" in production stages of imports. But they stress the im-
portance of the composition of imports. 
C. Aggregate, Sectoral or Industrial 
All this immediately implies something about the need for disaggregation. 
Autarky (in its ideological as well as unexpandable export-market versions) 
requires a decline (relative or absolute) in aggregate imports. Its rationale 
depends on aggregates and, as illustrated above, autarky stands up less well in 
either version when disaggregation is accepted. (Note, too, that on the export 
side, "disaggregation" leads to less pessimistic views of the possibilities of ex-
panding exports.) 
A Though this is certainly not the sole criterion on which such decision of "essentiality" 
would be made. 
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D. Fixed Investment or Increased Investment 
A good deal of Australian energy in the late 1950's was needlessly expended 
for want of explicit recognition that an import-substitution policy can have 
either of two effects (or both): a) it can influence the allocation of the country's 
fixed quantity of investible resources, favouring investment in those industries 
that produce import-competing goods; or b) it can change the level of investible 
resources available to the country. The difference between these two bases of 
analysis is the complexity of the secondary effects of the investment that have 
to be considered. If total investment is fixed and its allocation alone is the 
question (as in the usual case of a savings constraint on investment), then the 
income effects of an investment in an import-competing industry can be ignored. 
The fixed amount of investment would have increased incomes anywhere and 
the fact that this investment is in an import-competing industry makes no differ-
ence-. But if the investment in an import-competing industry is net new invest-
ment that would otherwise not have taken place, then in addition to the direct 
effects of that investment (on saving, consumption, imports, output) it 
must be credited with the indirect effects that derive f rom higher incomes and 
employment. "Import substitution"—as a reduction of imports that results 
f r o m such an investment—may then be negative if the direct import content of 
the product of investment plus the income-induced imports are sufficiently large. 
(Note that this is an absolute increase in M but not an increase in M/Y. We 
will return to the touchy proportionality question below.) 
The most interesting suggestion of a direct effect whereby import-substitu-
tion policies influence the aggregate level of investment is by Harry Johnson 
[6]. He describes the results of import-substitution policies — changing the 
relative profitability of importation and domestic manufacture of a product— 
as one that induces the former supplier to set up a branch within the country 
rather than give up the market . This, of course, is what has happened—in 
another context—with American firms in face of the European Common 
Market . This investment is a net addition to capital inflow induced by the 
policy of import substitution. But if this is, in fact, a typical result of import-
substitution policies in developing countries—that they bring with them foreign 
ownership and control—then a number of additional questions are raised that 
revolve around the efficiency, motivation, competitiveness, and appropriateness 
of techniques of production by these firms. If import-substitution policies lead 
to the growth of foreign ownership in the industrial sector, this fact might recom-
mend a very different direction of study. 
SThis is an oversimplification, of course. It can make a difference if 1) capital productivity . 
is systematically different between import-substitution investment and other investments, or 2) 
if there is something that changes the behaviour of saving out of i ncome arising from these two 
classes of investment. My guess would be that such differences are unlikely that where such 
differences are found they are more attributable to sectoral or product differences than to import 
substitution or nonimport-substilution investment. I know of no evidence on this, however. 
Winston: The Concept of Import Substitution 115 
Another case of feedback f rom import-substitution policy to the level of 
investment resources available for growth would be found if aid agencies were to 
try crudely to encourage such policies with more or easier capital for those 
projects that represented import substitution. Although I know of no such bias 
in AID, the World Bank or other lenders, it, like the case above, would com-
plicate the study of import substitution since it would no longer deal with 
questions of investment allocation alone. 
Power's proposal [10] should be mentioned here since it too involves feed-
back on investment levels. But it differs f rom the above in two important 
respects: /) the feedback is dynamic — today's actions affect future levels of 
investment rather than present levels as above — and 2) though they may — even 
universally—be incorporated in particular import-substitution policies, they are 
logically separable f rom import substitution as such. 
Power's is a Mahalanobis-type model—a development of the fact that a 
pattern of fu ture demand may be ordained by the composit ion of the capital 
stock. If there is little substitution in use between capital and consumption 
goods, the allocation of current investment will constrain the fu tu re division of 
income between consumption and saving and therefore, ceteris paribus, the future 
rate of investment and growth. 
To be pertinent to the study of import substitution, however, it must be 
shown that there is something particular in an import-substi tut ion policy that 
increases the risk of over-absorption of consumption goods ("over", in that it's 
inconsistent with planned consumption and saving). But even if it could be 
shown that policies of import substitution magnify these risks of embodying 
inappropriate fu ture demand patterns, it would seem preferable to deal with 
capital-embodied demand as a general aspect of plan consistency, not only as it 
appears in the restricted segment of the plan that is import-oriented. For this 
reason—and because it seemed to be a very f ru i t fu l direction for study—I have 
dealt with capital-embodied investment patterns in a separate paper [15], 
Finally, recent directions of research have suggested that investment in 
import-substitution industries can feedback on future investment in yet another 
way [11; 12]. 
In sequence: 
a) protection of manufactured goods leads to import-substituting invest-
ment in finished goods which then require imported intermediate goods 
for their production so 
b) this shift in imports f rom finished to intermediate goods increases the 
"essentiality" of imports by increasing their complementarity with 
domestic income and employment so that 
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c) in response to this increased essentiality the government makes imports 
of intermediate goods available to domestic manufacturers at favoured 
terms — through differential tariff, easier licensing, or whatever, relative 
to the finished goods. This means that 
d) import-substitution investment in these intermediate goods is system-
atically discouraged both by a level of protection that is absolutely lower 
than that afforded finished goods, and by the additional protection to 
consumer goods implicit in favoured prices for their inputs. 
So the quantity of investment allocated to "import-substi tution" industries may 
be initially high but, due to the unfor tunate response to the increased "essen-
tiality" of imports after step a), its composition is distorted and import sub-
stitution must stop when opportunities for investment in finished goods are 
exhausted. 
E. What Denominator? 
With few exceptions, import substitution is measured in relative terms so 
it is important to be in agreement about what it's relative to. Imports have been 
compared J) to total supply, 2) to income, 3) to domestic expenditure on goods 
but not on services, 4) to total consumption expenditure, and 5) to domestic 
value added. Almost any one of these may be appropriate to a particular 
question, but the behaviour of any two may not be similar. 
F. What Would Have Been? 
Once again the distinction between descriptive historical and policy studies 
of import substitution is important. In a historical study like Chenery's, the 
definition of import substitution is pure tautology—since there is no conventional 
meaning attached to it, whatever he chooses to call by that name is import 
substitution. But in a policy study, a good deal more is involved because, in 
defining something as import substitution, we imply What Would Have Happ-
ened in the absence of such a strategy. So there is no basis for arguing with 
the tautology of a historical study and its definition of import substitution at the 
same time that there may be room for real disagreement on appropriate assump-
tions of what would have happened in the absence of any policy of import sub-
stitution. (Tinbergen's "forecast step" in planning [14].) 
The simplest assumption that can be made is that without a policy of import 
substitution there would have been no change in the absolute quantity of imports 
(the level of disaggregation having been previously specified). Then import 
substitution is measured in absolute terms as a decline in the quantity of imports®. 
Only one author I have found has used this definition and, to no one's surprise, 
'The only niggling question that remains (here and elsewhere) is whether "quantity" is in 
value or real physical terms. 
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he found that there has been virtually no import substitution over the course of 
the growth of the Australian economy [5]. 
Accepting the need for a relative measure of imports in describing import 
substitution, the most common of these is that import substitution occurs if 
there is a departure f rom proportionality (vis-a-vis one of those denominators 
specified above). Then import substitution has occurred when there is a 
decline in the proport ion represented by imports—an increase in domestic 
production. This is the measure used by Chenery and by Lewis and Soligo [9]. 
It should be stressed that there can be no faulting Chenery's tautology but there 
may be a basis for disagreement with Lewis and Soligo if proportionality does 
not appropriately describe what would have happened in the absence of an 
import-substitution policy. 
There are two difficulties with measuring (and defining) import substitution 
as a change in the proport ion of imports to total supply of a commodity (to 
specify a denominator arbitrarily): 
1) This definition implies that in the absence of an import-substitution 
policy there would have been a proportional increase in imports and 
domestic supply—nei ther more nor less—and this seems quite unrea-
sonable. This measure will, what's more, tend to overstate the degree 
of import substitution in industry achieved by any policy if the forces 
described by Chenery are operative. This objection would be softened 
if it were likely that people could simultaneously juggle two separate 
meanings of "import substi tut ion"—one a tautological measurement 
and the other a description of the results of a policy. (Perhaps Chenery's 
cross-section coefficients would make a better base for determining 
What Would Have Happened.) 
2) This definition takes the study of import substitution out of its context 
as an aspect of investment allocation. It is virtually impossible to talk 
meaningfully about what the inducement of investment into import 
substitution should have been to attain the growth goals. 
These correspond to Tinbergen's [14] simple but helpful distinction in the 
planning process between a) a forecast under the assumption of unchanged 
policies that is compared to b) desired (planned) goal so that c) the difference 
can be reconciled by active policy. 1) above is a) while 2) is c), the quantities 
involved in reaching the plan by this policy—What Should Have Happened. 
To illustrate, consider Chenery's estimate of the amount of sectoral growth 
"caused by" import substitution as a change in the ratio of imports to total 
supply. They were 77 per cent for capital goods, 66 per cent for intermediate 
goods, and 13 per cent for consumer goods [3]. 
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It would be tempting to suggest that this should lead import-substitution 
policies to stress the more basic—capital- and intermediate-goods—industries. 
But however desirable such a policy may be, Chenery's evidence says nothing 
of the sort since measures depending on proportionality of output do not say 
anything about how much relative investment was allocated where. That the 
typical underdeveloped country has too little capital format ion for sustained 
growth means that consumption is relatively large; that production methods 
are unsophisticated so that intermediate goods are relatively less important and 
a very small absolute change in the size of domestic capital-goods and inter-
mediate industries could easily account for the very large relative changes in the 
domestic production of these goods. For consumer goods the opposite is true— 
a large absolute increase in domestic production could represent a small relative 
increase. If growth is the objective, proportionality would seem to say very 
little about the effectiveness of investment allocation. 
Proportionality falls short of adequately measuring import substitution but 
it is impossible to know what to suggest as an alternative. Khan 's use of 
expenditure elasticities of demand as the basis for measuring import substitution 
[8] seems unsatisfactory for the reasons implied above in discussing a Mahala-
nobis-type model—that it then becomes an issue, not of investment in import 
substitution per se but of investment import substitution in consumption goods. 
This goes so far that there is no simple way to measure import substitution in 
intermediate- or capital-goods industries using the Khan ' s def in i t ion 1 0 . 
Even ignoring this very real problem, because aggregate consumption can 
be assumed to be under constraint in a developing country, total (planned) sav-
ing is higher than it would be voluntarily at any given income level. In this 
disequilibrium, expenditure elasticities — the pattern of demand that would 
follow f rom increasing incomes under conditions of free choice — are question-
ably applicable [9]. 
As is so often the case, there is no all-purpose measure of the effects of 
import-substitution policies and it can only be hoped, since measure we must, 
that each alternative is used with recognition of its potential pitfalls. 
lOThis is almost unfair since capital coefficients would provide an analogous teohnique for 
these industries. 
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Import Substitution, Export Expansion 
and Consumption Liberalization: 
A Preliminary Report 
Azizur Rahman Khan 
In recent literature, attempts have been made (notably by Hollis B. Chenery 
[1]) to analyse the factors responsible for industrialization. Based on an interin-
dustry input-output table, this type of analysis relates the growth of industrial 
output to factors, such as import substitution, domestic and foreign final de-
mand expansion, and the expansion of intermediate demand. 
A similar analytical f ramework applied to the case of Pakistan would be 
extremely useful in determining the pattern and characteristic features of our 
industrial expansion. At tempts to prepare a workable input-output table are, 
however, thwarted by the absence of necessary quantitative in fo rma t ion 1 . 
One, therefore, has to settle for a much more modest analytical f ramework in 
order to pursue a not very different objective. 
THE P U R P O S E OF THE STUDY 
Consumer-goods industries, such as cotton textiles, started growing in 
Pakistan with the policy of replacing imports by domestic product ion. It is 
widely believed that in an import-competing industry any increase in domestic-
output represents import substitution since in its absence imports would have 
been necessary to maintain the same availabilities. The proposit ion, however, 
is incorrect. Once the production of a commodity that was formerly import-
iThe results of a preliminary attempt undertaken at the Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics are reported in [2], 
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the change in normal domestic absorption less the change in import, Any 
increase in output leading to a level of absorption in excess of normal means 
liberalization of domestic absorption. The Jast statement holds also for an 
export industry. 
The purpose of this study is to measure the amounts of import substitution, 
consumption liberalization and export expansion for a number of important 
consumption-goods industries and to see what this suggests about the impact 
of the pattern of industrial growth on aggregate savings and the development 
effort. 
THE MEASUREMENT OF NORMAL ABSORPTION 
As stated above, normal absorption has to be defined in relation to the 
growth target or, to be more precise, to the target marginal rate of saving. In 
this study, the four immediate pre-plan years (1951/52 to 1954/55) are taken as 
the base. Normal absorption for a commodity for each year of the first-five-
year-plan period is then measured as follows: 
Using the target rate of marginal saving proposed by the First Plan, we 
measure for each year the level to which aggregate consumption has to be cons-
trained. Then, an expenditure elasticity of demand (based usually on Pakistan 
and Indian estimates obtained from cross-section data) is used to measure the 
level to which the consumption of a particular commodity has to be constrained. 
It is possible to measure normal absorption in a number of other ways. For 
example, a second measure of normal absorption may be obtained on the 
assumption of a more heroic growth target. One can contemplate as a 
"practical maximum" a growth path that requires per capita aggregate con-
sumption to remain unchanged. This would in turn mean that per capita 
consumption of individual commodities should remain unchanged 3. 
According to this measure, per capita absorption of each commodity in each 
of the first-plan years would be the same as in the base period. It is obvious 
that normal absorption measured in this way would differ significantly from that 
measured in the former way only if per capita national income changes are signi-
cant. Since per capita income changed very little over the relevant period, it 
does not seem useful to obtain a second measure of normal absorption on the 
assumption of such a "practical maximum" growth target. 
We are now in a position to define the rales of import substitution, con-
sumption liberalization and export expansion on the basis of accounting identity 
(3) above. By dividing (3) by X, we have 
+ + - 1 - = = ' <*> 
3This ignores the effects of autonomous supply changes. 
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0.05, A ^ i — 2,5). Hence, an additional 17.5 has to be saved out of AY2. 
This means a marginal saving rate out of the increase in per capita income 
of 35 per cent. 
Such a saving target implies that consumption expenditure for each year of 
the first-plan period has to be constrained to a certain level. This constrained 
level of per capita consumption (which we call normal aggregate per capita 
consumption) is found by applying the following formula: 
Y = per capita income 
C ~ per capita normal aggregate consumption 
C0 — average consumption ratio in the base period (0.95) 
0.65 — planned marginal consumption ratio out of increase in per capita 
income 
t = current period 
0 ~ base period 
The above seems to be a plausible and realistic interpretation of the saving 
target of the First Plan. A different formula (5b) is used to measure normal 
consumption for the years in which per capita income decreases while formula 
(5a) is used for all other years. This is done just to recognize that a reduction 
in per capita income is not likely to reduce per capita consumption as much 
as is suggested by formula (5a). In such a situation, per capita consumption 
is more likely to be indicated by formula (5b). 
Once per capita normal aggregate consumption is measured for each year, 
the next step is to estimate the normal absorption of an individual consumption 
good by applying the following formula; 
where Q — per capita normal absorption of the Mh good, and 
ej — expenditure elasticity of demand for the /-th good. 
Total normal absorption of i in the period t(A n , ) is found by multiplying 
C i t by the population in period t, 
Thus, normal absorption of a commodity is determined by two factors. The 
first is the aggregate consumption constraint within which consumers must 
operate in order to achieve the planned saying target. The second factor is 
For Y t ^ Y 0 , we have C t = C 0 Y 0 + 0.65 (Y, — Y 0 ) 
and for Y t < Y 0 , we have C t — C 0 Y t 
where 
(6) 
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nearly 70 per cent of domestically absorbed cotton cloth was imported, in the 
later years Pakistan emerged as a net exporter of this commodity. 
Expenditure elasticity 
rural West Pakistan on the 
Survey?. While elasticity 
for cotton cloth is likely to 
measured for cotton on th 
what lower. We decided 
absorption of cotton cloth, 
for cloth as a whole was found to be about 0.90 for 
basis of a subsample drawn from the National Sample 
is likely to be higher in urban areas, the elasticity 
be lower than that for cloth as a whole. Elasticities 
e basis of Indian National Sample Survey are some-
to use an elasticity of 0.90 in calculating normal 
recognizing that this is probably a liberal estimate. 
Calculation of normal absorption by use of formula (6) above resulted 
in values far smaller than actual absorption for all of the years. Consequently, 
the measured rate of consumption liberalization was very high. By the end of 
the first-plan period, 46 per cent of the increased cotton-cloth production (over 
the base period) represented consumption liberalization and 44 per cent 
represented import substitution (Table I). The use of Planning Commission 
estimates of GNP changes the results only very slightly, The rate of consump-
tion liberalization between the base period and the terminal year (1959/60), 
in this case, is somewhat lower (42 per cent of the increased production) and 
the rate of import substitution is correspondingly higher (48 per cent). 
TABLE I 
COTTON CLOTH: RATES OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION, CONSUMPTION 
LIBERALIZATION AND EXPORT EXPANSION, 1955/5&-1959/60 
(Base period=1951J52—1954/55) 
Import substitution Consumption liberalization j 
Export expansion Period CSO national incom e 
Planning Commission GNP 
i 
CSO I national income ! 
1 
i 
Planning I 
Commission 
GNP | 
j 
1955/56 0.2044 0.7854 •— 0.0102 
1956/57 0.4773 0.4652 — 0.0575 
1957/58 0.4691 0.5190 — 0.0119 
1958/59 0.4099 — 0.5674 0.0227 
1959/60 0.4356 0.4787 0.4632 0.420 0.1012 
7The sources of this and at) other measures of expenditure elasticity ace mentioned in Appendix B. 
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(he early 1950's has now almost completely been replaced by domestic produc-
tion. Domestic production over the period under consideration increased 
nearly four times resulting in large increases in total and per capita domestic 
absorption. 
No estimate of expenditure elasticity based on Pakistan and Indian data is 
available for cigarettes. We have expenditure elasticities for tobacco, how-
ever, (0.77 in urban and 0.88 in rural areas) based on the Indian National 
Sample Survey. Since the elasticity for cigarettes is likely to be higher than for 
tobacco, we used an elasticity of one which is considerably higher than both 
urban and rural elasticities for tobacco 9 . 
TABLE III 
CIGARETTES: RATES OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION, C O N S U M P T I O N 
LIBERALIZATION AND EXPORT EXPANSION, 1955/56—1959/60 
(Base period = 1951/52—1954155) 
Import substitution Consumption liberalization 
Period 
CSO 
national 
income 
Planning 
Commission 
GNP 
CSO 
national 
income 
Planning 
Commission 
G N P 
Export 
expansion 
1955/56 0.0705 
1956/57 0.1542 
1957/58 0.1283 
1958/59 0.0787 
1959/60 0.0933 0.1254 
0.9295 
0.8458 
0.8717 
0.9213 
0.9067 0.8746 
As is shown in Table III, most of the increased output represents consump-
tion liberalization (on the average 90 per cent for every year). Consequently, 
only about 10 per cent of the increased output represents import substitution. 
The use of the Planning Commission estimates to calculate these rates for 
the terminal year (1959/60) changes the results only very slightly. The rates 
of consumption liberalization and import substitution, thus measured, are 87 
per cent and 13 per cent, respectively for 1959/60 (as against 91 per cent and 9 
per cent based on the CSO estimates of national income). 
»This measure is quite arbitrary, and elasticity of cigarettes may actually be still higher in 
view of the fact that here too a process of substitution of cigarettes for bidis probably takes place 
as income rises. However, we do not have any quantitative knowledge about this. 
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Writing and Printing Paper 
Domestic production of paper started early in the 1950's. Imports , how-
ever, have not been replaced significantly because domestic absorption has been 
increasing rather rapidly. 
The problem of measurement is complicated by the fact that no estimate of 
expenditure elasticity for paper is available for Pakistan or India. Expenditure 
elasticity for education was found to be 1.6 and 1.8, respectively for urban and 
rural India, on the basis of Nat ional Sample Survey. We assumed the elasticity 
for paper to be 1.8 on the assumption that absorption of paper for writing and 
printing purposes may vary directly with the rate of expansion of education. 
As is shown in Table IV (except in the year 1958/59), consumption liberali-
zation has been very great and correspondingly a very small percentage of 
increased output represents import substitution. For the terminal year (1959/60), 
the rates of import substitution (based both on CSO and Planning Com-
mission estimates of national income) are negative — the increase in imports 
in that year exceeded the increase in normal absorption (measured on the basis 
of either estimate of national income). Correspondingly, consumption liberali-
zation represents more than 100 per cent of the increased product ion for that 
year (128 per cent on the basis of CSO national income and 117 per cent on 
the basis of Planning Commission GNP). 
TABLE IV 
PAPER: RATES OF I M P O R T SUBSTITUTION, C O N S U M P T I O N LIBERALIZATION 
AND EXPORT EXPANSION, 1955/56—1959/60 
(Base period — 1951152—1954155) 
Import substitution Consumption liberalization 
Period 
CSO 
national 
income 
Planning 
Commission 
GNP 
c s o 
national 
income 
Planning 
Commission 
G N P 
Export 
expansion 
1955/56 
1956/57 
1957/58 
1958/59 
1959/60 
0.0725 
0.1838 
0.1078 
0.4272 
0.2806 0.1685 
0.9275 . 
0.8162 
0.8922 
0.5728 
1.2806 1.1685 
134 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
Tea 
The case of tea presents altogether a different story. Tea is an export item 
rather than an import substitute. Over the 1950's, its output increased very 
little, the annual growth rate being just below one per cent. Domestic absorp-
tion nevertheless increased very rapidly. As a result (since production was 
more or less stagnant) the volume of exports declined sharply. Average annual 
export during the first-plan period amounted to only about half of that during 
the pre-plan years. 
No Pakistan or Indian estimate of expenditure elasticity for tea is available. 
In calculating normal absorption, we used for tea the expenditure elasticity for 
gur and sugar (1.06). Since tea and these goods are to a large extent 
complementary in use, their expenditure elasticities are unlikely to be vastly 
different . 
TABLE V 
TEA: RATES OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION, C O N S U M P T I O N LIBERALISATION 
AND EXPORT EXPANSION, 1955/56—1959/60 
(Base period=1951152—1954155) 
Import substitution Consumption liberalization 
Period 
CSO 
national 
income 
Planning 
Commission 
GNP 
CSO 
national 
income 
Planning 
Commission 
G N P 
Export 
expansion 
1955/56 9.1321 _ 234.2075 — —242.3396 
1956/57 1.1191 — 2.6135 _ —2.7326 
1958/59 2.0262 — 12.7813 —13.8074 
1959/60 1.0435 1.4080 3.2190 2.8546 —3.2626 
Note: The rates for 1957/58 are not shown. Since the change in production for that year 
was negative, the measured rates do not have their normal meaning. 
The resulting estimates (Table V) show very high rates of consumption 
liberalization for all the years. Since product ion remained more or less stag-
nant, this required a corresponding contraction of exports. Thus, the rate of 
export expansion is shown as negative and large in absolute value. The rates 
for the terminal year have again been calculated on the basis of both CSO 
and Planning Commission estimates of national income. As can be seen from 
Table V, the two measures differ only slightly. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
If the expansion of domestic production of a commodity aims only at im-
port substitution, such expansion need be no greater than the increase in normal 
absorption less the change in imports. If domestic production expands beyond 
this level (without a corresponding increase in exports) domestic consumption 
can be said to have been liberalized. Likewise, in the case of an export good, 
consumption liberalization occurs when domestic production expands beyond 
the increase in normal absorption plus the change in exports (without a corres-
ponding decrease in imports). 
In either case, there is a diversion of resources away f rom the output of in-
vestment goods, exports or other import substitutes, with a corresponding short-
fall of domestic saving. Thus, the ability of the economy to increase investment 
and the rate of growth or to reduce its dependence on foreign finance is to that 
extent retarded. 
The findings of the present study reveal very substantial liberalization of do-
mestic consumption for the five commodities studied. Moreover, f rom these 
cases, we can distinguish several types of interrelationships among production, 
imports and exports that can be associated with consumption liberalization. 
Cotton cloth and sugar represent, perhaps, the classic case, with increased 
production permitting an evolution f r o m dependence on imports to modest ex-
port surplus. The fact that domestic absorption rose abnormally, however, 
means that the export surplus was less than it would otherwise have been. 
In the case of cigarettes, imports and exports were negligible or nil through-
out the period studied. Some import substitution occurred because normal 
absorption would have required rising imports in the absence of any increase 
in domestic production. But domestic production increased far beyond this 
requirement to permit a very great liberalization of consumption. 
Imports of paper actually increased over the entire period by more than the 
rise in normal absorption, i.e., import substitution was negative. Since the rise 
in domestic production just matched the rise in normal absorption, consump-
tion liberalization was just equal to the rise in imports. 
Finally, in the case of tea, imports were negligible and the rise in domestic 
production was not very great. Accordingly, consumption liberalization was 
roughly matched by the decline of exports. 
The fact that actual consumption of each of these commodities rose faster 
than the stipulated normal rate needs explanation. Our estimate of normal 
absorption is based on what we consider to be normal consumer behaviour 
(given the planned consumption constraints, population growth, per capita 
136 Commercial Policy and Economic Growth 
income change and income elasticities reflecting consumer preferences). Why 
did actual consumer behaviour greatly deviate f rom this no rm? 
The high degree of protection that precedes the process of import substitution 
usually allows (probably induces) an excessive concentration of investment in 
the protected industries. Once the capacity is created (export possibilities being 
nonexistent or unexplored) the tendency is to utilize the capacity by inducing 
domestic consumption through sales promotion, as well as pressures to keep taxes 
and other constraints on the consumption of these goods at a minimum. 
Moreover, an automatic "decontrol" of consumption takes place as the pro-
cess of import substitution goes on. In an economy where the only effective 
control of consumption consists of import licensing, the replacement of imports 
by domestic product ion gradually renders such consumption controls ineffec-
tive. Thus, domestic absorption of the import-substituting goods is likely to 
grow at a faster rate than for other goods. 
Part of the mechanism producing this result might be the removal of ration-
ing or other direct controls on consumption of the import substitutes. In the 
absence of direct controls, changes in relative prices would serve a similar pur-
pose. 
Consumption of those goods which are not produced domestically (or whose 
production expands slowly) would continue to be controlled by quantitative 
import restrictions. The result would be relatively high prices which ration 
the consumption of these goods. In the protected import-substituting indus-
tries, however, output expands much more rapidly (for reasons discussed above) 
and as a result prices would decline relatively, inducing greater consumption. 
TABLE VI 
PRICE MOVEMENTS, 1955/56- 1959/60 
(1951152-1954,155 —100) 
General 
price 
index 
Cotton 
cloth 
Sugar Cigarettes Paper 
1955/56 97.30 82.38 91.44 99.44 96.12 139.91 
1956/57 126.83 88.21 88.87 107.75 96.12 125.44 
1957/58 122,75 97.12 105.51 86.98 97.25 132.89 
1958/59 127.16 97.44 122.86 82,11 94.36 140.35 
1959/60 134,21 119.86 114.87 80.84 97.52 168.86 
Source: 14J, 
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The case of the import substitutes considered in this paper closely approxi-
mates the above situation. The production of these four commodities (cotton 
cloth, sugar, cigarettes and paper) increased much more rapidly than national 
income and, in the aggregate, their growth rate exceeded that of industrial pro-
duction as well. Moreover, domestic absorption of these commodities increased 
at a rate so far in excess of the rate of increase of aggregate consumption that 
no conceivable set of expenditure elasticities could explain the divergence. 
Correspondingly, as is shown in Table VI, the prices of these four commodities 
increased at a slower rate than that of the general price level. 
In the case of tea (which is an export good and not an import substitute), 
liberalization was made possible by quantitative restrictions on the volume of 
exports. 
Finally, the divergence between actual and normal absorption may be ex-
plained in part by the fact that our estimate of the latter does not take into ac-
count the possible effects of shifts in the distribution of population and income 
as, for example, the shift in favour of the urban sector at the expense of the 
rural. The fact that in the course of economic development this kind of struc-
tural chango is likely to create upward pressures on the consumption funct ion, 
however, only emphasizes more strongly the need for curbing the growth of ur-
ban demand for import substitutes. 
The question may be asked whether consumption liberalization of the goods 
considered above meant entirely a substitution of these products for others which 
became relatively dearer, or, at least partly, an upward shift in the consumption 
function. If it was only a substitution process arising out of autonomous supply 
changes then it should be regarded as simply a distortion of the pattern of con-
sumption with no effect on aggregate saving. It might be argued that since per 
capita income change over the period was insignificant (slight decline according 
to CSO and slight increase according to the Planning Commission) the whole 
process of consumption liberalization should be viewed in this light. 
Without claiming to disprove such a contention, two important consider-
ations must be raised against it. While it is true that aggregate consumption per 
capita could not increase because there was no gain in per capita income, this 
is the ex post re.su! 1. But what is crucial for the growth effort is instead the ex 
ante propensities to save and consume. One could equally well argue that the 
stagnation in per capita income itself was due to a high propensity to consume in 
the first instance. And it is quite plausible that the high propensity to consume 
was at least partly due to the emphasis on import substitution with its consequent 
consumption liberalization. 
Moreover, a process of pure substitution would presumably require the 
tightening of constraints on the consumption of other goods (via taxes or stricter 
138 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
import licensing) as constraints on the consumption of import substitutes diminis-
hed with increased domestic production. Since there is no evidence of this, the 
presumption is that the liberalization of consumption of import substitutes meant 
a liberalization of consumption in general W. 
JOFor a comprehensive analysis of the effects of import-substitution policy on growth, 
see [8], 
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Appendix A 
TABLE A-l 
COTTON CLOTH 
Year 
! i \ i 
j Production ! 
i 
; ) 
Import Export 
i i i i 
• Domestic i j absorption J 
1 ' I j ! 
Normal absorption Liberalized absorption 
CSO national income 
j Planning Commission GNP 
CSO national income 
Planning Commission GNP 
Average Annual (. . .(in thousand vnrdv\ 1 
1951/52—1954/55 261,733 107,263 501 368,495 368,495 368,495 — „ 
1955/56 482,867 69,944 2,752 550.059 367,381 173,678 .—_ 
1956/57 521,181 13,488 15,464 519,805 398,841 - 120,964 
1957/58 555,755 3,511 3,987 555,279 402,671 ] 52,608 „ 
1958/59 598.050 1,648 8,146 591,552 400,722 - - 190,830 
1959/60 607,235 4,271 35,476 576.03G 415,998 430,900 160,030 145,130 
J? O 
Cj 
TABLE A-2 
SUGAR 
Normal absorption Liberalized absorption 
Year i ; i production ; ! j Import Export 
i Domestic 1 absorption CSO national income 
Planning Commis-sion GNP CSO national income 
| 
i i 
\ I 
Measure A Measure B 
j 
Measure i Measure A | B 
i 
Measure A 
Measure B 
( ) 
Average annual 
1952/53—1954/55 80,303 19,148 — 99,451 99,451 99,451 99,451 99,451 — — 
1955/56 103,576 39,598 — 143,174 99,476 97,352 — — 43,698 45,822 
1956/57 107,799 25,938 133,737 106,117 106,246 — — 27,620 27,491 
1957/58 157,352 37,247 - - 194,599 106,911 106,295 87,688 88,304 
1958/59 169,094 13,060 422 181,732 105,892 103,574 — ' — 75,840 78,158 
1959/60 144,576 13 3,028 141,561 110,251 108,957 108,004 116,133 31,310 32,604 
Liberalized absorption (Planning Commission GNP) for 1959/60: 
Measure A: 26.557 
Measure B: 25,428 
TABLE A-3 
CIGARETTES 
Year 
Average 1951/52—1954/55 
1955/56 
1956/57 
1957/58 
1958/59 
1959/60 
Production 
3,860 
5,038 
5,903 
6,963 
8,142 
9,275 
Import Domestic absorption 
33 
1 
21 
1 
1 
Normal absorption Liberalized absorption 
CSO national income 
Planning Commission GNP 
3,893 
5,039 
5,924 
6,963 
8,143 
9,276 
. (in million cigarettes). 
3,893 
3,944 
4,196 
4,258 
4,198 
4,366 
3,893 
CSO Planning national Commission income GNP 
4,540 
1,095 
1.728 
2,705 
3,945 
4,910 4,736 
TABLE A-4 
PAPER 
j | j Normal domestic absorption j Liberalized absorption 
Year ' Production I Import j D ° m £ s t i c I —— - • , • • — 
j j absorption C S O Planning CSO Planning I ! national Commission j national j Commission ! income ; GNP income GNP _ _ i 1 i ! | 
( (in Tons) ) 
Average 1951/52—1954/55 6,363 9,934 16,297 J 6,297 16,297 — _ 
1955/56 21,590 8,467 30,057 15,934 . — 14,123 — 
1956/57 24,398 7,863 32,261 17,541 — 14,720 — 
1957/58 23,752 9,265 33,017 17.503 — 15,514 — 
1958/59 19,112 5.142 24,254 16,952 — 7,302 — 
1959/60 17,813 14,753 32,566 17,903 19,187 14,663 13,379 
Year ! Production Import 
( 
Average 1951/52—1954/55 52,576 605 
1955/56 52,629 450 
1956/57 54,734 276 
1957/58 44,500 271 
1958/59 53,760 181 
1959/60 56,000 233 
TABLE A-5 
TEA 
5 
Normal absorption 
Actual absorption CSO national income 
Liberalized absorption 
Planning Commission GNP 
. (in thousand pounds) • 
CSO national income 
Planning Commission GNP 
26,927 26,254 26,254 26,254 — — 
34,083 38,996 26,583 — 12,413 — 
21,030 33,980 28,340 — 5,640 — 
8,357 36,414 28,559 — 7,855 — 
10,579 43,362 28,229 — 15,133 — 
15,756 40,477 29,455 30,703 11,022 9,774 
O 5 
rj 5" 
o 
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Appendix B 
Per Capita Normal Aggregate Consumption Measured from C.S.O. National Income 
Table B-l shows the calculation of per capita normal aggregate consumption 
on the basis of CSO national income. 
TABLE B-l 
Year 
Constant 
price 
national 
income 
Population obtained by interpolation 
Constant 
price 
per capita 
income 
(Y) 
Constant price per capita national consumption 
(c) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1951/52 
1952/53 
18,522 
18,761 
77,463 
79,121 
239.11 1 
237.12 
in oo s 
c n II 
o o 
c o CN <N II 
1953/54 19,727 80,814 244.10 <D bf) cti « 8P 
r 
1954/55 20,064 82,543 243.07 j <L> > Ki £ rt J 
1955/56 19,586 84,309 232.31 220.69 
1956/57 20,882 86,113 242.50 SvJi SO oo 8 
1957/58 21,011 87,956 238.88 226.94 
1958/59 20,850 89,838 232.08 220.48 
1959/60 21,683 91,761 236.30 224.49 
Note: National income in million rupees; population in thousands; per capita income and per capita national consumption in rupees. 
The method of calculation is as follows: 
Column (1) is taken from [3, p. 2261. These are in constant (1949-53) prices. 
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Column (2) is calculated on the basis of annual population growth rate of 
2.14 between the years 1951/52 and 1961/62. 
Col. (3) = Col. (1) -r Col. (2). 
Column (4) is obtained by using the following formula: where 
Yt > Yo, we use Ct = CoYo + 0.65 (Yt — Y 0 ) and where 
Yt < Yo, we usec t = CoYt- For explanation and meaning of the symbols, 
see Statistical Methodology on pages 126-128. 
Per Capita Normal Aggregate Consumption (for 1959/60) Measured from Planning 
Commission GNP 
Using our population estimates and the Planning Commission's GNP 
estimates (taken from [6a, p. 30]), we have per capita income in constant (1949-53) 
Such estimates for the other three base years (1951/52 through 1953/54) are 
not available. We, therefore, estimate the annual average per capita income 
during the base period (1951/52 through 1954/55) as follows: 
According to the CSO estimates, annual average per capita income during 
the base period is 0,9909 of that in 1954/55. Assuming that the same ratio holds 
for the Planning Commission estimates, we have base-period per capita income 
(annual average) according to the Planning Commission estimates as: 0.9909 of 
250.41 = Rs. 248.13. 
Per capita normal aggregate consumption for the year 1959/60 is then found 
by applying the formula used in calculating Column (4) of supporting Table B-l. 
Sources oi' Data 
/) Production figures are taken from the sources noted below against the 
names of the commodities: 
Cotton cloth: [9j. 
Sugar: [91. 
Cigarettes: [9], 
Tea: [5, for 1952/53 through 1957/58; 7, for 1951/52; 9, October 1960, for 
1958-60], 
Paper: [4 ; 9]. 
p n e e s ; 
1954/55 
1959/60 
Rs. 250.41 
Rs. 255.45 
ii) Import data are taken from the following sources: 
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Cotton cloth and tea: [3]. 
Sugar, cigarettes, and paper: Unpublished C.S.O. data 
All export data are taken f rom [3]. 
iii) All prices are taken f r o m [4]. 
iv) Expenditure elasticities for Pakistan are those calculated by Dr. Christoph 
Beringer, then Research Advisor at the Pakistan Institute of Development Eco-
nomics, on the basis of a subsample drawn f r o m the National Sample Survey 
(West Pakistan, Rural). 
Expenditure elasticities for India are taken f r o m [10 ; 11], 
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The Determinants of 
the Domestic Prices 
of Imports 
Mati Lai Pal 
INTRODUCTION 
Imports play a key role in the economy of Pakistan, especially since they 
provide a large share of the nation's industrial raw materials and most of its 
capital goods. Scarce foreign exchange is rationed and allocated among 
different types of commodities thro.ugh an elaborate licensing system. To cope 
with the needs of the economy, there has been liberalization of imports in recent 
times. Proposals for further liberalization and alternative proposals for 
rationing foreign exchange through an import surcharge system or an exchange 
auctioning system have also been put forward. But, in the absence of empirical 
evidence regarding scarcity value of foreign exchange and the domestic prices 
of imports, the impact of these changes on the import sector and therefrom 
on the economy could not be definitely estimated. Different assumptions 
have been made regarding these magnitudes resulting in very different conclu-
sions about the impact of various policies. A study of the facts is necessary 
under these circumstances, and so we have embarked on an empirical study 
regarding the determinants of the domestic prices of imports, 
The import sector in Pakistan is' subjcc to many government policies. In 
addition to the direct controls regarding import licensing and the exchange rate, 
a detailed tariff and sales-tax structure, along with numerous minor regulations, 
is operative in this sector. Some of the effects of this elaborate system of 
government policies are reflected in the level and structure of prices of imported 
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goods in local markets. In the absence of import restriction and under perfectly 
competitive market conditions, the domestic price of an imported commodity 
would equal the c.i.f. cost plus import duty and sales tax plus " n o r m a l " com-
petitive m a r k u p 1 . But the restriction of imports through the licensing system 
causes excess demand at such a price, and the gap between actual internal price 
and landed cost is widened. This gap constitutes a licence-created profit for 
licence-holders. The basic hypothesis under investigation in this paper is that 
when there is direct control of supply, the main determinant of the local prices 
of imports at the margin is the import-control policy, not the landed costs 2 . 
In Section II, we shall give a brief summary of the present import-control 
policy. Section III gives the purpose of the study along with a theoretical dis-
cussion. Empirical findings have been presented in Section IV. The problems 
of allocation of resources and distribution of income vis-a-vis import-control 
policies are discussed in Section V. A summary of the study and a few sugges-
tions about useful investigation are given in Section VI. 
II. SUMMARY OF THE LICENSING SYSTEMS 
Due to the excess demand for foreign exchange, at the existing exchange 
rate, the government controls almost all imports into Pakistan. A high-level 
Foreign Exchange Committee prepares an annual Foreign Exchange Budget 
on the basis of expected earnings, aid receipts, and the level of reserves. Af te r 
the adjustment of the amount of foreign exchange automatically designated for 
private imports under the Export Bonus Scheme, the Committee determines 
the division of foreign-exchange expenditure between private and public imports. 
The licensing authorities then decide on the commodities to be imported, deter-
mine the ceilings for the value of imports of individual items, groups of items, 
and industries, and allocate the amount earmarked for each item to individual 
importers. Licences are required for almost all private imports, the major 
exception being commodities included on the "Free Lis t" 4 . Import licences 
are issued on a c&f-value basis to commercial importers and industrial users 
and may be used in any country of the world except for items for which specific 
commodity licences are issued in accordance with trade, aid, or loan agreements. 
iThe importers have to pay a few other minor charges, namely, clearance charges, import 
licence fee, banking charges, wharfage cost, etc. We shall use the term 'Landed Costs' for the 
total of all the costs and charges paid by the importers. Insurance cost is a very small part of 
the c.i.f. cost and so the difference between c & f and c.i.f. costs is not significant. 
AActually, of course, price is demand determined under conditions of fixed (controlled) 
supply. Here we are assuming demand to be excessive and given. Hence, price must be fixed 
unless there is a change in the controlled supply. 
sFor this part of the paper, the author draws on [9] which contains a detailed discussion 
of the import-control policy in Pakistan, and on discussions with Dr. Philip S. Thomas. 
4The "Free List" was considerably extended to fifty-one items in June 1964, but for the 
period in which the commodities considered in the current study were imported, only four 
items were under "Free List". 
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The present import policy has its origin in November 1952, in the days 
of depression in foreign-exchange earnings after the Korean boom. Before this 
system came into operation, private imports were, more or less, free under the 
Open General Licence (OGL) system (during the period July 1950 to November 
1952) under which an importer could import any amount of the commodities 
under the "OGL XII I " list. With the imposition of the new system, the former 
Open General Licences were cancelled and each importer of that period was 
given, for each type of good that he imported, a monetary category the value 
of which was determined by the average imports during the five OGL shipping 
periods. A category is a standardized unit of account, the actual value of each 
licence for a shipping period being expressed as a percentage of the monetary 
value of the category. For one particular commodity, an importer gets only 
one category. 
With the introduction of the new Open General Licence procedure in 1961, 
the scope of the category system became narrower. The new OGL applies to 
specific commodities and to specific groups of commercial importers and pro-
vides for issue of licences of specified amounts in each shipping period. Its 
purpose was to encourage new entrants to the import trade and to extend the 
value of licences issued in the commodities chosen. Uptil introduction 
of the "Free List", the new OGL was the principal sign of "liberal" 
import policy. 
Other import procedures exist for certain groups of commodities and 
industries. Under the "Automat ic" licensing procedure, importers of the 
specified commodities become entitled to another allocation in the same import 
period under the same licence when an earlier allocation has been utilized. 
For industrial raw materials and spare parts, "regular industrial licences" 
are issued to the quota-holders enumerated by a survey of industrial units. 
The values licensed are determined on the basis of assessment certificates issued 
by Provincial Directorates of Industries, indicating the "requirements" of a 
quota-holder for raw materials and spare parts to operate on a single-shift 
basis. Licences for importing machinery for new industrial capacity in the 
country are based on the sanctions made by the Central Permissions Com-
mittee in the Ministry of Industries. 
Import licences are also issued under the Export Bonus Scheme on the 
basis of import-bonus vouchers issued by the State Bank of Pakistan to exporters 
for a specified part of their foreign-exchange earnings. Import-bonus vouchers 
are issued for all exports except the exports of some raw material and food 
items. Imports allowable under bonus vouchers include a wide range of goods 
specified in the "bonus list" in the import policies. Vouchers are marketable 
and, due to the excess demand for import, command a high premium. 
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market-clearing price is still PiXj. The licence-holder still enjoys a profit 
margin to the extent of PjL'; the whole amount of the rise in the landed cost 
is paid out of the former profit of the licensee. But if the rise irt the landed 
cost rises sufficiently, the supply curve S"L/R will intersect the demand curve at 
some point P" which lies above P, and OS" will be the price with S"P" quantity 
sold. In this (probably extreme) case, the rise in the landed cost is big enough 
to more than eliminate the licence-created profit, hence the licensees will import 
less than is allotted to them by the government in the form of licences. 
Thus, it is clear that If licence-created profit is large, changes in landed 
costs should not affect domestic market prices over a fairly wide range. Given 
domestic demand conditions, changes in domestic price are detei'mined by 
changes in quantity licensed, not by changes in landed costs over that range. 
The extent to which landed costs could increase without raising domestic prices 
is, therefore, related to the licence-created profit of importers or, roughly, the 
margin between landed costs and domestic market prices, at any point in time. 
The effects of import liberalization measures, such as the new OGL, the 
automatic licensing, and the "Free List", can also be illustrated in Figure 1 as 
increases in the quantity of a commodity licensed in a particular period. It can 
also be seen that increased quantities licensed, even if combined with increased 
landed costs through regulatory duties, could result in lower domestic market 
prices, rf the licensed amount increased from OXi to OX2 and duties were 
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i-aised so that the price to the importer rose f r o m SS to S'S' , the new supply 
curve would become S 'LiRi , and the domestic market price would fall f rom 
X1P1 (under "tight" licensing and lower duty) to X 2 P 2 (under "liberal" licens-
ing and higher duty), The result would also be a fall in licence-created profit 
per unit (or margin over landed cost) f rom PjL to P2Li. 
The empirical study of the licence-created profit margin is extremely impor-
tant, therefore, in order to analyse the effect of proposed changes in tax structure 
or import policy, or both, on the domestic prices of imported goods. The extent 
to which changes in duty or in licensed value of different commodities will affect 
the internal price structure and thereby influence the allocation of imports can 
be approximately determined, at least, when the markup is known. If for all 
important commodities under quantitative controls the profit margins are high, 
existing import duties cannot, and do not, influence relative prices of different 
imported goods and of imported goods vis-a-vis nonimported goods, and they 
have no allocative role 9 . If, however, there are items priced very close to landed 
cost, changes in tax rates on those commodities may affect the quantity imported, 
and, therefore, domestic market prices, The extent of licence-created profit 
or existing markups f rom landed costs to market price set a rough limit beyond 
which tax rates on imports will play an allocative role. 
The above argument assumes that all users of imported goods purchase 
such goods f r o m import licensees at the domestic market price. This group 
includes some industrial users. There is an important class of importers, how-
ever, who use the goods they are licensed to import. These are the industrial im-
porters referred to in Section II, who receive licences to import capital goods, 
spare parts, and raw materials for their own use. Am anufacturer possessing 
import licences buys raw materials and equipment at lower prices and sells the 
resulting product at prices which fully reflect internal scarcities. "Much of his 
profit emerges f rom the spread between world prices and internal prices. His 
gain is not essentially different f rom that of the importing merchant who merely 
resells at high internal prices the same goods he has been licensed to purchase 
abroad at much lower world market prices" [3, Pp. 8-9]. Therefore, though an 
increase in tax rates would raise the cost to some privileged users of imported 
raw materials, they would be likely to absorb the increased taxes themselves 
in their manufactur ing profits, since part of their manufactur ing profit is due to 
possession of scarce import licences. 
So far we have discussed the question of profit margin under "quasi-
competitive conditions" t°. It is often argued that there is a considerable degree 
'That the existence of a domestic industry does not alter the argument is shown in Appendix B. However, it is necessary to assume that import licensees are the ultimate users of imports, so that all users face one price—the domestic market price. The reason for this assumption is illustrated in the next paragraph. 
l»The conditions of entry, numbers, and collusion have been assumed to be sucli that a "competitive" pricing situation would prevail if government restrictions were absent. 
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increase the competition and thereby reduce price somewhat. If all import 
, allocations are utilized however, the domestic prices of imports will not be 
affected simply by entry of firms. The total profit would be shared by more, 
of course, but the price would remain the same. If an expansion of the value 
licensed accompanied the shifting of the commodity to the " O G L list", the 
supply position would be improved and prices should fall. However, the 
improvement would be entirely due to the increased foreign-exchange allocation, 
and increasing the number of importers, by itself, could not increase the supply 
and lower prices. 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The empirical analysis of markups above landed cost is based on the 
findings f r o m samples of " representa t ive" 1 1 commodities in the three broad 
groups: consumption goods, raw materials, and capital goods. The domestic 
prices considered are those prevailing in Karachi during the period June-August 
1964 and so the import conditions of these commodities are related to the 
January-June 1964 shipping period 1 2. In this section, we first try to analyse 
the profit margins in these commodities during that period and then attempt to 
determine the effects of duties on domestic prices of imports. 
As has been discussed in the preceding section, the price position may be 
different for commodities placed under different lists (category or OGL). Some 
of our samples include commodities imported under more than one list. For 
the consumption goods, the position is relatively clear. Most semi-essentials, 
luxury commodities, and consumer durables are imported by the category-
holders. But in the case of raw materials, no definite division could be made. 
Here the imports are made by category-holders, by O G L importers, and directly 
by industrial users. 
Average Markup on Imported Goods 
In the consumption-goods group, the average of the profit margins over 
landed costs in twelve items is 61 per cent, i.e., the "scarcity price" which the 
consumers have to pay for the imported consumption goods is 61 per cent higher 
than the landed cost. For most of the items that come under import-bonus 
vouchers, the profit margin is as low as 5 to 7 per cent since bonus-voucher costs 
wipe out the scarcity margins to a great extent. Yet the overall difference 
between landed cost "ex-bonus" and market price still approximates 60 per cent. 
For raw materials, in our sample of twenty-five observations, the average 
profit over landed cost is 58 per cent. The wholesalers in raw materials earn 
115'ee Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the samples. 
i T h e r e is usually a lag of two to four months between obtaining of licence and receiving 
the shipments. 
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licence-created profit to this extent. The manufacturers who do not have 
import licences have to purchase these raw materials f r o m the wholesalers at the 
"scarcity price". The industrial users who get raw materials through industrial 
licences have lower cost of production than the former and they, therefore, can 
earn excess profits. As pointed out above, a part of industrial profits is profit 
f r o m import licensing, not "real" profits. 
Our sample for raw materials is composed of both the "category items" 
and "OGL items", so it is possible to determine whether or not the price situation 
is different for the items in the two lists. In our sample, the difference between 
the average profit margins for "category items" and "OGL items" is 5 percentage 
points. Since the standard error of the difference between the two means is 
9.6 percentage points, the difference is not statistically significant, which means 
that the average profit rates may not be considered different for items imported 
under these two types of licence. Even though the "degree of compet i t ion" is 
supposed to be different, the profit margins do not vary significantly. It can 
be inferred that the licence-restricted supply falls short of the monopolist ic maxi-
mum-profi t quantity, and this supports the view that mere introduction of 
competition without increased foreign-exchange allocation does not improve J 
the domestic price situation. 
The existence of some extreme observations in the sample for raw materials 
necessitated a clear inquiry about their particular supply-and-demand condi-
tions. Some observations like those of Gum Arabic (8 per cent), bicli leaf (260 
per cent), lead ingot (108 per cent), and pig iron (15 per cent) are conspicuous 
by their extreme values. Gum Arabic was on the "Automatic List" in the first 
shipping period of 1964. The Automatic List is supposed to bring a larger 
allocation of foreign exchange if it is "needed", which would generally bring 
the price of the item down. The lower profit margin might be due to the 
improvement in supply situation through foreign-exchange allocation. Pig 
iron was on the "Free List". The supply allocation may have been sufficient 
to cope with the demand at c & f plus duty-paid price. There have been some 
allegations coming f r o m the small importers, regarding the items on the "Free 
List" that the big importers, in order to eliminate the small competitors, charge 
a lower price at the outset, and when the small importers are out of the market, 
they raise the prices. Pig iron might be such a case. Of course, it can only be 
ascertained, if at all, when prices in later periods are examined. Bidi leaf is a 
commodity that the licensing authority tries to license exactly on the basis of 
"requirements" of individual manufacturers. But the demand for tobacco 
manufacturers has raised the demand price jf raw materials well above the 
c&f and duty-paid price. Presumably, the domestic market in bidi leaves is 
small and exists only between bidi manufacturers in deficit and surplus raw 
materials positions. A relatively small "error" in foreign-exchange allocation 
can lead to a large internal price change. 
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For the capital goods, our sample was very small. For the sample of ten 
observations, the average profit margin on landed cost was 62 per cent. In 
order to raise the tempo of industrialization in the country, the rate of duty for 
these goods is kept l o w 1 3 . Low duties were supposed to give incentives for 
investment. But the high markup shows that there is excess demand for capital 
goods at prices equal to landed costs. While the duties are kept low to en-
courage imports of capital goods, they are deprived of this role by a licence-
restricted supply. The low duties simply add to the profits of the licence-holders. 
If imports are to be increased, it can be done only through an increased foreign-
exchange allocation. 
One characteristic of some capital goods is that the importers ' profit margins 
are lower for commodities imported f rom the United States than for the same 
commodities imported f rom other countries. This is additional evidence in 
support of the hypothesis that quantitative restrictions are more important 
than landed costs in determining (at the margin) domestic market prices. 
Because, goods f rom the United States and f rom other sources are comparable 
(easily substitutable), their prices in Pakistan's domestic markets are almost 
the same, while their c & f prices are quite different. Domestic price tends to 
be set (given domestic demand) by the total amount imported f rom all sources, 
not by the cost of the higher-priced US imports that dominate the supply side 
of the market. Prices to the import licensee are higher due to the higher landed 
cost of the US items. The profit over lowest landed cost is so high, however, 
that total quantity imported remaining the same, a rise in price to the importer 
is paid out of licensees' profits, and domestic market prices are not affected 
Industrial importers using aided imports f rom the United States pay higher 
prices than if they were free to use licences to import f r o m other countries. To 
this extent, there is a reduction in the spread between the prices of domestic 
manufacturers and their total costs of production, or a reduction in profits. 
After finding out the profit margin for different groups of commodities, we 
can give a crude measure of the extent of overvaluation of our currency, assum-
ing that the imports were to be kept at their existing levelsi 5 . The average 
scarcity margin is around 60 per cent in all cases. If we subtract 10 to 15 per 
cent for "normal" markups phis costs of distribution, we get the extent of 
13See [18]. 
i4if dollar loans were not tied to United States exports, of course, a given value loan 
would provide larger quantities of imports if they could be bought in cheaper markets. It is 
not clear, however, whether the situation of a tied loan should be compared with an untied 
loan of the same dollar value or with some other alternative, when assessing "the etTects of tied 
loan". 
isOne should be careful in using this, however, since domestic prices for some commo-
dities are from markets that only cover a part of total imports. Bidi leaf is an extreme example 
of such a commodity. If all Wrfi-leaf imports were by commercial licence-holders and if all 
industrial users bid for all of their supplies from commercial importers, a different price would 
rule than the (blackmarket) price given here (which covers only a small part of total imports). 
This is probably true in varying degrees for most commodities studied here. 


Pal: Determinants of Domestic Prices of Imports 165 
If the licensing becomes tighter for the commodities which have higher duties, 
the margin over landed cost remains constant, more or less, for all commodities. 
Consequently, the margin over c & f price varies with the duty. Therefore, we 
should not conclude that the duties can affect internal prices when we know 
that the margin over landed cost is large. The low values of r 2 in all the cases 
also support our contention. The duties explain less than 50 per cent of the 
variation in the margin over c&f price. Though the coefficient of X is signi-
ficant, only a small part of the variation in Y is explained by X. In case of raw 
materials, the range of duties is not great but the variation of the markup is 
considerable, resulting in a very low r 2 . The variation in markup is largely 
caused by the licensing system so that the effect of duties on the prices at the 
margin is very low. 
V. A DIGRESSION ON M E T H O D S AND o b j e c t i v e s " 
At least two separate aspects of the problem of import licensing should be 
distinguished when analysing the system, or when making use of the empirical 
results of surveys such as ours. One aspect is the effect of licensing on the 
efficiency of resource allocation; the second aspect is the effect on the distribution 
of income. A few observations are in order on each. 
There are basically two possible ways to control prices of imports and 
quantities sold. The licensing system specifies the quantity which, given the 
demand conditions, determines the price. This is the way the system in Pakistan 
presently works. The alternative methods, such as an import surcharge, an 
auctioning system for foreign exchange, and devaluation, all with differential 
tariff systems, attempt to set the prices and allow the quantity imported of each 
commodity to be the quantity demanded at that price. Given adequate know-
ledge of demand and supply conditions, both methods can achieve the same 
composition of imports and of domestic relative prices. 
Consider a hypothetical case in which the industrial licence-holder was not 
legally committed to use his imports, but might sell them. If a differential 
surcharge (or a general surcharge with differential rates of import duty) were 
imposed as a means to mop up all licence-created profit , relative prices would 
not be affected, and resource allocation would also remain unchanged. With 
the existing tariff structure, auctioning quotas of foreign exchange for particular 
commodities could also lead to the same result. To the extent that market-
equilibrium prices do not equal social opportunity costs, there will be some 
misallocation of resources in all three eases If the surcharge is a general one 
imposed on top of the existing tariff structure, the relative prices and the relative 
quantities imported would be different f rom the previous alternative insofar as 
"Discussions with Dr. Ronald Soligo and Mr. Abdul Ghafur of the Institute were 
helpful in developing the argument in this section. 
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there are differentials in the profit margins in different commodities under the 
current licensing and tariff system. A general auctioning system (or fluctuating 
exchange rate) with the existing tariff structure will also lead to a different set of 
relative prices. There is no guarantee, however, that these new sets of relative 
prices will be efficiency prices f rom the social point of view. Of course, value 
judgments will play an important role in evaluating all these cases, but the 
investigation of "eff ic ient" resource allocation in general is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Under an alternative system where sale of imports under industrial licences 
was illegal, if industrial licences were abolished, allocation of resources, among 
different industrial users may be different even if the quantities imported of every 
commodity remained the same. "The decisions of buyers based upon their 
willingness or unwillingness to pay the surcharge would be substituted for the 
decisions of government officials in determining the allocation of scarce foreign 
exchange among competing claimants" [3, p.7], Those "efficient" industrialists 
who previously could not obtain licences would now get the materials and would 
increase productivity per unit of imported goods. Again, insofar as the present 
licensing is based on incorrect calculations (from the social point of view) of 
optimal factor combinations, the alternative system would lead to more efficient 
allocation. The benefits to cottage industries, small- and medium-scale indus-
tries, which do not get industrial licences under the present system, are also 
apparent. Whether these industries willing to pay the highest price will 
invariably be those who would put goods to their most productive uses f rom the 
long-run social point of view depends on how closely private and social marginal 
valuations overlap. It is sometimes argued that "since these (small-scale in-
dustries) are generally labour-intensive, the small amount of capital equipment 
which they need would be very highly productive" [3, p.7J. It is possible, of 
course, that the large-scale entrepreneur would also prefer to adopt a labour-
intensive technology. There is empirical evidence, however, that large-scale 
enterprises in Pakistan use relatively capital-intensive techniques. But this 
"inefficiency 'in the large' is caused by the overvaluation of labour relative to its 
shadow price for the industrial sector as a whole" [19, p.39]. It cannot be 
asserted with certainty that the licence-holders resort to "needlessly capital-
intensive" technologies due to the low price of capital goods, however. 
In any case, if we accept the overall distribution of imports among commo-
dities, as it presently exists, the licensing system in itself misallocates resources 
only to the extent that industrial users obtain imports at two different sets of 
prices, depending on whether they are or are not import licensees. As pointed 
out above, there is no difference among alternative systems f rom the point of 
view of allocating scarce resources, unless one says that the licensing authorities 
are less efficient in their distribution of imports than are the tariff authorities in 
their implicit set of differential between c & f and domestic market prices of 
imports. 
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One should be careful to separate the effects on the distribution of income 
f rom the effects on the allocation of resources. The alternative to having excess, 
or above normal, profits accruing to the private sector's import licensees is to 
have the government appropriate them through an import surcharge, or re-
gulatory duty, or to transfer them to exporters by general or selective devalua-
tion, or a combination of both methods. The superiority of the alternative 
methods on grounds of income distribution depends on judgements of inter-
sectoral equity and/or the relative efficiency of private and public-sector alloca-
tions of resources. 
If one accepts the distribution of imports by commodities, then one can 
criticise the licensing system f rom an efficiency point of view only in its dual 
prices for raw materials, spare parts, and capital goods to industrial users; and 
f rom the income distribution point of view primarily f rom an equity argument, 
i.e., that the public sector should absorb "excess" profits. One can also criticise 
the tariff system for not adjust ing to absorb the entire difference between c&f 
and domestic prices at the licence-determined distribution of imports. Alter-
natively, if one accepted the set of relative differential implied by the tariff 
system, one can criticise the licensing system for not adjusting its quantitative 
controls to equilibrate the profit margin for every commodity. But, one should 
be careful to distinguish his grounds for criticising the system or for making 
use of the differentials and profit margins investigated in the empirical section 
of this paper. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We have found that the average profit margin over landed cost for imported 
commodities in Pakistan was about 60 per cent during the middle of 1964. 
This margin is high enough to absorb small changes in the prices to import 
licensees. The main determinant of the domestic prices of imports at the margin, 
therefore, is the licensing system, since it restricts supply and gives high profi t 
to the importers. 
There has been heretofore no systematic study in Pakistan regarding the 
profit margins for imports. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports has, 
at times, kept track of the prices of the important commodities in order to 
rationalise his decisions. However, a knowledge of the extent of markup over 
landed cost for most items should be extremely useful to both the Chief Con-
troller and the Central Board of Revenue. This type of study should be helpful 
in estimating the demand for imports at different import prices and different 
levels of imports (of course, a knowledge of the elasticities of demand is neces-
sary). A movement towards more liberal) zauon or towards an "equilibrium 
rate of exchange" also depends on knowledge of this margin. In order to 
determine the impact of different policies, the behaviour, under different policies, 
of such key variables as the value of the rupee and the prices of imports should 
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Appendix A 
Selection of Commodities 
From a study of the recent literature on import-control policy, it is evident 
that consumption goods, raw materials, and capital goods are treated with diffe-
rent degrees of stringency in licensing. Power noted that "foreign exchange is 
valued more highly in substituting for imports of final consumption goods than 
in producing equipment" [17, p. 207]. It has also been argued that the major 
effect of the increase in imports due to recent liberalization has been in the 
area of capital goods while raw materials were held under strict control which 
might result in a low level of utilization of productive capacity. The incon-
sistency arising out of the degree of stringency in licensing capital goods, con-
sumption goods, and raw materials required that our study investigate how "the 
pattern of distortions" differed among types of goods. For these broad groups, 
we followed the Planning Commission-ECAFE definitions. Since by these 
definitions consumer durables are classified under capital goods, we made a 
fur ther breakdown of capital goods into consumer durables and machinery and 
equipment and treated the consumer durables and consumption goods together. 
Our objective is to find the gap between domestic market price and landed 
costs for different imported commodities. As the number of commodities 
imported is large, we chose a few commodities. In order that our conclusions 
regarding these few commodities may be applied to the whole of the import 
sector we first selected "representative" commodity groups in the sense that the 
shares of these commodity groups in total imports were large and then we 
selected "representative" commodities f rom those commodity groups on the 
criterion of the share of these goods in total imports under the particular com-
modity group. Detailed statistics of imports of commodities were available 
only up to 1960/61, selection was based on the share of the particular commo-
dities in 1960/61 and assumed that the same commodities would also be impor-
tant in 1963/64. 
Collection of Data 
We compared the landed cost of an imported commodity with its domestic 
price. The main components of the landed cost are the f .o .b . price in the foreign 
ports, freight charges, import duty, and sales tax. The minor ones, namely, 
insurance charge, clearance charge, import-licence fee, banking charge and 
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wharfage cost amount to 2 to 2.5 per cent of the c & f costs. So we made 
allowance for these minor costs as a percentage of the c & f costs and added it 
to import duty and sales tax to get the total landed cost. 
The rates of import duty and sales tax were obtained f r o m the Pakistan 
Customs Tariff [14] and The Law of Sales Tax [2] respectively. We contacted 
different shipping agencies for the freight charges. We are thankfu l to them for 
providing us with requisite rate structure of freight charges f rom the main ports 
of the countries exporting to Karachi. 
In comparing the internal price of the imported goods with the foreign 
prices, we had to be careful in choosing comparable foreign and local prices. 
In the cases of raw materials and capital goods, we compared the immediate-
delivery wholesale price in the domestic market with the wholesale export prices 
in the international markets plus freight and minor charges plus import duty 
and sales tax. In most of these cases, import trade and domestic wholesaling 
are done by the same firm. We collected the domestic prices f rom these firms 
and so the profit margin over landed costs includes in it, among other factors, 
the "normal" markup for the wholesaler. For the consumption goods, it was 
easier to collect the retail prices in the local market, The international exporting 
houses offer a percentage rebate for wholesale purchases. Assuming that this 
percentage is the "normal" markup for the domestic retailers also, we subtracted 
it f r o m the domestic retail price to estimate the wholesale price. We are aware 
of the flaws that can creep in due to this assumption; yet in the absence of any 
good measure of the "normal" markup going to the retailer, we retained it. 
The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics conducted a survey to 
collect the prices in Karachi. An enumerator was appointed for this special 
purpose. For capital goods and raw materials, we investigated two sources: the 
seller and the user. The enumerator asked manufacturers what they paid for 
their machinery, equipment, and raw materials. The Karachi Polytechnic 
Institute uses some of the commodities for its workshop and laboratory. The 
storekeeper there was most helpful in providing us with the data relating the 
prices he paid for the different commodities. A contractor who dealt in build-
ing and construction materials also extended his help. Wholesale markets in 
Karachi were visited several times to obtain selling price of the items. We 
checked both the buying price and the selling price to help reduce any bias on 
the part of one respondent or the other who might be trying to protect his interest. 
The prices were very close in all the cases. 
Trade commissions and trade journals were the most helpful sources of 
foreign prices. For consumption goods, the catalogues of the reputed exporting 
houses in free ports have been used. 
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Product differentiation in cases of consumer goods and difference in sizes 
and qualities in cases of raw materials and capital goods necessitated giving the 
specifications in a clearcut fashion. We tried to choose some popular brands 
of a particular consumption good. Then we averaged the profit margins in 
these brands. For raw materials and capital goods, the markups for different 
sizes and qualities have been averaged. 
Thus, each observation used in the analysis is an average of several items, 
and all averages given are really averages of averages. The prices represent spot 
quotation for the items in question so that, at the specific price, delivery could 
have taken place immediately in the Karachi area in the period June-August 
1964. 
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Now, if a rise in landed cost raises the supply schedule for imports to the 
level S'm S 'm, the new total supply curve will be SDJKS. Even in the new situa-
tion, PX will be the price and UX the quantity sold. JK = SdR = UM is the 
(licensed) imported supply and SMJ + KQ = SMQ JK = UX UM = MX 
is domestic supply. So, with the presence of licence-created profit , if the licensed 
import quantity remains at the same level, tariffs have 110 contribution to pro-
tection over a wide range. Raising SmSm does not change the equilibrium price 
until landed cost rises above XP. Increased tariffs will not increase protection 
within this range, the limits of which are set by the licence-created profit. 
But, in this situation, fur ther restriction of imports gives increased protec-
tion. If imports are restricted to OM,, the total quantity supplied becomes 
OX* Imports are reduced by MMx = XX2 but the total supply diminishes by 
XXi only. The distance X2Xx measures the increase in domestic supply 
resulting f rom the increased protection provided by reduced amount of imports. 
Of course, we have not taken account of the excess production costs and have 
ignored consumption costs altogether. 
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TABLE I 
175 
RATES OF MARKUP ON IMPORTED CONSUMPTION GOODS AND 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
Name of commodity 
Import duty (%on c&f value) 
Sales 
(%onc<fi/ +import duty) 
Total duty (% on c&f value) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(% terras) 
(5) 
(% terms) 
(6) 
A: Regular Items 
Coffee 80 15 107 30 169 
Pepper 5 r 15 20.75 106 149 
Cloves 25 15 43.75 96 134 
Saffron 5 15 43.75 67 140 
Beer 16* 20 39.20 61 123 
Citronclla oil 30<i 15 49.50 53 129 
Leather polish 60 4 87.20 42 156 
Glass tumblers 100 15 130 38 225 
Cups and saucers of Chinaware 100 20 140 31 220 
Safety razor 50 15 72.50 90 227 
Electric lamps 40 15 61 36 120 
Radios 80 20 116 78 286 
B: Bonus Items** 
Meat and meal preparations 20* 15 38 82 
Sugar 71- 0 71 6 — 
Tobacco for pipes and cigarettes 234« 0 234 16 
Domestic refrigerators 30 20 56 5 — 
Air conditioners 80 20 116 5 — 
Motor scooters 40 15 61 5 — 
Bioycles 40 15 61 6 
Cameras 60 20 92 7 
Source: Col. (2) from [14]; Col. (3) from [2], 
"Rates in these oases were in absolute terms. They have been transferred to ad valorem 
rates by taking the average c&f value as the base. 
^Calculations are made assuming that prioe of bonus voucher of Rs, 100 worth of 
foreign exchange — Rs. 150. 
^For British Colony. 
''For Ceylon. 
"For GATT areas. 
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TABLE II 
RATES OF MARKUP ON IMPORTED RAW MATERIALS 
Name of the commodity 
Import duty (% on c&f value) 
Sales tax (% on c&f +import duty) 
Total duty (% on c&f value) M
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(% terms) 
(5) (%(erms) (6) 
A : Regular Items 
Teak sawlog 25 0 25 43 81 Bidi leaf 80 15 107 260 669 Ultramarine blue 35 15 55.25 29 105 Tallow 0 15 15 83 115 Soyabin oil 25 15 43.75 62 138 Cottonseed oil 25 15 43.75 26 83 Coconut oil 15" 15 32.25 90 158 Lithophone 35 15 55.25 28 99 Celluloid 25 15 43.75 53 123 China clay 25 15 " 43.75 54 116 Paraffin wax 30 15 49.50 32 124 Firebrick 30 15 49.50 13 101 
B; OGL Items 
Ammonium sulphate 0 0 0 60 62 Agglomerated cork material 25 15 43.75 56 126 Cinematographic films 60 20 92 32 156 Caustic soda 25 15 43.75 26 172 Soda ash 20 15 38 93 173 Calcium carbide 25 15 43.75 22 79 Sodium bicarbonate 25 15 43,75 49 115 Acetic acid 25 15 43,75 72 148 Tyres and tubes 40 15 61 56 154 Copper ingot 5 5 10.25 78 100 Lead ingot 5 5 10.25 108 134 Alluminiuin ingot 12.50 5 18.12 51 83 Ziuc ingot 5 5 10.25 88 89 Tin ingot 5 5 10.25 17 31 
C: Bonus Items 
Copra 10 15 26.50 12 Wool tops 10 15 26.50 75 Sodium hydrosulphite 25 15 43.75 5 
D: ; Other Items 
Gum Arabic (automatic) 15 15 32.25 8 50 Pig iron (free) 5 5 10.25 15 27 
"For Ceylon and British Colony. Source: Col. (2) from [14]; Col. (3)from [2]. 
Pal: Determinants of Domestic Prices of Imports 177 
TABLE rn 
RATES OF MARKUP ON IMPORTED CAPITAL GOODS 
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Name of the commodity 
Import duty (% on c&f value) 
Sales tax (% on c&f +import duty) 
Total duty (% on c&f value) 
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( 0 (2) (3) (4) 
(% terms) 
(5) 
(% terms) 
(6) 
Iron and steel bars and rods 20 5 26 26 59 
Iron and steel sheets, uneoated )0 5 15.50 58 81 
a) Belgium 10 5 15.50 79 
b) UK 10 5 15.50 70 
c) Japan to 5 15.50 52 
ct) USA 10 5 15.50 41 
Iron and steel plales, unco a ted 10 5 15,50 101 132 
Galvanised plain iron sheets & plates 10 5 15.50 36 57 
a) Belgium 10 5 J 5.50 52 
b) Japan 10 5 15.50 35 
e) USA 10 5 15.50 22 
Iron wire 12.50 5 18.12 60 80 
Steel wire 12.50 5 18.12 90 128 
Galvanised iron pipes 20 5 26 78 124 
a) Belgium 20 5 26 133 
b) USA 20 5 26 23 
Lead sheet 10 5 15.50 30 52 
Electric motors 12.50 20 35 51 105 
Bus chassis 30 15 49.50 87 186 
Source: Col. (2) from [14]; Col, (3) from [2]. 
Liberalization o f t h e 
Foreign Exchange Market 
Frank C, Child 
This chapter originally appeared as an article in the Summer-1968 issue of 
The Pakistan Development Review and is the result of researches carried out by 
the author during his association, f rom August 1967 to July 1969, in advisory 
capacity with the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. 
Professor Child is at present Professor of Economics, University of 
California, Davis. 
Liberalization of 
Foreign Exchange 
the 
Market 
Frank C. Child 
There is a pattern in the evolution of exchange control systems. A typical 
sequence of events is: 
Phase 1, implementation — in response to a serious balance-of-payments 
deficit, a free foreign-exchange market is abandoned in favour of price control 
and rationing of foreign exchange. Initially, exchange control applies only to 
major categories of receipts and payments but is rapidly extended to cover all 
external transactions. 
Phase 2, consolidation •— a blackmarket appears; regulations are extended 
and revised to close loopholes, to cope with shortages, and to repair inequities 
and anomalies. The foreign-exchange market is f ragmented and differential 
treatment is accorded to different types of trade or traders. Taxes, subsidies, 
or multiple-exchange rates are introduced to offset, in a discriminatory way, 
the effect of an overvalued currency on foreign-exchange receipts and the demand 
for imports. The system becomes increasingly complex and administratively 
burdensome. 
Phase 3, rationalization — the complexity of the system is reduced by con-
solidation of market fragments. Regulations are simplified and applied to 
broader categories of transactions. De facto but selective devaluation, through 
tax, subsidy, and exchange-rate adjustments, becomes a policy instrument. 
Portions of the market are "liberalized" by returning to a limited free market 
in which price resumes its functions of evoking supply and limiting demand. 
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Continued disequilibrium, however, sustains the blackmarket which may be 
"tolerated" as a sort of unofficial free market. 
Phase 4, termination — to the accompaniment of some fur ther adjustments 
of the tax and subsidy structure, there is a return to a free market. However, 
complete termination may be postponed; phase 3 may continue more or less 
indefinitely. 
With due allowances for Pakistan's unique circumstances and after re-
cognition of some interesting Pakistani innovations, it may still be said that so 
far the origin and development of Pakistan's exchange-control system fit toler-
ably well into the above pattern. While it is clearly too soon to predict the 
advent of "phase 4", it does appear that Pakistan has entered "phase 3". Recent 
changes have, to a limited extent, simplified and rationalized a complex, dis-
criminatory system. There is open and audible discussion among businessmen 
and government officials on the question of fur ther liberalization. In [2] and 
[3], the present writer lias argued that a freer foreign-exchange market in Pakistan 
is both feasible and desirable. The purpose of this paper is to examine in some 
detail the feasible and likely paths to further liberalization of the foreign-
exchange market. 
Some general background on the origin, characteristics, and evolution of 
Pakistani exchange control is presented in Part I. This is followed, in Part II, 
by a description of the main features of the present (1968) system. Part III 
suggests a convenient and expeditious mechanism for liberalization — in antici-
pation that the arguments for doing so eventually become persuasive to those 
in authority. The paper concludes with a brief statement of some of benefits to 
Pakistan which would follow f rom liberalization. 
Exchange control in Pakistan was adopted in 1954 in the face of a serious 
baiance-of-payments deficit. The circumstances may be illustrated by Figure 1. 
DD and SS represent the demand for and supply of foreign exchange for Pakistan 
circa 1954. The end of the Korean War had brought a serious decline in export 
markets and a drastic reduction in foreign-exchange receipts. Maintenance of 
the official exchange rate, OR0, together with free access to the market, required 
an outflow of gold or foreign-exchange reserves, VZ, per period of time. (Pre-
viously, during the Korean War boom, the D and S funct ions presumably 
intersected somewhere in the vicinity of A, so that OR0 was approximately an 
equilibrium price for foreign exchange.) When the loss of reserve became 
intolerable, exchange control was adopted as an alternative to devaluation. 
(Barring destabilizing speculation aud assuming normal elasticities, ORe would 
be the equilibrium rate.) Henceforth, all foreign-exchange proceeds — and 
existing private foreign-exchange holdings—were required, by law, to be sur-
rendered to the exchange-control authority at the official rate of exchange. The 
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foreign exchange forthcoming at this rate, OV, was then rationed, somehow, to 
importers and other users of foreign exchange. The degree of disequilibrium is 
represented by the "horizontal gap" between amount demanded and amount 
supplied, VZ, or by the "vertical gap" between the official ration price of foreign 
exchange and its scarcity value, G R P . The latter "gap", R0 Rp , is 'a "scarcity 
premium" which becomes a windfall profit to importers favoured by the ration-
ing system. 
Q U A N T I T Y OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
Figure 1. Foreign Exchange Market 
It. would have been possible to retain price as a rationing device, i.e., to 
auction the available foreign exchange in an open market limiting demand to 
those willing and able to pay the highest prices and, thus, clearing the market 
at the premium price OR p . This procedure, widely used in Latin Amorican 
countries and in pre-War Germany, would introduce a dual pricing system. 
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Absorption of the scarcity premium by the monetary authority would be tanta-
mount to a tax on external t ransact ions 1 . Price control, in effect, continues 
the "tax" but diverts the entire amount as a subsidy to importers. 
However, Pakistan eschewed price as a market-clearing device and chose, 
rather, to ration exchange by non-price means. It introduced a comprehensive 
system of licensing and administrative procedure through which to decide 
which of the competing demands would be satisfied. Presumably, demands 
of "high social pr ior i ty" were met in ful l ; those of lower priority were met in 
par t ; and low priority, nonessential uses of foreign exchange were denied —• 
except insofar as there was leakage f rom the system into a blackmarket. In-
deed, the divergence between the assessment of private and social values would 
almost certainly lead to a blackmarket and a blackmarket price of exchange, a 
price in excess of either a devalued free-market rate or the price that would exist 
in an auction market for scarce exchange. To the extent that administratively 
determined social priorities required satisfaction of demands of those pur-
chasers with low demand prices — those included in the lower right portion of 
the demand funct ion — there was a diversion of exchange away f rom those 
willing to pay very high prices but with low priority — those included in the 
demand funct ion above B or even C (see Figure 1). We might note in passing 
that the emphasis on social priorities and the simplicity of rationing by price 
could be reconciled. By segmenting the import market into, say, capital goods, 
raw materials, essential consumer goods, and luxuries, available foreign exchange 
could be allocated to each segment and then auctioned freely within that sub-
market. This would, of course, be a system of multiple-exchange rates, a system 
widely used in exchange controlling countries because of its (relative) simplicity. 
Such a system can be made more sophisticated by introducing multiple-export 
rates as well. As we shall see shortly, over time Pakistan's trade and payments 
control system has evolved toward one which approximates these characteristics. 
In any event, price rationing was avoided, at least at first, probably in an (ulti-
mately ineffective) effort to avoid increasing the rupee cost of imports. 
Pakistan's decision not to devalue was, under the circumstances of the time, 
a reasonable one. At that time virtually all foreign-exchange earnings were 
derived f r o m traditional agricultural exports. Given normal, low supply elas-
ticities and given world prices, a higher exchange rate would mean higher rewards 
to exporters without much increase in output, i.e., higher economic rents. In 
the case of jute, low-demand elasticity abroad, even with a positive supply 
response, might reduce foreign-exchange earnings. On the import side, prices 
would increase across the board — on consumer goods, capital goods, and 
imported raw materials. The total impact would be essentially a change in the 
»ts the exchange profit of the monetary authority, RoRp per unit, a "tax" on exporters 
who receive less than the market value of their export earnings? Or is it a "tax" on importers 
who must pay more than the exporters receive for their foreign exchange? 
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internal terms of trade in Pakistan — in favour of sectors producing traditional 
agricultural exports and against consumers generally and industry in particular. 
Questions of "fa i r" distribution of income aside, such a change was inconsistent 
with plans for a high saving rapidly industrializing economy with urban/industry 
as the leading sector (see [2 ;3]). 
Systems of exchange control substitute administrative rules, regulations, 
and procedures for the indirect controls of a self-regulating market place. Since 
the foreign-exchange market is normally highly organized and centralized, it 
appears to be easily regulated; virtually all international transactions pass 
through the hands of a few foreign-exchange dealers, usually commercial banks, 
who conduct their affairs meticulously and with a high degree of technical effi-
ciency. With exchange control, however, it soon becomes apparent that there 
are numerous other, though less convenient and efficient, ways to accomplish 
international money transfers. The pressure of excess demand makes these 
alternatives attractive and profitable; effective, exchange control requires that 
these "loopholes" be closed or brought into the controlled system. And as each 
loophole is closed, new ones appear — a tribute to man's ingenuity. Exchange 
control contains a sort of built-in, self-generating mechanism for its own ex-
tension, once established it must be constantly revised and extended. 
Pakistan's exchange control is 110 exception to this rule; it has been con-
sistently, regularly revised. Virtually every issue of the official Gazette of 
Pakistan contains some addition, deletion, or modification of the regulations and 
procedures. Just a few examples: prices of traded commodities are subjected 
to administrative review to reduce the incidence of over- and under-invoicing of 
imports and exports; travellers are subject to a variety of constraints and 
record-keeping requirements to reduce blackmarket currency transactions; 
international mail must be inspected to check illegal currency transfers and to 
minimize private barter/compensation arrangements between two pairs of 
trading partners; some sort of "certificate of origin" (and inspection) is required 
for commodities which' might originate in a country with which trade is banned: 
and, of course, there is the chronic problem of smuggling. 
The more serious the market disequilibrium the greater the pressure for 
circumventing the regulations and for extra-legal transactions. An alternative 
to more rigid controls is a reduction of the disequilibrium pressure and Pakistan 
has, f rom time to time, revised its control system in this direction. The scarcity 
premium 011 imported goods, the difference between internal scarcity value and 
landed cost, has been reduced by higher import duties; tariffs and excises have 
been increased and new surcharges imposed. (Additional taxes on imported 
goods shift the demand curve for foreign exchange downward f rom D to D-T 
in Figure 1.) The Bonus Voucher Scheme has decontrolled or "liberalized" a 
portion of Pakistan's foreign trade, i.e., returned it to a more or less self-regulat-
ing free market. The price paid for bonus vouchers effectively absorbs the 
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scarcity premium on goods so imported and transfers this premia to exporters 
to offset partially the inhibiting effects of an overvalued currency on the volume 
of exports (see p. 188). All these measures, and others, reduce the incen-
tive for circumventing exchange control. 
Autonomous or fortui tous circumstances also affect the system and lead to 
change. A substantial inflow of aid loans and private capital has, over the 
years, augmented foreign-exchange supplies, reducing the excess demand for 
and the scarcity premium on foreign exchange and reducing the need for even 
tighter controls. (Capital imports shift the supply curve in Figure 1 f rom S to 
S + L and, in conjunct ion with the lower demand curve, D-T, reduce the scarcity 
premium to R . R p ' ) . The war with India, hesitant action by the Aid consortium, 
and substandard harvests during 1966 and 1967, on the other hand, increased 
the disequilibrium. The devaluation of sterling in November 1967 was the 
occasion for a significant liberalization; the bonus voucher issue rate for eligible 
exporters was increased by 10 per cent, stamped (restricted use) bonus vouchers 
were eliminated, the export taxes on raw jute and cotton were eliminated, and a 
10-per-cent "regulatory duty" was imposed on a wide variety of imports 2 . We 
might add that these actions are tantamount ' to a 6-9-per-cent devaluation des-
pite the official announcement to the contrary that Pakistan would not devalue 
its currency in the wake of the British pound. 
Finally, an exchange-control system will be modified over time to adapt it 
to changing public policy goals. As indicated above, Pakistan adopted exchange 
control to meet a serious balance-of-payments deficit. Today the rupee remains 
overvalued and exchange control continues to defend the balance of payments. 
But exchange control now serves a larger purpose; it has become part of a com-
prehensive system of economic controls designed to promote saving, investment, 
and economic growth. By controlling the volume, composition, and terms of 
international transactions, it seeks to guide the quantity and quality of domestic 
economic activity — the price structure, resource allocation, output composition, 
and income distribution. Such goals require more and different devices than 
simple management of a foreign-exchange scarcity. The system has become 
comprehensive, complex, and discriminatory. In addition to a multiplicity of 
discriminatory taxes, it employs a variety of equally discriminatory and frequently 
discretionary quantitative and procedural controls over external transactions. 
II 
The most striking and important feature of the present exchange-control 
system is the fragmentat ion and compartmentalization of the fore ign-exchange— 
"Exceptions: the new regulatory duty was not applied to bonus-voucher imports nor to a 
few commodities used exclusively in agriculture. The duty was limited to 5 per cent on a few 
consumer goods and on capital goods and machinery imported into East Pakistan. 
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market . While the various submarkets have certain common characteristics, 
each one has its own unique features with respect to commodities which may be 
traded, eligible participants, procedures to be followed, and degree of constraint. 
Except for the ceiling imposed on the exchange rate, administrative con-
straints on exports f r o m Pakistan are few. Exports are licensed but this is 
essentially a surveillance procedure designed to encourage compliance with 
the requirement that export proceeds be surrendered to the monetary authority. 
About 55 per cent of Pakistan's export earnings f rom raw jute, cotton, skins 
and hides, and a few minor items, are converted to rupees at the official rate 
(Rs. 4.75 = $1). The remaining exports—from the developing manufactur ing 
industries, certain service industries, and some invisibles—receive supplementary 
price incentives of various sorts (to be described below) which increase their 
rupee return to Rs. 6-8 per dollar with a few rates going as high as Rs. 12 per 
dollar. 
On the import side, capital goods for establishment, expansion or modern-
ization of industry enter the country at the official rate of exchange (plus various 
taxes) and access to exchange for these purposes requires a licence based on a 
prior "investment sanction" that the project is in accordance with the Compre-
hensive Investment Schedule of the development plan. All other imports enter 
the country under one or more of seven import procedures A . 
A. Licensing has, since 1954, been the basic procedure through which to 
ration limited supplies of foreign exchange. Simple in form, licensing re-
quires that established importers "register" with the Chief Controller of Imports 
and Exports and, as such, they become eligible to obtain licences for import of 
eligible commodities up to some specified limit. Each registered importer 's 
quota is expressed as a percentage of his "entitlement" or "category" the amount 
imported during some base period or the amount adjudged necessary to operate 
his facilities at a "normal" rate. Licensed imports enter the country at the 
official exchange rate, plus applicable duties. 
Over the years, the list of items importable under ordinary licensing has 
been reduced as alternative import procedures have been instituted. At present 
there are 25 groups of commodities remaining on the licence list and they are 
subject to a variety of constraints and restrictions; three groups are importable 
by public-sector agencies only, three by "industrial users" only, and five by 
"actual users" (ultimate consumers) only. The rest are available to any eligible 
"commercial importer". Certain goods are importable only f rom specified 
countries and two commodities may be imported "subject to availability of U.S. 
PL-480 funds" . Pharmaceutical importers are required to obtain prior approval 
•'The following summary of procedures with respect to each import submarket is based 
primarily on the "Import Policy" announced in the Gazette of Pakistan—Extraordinary, January 
15 and January 20, 1968. 
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of the Director General of Health and their incoming shipments must contain 
not less than 30 per cent (in value) of a list of specified goods but not more than 
30 per cent of another list. Payment to abroad must be accomplished through a 
banker 's Letter of Credit (L/C) the face value of which must fall within minimum 
and maximum limits set by the monetary authority. The limits vary among 
commodities; pooling of quotas to accommodate these limits is permissible. 
Import of "spares" for industry requires the approval of the Directorate of 
Industry. This list of constraints is not exhaustive but representative. 
B. The Free List includes those items which may be "imported without cover 
of licence". A reading of the "fine pr int" explaining the procedure reveals, 
however, that the f ree list is free in name only. Of the fourteen groups of 
commodities on the list, two are importable by the public sector only, five by 
industrial users only (of which two are specified, particular industries), one is 
for East Pakistan only. Industrial users may open L/Cs equal to 100 per cent 
of their entitlements (quotas), as shown in their importers' passbooks, while com-
rnerical importers may open L/Cs within stated minima and maxima provided 
they were importers of that same commodity between July 1964 and July 1967 
and provided that their L/C may not exceed the amount imported during July-
December 1967. Moreover, commercial importers are limited to trade in one, 
in some cases two, commodity on the list. There are additional constraints 
similar to those applicable to ordinary licensing which leads to the conclusion 
that except in the most formal and limited sense, free-list importing is essentially 
a second-licence procedure. Originally the f ree list was a special category of 
goods importable f r o m countries which have (tied) commodity aid programmes 
for Pakistan. Since aid-financed goods may now also be imported under other 
procedures, this distinction has lost much of its meaning, although free-list items 
arc still specified as to source, i.e., they may be imported only f rom countries 
with aid or barter agreements with Pakistan. 
Free-list goods enter the country at the official rate of exchange plus applic-
able duties. While the degree of excess demand is not serious, there is 
apparently some scarcity premium; otherwise there would be no need to ration 
imports. 
C. The Bonus Voucher Scheme is the most novel and interesting element 
of Pakistan's foreign-exchange market (see [1 ; 4 ; 6]). Briefly, under this pro-
cedure selected exporters receive bonus vouchers — a right to purchase foreign 
exchange at the official rate of exchange—in an amount equal to some fract ion 
(currently 20 per cent, 30 per cent, or 40 per cent) of the foreign-exchange pro-
ceeds surrendered at the official rate to the exchange-control authority. Upon 
presentation of bonus vouchers, import licences are issued automatically to 
importers of a list of eligible goods. Given the scarcity value of imports, 
voucher holders have a valuable and marketable property. There is an organ-
ized market (including a futures market) for bonus vouchers. Given the 
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exporters' supply function, the bonus voucher issue rate, and the demand func-
tion of eligible imports, there is a unique bonus-voucher price and rate of sale 
which will clear the marke t 4 . 
The bonus-voucher segment of the foreign-exchange market has been 
gradually expanded since its inception in 1959. Currently, almost all exporters 
of manufactured goods, certain service industries {i.e., aircraft maintenance, 
hotels), tourist sales centres, and exporters of basmati r ice 5 may earn bonus 
vouchers—unless they are re-exporting or are exporting under barter agree-
ments. The import list has grown to include 244 commodity groups f rom 
machinery and raw materials to consumer durables. In addition, with one or 
two exceptions, any item on the free list, the licence list, or on the cash -cum-
bonus list (see below) may also be imported at the higher bonus rate of exchange. 
There are some administrative constraints. Certain items are importable into 
only one of the two wings of Pakistan and several are importable by industrial 
users only. A number of bomis imports are subject to quantitative restrictions 
(e.g., automobiles). 
The bonus-voucher market is the channel through which the stultifying 
effects of direct controls have been ameliorated without, apparently, sacrifice 
of public-policy goals. It has been a major factor in promoting exports of 
Pakistan's nascent industry; manufactured exports have increased at a rate of 
almost 100 per cent per annum since 1959 and the share of such goods in Pakis-
tan's total exports is approaching 50 per cent. On the import side, bonus 
vouchers face an exchange rate more than 150 per cent above the official rate 
and are subject to (frequently very high) taxes and surcharges. Nevertheless, 
bonus imports are currently nearing 10 per cent of the total. It is an outlet for 
excess demand in other segments of the market. 
D. A Cash-cum-Bonus procedure was established in 1967; as the name 
implies it is a compromise between the bonus-voucher system and ordinary 
licensing. Under this arrangement, importers may obtain import licences only 
when applications are accompanied by bonus vouchers covering 50 per cent of 
their exchange requirements. Quotas for industrial users are set at 100 per 
cent of their half-yearly entitlements; those of commercial importers are set by 
stated minimum or maximum value of the L/Cs which may be opened. Com-
modities transferred to this new segment of the market f r o m the free or bonus 
4The mechanics of the bonus-voucher market will be examined in detail below, see page 194. 
SThe inclusion of basmati rice, which accounted for 6 per cent of Pakistan's exports in 
1967, is incongruous. Trade control regulations specify that this high-quality rice is for export 
only. Although there is substantial "disappearance", the entire crop is subject to government 
procurement at a low fixed price. The government's purchases are then sold, at auction, to 
exporting firms. The auction price is expressed in terms of foreign exchange payable after the 
rice is actually exported. They are, however, granted 20 per cent bonus vouchers on their 
export proceeds. Under these oircumstancesf the bonus vouchers "earned" are at best super-
fluous, at worst a simple windfall to the exporters. 
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lists, for which there were no established quotas, are available only to importers 
with a previous record of imports. The cash-cwm-bonus list contains 73 com-
modity groups of which 43 are importable by industrial users only and five are 
importable into East Pakistan only. 
If it operates as described, the system is essentially a variation of the ordinary 
licensing procedure with an import surcharge; the bonus-voucher requirement 
transfers a port ion of the scarcity premium on imports to the bonus-voucher 
market and should support the bonus-voucher price. There are reports that, 
in fact, cash-cu/H-bonus importers have been unable to obtain the "cash" por-
tion of their licences while the "bonus" portion is readily available. If this is 
true, and this writer has not been able to verify the report, the cash-ci/w-bonus 
procedure is a de facto extension of the bonus-voucher system with a quota 
constraint. 
E. Export-Performance Licensing (EPL) of imported industrial inputs is 
permitted, subject to approval of the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports 
and the Export Promotion Bureau. Import licences, presumably above and 
beyond entitlements under normal licensing, are issued at rates of 2.5-30 per 
cent of the f .o .b . value of exports of some 143 commodities. Advance licensing 
based on an agreed export target is also permitted but an exporter who does so 
is subject to a penalty in the form of bonus vouchers to cover licences issued 
but not ultimately "earned" by export performance. Although imports under 
export-performance licences are not supposed to be transferable, their value, 
like that of bonus vouchers, derives f r o m the domestic scarcity value of imported 
goods. They are, in effect, restricted-use bonus vouchers similar to the stamped 
bonus vouchers issued to exporters of ju te manufacturers until the end of 1967. 
Export-performance licensing is an administrative nightmare of such 
horrendous complexity as to break the spirit of the ablest bureaucrat. Pro-
cedures for establishing eligibility and issue rates are complex and responsibility 
is split. Supervision of the procedure and enforcement of conditions by the 
responsible agencies are onerous; costs of compliance on the part of businessmen 
are unusually high. The system is a channel for political pressure f rom special 
economic interests. Any useful purpose served by export-performance licensing 
can be met by incorporating it into the general bonus-voucher system; EPL 
should be abandoned forthwith. 
F. The Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) was established in 1967 as 
a public agency through which importers are required to place their orders for six 
metal products f r o m seven countries. Importers ' quotas — at 29 to 262 per cent 
of the old half-yearly entitlements — are effectively pooled and bulk purchases 
made. Since the commodities concerned are covered by barter agreements 
with various countries, it would appear that TCP is simply an indenting service 
established to control the volume and terms of barter trade. Importers are 
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fearful that it is more of a device to erode their profit margins by absorbing the 
scarcity premift on goods so imported. The writer has not yet found incon-
trovertible evidence to support or refute these fears but the anguished cries of the 
business community lead one to suspect that it is so. 
Bulk purchasing or sales in barter or other markets by TCP might permit 
better terms on external transactions. TCP offers its services as a broker or 
agent to any interested importer or exporter and while the agency hopes to pro-
vide a useful service, few firms have thus far availed themselves of the oppor-
tunity. 
G. Under the Baggage Allowance exemption, Pakistani travellers return-
ing to the country may import , duty-free and without licence, Rs, 1,250 worth of 
goods per trip including one refrigerator, one airconditioner, and one radio 
per year. The volume of consumer durables so imported has led to a structured 
market for these items and their market price has fallen below landed cost plus 
normal markup in commercial channels. Indeed businessmen offer and publicly 
advertise their willingness to order and receive merchandise f r o m abroad so that 
no traveller's exemption need be lost. While it seems reasonable to permit 
travellers to bring home some personal items, gifts, and mementos, the present 
exemption clearly provides a loophole through which a significant volume of 
foreign exchange is drained. 
Superimposed over this entire exchange structure is a large element of 
discretionary administrative control. The Chief Controller of Imports and 
Exports, in consultation with a number of other governmental units, has the 
ma jo r responsibility for formulat ing and implementing public policy in this area. 
The State Bank has the immediate administrative responsibility. The State 
Bank, in turn, relies upon foreign-exchange dealers, the "scheduled" commercial 
banks, to operate the system by requiring that all foreign-exchange transactions 
must pass through the banking system. Import transactions must be accom-
plished through letters of credit opened at one of the scheduled banks, each 
bank being responsible for supervision and enforcement of the applicable 
regulations. In the process the State Bank must, within the limits of the "foreign-
exchange budget" , establish suballocations or subauthorizations of exchange 
which set a limit on the availability of exchange for various categories of import-
able goods. There is some evidence that the State Bank imposes informal 
foreign-exchange quotas against which L/Cs may be issued to various importers; 
when the allocation is exhausted no fur ther L/Cs may be issued unless and until 
additional foreign-exchange allocations are forthcoming. Indeed, the January-
1968 Import Policy explicitly states that import quotas will be met "subject to 
the availability of exchange". Commercial banks, in turn, may discriminate 
among their customers. Moreover, the State Bank and the various scheduled 
banks, which act as its agents, exercise cohsiderable discretion in the speed with 
which administrative procedures are completed, effectively hastening or delaying 
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the process for particular transactions. This is especially notable with respect 
to the occasional provision for so-called "automatic repeat licensing" available 
to importers of certain commodities during a six-month shipping period. 
The complexity and variability of the system requires that the State Bank 
and CCI&E establish an appeal procedure to resolve questions about eligibility 
of importers, the size of quotas, and applicable procedures. It appears that the 
controlling agencies have established a sort of rule-by-precedent to reduce the 
load of discretionary decisions. 
Further, the monetary controls are butteressed by (buttress?) the basic 
commercial policy. Export duties have been abolished but imports are subject 
to tariffs, excises, a defence surcharge, a rehabilitation tax and regulatory duties, 
as well as licence and registration fees. In general, the tax rates are "cascaded" 
with highest rates applicable to "nonessential" consumer goods or products 
whose production is encouraged under the "import substitution" policy, lower 
rates on essentials and industrial raw materials, and the lowest rates on capital 
goods. On many items there is an outright ban. The latest import policy 
contains eight lists of banned items and anything not explicitly permitted is 
banned. There are exceptions — lathes are importable but certain sizes, com-
monly used in Pakistan, are banned. There are exceptions to exceptions — steel 
pipe is importable, except certain sizes which are banned, except certain speciality 
pipe which is permitted. 
The complexity and intricacy of the system is, if anything, understated by 
this summary. Yet we hasten to add that Pakistan's exchange-control authorities 
have shown remarkable ingenuity and responsiveness in the ways in which they 
have modified — and even simplified—the system so that it would serve as an 
effective instrument of public policy. Until 1965, substantial liberalization and 
simplification of the system was obtained through Open General Licensing, 
expansion of the f ree list, and the introduction of the Bonus Voucher Scheme. 
In 1965-67, with an increased degree of disequilibrium, administrative controls 
were tightened. Open general licensing was abandoned, the free list became 
just another licensing procedure, and the bonus-voucher system was hedged 
with quotas and administrative constraints. However, the new cash-cum-
bonus procedure plus a variety of other minor changes in the latest import policy ' 
suggest that more liberal policies are possible. 
We may note, parenthetically, that some discrimination and bilateralism 
is imposed externally. So long as the various aid-lending countries tie their 
development loans to their own particular exports, exports which are priced 
above the world market price, Pakistan has little choice but to impose bilateral 
clearing for aid-financed commodities. The alternative is chaotic, dual pricing 
for a single commodity or the imposition of constantly changing and probably 
ineffective discriminatory taxes and subsidies to eliminate the differential between 
prices in the world market and the aiding country (see [3]). 
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H I 
The liberal case for a free market as the mechanism for allocation of scarce 
resources is based, primarily, on two arguments: i) economic efficiency; and ii) 
low social cost of administration. The former argument has become somewhat 
attenuated because of a growing awareness, among political practitioners if not 
among economists, that the achievement of "Pareto Opt ima" is an inadequate 
or even inappropriate public-policy goal. It is clear that private and social 
values or costs can and do diverge. Problem of externalities, convexities, and 
interpersonal comparisons of welfare vitiate the usefulness of criteria of economic 
efficiency. The dynamics of growth frequently call for abrogation of the re-
quirements of static efficiency. In less arcane terms, social goals with respect to 
economic growth, resource use, and income distribution may require decisions 
inconsistent with those which would obtain when private individuals make 
unfettered decisions in a "natural", unregulated, market-guided economy. It is 
on such grounds that Pakistan has opted for a controlled disequilibrium rather 
than a free market for foreign exchange. In doing so, however, Pakistan has 
run afoul of ii) above. Exchange control has clearly become costly to admin-
ister. It is complicated, slow, cumbersome, uncertain, inefficient, and con-
ducive to corruption. One suspects that it has become so intricate that it no 
longer "controls" effectively, that it is unable to accomplish the ends for which 
it is intended. 
For example: businessmen and government officials have informed this 
writer that, in some cases, the combined export incentives under the Bonus 
Voucher Scheme and Export Performance Licensing are sufficient to permit 
profi table sale of exports for less than the cost of their imported raw-material 
content. Similarly, it is reported that the scarcity premium on imported raw 
materials is high enough that, in some cases, it pays to import capital equipment 
solely for the raw-material-import quotas that can be justified by higher-output 
capacity. Since capital-goods imports are routinely overinvoiced, the fact 
that capital equipment may be under- or unutilized is not a deterrent. The 
scarcity value of imported raw materials plus the premium attached to foreign 
balances is great enough to offset the cost of capital equipment which may be 
imported at an artificially low exchange rate. It is anomalous that capital goods 
are imported, under a rationing system at artificially low prices, when existing 
productive facilities in industry operate at 40-60 per cent of capacity*"'. These 
and other examples suggest that the exchange system in Pakistan is out of control. 
A liberalization of the foreign-exchange market would actually promote better 
"control" in the sense that the pricing system would enforce more uneconomical 
use of scarce resources and simultaneously reduce the administrative burden 
T h e s e figures are "armchair" but widely accepted estimates in Pakistan. For an in-
complete but informative report on rales of utilization of capacity in selected industries,.we 
151. 
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change earned and surrendered to the exchange-control authority at the official 
rate of exchange, exporters receive transferable bonus vouchers entitling the 
holder to purchase $30 of foreign exchange together with an import licence for 
$30 worth of eligible goods. The line OV is a reference line indicating the 
volume of bonus vouchers issued with each alternative rate of export proceeds®. 
Alternatively, the line OV indicates that fraction of the foreign-exchange pro-
ceeds of bonus-voucher exports which must be earmarked to honour the ex-
change authority's commitment to sell foreign exchange against vouchers. For 
example, if OY of foreign exchange is surrendered to the exchange-control 
authority by the exporters concerned, OW of this amount is committed to those 
importers exercising bonus-voucher rights and WY of exchange is available to 
the authority to meet other demands. 
Indeed, in this example, OY is the equilibrium foreign-exchange value of 
bonussed exports. D D ' represents the demand for foreign exchange for those 
commodities eligible for import under bonus. Upon introduction of the Bonus 
Scheme, exporters who have been earning OX of foreign exchange will receive, 
in addition to OR0LX rupees, OU of bonus vouchers. In an auction market, 
importers will pay ORp' rupees for each of the OU units of exchange available 
to them. Since they pay OR0 for each unit of foreign exchange when they 
utilize the bonus vouchers, R0Rp' is the price they will pay for the vouchers 
themselves — the bonus-voucher premium. The bonus-voucher premium 
provides a price incentive to exporters to generate more bonus vouchers. As 
export earnings and the volume of vouchers rise, the price of vouchers will fall; 
equilibrium will be reached when OW of vouchers sell for R0RP rupees each. At 
that price, the total bonus-voucher premia R0RPTK is just sufficient to generate 
OW supply of vouchers; this amount , when spread over total exports, yields an 
exporter's premium of R.Re per unit of foreign exchange for a total of R0RCSM. 
(The area RoRpTK equals the area R0ReSM.) Any bonus-voucher price other 
than R0Rp, given the 30-per-cent issue rate, will lead to an excess demand for 
or supply of bonus vouchers. 
There are at least five interesting features of the bonus-voucher system: 
i) imports under bonus are "liberalized" in the sense that these goods are 
rationed by the pricing system rather than by an administrative procedure ; ii) 
the scarcity premium on eligible imports is captured and transferred to exporters, 
thus stimulating export earnings, i.e., the procedure is a de facto, albeit partial, 
devaluation of the rupee; iii) unlike exporters who receive vouchers for a frac-
tion of their foreign-exchange earnings, importers must buy all of their foreign 
exchange with vouchers; /v) that fract ion of export proceeds not committed to 
honour bonus-voucher holders' claims is available to the exchange-control 
«In fact, bonus vouchers are issued at three different rates — 20 per cent, 30 per cent, 
and 40 per cent — for different export commodities. For simplicity of presentation, a single 
rate of issue is assumed. 
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authority to meet other import demands; and v) the f ract ional issue rate of 
bonus vouchers drives a wedge between the import and export rates of exchange, 
it creates a multiple-exchange-rate system 9 . Generalization of the bonus-
voucher system — and fur ther liberalization — could be accomplished by 
increasing the bonus voucher issue rate to 100 per cent and extending the system 
to cover all transactions. 
Increasing the issue rate to 100 per cent would eliminate the difference 
between the import and export rates of exchange. Again referring to Figure 2, 
equilibrium in the limited bonus-voucher segment of the market would be 
reached at Q; the effective rate of exchange would be ORg. OZ amount of 
foreign exchange would be traded for OR„NZ rupees and an equal amount of 
bonus vouchers would trade for R„RgQN. Since the 100-per-cent rate of issue 
of bonus vouchers "commits" the entire proceeds of bonus-voucher exports, the 
voucher system no longer contributes any foreign exchange to other import 
procedures. However, total export proceeds would rise as would bonus-
voucher imports. If the bonus-voucher system were completely generalized to 
apply to all transactions, it would mean de facto devaluation, a free market, 
and a unified rate of exchange. Referring back to Figure 1, OX of foreign 
exchange would be "officially" traded at the price OR0 and bonus vouchers of 
the same quantity would be exchanged in a free market for a premium of R . R e ' . 
Total export earnings would rise, permitting an increse in total imports. 
The crucial difference between a generalized bonus-voucher market and an 
ordinary free market is that it retains the key role of the State Bank in the ex-
change market . All foreign-exchange receipts would continue to be surrendered 
to the State Bank (or its agents) at the official (arbitrary) rate of exchange; all 
foreign-exchange purchase would be made f rom the Bank (or its agents) at the 
same rate. The State Bank would remain the bottleneck through which foreign 
exchange is channelled and the free market for vouchers is superimposed on top. 
An equilibrium quantity of exchange would pass through the market at the 
official rate of exchange but the maket would actually be cleared or "equilibra-
ted" by an exchange of bonus vouche/s at some equilibrium price. There 
are singular advantages to this dichotomy. 
First, it is possible effectively to exclude certain foreign traders f r o m the 
market in accordance with public policy, e.g., those who demand foreign ex-
change for non-permissible capital export or for purchase of banned commodi-
s>The import rate of exchange is R, = R0 (1 +p), where R0 is the official rate and p is the bonus-voucher price expressed as a percentage of the official rate. The export rate is Re = 
aRm + ( l— a) R o = R o (1 -!- op), where a is the bonus voucher issue rate. For some years, bonus vouchers sold at 150-160 per cent of the official exchange rate; therefore, R, is approximately Rs. 12 =$1 and Re is approximately Rs. 7= $1, when the bonus voucher issue rate is 30 per cent. Since November 1967, the price of bonus vouchers has been generally higher and somewhat less stable. 
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ties. Secondly, it continues the Bank's careful scrutiny, but not rationing, of 
foreign-exchange transactions. Thirdly, it maintains the organization and 
structure of the exchange-control system intact. In the event of large shifts in 
external conditions, which require adjustments beyond the ability of a f ree market 
or the internal economy to respond in an orderly way, controls and non-price 
rationing can be adopted forthwith. In short, it retains a second line of defence 
in the event of a disorderly foreign-exchange market. 
We also note in passing that it would probably be appropriate for the State 
Bank to intervene, on occasions, as a participant in the voucher market. In the 
face of seasonal fluctuations in the demand for or supply of vouchers/ exchange, 
it would be expedient to dampen price fluctuations and discourage disequili-
brating speculation. It would also reduce the element of uncertainty in foreign 
trade associated with fluctuating exchange rates. This is nothing more than the 
usual suggestion that the monetary authority be willing to risk temporary losses 
or accumulations of foreign-exchange reserves by acting as an exchange stabi-
lization f u n d 1 0 . If the present futures market for bonus vouchers can be 
developed to perform this stabilizing function, the need for official intervention 
is reduced. 
Two earlier import procedures, Open General Licensing and the original 
Free List, were attempts to move toward a more "liberal" payments system; 
each proved nugatory in the end. Both arrangements are moribund and they 
were quietly dropped in 1967 without benefit of public announcement. The 
bonus-voucher system remains the single major success in the direction of 
liberalization. There are indications in 1968 import policy, however, that this 
market, too, is to be brought under more direct control; quotas were imposed on 
certain bonus imports and the cash-ct/m-bonus procedure, which carries quanti-
tative restrictions, implies new controls in the bonus-voucher market. Closer 
examination, however, reveals that integration and coordination of the cash-cwm-
bonus and ordinary bonus-voucher procedures offer possibilities for liberalization 
of the foreign-exchange market. Generalization of the combined bonus-
voucher and cash-cww-boniis systems presents an attractive and feasible method 
for rationalization and simplification which is potentially as effective as and 
perhaps more flexible than a simple 100-per-cent bonus-voucher market as 
described above. 
It will be recalled (see Figure 2) that fractional bonus voucher issue rate on 
the export side and a 100-per-cent bonus-voucher requirement on the import 
. lOThe rather remarkable stability of the present limited bonus-voucher market has led 
some observers to suspect such intervention on the part of the monetary authority. Offioials 
at the State Bank have denied any such stabilizing actions. It is possible that the futures market 
contributes a stabilizing influence. The policy-making authorities seem to consider stability 
in the bonus-voucher price when they alter the rate of issue of bonus vouchers and ohange the 
composition of the bonus-voucher import list — as they do every six months. Also, see 
page 202. 
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side separate the import and export rates of exchange. Dual pricing is con-
sistent with market equilibrium because only 30 per cent (OW) of bonus-voucher 
export proceeds is committed to bonus-voucher imports; the remaining 70 per 
cent (WY) of export earnings is diverted to other segments of the foreign-
exchange market . The export rate is the weighted average of the official and 
bonus-voucher import r a t e s 1 1 . 
The cash-cww-bonus import procedure is analogous to the fractional bonus-
voucher issue rate on the export side. Importers of cash-cwm-bonus items 
must purchase a portion of their foreign exchange with bonus vouchers but, when 
they do so, they are entitled to purchase their remaining foreign-exchange re-
quirements at the official rate. This procedure increases the exchange-control 
authority's commitment of foreign exchange to bonus-voucher holders. For 
example, if the present cash-mn-bonus ratio of 50:50 were applied to all bonus-
voucher importers participating in the market, illustrated by Figure 2, the 
fraction of bonus-voucher export proceeds available to importers would be 
doubled. Since each unit of foreign exchange purchased with voucher permits 
an additional unit to be purchased without voucher, each bonus voucher be-
comes, in effect, a right to purchase two units of foreign exchange 1 2 . In terms 
of our diagram, we need another "reference line". OV still shows the volume 
of bonus vouchers generated by the system but a second reference line, rotated 
clockwise f r o m OV so that it stands at 60 per cent of the horizontal distance 
f rom the vertical axis to OSb denotes the foreign exchange available to voucher 
importers. This change would, of course, require an adjustment to a new 
equilibrium relationship involving the price of bonus vouchers, the volume of 
exports, and the differential between importers' and exporters' rates of exchange. 
More generally, the portion of foreign-exchange proceeds available to 
bonus-voucher importers is S = Si, (r / /) , where r is the bonus voucher issue 
rate and / is the bonus-voucher fraction of the exchange requirements of casli-
cww-bonus importers. It is apparent that if r a n d / are equal, the total foreign-
exchange earnings, Sb, are committed to bonus-voucher importers and that 
dual pricing of exchange is eliminated>3. 
The system can, of course, be generalized. Suppose that a bonus voucher 
issue rate of 30 per cent is applied to all export transactions and that all imports 
require cash-cww-bonus in a 70 per cent/30 per cent ratio. Referring to Figure 3, 
OS represents the foreign-exchange supply function and OV the (30 per cent) 
bonus-voucher reference line. Given demand, D D ' , equilibrium will be estab-
lished at B with OX volume of foreign exchange traded at an effective rate of 
uSee footnote 9 on page 196. 
"As mentioned earlier, there are reports that the exchange authority does not always 
honour its commitment to provide the cash portion of cash-eiwj-bonus importers' requirements. 
Also, there are quantitative strictions on cash-cw«-bonus imports. It is here assumed that 
cash exchange is provided and that quotas are eliminated or redundant. 
"In the previous example of a generalized bonus-voucher market, r = / = 1 0 0 % . 
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exchange of OR c . OR e remains the official (and arbitrary) rate of exchange; the 
average premium over the official rate is R 0 R e . Concomitantly, OZ of bonus 
vouchers (30 per cent of OX) are traded at a price of R 0 R P ; the area R 0 R P AK is 
equal to area R 0 R e BC. Moreover, any value for r and / would do as well, 
Given an equality of r and /, the total bonus-voucher premia must be R0RcBC, 
if the market is to be cleared; the market price of bonus vouchers will vary 
inversely with the volume of bonus vouchers generated by the system. Using 
the line R 0 C as a horizontal axis, the dashed line AB is a rectangular hy-
perbola, a locus of points representing the various bonus-voucher premia for 
QUANTITY OF FOREIGN E X C H A N G E y BONU-S V O U C H E R S 
Figure 3. Bonus Vouchers/Cash-cwwi-Bonus: Foreign Exchange Market 
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different r — J values. In short, it is feasible to accomplish simplification and 
rationalization of the foreign-exchange market by generalizing the cash-cum-
bonus procedure. 
It is also possible to continue the discriminatory treatment of import and 
export transactions by application of differential or multiple rates of r and /, 
If the bonus-voucher portion of cash-cum-bonus ( / ) equals the bonus-voucher 
issue rate (r), 100 per cent of the economy's foreign-exchange earnings are 
available to importers and there will be a single, unified rate of exchange, J On 
the other hand, if r / fA 1, there will be an inequality between current bonus receipts 
and current bonus payments and a disparity between the effective import and 
export rates of exchange. If r j f < 1, some portions of bonussed export proceeds 
are diverted away f r o m the market for, e.g., non-price rationing to preferred 
importers, official government imports, official debt service, or accumulation of 
foreign-exchange reserves 1 4 . If, on the contrary, r If > 1, the exchange-control 
authority is committing foreign-exchange resources beyond current bonus 
receipts, i.e., drawing down foreign-exchange reserves 1 5 . In addition, if 
public policy goals call for discrimination among importers and exporters, 
multiple rates of r will provide differential incentives (penalties) to different 
categories of exports and multiple rates of / will establish preferred (or penalty) 
rates of exchange to different importers. So long as the weighted average of 
rs and /s is equal, the market will be cleared; if the weighted average of 
r j f A \, foreign-exchange reserves will rise or fall. A bonus-voucher system is a 
powerful instrument for use or misuse by public policy-makers. 
It is clear that some form of generalized bonus-voucher procedure will 
simplify and liberalize Pakistan's foreign-exchange market. There are, however, 
institutional constraints which may preclude extension of the system to the 
entire market. The problem areas are imports of government and quasi-
governmental units, aid-financed imports, and trade under barter agreements. 
I) Government imports and imports of government enterprises are currently 
purchased at the official, undervalued price of foreign exchange. This practice 
seriously understates the scarcity value of imported resources. If all privately 
used imported resources were priced at a free-market rate, as they would be if a 
bonus-voucher procedure were generalized, underpricing of government imports 
would become an even more serious problem. Without entering into a debate 
over the relative efficiency of government and private enterprise, the price 
discrepancy would be so large as to lead to serious misallocation of resources. 
I'tThis is, of course, the state of affairs in the present, limited, bonus-voucher market 
(see page 194). 
"It would be possible U support an excess of r over / b y offering aid-funded foreign ex-
change or other official capital inflows to supplement foreign-exchange receipts from trade and 
private capital inflpw. For reasons to be noted below, there are compelling arguments against 
doing so (see page 201). 
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The price disparity would be eliminated if government agencies and enterprises, 
too, were required to import with bonus vouchers 16. (There is still a question 
of the dutiability of government imports.) The budgetary impact of higher 
rupee cost of imports would be modest and would be more than offset by revenues 
f rom premia on aid-supplied foreign exchange. 
2) Aid loans are tied to exports of the aid-lending country, frequently 
to products whose prices exceed those of the world market . Tied loans require 
creation of a special submarket for aid-exchange. As already noted, aid-eligible 
commodities are imported under free-list or cash (aid)-cww-bonus procedures 
and, while relatively free f rom unusual constraints, are importable only f r o m 
the specified, aid-lending countries. It is difficult to integrate the aid-goods 
market with the general market . A merged market would require a single 
bonus-voucher price; barring the unlikely case in which the effective exchange 
rates are equal in the two separated markets, a unified price would create an 
inequality between aid flows and aid imports, i.e., the accumulating of unutilized 
aid (or the misuse of aid) or the import of expensive aid-type goods against 
Pakistan's own foreign-exchange earnings, (see [3, Appendix]). An alternative 
would be the use of a discriminatory regulatory duty on import of aid-competing 
goods f r o m the world market . This latter possibility is apparently the purpose 
behind the announced — but not yet implemented — price-equalization tax. But 
a price-equalization tax is a cumbersome device which would need continual 
adjustment to reflect changing external price differentials. A second alternative 
is the introduction of a special variety of bonus vouchers sold against aid ex-
change and goods only for import of aid commodities f rom the respective aid-
lending countries. This would be the operating equivalent of the recently eli-
minated stamped bonus vouchers. It would mean constructing a separate 
submarket for aid goods but, within that market, price would be the rationing 
device and the differential between the price of aid and regular vouchers would 
automatically reflect the high prices of the aid-financed goods. Aid vouchers 
would presumably sell at a discount compared to the more valuable, regular 
vouchers. 
It would be necessary to establish a separate aid voucher and aid-voucher 
market for trade with each country providing tied aid loans. If the aid loans 
are commodity-tied as well as country-tied, or if the total volume of aid f rom a 
particular country was very small, special bonus vouchers would be impractical. 
In those cases, it would be expedient to acquire aid-financed imports through 
the Trading Corporat ion of Pakistan, both to ensure the best possible terms of 
trade and to capture for public purposes any scarcity premium on goods so 
imported. 
ifiTha government has already announced a withdrawal of the preferential treatment of pub-
lic-sector industry with respect to importation of raw materials and spares. Henceforth, pubJiciy-
operated enterprises must import these items under the same conditions as private firms. 
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A major advantage of the special voucher is that its price would absorb the 
scarcity premia presently available on aid imports. Furthermore, it would 
generate at least 80-100 crore rupees of government revenue, more than enough 
to offset the budgetary impact of higher government import costs mentioned 
earlier. 
3) Barter trade creates similar problems. The only difference between 
the market for barter trade and aid-financed trade is that the supply of foreign 
exchange for the former derives f rom Pakistan's supply of barter-eligible export 
commodities and the demand for these goods by the trading partner rather than 
f rom a negotiated loan. The achievement of "equil ibrium" in these markets 
depends upon the constraints imposed either unilaterally or by negotiation. 
Trade in such commodities could also be conducted with another variety of 
restricted voucher or, since barter agreements are generally negotiated with 
socialist countries, barter trade could be conducted through the Trading Cor-
poration of Pakistan to ensure volume and terms of trade which are consistent 
with the agreement and mutually acceptable to both trading partners. 
A final point : we have noted the rather remarkable stability of the price 
of bonus vouchers at 155-160 per cent of the official rate of exchange. Such 
stability appears to be the consequence of official policy. Whenever the voucher 
price departs substantially f r o m the "norm", subsequent revision of the "Import 
Policy" alters the composition of the bonus-import list to increase or decrease 
the demand for bonus-vouchers, and brings the price back to the "desired" level. 
The apparent motive is to provide a "proper" level of incentive to bonus-voucher 
exporters, i.e., an effective export rate of exchange of around Rs. 7 = $ 1 . While 
such a procedure clearly reduces the element of uncertainty in the market for 
bonussed exporters, it does so at the expense of a high degree of instability and 
uncertainty for importers. Continuation of this practice would be inconsistent 
with liberalization of the foreign-exchange market. As noted earlier, short-
run exchange rate stability can be provided by operations of the futures market 
and/or by stabilizing intervention in the market by the State Bank (see 
page 197). 
I V 
In this paper, we have emphasized the mechanics of Pakistan's exchange-
control system. We have suggested a means by which policy-makers could, if 
they so desired, liberalize the system. Given the present state of affairs, it would 
appear that some sort of generalized Bonus Voucher Scheme is the most expedi-
tious route to a liberal market. Furthermore, the writer has made no effort to 
conceal his own conviction that such a liberalization is desirable as well as 
feasible. Ma jo r benefits would accrue to Pakistan f r o m a freer, simpler foreign-
exchange market. 
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In the first instance, the present system is very costly to administer. Mana-
gement of a disequilibrium market requires an extensive governmental apparatus, 
both to facilitate compliance and to minimize evasion. Administrative talent is 
a scarce resource in Pakistan; reducing the volume of regulations and narrowing 
the range of bureaucratic discretion would reduce the administrative burden. 
Similarly, fewer and simpler rules reduce the cost of compliance for foreign 
traders — the paper work, the multiple approvals, the delays and uncertainties, 
the petty tyrannies of minor officials — implicit in extensive and discretionary 
regulation. Substantial savings of administrative and managerial resources are 
possible by greater reliance on a free market. 
We have also noted that the present system is almost beyond effective 
control; a freer market for foreign exchange would promote efficient operation 
of Pakistan's economic system. For example: 
1) Generalized bonus vouchers would extend to traditional, non-indus-
trial exports, the incentives and favours currently granted only to manufactured 
p r o d u c t s 1 7 . Now, when agricultural productivity and production are rising 
sharply as a consequence of rapid innovation, is an appropriate time for change 
in export policy. Normally low price and income elasticities of demand will 
certainly lead to falling agricultural prices; unless agricultural prices can be 
supported, price changes will wipe out much of the gains to farmers f rom the 
agricultural revolution. But a government price-support programme would 
flood available storage facilities at high cost to the public treasury. Falling 
rupee prices may eventually open export markets but bonus-voucher-export 
incentives will promote exports with a smaller decline in the internal price level. 
Liberalization along the lines described above will promote export earnings 
without such a serious wretching of the internal economy and will do so at a 
propitious time when the flow of foreign aid/loans is diminishing. 
2) If foreign-exchange earnings expand there can be a larger and more 
stable flow of imported raw materials, promoting more intensive use of existing 
but underutilized industrial capacity and reducing the problem of unemploy-
ment of labour. 
3) Generalized bonus vouchers would increase the cost of imported 
capital; this, too, would have a salutory impact on the economy. Capital in 
Pakistan is presently underpriced and rationed. However, as noted above, the 
exchange-control regulations have permitted and even encouraged the creation 
of idle industrial capacity. Moreover, when capital is underpriced, businessmen 
and farmers have incentives to substitute capital for labour even though it is 
"The bonus vouchers given to exporters of bcumati rice benefit only the commercial 
exporterj not the rice producer. Indeed, the artificially low rice procurement price is a dis-
incentive1: to the grower. 
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obvious that in Pakistan capital is a scarce resource and labour is so abundant 
that much of it is idle. A price for capital, more nearly equal to its scarcity 
value, would discourage creation of further excess capacity and remove the 
capital-intensive bias in present investment programmes. It would induce the 
system to economise on the use of its scarce capital and promote employment 
of abundant labour. 
4) Expansion of employment and avoidance of the more extreme capital-
intensive methods of production will be conducive to more rapid and wide-
spread development of labour skills. The machinery used in capital-intensive 
methods of product ion is usually complex and requires a small number of highly 
skilled workers for its effective operation and maintenance. Highly skilled 
workers are scarce in Pakistan. Utilization of somewhat more modest and less 
complicated equipment will introduce mechanical skills to more people more 
quickly, at lower cost and with less effort. Later, as the labour force becomes 
more familiar with machinery and capital is more abundant , the transition to 
more complex technology can be accomplished with less t rauma. 
5) A liberalized foreign-exchange market would alter the internal inter-
sectoral terms of trade and relative factor prices; it should reduce, somewhat, 
the extremely unequal distribution of income. Increasing demand for labour, 
as per 2) and 3) above, will increase the total wage bill and perhaps the wage 
rate. Agricultural prices will be higher than would otherwise be the case. 
More importantly, liberalization would eliminate the windfall profit (scarcity 
premia) presently accruing to favoured, and usually well-to-do, importers. 
While the cost to importers of imported goods or goods with import content 
will rise, the price to the users of these goods will not rise; their scarcity value is 
already reflected in the market price charged by importers. Increased volume 
of imports may even lead to a decline in the prices paid by consumers. 
In short, a liberal market would increase economic efficiency through more 
intensive use of available resources and through more efficient allocation of 
those resources among alternative employments. This is not, we assert, an 
ideological question nor a special brief for a free market per se. A price system 
as a guide to economic activity is, after all, only a means to an end and not an 
end in itself. Direct controls are both necessary and desirable under a variety 
of circumstances. At this stage in the development of Pakistan's economy, 
however, a free market is indicated on purely pragmatic grounds—it would 
better serve Pakistan's interests. 
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Comparative Costs, Factor Proportions 
and Industrial Efficiency 
in Pakistan 
Nurul Islam 
The paper presents, in Section I, new and additional evidence on the com-
parative costs of manufactur ing industries in Pakistan. Furhermore, the findings 
of the present study are compared with those of earlier studies. Comparative 
costs in this context are defined as the ratios of ex-factory price of specific domes-
tic products to c.i.f. prices of closely competing imports. In Section I I , it examines 
whether the tariff rates are an adequate index of the comparative cost ratios 
i.e., in other words, whether the differences in the tariff rates reflect the differential 
cost structure of Pakistani industries ? We also examine, in Section III, whether 
the available data provide any evidence on the relationship between the magni-
tude of cost disabilities of the Pakistani industries and their stage of infancy, 
i.e., whether and to what extent cost ratios decline with the growing up of infant 
industries. This paper also analyses, in Sections IV and V, how far comparative 
cost ratios can be used as a measure of the relative inefficiency of industries in 
Pakistan? How far, for example, the high cost ratios of domestic industries 
merely indicate that the Pakistani rupee is overvalued ? How far the cost ratios 
are affected by or represent high profits of industries ? An attempt is made to 
adjust for both the overvaluation of foreign exchange and the prevalence of 
abnormally high profits. Finally, in Section VI, we relate the comparative cost 
ratios of the manufactur ing industries to their factor intensities or their factor 
proport ions in an attempt to explore whether relative efficiency is correlated 
with the relative intensity of use of the different factors such as capital, labour, 
and skill. 
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I. EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE COST RATIOS 
Pakistan's impressive achievement in the growth of the industrial sector has 
attracted a considerable amount of analysis, especially with respect to the pattern 
or strategy of industrialization and the efficiency of the industrialization pro-
gramme. This paper is an attempt to analyse the comparative cost structure of 
the Pakistani industries, based on a direct estimate of the costs of the individual 
manufactured goods and the c.i.f. prices of the closely competing import products. 
The data are derived f r o m the published and unpublished reports of the Pakistan 
Tariff Commission on 115 industries scattered over a 15-year period, i.e., 1951-661. 
The analysis covers about 359 products. They, in no sense, therefore, constitute 
a random sample f r o m the manufactur ing sector as a whole so as to represent 
various industrial groups. The most important industries such as cotton 
textiles, ju te textiles, woollen textiles and fertilizers are not included at all in this 
analysis since they have not been subject to investigation by the Tariff Commis-
sion. For the same reason, there are also important omissions f rom within such 
industry groups as machinery, both electrical and otherwise, and transport equip-
ment. The industries covered here, moreover, range over both the large-scale 
and small-scale manufactur ing sectors. The difference in cost conditions between 
large and small f irms is ignored in the analysis. 
The total number of establishments or firms covered in the present analysis, 
excluding such industries as coir-goods industry, washing-soap industry, 
leather-footwear industry, and bidi industry, where small firms predominate, 
is around 1,164. This number, however, still includes a few small firms in a 
number of industries such as paints and varnishes, non-metallic mineral 
products, engine turbines, etc., which are included in the analysis. Since the 
number of establishments in the large-scale manufactur ing sector, as reported 
in the revised 1959-60 Census of Manufactur ing Industries, is about 3,800, our 
coverage is quite large 2 . 
Does an analysis of the cost ratios of only those industries which have been 
investigated by the Tariff Commission yield biased results, because only inefficient 
industries will need such intervention? This is unlikely since the great majori ty 
of the manufactur ing industries in Pakistan have ex-factory prices higher than 
the competing world prices, and thereby are prospective candidates for protective 
tariffs. The reasons why some industries come before the Tariff Commission and 
i All the data relating to cost ratios, unless otherwise specified, are from [8], The specific 
reports have not been cited and, in some cases, the reports have not been published so far. The 
Cost data relating to sugar, cement, and paper are taken from [3, Pp. 121-128], 
Since data on the value of output of industries covered in this analysis are not available, 
it has not been possible to estimate the proportion of the total industrial output which the 
industries covered by the present study contribute. However, an attempt is made to compare 
the number of establishments in specific industry groups which are covered in the present 
analysis with the number of establishments in corresponding major industry groups which are 
recorded in the Census of Manufacturing Industries, 1959-60 in Appendix B. This compari-
son only includes those industry groups from the Census which include commodities investi-
gated by the Tariff Commission. 
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others do not are not systematically related to their respective relative efficiency. 
Thus, for instance, some industries receive protection f rom foreign competition 
through high revenue tar iffs or quantitative restrictions on imports, none of 
which require the intervention or investigation by the Tariff Commission. There 
is likewise no reason to believe that the protective incidence of these measures 
is systematically related to the comparative cost structure of the industries, 
since the height of revenue duties or the level of quantitative restrictions is deter-
mined primarily without reference to the cost structure of the affected indus-
tries. Fiscal and balance-of-payments considerations are the principal determi-
nants of the levels of these alternative instruments of import restrictions. There-
fore, there does not seem to be any strong reason for bias in the sample, one 
way or the other, with the result that what is true of the given sample of indus-
tries in the present study is likely to be broadly true of the whole range of indus-
tries in Pakistan. 
It is also important to remember that the cost ratios for each industry 
are the averages of the ratios for the individual products which are included in 
each industry. There are in some cases important differences in the cost ratios 
between different products produced by the same industry. While the average 
cost ratio for the industry as a whole in some cases may be high, individual 
products may have cost ratios which are higly competitive with imports. More-
over, there are instances where differences in efficiency exist between different 
firms producing the same product . Again, there are differences in the c.i.f. 
prices of the same product , depending upon the sources of supply. The cost 
ratios reported in this paper are, however, averages for a number of firms or 
represent the cost ratio of the representative firm chosen by the Tariff Commis-
sion for its cost analysis. The data relate to the years 1951-66 and the different 
industries are covered in the different years, limiting the value of an intertemporal 
comparison. Where cost ratios differ because of difference in the c.i.f. prices 
f r o m different sources, an average of the cost ratios based on different c.i.f. 
prices is taken A . 
The average cost ratios have been computed in three different ways for 
each of the time periods. Firstly, the simple averages of the cost ratios have 
been computed for the periods, i.e., 1951-55, 1956-60 and 1961-66, respectively. 
Secondly, for each period, the individual industry ratios have been computed 
as a simple average of the cost ratios for individual products covered by an 
industry. The output data relating to individual products are not available; 
3[4], There are in many instances indirect taxes in the form of sales and excise duties on 
the manufactured goods produced at home. The indirect taxes are not relevant for an analysis 
of comparative costs and efficiency of the manufacturing industries; however, they affect the 
prices facing the domestic consumers and the relative use or consumption of the different 
products is affected by their relative prices including taxes. The c.i.f. prices of competing imports 
on which comparative cost ratios are based include the costs of transportation, a change which 
will affect the c.if. prices and cost ratios. This need to be borne in mind while using cost ratios 
as an indicator of the cost disability or the relative inefficiency of the Pakistani industries. 
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bias in favour of industries with a greater diversity of products. The (C) ratios 
are based on the appropriate weights insofar as the weights for the cost ratio of 
each major group of industries are concerned, even though the cost ratios for 
each major group suffer f r o m the same limitation as that of the (B) ratios. The 
(A) and (B) sets of cost ratios are roughly comparable. The changes in the 
cost ratios of all the three sets between the different time periods are in the 
same direction. They all go down in the second period and go up in the third. 
The ratios within brackets exclude the extreme values above 3.00 and they are 
about 4 to 5 times for the whole period. The ex-factory prices, on the average, 
are about 50-90 per cent higher than the corresponding c.i.f. prices in the different 
time periods whereas the median values of the excess of the ex-factory price over 
the c.i.f. prices range between 40-65 per cent. 
It may be pointed out, however, that the cost ratios of 3 out of 62 industries 
in the period 1961-66, 2 out of 29 industries in the period 1951-55, and 5 out of 
24 industries in the period 1956-60, were less than one; this implies that they were 
highly competitive and their prices were less than the c.i.f. prices of competing 
products. 
An attempt has been made to classify the industries into three groups, i.e., 
consumer goods, intermediate goods, and raw materials and capital goods, and 
to examine how the cost ratios differ between these three groups of industries 
which are given be low 4 : 
TABLE II 
COST RATIOS (WITHOUT INDIRECT TAXES) 
Consumer goods Intermediate goods Capital goods 
Simple average 
Median value 
Weighted average* 
1.58 (1.34) 
1.40 
1.60 (1.43) 
1.78 (1.68) 
1.58 
1.87 (1.77) 
1.70 
1.62 
1,77 
*The weighted average ratios used hereafter in this paper are based on number of products 
relating to a particular industry as weights. 
The cost ratios computed by the different methods for consumer goods 
are consistently lower than those for the other two categories whereas, as between 
the intermediate and capital goods, both tlie weighted and simple average cost 
ratios of the former are higher than that of the latter. But the differences between 
the cost ratios of the two latter categories virtually disappear when the extreme 
4The ratios within brackets exclude extreme values and are weighted averages—weights 
being the number of products in each industry. 
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values are omitted, as indicated in the above table. A more detailed 
picture of the comparative cost ratios of the three categories of com-
modities is seen below: 
TABLE I f l 
COST RATIOS FOR THREE MAIN CATEGORIES OF INDUSTRIES 
Groups 
(cost ratios) 
Consumer goods Intermediate goods Capital goods 
Frequency 
distribution 
% of total 
frequencies Frequency distribution 
% of total 
frequencies 
Frequency 
distribution 1 % of total [ frequencies 
0.50-0.99 7 16.3 1 2.6 2 6.0 
1.00-1,50 21 ' 48.8 13 33.3 12 36.4 
1.51-2.00 10 23.3 15 38.5 11 33.3 
2.01-2.50 1 2.3 8 20.4 5 15.2 
2.51-3.00 1 2.3 — — 3 9.1 
3.01-3.50 ~ — — 7 — — 
3.51-4.00 2 4.7 1 2.6 .—. — . 
4.01-4.50 5 5 — 1 2.6 — . 
4.51-5.00 — • — — , — — . 
5.01-5.50 — — . — 
5.51-6.00 1 2.3 — — . .—. 
6.01-6.50 — — — — — — 
43 100.0 3? 100.0 33 100.0 
The greatest number of consumer-goods industries, i.e., 49 per cent of the 
total, have cost ratios between 1.00 and 1.50 and about 23 per cent have cost 
ratios between 1.50 and 2.00; in the case of intermediate and investment goods, 
almost equal precentage of industries, i.e., between 33 per cent and 38 per cent, 
have cost ratios ranging a) between 1.00 and 1.50, and b) 1.51-2.00, respectively. 
About 20 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, of the intermediate- and capital-
goods industries have cost ratios between 2.00 and 2.50 whereas only about 
8 per cent of the consumer goods fall in this range. The range of cost ratios 
derived above seems to compare well with the results of an earlier s tudy 5 . The 
latter estimates the domestic prices of imports which may be used to derive the 
cost ratios of domestic industries, as shown in the Appendix A. In spite of the 
differences in methods and sources of data as well as the commodity composi-
tion of the two samples, the overall comparability of the two sets of cost ratios 
adds to the degree of confidence in the general level of cost disability of the 
different manufactur ing industries in Pakistan, as evidenced f rom the present 
study. 
s[9]. Unweighted averages in Table IV are simple averages of cost ratios, and weights used 
in the estimation of weighted averages are the values of imports of individual items or of the 
category of commodity to which the item belongs. 
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II. COMPARATIVE COSTS AND TARIFFS 
A pertinent question relating to the measurement of comparative costs is 
whether, and to what extent, tariff rates measure or fail to measure comparative 
costs. In a regime of quantitative restrictions, the usual assumption is that tariffs 
underestimate the excess cost of the domestic product over the c.i.f. price of the 
competing imports. Therefore, the tariff rates on different commodities may 
not reflect the cost disadvantages of the producing industries. 
Another hypothesis suggests that the excess of ex-factory price (inclusive 
of indirect taxes) over landed costs (inclusive of excise and sales taxes) is a uni-
form percentage of landed costs for all commodities. Thus, Soligo and Stern, 
in their analysis of effective protection, derive the world prices of the domestic 
products by deflating the domestic prices by tariffs alone, ignoring scarcity 
margins**. They assume that as a group the scarcity margin is the same for 
goods and investment goods and that domestic prices are at least equal to c.i.f. 
price of a competing import converted at the official exchange rate plus import 
duties. Thus, where scarcity margins are positive, tariffs alone will understate 
cost disadvantage, and where scarcity margins are negative, the cost disadvan-
tage of domestic industries will be overstated. The following analysis provides 
additional evidence on the overall magnitude, both positive and negative, of 
interindustry differences in scarcity margins. 
TABLE IV 
RATIO OF ACTUAL EX-FACTORY PRICE INTO LANDED COSTS 
Equal to one Below one Above one 
Year No. of 
items 
No. of 
items 
Average 
ratio 
No. of 
items 
Average 
ratio 
1951-55 — 9 0.75 22 1.29 
1956-60 2 21 0.72 27 1.42 
1961-66 5 47 0.75 120 1.47 
In the majority of the cases, ex-factory price exceeds landed cost (67 per cent of 
the total number of items) whereas in 30 per cent of the cases it falls short of the 
landed cost. In a very few (about 3 per cent) they are equal. The ex-factory 
price below the landed costs may imply either that for these products the tariffs 
<[11, Pp. 249-266], The landed costs in Tables IV to VII include both the tariffs as well as 
excise and sales taxes on imports and the ex-factory prices likewise include indirect taxes. The 
ratios are weighted ratios, weights being the number of products to which each price ratio 
relates. Each industry ratio is a simple average of the ratios for the different products and the 
ratios for different industries are weighted by number of products of each industry in order to 
obtain an overall ratio. 
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are redundant , or that the domestic product fetches a lower price because of 
inferior quality. Even when rates are determined by the Tariff Commission 
at a particular moment of time, tariffs and quotas may be out of line with the 
divergence between the c.i.f. and the ex-factory price and they need revision 
which takes place with a time lag. Often these rates and quotas are fixed without 
reference to the Tariff Commission and hence without any reference to the diver-
gence between the ex-factory price and the c.i.f. price of the competing product. 
Moreover, an industry which starts out with its ex-factory price being equal 
to or higher than the landed cost, both because of high profits as well as of high 
costs, may af ter a period, not only reduce costs but also earn lower profits 
owing to increasing competit ion. 
In many cases, the available data on the ex-factory prices relate to fair ex-
factory prices rather than to actual prices. For the purposes of the estimate of 
scarcity margins, ' fair ' prices have been used only when actual prices are not 
available so that the former provides an additional evidence on the magnitude 
of scarcity margins. To the extent that fair prices are lower than actual prices, 
which is the case in the great majority of the cases, excepting where firms were 
making losses, the corresponding scarcity margins are an underestimate of the 
actual scarcity margins. Sixty per cent of the items have positive scarcity mar-
gins varying between 43 to 73 per cent, as seen below: 
TABLE V 
RATE OF FAIR EX-FACTORY PRICE TO LANDED COSTS 
Equal to one Below one Above one 
Year No. of 
items 
No. of 
items 
Average 
ratio 
No. of items Average ratio 
1951-55 1 23 0.80 40 1.43 
1156-60 — 12 0.72 12 1.73 
1961-66 — 6 0.65 13 1.43 
Thus, the general range of the positive scarcity margins in the case of both 
fair-price and actual-price rise is as high as 30-50 per cent above landed costs, 
except for the period 1959/60 when the margin for "fair price" went up as high 
as 73 per cent above the landed costs. In many cases, ex-factory prices are 
below landed costs, about 25-30 per cent below landed costs. 
The scarcity margins widely vary as between different commodities, as is 
evident f r o m the coefficient of variation of the ratios of ex-factory actual prices 
to landed costs for individual commodities. 
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TABLE VI 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF RATIO OF EX-FACTORY ACTUAL 
PRICE TO LANDED COSTS 
A B 
1951-55 0.17 0.96 
1956-60 0.81 0.56 
1961-66 1.51 3.78 
Notes: A indicates the coefficient of variation for the ratios below one. 
B indicates the coefficient of variation for the ratios above one. 
As between different classes of commodities in terms of actual ex-factory 
price, the highest scarcity margin is in the category of consumer goods whereas 
in terms of fair price, capital goods have the highest margins. In both cases, 
consumer goods have the largest number of items with negative margins, as seen 
below: 
TABLE VII 
RATIO OF EX-FACTORY PRICE TO LANDED COST 
Fair Actual 1951-66 1951-66 
Below one Above one Below one Above one 
Consumer goods 0.72 1.32 0.67 1.53 
(23) (26) (38) (35) 
Intermediate goods 0.89 1.39 0.74 1.43 
(3) (12) (17) (75) 
Capital goods 0.78 1.69 0.87 1.39 
(15) (27) (22) (59) 
ID. COMPARATIVE COSTS AND INFANT INDUSTRY 
In a young industrializing economy, infant industries start out with high 
costs which, with the acquisition of skill and experience in terms of management 
and technical knowledge, are expected to decline over the years. Accordingly, 
cost ratios may be related to the age of the individual industries. It may be 
argued that an older industry, irrespective of its nature, benefits more f rom the 
growth of external economies and an industrial milieu. The cost ratios of the 
different industries on the basis of the number of years of their operation can be 
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combined in a few limited number of broad groups as follows: 
TABLE VIII 
of f irms No. of produots No . of years in Comparative cost ratios operation Unweighted Weighted 
41 131 1-5 1.54 1.61 
25 112 6-10 1.61 1.65 
23 49 11-20 1.46 1.61 
2 4 21-30 1.34 1.34 
2 12 31-and-above 1.61 1.83 
There does not appear to be any clear relationship between length of life and 
comparative cost ratios. However, the data presented above do not provide 
an adequate test of the hypothesis partly because the composition of industries 
in different age groups is different and partly because the number of industries 
which have operated for a longer period, i.e., above 20 years or so, is very small. 
Conceivably, different industries have different periods of infancy and some 
develop competitive efficiency earlier than others. But in the above sample, 
various industries with widely different characteristics are lumped together for 
each age group. Table IX below indicates the cost ratios by the three broad 
categories of industries, i.e., consumer goods, intermediate goods, and capital 
goods as well as by the number of years in opera t ion 7 . 
TABLE IX 
Number of years in operation 
Industry 1-5 6-10 j 11-20 21-30 | 31-and-above 
Cost ratios 
Consumer goods 1.37 1.64 1.25 
(12) (14) (10) 
Intermediate goods 1.64 1.83 1.73 
(19) (3) (6) 
Capital goods 1.82 1.61 1.84 
(10) (8) (7) 
1.11 1.33 
(1) 0 ) 
1.57 1.88 
(1) (1) 
A more detailed classification of industries is given in Table X. 
'The cost ratios are weighted cost ratios—weights being the number of products. The 
figures in brackets ofTable IX indicate the number of firms relevant to each period. 
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TABLE X 
COST RATIOS OF MAJOR G R O U P S OF INDUSTRIES AND NUMBER OF 
YEARS IN OPERATION 
Industry 
Number of years in operation 
1-5 6-10 11-20 | 21-30 | 31- and-abova 
Canning and preserving 1 . 4 1 1.42 — — — 
Bakery products 1.19 1.23 0.67 — — 
Alcoholio beverages — — — — 1.33 
Footwear 1.44 — 1.63 — — 
Paints, varnishes and polishes 1.55 1.47 - — — / 
Matches — — 0.96 — 
Pharmaceuticals 2.67 1.89 — — 
Industrial chemicals 2 . 7 1 — — — • 
Rubber and rubber products 1.78 1.75 — 
Petroleum products — — 1.40 — 
Non-metallic mineral products 1.64 1.13 1. 25 — 
Basic metals — — 1 . 0 0 — 
Metal products 1.51 1.67 2.07 1.11 
— 
Nonelectrical machinery 
— 
1.46 1.57 1.88 
Electrical machinery 2.63 1.62 1.69 — 
-
Transport equipment 1.31 1.23 — 
— 
Plastic products 1.13 1.95 — 
-
— 
Paper and paper products — _ 1.32 — — 
Made-up textiles 1.40 0.68 — — 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
— 
1.59 1.42 
- — 
The sample of industries in the last two age groups is too small to permit 
any comparison. Even comparison among the last three age groups does not 
yield any consistent and systematic behaviour of the cost ratios with increasing 
years in operation. In some cases, such as the total of the consumer-goods 
or intermediate-goods industries, the ratios first increase and then decrease with 
increasing years of operat ion; in the case of the capital-goods industries, they 
go down first and then go up. The time pattern of the behaviour of the cost ratios 
of the individual industries is not very different, as is shown in Table XIII . If 
one compares the first and third age groups, only the cost ratios in the case of such 
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industries as bakery products, paints, varnishes and polishes, pharmaceuticals, 
rubber and rubber products, non-metallic mineral products, electrical machinery, 
transport equipment, made-up textiles, and miscellaneous industries, register 
a decline. This is not true for the rest of the industries, some of which suffer a 
rise in cost ratios with an increase in the number of years in operation. 
The above analysis, therefore, does not appear to provide any satisfactory 
or conclusive answer to the problems of the behaviour of the cost ratios over 
time. Partly these comparisons are constrained because each industry group 
combines a large variety of products and activities whose cost behaviour over 
time may widely differ. An earlier analysis of the f if teen specific industries for 
which the cost ratios were reviewed by the Tariff Commission indicated an 
improvement in comparative efficiency in the course of ten to fiteen years. They 
covered about forty individual products. For seven industries and sixteen pro-
ducts, the cost ratios declined by 25 per cent to 60 per cent. The rest of the cost 
ratios declined by 5 per cent to 24 per cent [4, Table 3, p. 11]. 
An analysis of the cost ratios over time by itself may not provide an adequate 
test of the infant industry hypothesis. The cost ratios may turn unfavourable, 
even when there is an improvement in efficiency and productivity in the domestic 
industry because the costs of competing imports may fall faster as a result of a 
more rapid technological progress in the advanced countries. The problem 
is then one of the speed of technological advance in developed countries and a 
lag in the developing countries in the process of their "catching up". This 
suggests that a more detailed analysis of the changes in the productive efficiency 
of the domestic industries over time is necessary; this necessitates an identifica-
tion of the changes in costs which are not due to a) changes in wage rates, b) 
profits, and c) input prices over time, since it is an improvement in efficiency in 
the use of inputs through a learning process, as distinct f r o m technological adv-
ance, that is involved in the infant industry argument. The improvement in effici-
ency in this sense should be compared with the c.i.f. prices which would have 
prevailed in the absence of technological advance. The statistical testing of a 
comparative cost analysis in a dynamic context of technological change, thug, 
confronts formidable difficulties. 
IV. COMPARATIVE COSTS AND OVERVALUATION OF EXCHANGE 
The comparative cost ratios in the preceding paragraphs have been obtained 
on the basis of the official exchange rate. To the extent that the Pakistani curren-
cy is overvalued, of which there is some evidence, comparative cost ratios greater 
than one really reflect the overvaluation of currency so that with an equilibrium 
rate of exchange the cost ratios all will be equal to each other and equal to one. 
The Pakistani rupee was devalued in 1955 and the fall in the average cost ratio 
between the periods, i.e., 1951-55 and 1956-60, may be partly traced to this fact, 
since with devaluation the c.i.f. price of imports in rupee went up. 
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One may, therefore, suggest that the comparative cost ratios should be 
corrected for the relative overvaluation of the currency. The study on the domes-
tic prices of imports as well as analysis of the amount of subsidy implicit in the 
export bonus scheme tends to suggest that the assumption of a 50-per-cent over-
valuation in the price of foreign exchange in Pakistan may be a reasonable one. 
it is not easy to estimate what would be the equilibrium rate of exchange in a 
free market with existing tariffs and domestic fiscal and monetary policies; supply 
and demand elasticities of exports and imports as well as that of demand and 
supply of domestic substitutes, etc., enter into picture in a complicated way. The 
assumption of 50-per-cent overvaluation may not be far out of line for use as an 
illustration. The adjus tment in the comparative costs ratio for alternative esti-
mates of overvaluation of exchange is easily done. 
As a result of the correction for the overvaluation of exchange, the compara-
tive cost disadvantage declines and the number of industries, which have cost 
ratios below one and, therefore, are competitive, are as follows: 
TABLE XI 
Cost ratios 
Number of industries 
1951-55 1956-60 1961-66 | Total 
Below one 
Above one 
17 (0.84) 
12 (1.33) 
14 (0.73) 
10 (1.27) 
26 (0.83) 
36 (1.50) 
57 
58 
For the period as a whole, about half of the total number of industries appear 
to be competitive with imports while the other -half have higher cost ratios. 
The overall weighted cost ratios for the three periods after adjustment for the 
price of foreign exchange are 1.08 for 1951-55, 1.08 for 1956-60, and 1.21 for 
1961-66. The weighted ratios for different groups of industries for the whole 
period are as follows: 
Consumer goods .. .. 1.03 
Intermediate goods .. .. 1.24 
Capital goods .. .. 1.19 
The consumer-goods industries appear competitive whereas the capital-goods 
industry is 19 per cent more expensive and intermediate-goods industry 24 per 
cent more expensive than the competing imports. 
The correction of the cost ratios for the relative overvaluation of the currency, 
as shown above, is only partial insofar as it corrects the c.i.f. price of the com-
peting imports in domestic currency and does not correct the import component 
of the domestic ex-factory price in domestic currency. The import component 
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becomes more expensive in terms of domestic currency consequent on a correc-
tion for the overvaluation of foreign exchange. The data on the foreign-ex-
change component of all the products are not available. In the case of only 
twenty-nine industries and their corresponding one hundred and seven pro-
ducts, the foreign-exchange component (current requirements of imported raw 
materials and spare parts) is available and the result of adjustment for the value 
of foreign exchange is given below: 
TABLE XII 
COST RATIOS ADJUSTED FOR OVERVALUATION OF EXCHANGE RATE 
J Unadjusted Adjusted Adjusted only for c.i.f. price 
Consumer goods 2.29 1.66 1.53 
Intermediate goods 1.82 1.45 1.20 
Capital goods 1.79 1.33 1.33 
Average: 1.86 1.44 1.24 
Thus, the cost ratio for ail industries declines f rom 1.86 to 1.44, i.e., about 23 per 
cent. It is important to mention that after either adjus tment for the value of 
foreign exchange, the ranking of the twenty-nine, or three broad categories of 
industries, does not change either in terms of the ex-factory price, or the foreign-
exchange component of the ex-factory price, or the comparative cost ratios. 
V. PROFITS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND EXCESS CAPACITY 
One important aspect of the analysis of comparative cost ratios on the 
basis of ex-factory price is the extent to which the high ex-factory prices may 
be due to high profits or high factor prices in the relevant industries. If the 
factor costs do not represent scarcity prices but contain large monopoly or rent 
elements due to the institutional factors and the imperfections of markets, 
the high ex-factory price is not an index of comparative disadvantage or ineffi-
ciency but represents a transfer f rom the rest of the community to the factors 
employed in the industries concerned. The industrial wage for unskilled worker 
is generally presumed to be higher than the agricultural wage by more than what 
is accounted for by the costs of movement. Again, wage rate is higher in organ-
ised industries than in unorganised, small-scale industries. Even larger firms 
in the same industry are found to pay higher wage rates than the smaller firms. 
One could argue that the kinds of labour employed in a large- and small-scale 
industries, or in large and small firms in the same industry, are sufficiently different 
in terms of work, discipline and ability to account for the wage differentials. 
These are issues on which conclusive answers are neither available nor can they 
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be dealt with within the purview of the present paper. There is some evidence 
which, however, permits at least a partial examination of how far excess profi ts 
may have contributed to the high ex-factory price. 
The cost ratios discussed earlier include mostly actual ex-factory prices 
which include abnormal profits, if any. In some cases, actual prices are not 
available and hence "fa i r" prices are used for estimating the comparative cost ra-
tios. The 'fair' prices, barring adjustments in a few cases for selling, distribution, 
and overhead expenses, which are considered exhorbitant by the Tariff Commis-
sion, are different f rom the actual prices insofar as the latter incorporate abnor-
mal profits. The concept of normal profits expressed in terms of "markup" 
over the cost of production, which the Commission considers fair and reasonable, 
has varied over the years. There are indications, however, in a number of 
reports that the markup premissible has increased over the years. Insofar as 
the actual percentage of profit on invested capital, which is allowed by the Com-
mission in its estimation of fair price, is concerned, it is not always mentioned in its 
earlier reports. During the fifties, the percentage of profit allowed on invested 
capital appears to be in the neighbourhood of 10 per cent in those cases where 
such a mention has been made, whereas in the sixties, when the reference to the 
rate of profit is more f requent , it has increased by gradual stages over the years 
to 12.5 per cent (1963), 15 per cent (1964), 19 per cent (1965), and 20 per cent 
(1966). 
There are about 39 industries for which data on both fair and actual prices 
are available; they indicate the prevalence of abnormal profits in the sense that 
in these industries the actual prices are higher than the fair prices to an extent 
varying between 8 per cent and 32 per cent [4, Table 7, p. 24], A few have been 
found to be suffering losses. It is pertinent to point out, however, that abnormal 
profits earned by the firms under consideration may in fact be larger than what 
is reported, and reported losses may be misleading insofar as the firms succeed 
in either misreporting their costs or, in the case of direct investigations by the 
Commission, succeed in avoiding a careful scrutiny of the detailed cost data. 
The valuation of the fixed assets on the basis of which the individual industries 
fix their actual rate of profit or the Commission fixes its fair rate of profit is in 
any case not an easy exercise. Thus, the comparative cost ratios given below 
based on fair ex-factory prices may still contain elements of excess profits which 
are not related to the comparative efficiency of the industries concerned with 
the result that the fair cost ratios may indeed be lower than what is indicated 
below: 
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TABLE XIII 
COMPARATIVE COST RATIOS* 
1951 -55 | 1956-60 1961 -66 1951-66 
Actual [ Fair J Actual | Fair Actual | Fair Actual Fair 
Consumer goods 1.39 1.53 1.25 1.62 1.83 1.48 1.62 1.30 
(19) (36) (15) (10) (45) (11) (79) (67) 
Intermediate goods 2.39 1.19 1.91 1.10 1.88 1.68 1.89 1.65 
(2) (3) (2) (2) (82) (76) (86) (81) 
Capital goods 2.24 1.60 1.67 1.96 1.82 1.66 1.82 1.70 
(12) (27) (30) (14) (34) (12) (76) (53) 
All goods: 1.76 1.61 1.55 1.76 1.85 1.66 1.78 1.62 
*The figures in brackets relate to the number of products. 
The comparative cost ratios on the basis of fair ex-factory price are generally 
lower than those based on actual ex-factory price. The fair cost ratio in some 
instances, especially during the periods 1951-55 and 1956-60, is higher than the 
actual ratio. In some of these latter cases, of course, the firms may be making 
losses or the two sets of ratios may relate to the different commodities. During 
1961-66, the sample of industries covered under each set of ratios is much larger 
and the commodities covered in the two types of ratios are more comparable. 
Over the whole period, 1951-66, the fair cost ratio is consistently below the 
actual cost ratio for all the three categories. 
If allowance is made for the fact that actual profits, as reported by the 
Tariff Commission, probably underestimate " t rue" profits, the fair cost ratio, 
excluding excess profits, both recorded and unrecorded, would be even lower. 
The existence of very large profit margins, larger than 10-12 per cent over the 
cost of production and larger than 12-20 per cent over capital investment, 
is also indicated by the additional evidence which is available on the profitability 
of industrial enterprises in Pakistan. A recent study of the balance sheet of 
public limited companies, which are listed in the stock exchange, shows that 
between 1959 and 1963 gross profits as a percentage of capital employed varied 
between 14 and 15 per cent. This was during the period when normal profits, 
as allowed by the Commission, varied between 10-12 per cent [1]. This is also 
a very partial evidence and possibly is an underestimate. 
Thus, if allowance is made for a) excess profits (to the extent of 10 per cent) 
and b) scarcity price of foreign exchange or the overvaluation of exchange rate 
(to the extent of 50 per cent), the aggregate comparative cost ratio is considerably 
reduced. Thus, the cost ratio will be reduced by a factor of 65 per cent, i.e., all 
the products with the cost ratios which are 1.65 and below will become compe-
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titive with the foreign product [1, p.21]-. The number of industries and pro-
ducts which have cost ratios below 1.50 and below 1.65 are given below. This 
generally indicates the change in the proport ion of industries which become com-
petitive when proper adjustments are made for the above two factors. 
TABLE XIV 
Year 
Number of industries Number of products 
Below 
1.50 
Below 
1.65 Total 
Below 
1.50 
Below 
1.65 Total 
1951-55 17 21 29 49 68 99 
1956-60 14 15 24 32 36 73 
1961-66 26 32 62 57 87 179 
57 68 115 138 191 351 
It appears that between 50 to 60 per cent of industries and between 40 to 54 per 
cent of the products become competitive as against about 10 per cent of the in-
dustries and 5 per cent of the products which are competitive in the absence of 
such adjustments. 
An important question is to what extent the ranking of industries is affected 
by either an adjustment of foreign exchange or an adjustment for excess profits. 
A rank correlation between fair and actual price is found to be very high, i.e., 
0.68, and it is significant at 5-per-cent level. Similarly, the ranking of industries 
is undisturbed if cost ratios are adjusted for the overvaluation of foreign ex-
change. The rank correlation coefficient between unadjusted cost ratios and 
cost ratios adjusted for the overvaluation of exchange is very high, i.e., 0.96, and 
is highly significant at the 5-per-cent level of significance. 
The cost ratios may also be affected by the existence of excess capacity or a 
structure of market where few firms dominate. There is a considerable excess 
capacity in the manufactur ing industries in Pakistan. About 60 per cent of the 
industries examined worked below 40 per cent of their installed capacity. The 
prevalence of excess capacity is not significantly different between the three cate-
gories of industries, as is shown be low 9 . 
s'fhis estimate, however, does not make any adjustment for the foreign-exchange com-
ponent of the domestic product which has the effect of raising the cost ratio. Making this 
double adjustment for overvaluation, where permitted by the data, would reduce the cost dis-
advantage by 23 per cent and then all industries with cost ratios of 1.33 and below would be 
made competitive. 
("Excess capacity is defined as the difference between the actual output and the installed 
capacity, as assessed by the technical investigations of the Tariff Commission. The number of 
shifts implied in the assessment of installed capacity is not clearly indicated. The observations 
relating to excess capacity relate to different industries in different points of time. 
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TABLE XV 
UTILIZATION OF CAPACITY IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
Percentage of capacity 
utilization Consumer goods Intermediate goods Capital goods 
0-20 
20-40 
40-60 
60-80 
80-100 
(percentage of total number of industries in each group) 
27.60 34.80 11.10 
34.50 43.50 38.90 
10.30 17.40 22.20 
10.30 _ 22.20 
17.30 4.30 5.60 
Most of the industries have only a few firms. In may instances, the 
number of firms is larger than justified by the limited extent of the domestic 
market. Since each produces at substantial excess capacity, a reduction in the 
number of firms would enable a concentration of output in a fewer firms, each 
producing at a fuller capacity. 
The shortage of imported raw materials has been suggested as an important 
factor in explaining the existence of excess capacity. An attempt is made to see 
whether more import-intensive industries suffer f r o m a greater excess capacity. 
No strong correlation is discernible. This is plausible in view of the licensing 
procedure under which the licensing is a funct ion of the assessed import 
requirements and there may be in fact a bias towards a more liberal licensing 
for the import-intensive industries, especially if they are successful in the export 
markets. An analysis of excess capacity and reasons thereof, as well as the 
opportunities of cost reduction consequent on the utilization of capacity in 
the industries under investigation, has already been pointed o u t " . 
To what extent are high cost ratios due to the prevalence of excess capacity ? 
While there is evidence that the cost of production declines with a greater utiliza-
tion of capacity, it is difficult to quantify the reduction in costs in the absence of 
additional data. Moreover, even if costs decline consequent on a greater utiliza-
tion of capacity, the behaviour of prices depends upon what happens in the 
meanwhile to a number of factors such as changes in demand and factor prices. 
It also depends upon the pricing policy of the industry, i.e., whether it maximises 
profits or not, and upon whether the crucial limitation on the expansion of 
output is the limited market or the shortage of inputs. 
io[4, pp. 25-26]. The ex-factory price of fifteen industries may be reduced anywhere 
between 8 per cent and 25 per cent, depending upon the nature of the industry. 
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The above argument relates to the price behaviour or changes in the com-
parative cost ratio of a given product under a changing utilization of capacity. 
Whether the differences in the comparative cost and price ratios of different indus-
tries are related to the differences in the degree of utilization of capacity is anot-
her matter and raises additional questions. The differences in the cost ratios bet-
ween different industries are only partly a matter of differences in the utilization of 
capacity. An industry may operate at a smaller capacity than another but may 
still have lower cost ratio because it is more efficient in the use of its inputs even 
at a lower level of operations than the other at a higher level vis-a-vis its competing 
imports. Its managerial and technical efficiency may be higher: prices of the 
factors necessary in its operation m a y b e lower; and taxes on its inputs may be 
lower to offset the disadvantages of lower scale of operations. Thus, an attempt 
to explore the correlation between cost ratios and percentages of capacity utiliza-
tion does not indicate any significant results. Nor do the profit rates (P) seem 
to to be related to the number of firms (N), as is seen below>>: 
p = —0.096 —0.00098 N + 0.0228 T • 
(0.00083) (0.021) 
R2 = 0.56 
The excess profit , P, is defined as the difference between actual and normal price 
expressed as a ratio of actual price 1 2. T stands for a dummy variable which is 
taken to be zero for all values of P which are negative (losses), and one for all 
values of P which are positive. The correlation is not significant and without 
the dummy variable, T, the relationship is still not significant, as is below: 
P = 0.035 + 0.0007 N 
(0.0012) 
R2 = 0.0033 
The relationship between excess profit (P) and capacity utilization (W) is as 
follows: 
P = _ 0.088 — 0.00079 W + 0.204 T 
(0.00063) (0.023) 
R2 = 0.57 
where T is a dummy variable, as explained above, but without T the relationship 
is statistically significant. 
P = 0.104 —0.0029 W 
(0.00081) 
R 2 = 0.14 
HA11 the regression equations in the present study are as "weighted" equations in the 
sense that each variable is given a weight equal to the number of products it relates to. 
i2Excess profit is used here in the sense of abnormal markup or the excess over the 
"normal" or fair markup on ex-factory price, as used by the Tariff Commission. 
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Excess profit seems to be negatively related with capacity utilization. That is, 
the greater the utilization of capacity, the lower is the excess profi t as a percentage 
of actual ex-factory price. With a larger output, the firms tend to charge a lower 
profit margin since a lower profit margin on a larger output may still lead to 
large absolute profits and, more important, to a higher return on capital. But the 
magnitude of the fall in excess profit in response to a given change or increase 
in the utilization of excess capacity is very small, as is seen f rom the small magni-
tude of the correlation coefficient between excess profi t and capacity utilization. 
VI. COMPARATIVE COSTS AND FACTOR PROPORTIONS 
There is a considerable diversity in the comparative costs of different indus-
tries, as analysed above. A relevant question is whether the comparative costs 
of different industries can be related to and explained by the diversity in the 
characteristics of these industries in respect of technology and factor proportions. 
It is expected that in a labour-abundant country like Pakistan more labour-inten-
sive industries are likely to have lower cost ratios compared with the less labour-
intensive industries. Data on labour costs as a proport ion of ex-factory price 
are not available for all the industries under investigation. For a number of 
industries, data are available on direct labour costs and not on indirect labour 
costs which are part of the overhead cost, i.e., administrative as well as selling 
and distribution expenses 1 3 . The regression equation relating the comparative 
cost ratios (Y) to the direct labour cost ratios (L) is shown below: 
Y = 2.02 —2.47 L 
(2.11) 
R 2 = 0.019 
Log Y = 0.252 —0.154 log L 
(0.032) 
R2 =0.18 
The double logarithmic regression gives reliable regression coefficients. The 
correlation is not very high but the regression coefficient is negative and statis-
tically significant at 5-per-cent level, implying a reliable relationship between 
variations in the labour cost ratio and in the comparative cost ratio. A 10-per-
cent increase in labour cost ratio causes a decline in the comparative cost ratio 
to the extent of 1.5 per cent. 
Attempts to correlate the comparative cost ratios to the capital-output 
ratios are limited by a lack of direct data on the capital-output ratios of the 
13 [6], In this exercise the comparative cost ratios and the labour cost ratios of the indivi-dual products are not combined to arrive at the average ratios for each industry. This increases the number of observations which are conducive to a satisfactory statistical testing. There are differences, often significant, between the labour cost ratios of individual products in a given industry. 
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specific industries under investigation. The Censuses of Manufactur ing Indus-
tries in Pakistan provide data on the fixed assets, employment, and wages and 
salaries by the major groups of industries. The comparative cost ratios which 
relate to specific individual industries may be grouped according to the classifi-
cation of the major industry groups in the Census. The capital-output ratios of 
the major groups of industries are then related to the cost ratios of the groups of 
industr ies 1 4 . The capital-output ratios are available for 1959/60 and 1955. The 
former is related to the cost ratios for the period 1961-66 and 1956-60 and the 
latter to the period 1951-55, respectively. The regression equations relating the 
cost ratios (Y) to the capital-output ratios (K) are given below: 
Log Y = 0.078 + 0.003 log IC (1951-55) 
(0.049) 
R2 = 0.0038 
Log Y = 0.195 + 0.021 log K (1956-60) 
(0.075) 
R2 = 0.0092 
Log Y = —1.175 + 0.704 log K (1961-66) 
(0.0207) 
R 2 = 0.87 
The cost ratios and the capital-output ratios are positively correlated for the 
period (1961-66) and the correlation is highly significant. The higher the capital-
output ratio of an industry, the higher is its comparative cost ratio. The magni-
tude of the relationship is also high, implying a 7-per-cent rise in cost ratio in res-
ponse to a 10-per-cent rise in capital-output ratio. However, for the other two 
periods, i.e., 1956-60 and 1951-55, the relationship between cost ratio and capital-
output ratio, though positive, is not significant. The simple linear relationships 
are less reliable than what is shown in the above logarithmic equations. 
The above two exercises relating the cost ratios to the labour cost-output 
ratio and the capital-output ratio as possible explanations of the variability in the 
cost ratios between industries, tend to indicate that the industries which use 
14[7], For each industry group, the cost ratio is the weighted average (weights being the 
number of products) — cost ratios of the individual industries included in the group. The 
weights are the number of products relevant to each cost ratio. This method of estimating the 
capital-output ratios for the industries under examination suffers from the limitation that in 
many groups of industries, the census contains a much wider variety of individual industries than 
is included in the present list of industries. Often the cost ratios relate to a small fragment of 
the major group of industry for which capital-output ratio is used. The limitation of the present 
set of data is added to the limitations of the data on fixed assets, as they are reported in the Cen-
sus. They represent book values of fixed capital assets, depreciated by each industry following 
its own method of depreciation which does not necessarily reflect the physical life of the capital 
equipment. In addition, the depreciated book value does not indicate the cost of replacement 
and does not reflect the changes in the price of the equipment since the time of its acquisition. 
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A more appropriate relationship to explain interindustry variations in the 
comparative cost ratios would be a joint or multiple relationship between the 
cost ratios and the differences in skill and capital intensities between the individual 
industries. A simple correlation does not reveal the joint influence on the com-
parative cost ratios and may even yield biased results. A multiple correlation 
yields a better result in terms of the explanation of the variance or the inter-
industry variations in the cost ratios, as given below: 
1951-55 
Log Y = — 0.424 + 0.284 log S + 
(0.098) 
0.030 log T 
(0.048) 
R 2 = 0.185 
Log Y = — 0.356 — 0.415 log S + 0.679 log T 
1956-60 1 ^ (0.045) (0.127) 
R2 = 0.548 
Log Y = — 0.132 — 0.217 log S + 0.403 log T 
1961-66 4 (0.046) (0.117) 
R 2 = 0.111 
The multiple correlations yield more reliable results and provide a better explana-
tion of the variations in cost ratios. All the multiple correlation coefficients are 
much larger than the simple correlation coefficients obtained earlier, and are 
statistically significant at 5-per-cent level; all the regression coefficients excepting 
that of T (wages and salaries per employee) in 1951-55, are statisticaly significant 
at 5-per-cent level. Generally speaking, the skill-intensive industries, as indica-
ted by the higher wages and salaries per employee, seem to have high cost ratios, 
except in 1951-55 when the coefficient is not reliable. This is also confirmed by 
one of the two simple regressions which yield reliable results. Again, excepting 
in 1951-55, the capital-intensive industries seem to be associated with the low 
cost ratios . This is also corroborated by the results of the simple regressions. 
The earlier results indicate a significant positive correlation between cost 
ratios and the capital-output ratios for the periods 1956-60 and 1961-66, but 
not for 1951-55. This is consistent with a significant negative correlation between 
the cost ratios and the non-wage value added per employee which is yielded by 
both simple and multiple correlations in two of the three periods. An increase 
in the non-wage value added per employee implying a higher ratio of capital 
to labour may lead to a high productivity of capital and, thus, a decline in the 
capital-output ratio. The evidence on the positive relationship between wages 
and salaries per employee and cost ratio between the time periods is less con-
clusive insofar as the results of all the simple and multiple regressions are not 
consistent, even though multiple regressions, which yield a positive relationship, 
provide in general a better explanation of the relationships examined. While, 
as is seen earlier, on the one hand, a higher ratio of labour cost to output is 
associated with a low comparative cost ratio, higher wages and salaries per 
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employee, on the other hand, are associated with a higher cost ratio. This would 
imply that skill-intensive industries in the sense of a higher proport ion of skilled 
to unskilled workers are associated with a lower ratio of labour cost to output. 
It is only when an increase in wages and salaries per employee is associated 
with a faster increase in output per employee that the labour cost per unit of out-
put will decline with an increase in skill intensity. Thus, high labour cost-output 
ratio is associated with a low proport ion of skilled to unskilled labour. This 
indicates that the industries with a low skill intensity but with a high proport ion 
of labour costs to value of output are more competitive with imports f rom 
abroad. Though more skill-intensive industries have a lower labour cost per unit 
of output, their total costs and ex-factory prices vis-a-vis the prices of competing 
imports are higher than those of the less skill-intensive industries. The labour 
cost ratio, though it does not distinguish between unskilled and skilled labour, 
as used in this study, includes only direct labour and excludes the managerial 
labour and the labour component of the overhead and distribution expenses, 
which may include a higher proportion of skilled labour than is included in 
the category of direct labour cost. Moreover, while interpreting the interindustry 
variations in the comparative cost ratios with reference to wage and non-wage 
value added per employee, it is important to note that the use of these ratios as 
the indices of capital and skill intensities is subject to a number of limitations 
which have been discussed earlier. But subject to the limitations of data and 
methodology, the above analysis provides some evidence, though very tenta-
tive at this stage, that the industries with a high component of skill and with 
high capital-output ratio tend to have high comparative cost ratios. This 
seems to provide a confirmation of the commonsense view that technical 
skill is a very scarce factor and high priced in Pakistan at our present stage of 
development. Until a wide diffusion of technical knowledge and skill takes place 
consequent on increased investment in this direction, the industries which need 
high levels of skill will tend to suffer f rom high-cost disadvantages in relation to 
competing imports. Similarly, the limited evidence on the positive correlation 
between the capital-output ratio and the comparative cost ratio may be attributed 
to the learning costs associated with the use of capital in the early stage of 
development. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The manufactur ing industries in Pakistan suffer, on the whole, f rom a 
high cost disadvantage vis-a-vis the competing imports. The weighted average 
cost ratios vary between 1.50 and 1.90, i.e., the ex-factory prices are 50 to 90 per-
cent higher than the c.i.f. prices. Thirty per cent of the industries examined in 
this study have ex-factory prices 51-100 per cent higher than their corresponding 
c.i.f. prices; about 16 per cent of the industries have prices 100-200 per cent higher 
than the c.i.f. prices [4, Table 2, p. 8]. This range of the comparative cost ratios 
compares well with those obtained f rom the earlier studies based on an analysis 
of the domestic prices of imported goods, allowing for the differences in the 
234 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
methodology and commodity composition of the two studies. The tariffs do not 
seem to provide an appropriate measure of either absolute or relative cost 5 
disadvantage of the different industries in Pakistan. On the one hand, because 
of quantitative restrictions, there are positive scarcity margins over the landed 
costs of the competing imports for a great majority of the commodities examined 
here; on the other hand, there are many commodities for which the ex-factory 
price is below landed cost. For example, in 30 per cent of the cases, actual ex-
factory prices, and in 40 per cent of the cases, fair ex-factory prices fell short of 
the landed costs. Positive scarcity margins usually vary between 30-50 per cent 
except in one year when it rose to 73 per cent. In those cases in which ex-factory 
prices fall below the landed costs of competing imports, they are as much as 25 to 
30 per cent lower. 
As is well known and is further corroborated by the present analysis, there 
is widespread underutilization of capacity, engendered partly by a lack of coordi-
nation between industrial investment licensing and the licensing of imports of raw 
materials and spare parts [4, footnote 18], Even though excess capacity contri-
butes to high cost in a particular industry, there is no evidence that interindustry 
differences in cost ratios are explained by the differences in excess capacity which 
are substantial in almost all the industries any way. 
High comparative cost ratios of the Pakistani industries, however, do not 
necessarily measure the inefficiency of industrialization in Pakistan to an equiva-
lent extent, if allowance is made for a) an overvaluation of exchange rate and 
b) the existence of high or excessive profits in many industries generated by a lack 
of competition, either internal or external, in the domestic market . An adjust-
ment of the c.i.f. price of the competing imports as well as of the foreign-exchange 
component of the ex-factory price, on the assumption of 50-per-cent overvalua-
tion, in the case of a sample of twenty-nine industries and one hundred and seven-
ty products, shows that the aggregative comparative cost ratio declines f r o m 1.84 
to 1.44, i.e., by 23 per cent. If one adjusts only the c.i.f. price and not the foreign-
exchange component of the ex-factory price, 50 per cent of the industries under 
examination become competitive. Again, if allowance is made for the fact that 
ex-factory price contains elements of excess profits, the comparative cost ratio 
will be further reduced by 10 to 11 per cent. When, however, both adjustments 
are made for overvaluation in the few cases when the data permit them to be 
done, the industries with the comparative cost ratio of 1.33 and below become 
competitive in the world market. 
Insofar as the growth of the infant industries into adulthood is concerned, 
the evidence examined in this paper on this subject is quantitatively very small. 
The performance of only a few industries, about fifteen in all, has been reviewed 
by the Tariff Commission subsequent to the grant of protection by it. The 
evidence indicates an improvement in comparative advantage and a decline in 
cost ratios; an attempt to correlate the cost ratios with the length of the period of 
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operation of the corresponding industry groups does not provide any conclusive, 
systematic, and consistent evidence relating to the development of infant indus-
tries. While there are few cases of a fall in the cost ratios with an increase in the 
number of years of operation and an accumulation of experience, it is not true for 
all nor is there any evidence that the cost ratios are a smooth and a continuously 
declining function of a increase in the number of years of operation. A satisfac-
tory examination of this problem is, however, inhibited by the limitation of the 
data. 
Insofar as the differences in the comparative costs among the individual 
industries are concerned, the industries with a higher labour-output ratio have a 
greater comparative advantage. However, the gain in terms of comparative costs 
resulting f r o m the choice of industries with a higher labour cost does not appear 
to be appreciable. At the same time, industries with a high component of skilled 
to unskilled labour tend to have high cost ratios, though the evidence on this is 
not conclusive. There is some evidence that industries with a high capital-output 
ratio have also high comparative cost ratio. Contrariwise, the industries which 
have higher non-wage value added per employee, i.e., with a higher ratio of capi-
tal to labour tend, however, to have lower comparative cost ratios, implying that 
with a greater application of capital to labour, productivity of capital goes up, 
and cost disadvantage declines. However, it is necessary to point out that these 
conclusions are very tentative and need to be fur ther verified on the basis of addi-
tional, more reliable, and comprehensive data and for different samples of indus-
tries and different years. 
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Appendix A 
A C O M P A R I S O N WITH EARLIER STUDIES 
The comparative cost ratios, derived above, may be compared with the 
results of an earlier study which estimated the domestic prices of imports; 
domestic prices include tariffs, other indirect taxes, and scarcity margins on c.i.f 
prices of the imports [4, footnote 7] as a result of quantitative restrictions on 
imports. On the assumption that the imported and the domestic products 
closely competing with them fetch the same wholesale prices in the domestic 
products, the ratio between the c.i.f price and the domestic wholesale price, i.e., 
(wholesale pricc/e././ . price) is given below for the three main categories of com-
modities. 
TABLE A-l 
COST RATIOS BASED ON DOMESTIC PRICES OF IMPORTS : 1964/65 
Karachi Chittagong 
Average of Karachi 
and Chittagong 
price 
Unweigh-
ted 
Weighted Unweigh-
ted 
Weighted Unweigh-ted Weighted 
Consumer goods 2.85 2.22 2.78 2.21 2.82 2.21 
Intermediate goods 1.97 1.93 1.94 1.86 1.95 1.89 
Capita! goods 2.42 2.73 2.36 2.05 2.40 2.39 
A comparison made between the cost ratios derived f rom the present study 
and those derived f r o m the study of domestic prices of imports is given below. 
The import study relates to they ear 1964/65 and, hence, its findings should appro-
priately be compared with the cost ratios of the period 1951-66; the cost ratios 
for the whole period 1951-66 are also given below: 
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TABLE A-2 
COST RATIOS 
Present study Import study 
With indirect 
tax 
unweighted 
With indirect 
tax 
unweighted 
With indirect 
tax 
weighted 
Unweighted Weighted 
1951-66 1961-66 1961-66 1964/65 
Consumer goods 1-79 2.06 1.87 2.82 2.21 
Intermediate goods 2.03 2.08 2.10 1.95 1.89 
Capital goods 1 89 2.10 2.05 2.40 2.39 
Average: 2.09 2.02 2.38 2.21 
The average cost ratios (weighted and unweighted) for all commodities, as 
obtained f rom the import study, are generally higher than the cost ratio derived 
f r o m the direct comparison of ex-factory prices (including taxes) and c.i.f. prices. 
However, when the commodities are grouped into three categories, the ratios 
for consumer and capital goods appear to be distinctly higher in the case of 
import study than in the present study whereas the ratios for intermediate goods 
are lower in the import study than in the present study. The critical assump-
tion for the use of the domestic prices of imported products to represent com-
parative cost ratios for the domestic industries is that the ex-factory price is equal 
to the domestic price of their competitive imports. This assumption may not 
hold for a number of reasons. In the first place, an industry may no longer be 
an "infant industry" and may have developed competitive efficiency in which 
case the domestic price, therefore, falls below the import price plus tariffs and 
scarcity margins. Tariffs, therefore, become redundant. Secondly, the domes-
tic prices of imports may be higher than the ex-factory prices of domestic com-
peting goods because of consumers' preferences for the imported products. In 
the extreme case, one can conceive of a highly differentiated market for import 
goods catering to a special clientele. This is especially true for commodities which 
are the products of international firms and are noticeable in the field of luxury 
items of consumer goods as well as in the case of drugs and pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals, etc. Thirdly, the domestic producers may not charge the maximum 
scarcity price which the comparable and competing imported products may 
fetch in the market , even though there are only a few domestic producers. 
Various considerations which induce monopolistic producers not to maximise 
short-run profits but to take into account various long-run factors affecting their 
profits may induce the domestic producers not to exploit the domestic scarcity 
to the maximum. Moreover, the comparison of the results of the present study 
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with those of import study is also inhibited by the fact that the commodities in 
the two studies are not all comparable. The earlier study includes a number of 
imported commodities for which no domestic production exists. Hence, their 
domestic prices cannot be said to represent what would have been the prices 
if the commodity is domestically produced, since tariffs and import controls in 
these cases bear no relation to the need for protecting an existing domestic 
industry. 
In order to obviate this difficulty, an attempt, has been made to select a few 
specific items which are common to both the studies. 
TABLE A-3 
COST RATIOS OF SELECTED ITEMS 
1964 Import study 1964/65 Present ,i with mark- without study impoi-t s t u d y up, 1964/65 markup (with taxes) Year 
Free-List Items 
Nylon twine and 
monofilament 
Caustic soda 
Sodium bicarbonate 
Soda ash 
Acetic acid 
Cement 
G . I . pipe 
Brass sheet 
Aluminium sheet 
Licensed Items 
Wheat 
Safety razor blade 
Electric lamp 
Leather belting 
Electric meter 
Transformer 
Batteries 
flour 
2.72 
2.15 
2.73 
2.48 
2.24 
3.27 
2.20 
1.92 
1.73 
2.17 
2.19 
1.73 
2.45 
1.53 
1.65 
1.62 
1.39 
3.20 
1.98 
1.98 
1.96 
2.66 
2.35 
1.72 
1.55 
1.94 
1.95 
1.54 
2.19 
1.36 
1.47 
1.44 
1.24 
2.85 
1.76 
1,77 
1.75 
2.38 
2.09 
1.97 
2.34 
1.90 
2.32 
1.89 
1.67 
2.21 
1.50i 
1.93 
1.32b 
1.24 
1.64 
1.31 
2.93 
1.44 
3.02 
1965 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1966 
1965 
1963 
1962 
1965 
1962 
1964 
1964 
1962 
1963 
1963 
1965 
Bonus Items 
Sugar 
Bicycle 
2.90 
2.74 
2.89 
3.33 
2.58 
2.97 
4.55 
1.84 
1966 
1963 
Simple Average: 2.12 1.92 2.05 
"Brass ingots and strips. 
''Wheat flakes, etc. 
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It appears f r o m the above that the unweighted simple average cost ratios for 
the selected items, which are comparable as between the two studies, are about 
the same, c.i.f. 2.12 and 2.05, respectively. The domestic wholesale prices which 
constitute the basis of the cost ratios in the import study include the normal 
profit margin of the wholesaler whereas the ex-factory prices which are the basis 
of the cost ratios in the present study do not include this element, excepting 
where the producing firm is itself the wholesaler. The indirect evidence suggests 
that this normal markup may be about 12 per cent. The unweighted average 
cost ratio after deducting the 12 per cent markup for all the items listed above 
comes to about 1.92, as against 2.05 in the present study. 
The average ratios conceal significant differences between the individual 
cost ratios. If we assume that the c.i.f. prices of a commodity are the same in 
both the studies, the differences in cost ratios indicate the differences between the 
ex-factory prices of the domestic products and the wholesale prices (with and 
without markup) of the competing imports. Thus, on this assumption, the 
ex-factory prices of caustic soda, electric meter, G. I. pipe, batteries, and sugar 
appear significantly higher than the domestic prices of competing imports. 
This may imply that the above mentioned industries are underprotected and that 
the domestic and imported items sell at different prices. In the case of cement, 
safety razor blade, t ransformer, and bicycle, the relative position is reversed with 
domestic prices being lower than the prices of competing products. In these 
cases, it is probable that importers do not charge the maximum price that the 
market will bear. In the case of the rest of the items, cost ratios are comparable. 
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TABLE B-l—(C<w/rf.) 
Industry No. of establishments 1959/60 Census 
No. of establishments covered in this analysis 
Metallic products 
Healing, cooking, lighting apparatus 
Cut le ry 
Utensils 
Safes, vaults and trunks 
Metal products, n.e.c. 
Machinery, non-electrical 
Engines and turbines 
Textile machinery and accessories 
Pumps and compressors 
Electrical machinery 
Manufacture of trausport equipment 
Manufacture of plastic products 
Manufacture of pens and pencils and related products 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
467 
27 
132 
13 
99 
211 
.19 
39 
11 
104 
118 
56 
23 
57 
5 
4 
57 
37 
7 
103 
(including small-scale) 
27 
2 
38 
6 
218 
(including small-scale) 
3 
60 
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Tariff Protection, Import 
Substitution and 
Investment Efficiency 
Ronald Soligo and Joseph J. Stem 
" . . . T h e import substitution effort will have to be intensified, parti-
cularly in capital goods and intermediate products, like base metals, 
chemicals, petroleum products and non-metallic minerals'.. .The 
scarcity price of foreign exchange should be appropriately reflected to 
the economy so that there is an incentive to use less foreign exchange 
and more domestic resources. This will call for a revision in the present 
tariff policy... [11, p. 35], 
" . . .The second important element in the [balance of payments] 
strategy is to develop an import pattern which will encourage savings 
and investment and extend the import subsitution effort to a much 
wider f ron t " [11, p. 79], 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A chronic deficit in the balance of payments is a problem which plagues 
almost all developing countries. In Pakistan, as in other countries, the develop-
ment plans have contained a two-pronged approach to the problem: to increase 
exports and to reduce the need to import through a process of import substi-
tution. Exports have been encouraged by giving numerous concessions and 
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subsidies to the exporting firms 1 but the best known and most successful of the 
export-promotion schemes is the bonus-voucher system 2 . 
Industrialization has been pursued behind a wall of tariffs and import 
licensing which have provided generous incentives for the establishment in 
Pakistan of import-substituting industries. Within this f ramework of high 
protection to domestic industries and stiff barriers to foreign competition, 
manufacturing industries in Pakistan have indeed grown at a rapid rate [6; 13]. 
Pakistan's Third Five Year Plan [11] has taken cognizance of the need to deve-
lop and extend the import-substitution effort and, what is more, to use tariff 
policies to achieve this end. 
The impressive gains which have taken place in industrialization under the 
protection of tariffs and licences, have always been used to just i fy the tariff 
policy. Yet the complexities of the economic system are such that what appears 
to be beneficial may, when looked at f rom the view-point of the whole economy, 
be less of a gain than one is led to believe at first, and may even be a loss to the 
economy. The purpose of this study is to examine, in light of the available data, 
the effects of past protection on the efficiency of investment allocation and to 
make some estimate of the implicit protection given to domestic industries by 
the present tariff structure in the absence of quantitative controls. 
As is pointed out in Section II, the present tariff structure may have been 
inoperative in the past because of other trade barriers. But with sufficiently 
increased liberalization of imports, it could become a ma jo r variable in deter-
mining the pattern of resource allocation in the future. Given the obvious need 
for import substitution, if the target for reducing dependence on foreign aid is 
to be realized, and the role that tariff 'policy must play in this effort, there can be 
no doubt that a serious effort to understand the full implications of the present 
tariff policy is warranted. 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
Two factors make import substitution an extremely attractive development 
strategy. First, a policy of encouraging import-substituting industries will 
produce results quickly since it permits indigenous entrepreneurs to exploit 
existing markets rather than forcing them to develop new markets for domesti-
cally produced goods. Second, import substitution makes an obvious and direct 
effort to save foreign exchange by substituting imports of raw materials for 
final manufactures while simultaneously increasing domestic value added. 
•For a detailed description of the export-promotion schemes which have been pursued 
in Pakistan since Partition, see [2]. 
For a description and analysis of the bonus-voucher scheme, see [I J. 
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For a number of reasons, a policy of import substitution often favours the 
development of consumer-goods-oriented industries. First, the markets which 
exist in developing economies are primarily for consumer goods. There being 
little or no indigenous manufacturing initially, the market for intermediate or 
capital goods is small or non-existent. Second, consumer-goods industries, by 
and large, require less capital investment than other industries, and often less 
skilled manpower — two factors which tend to be scarce in underdeveloped eco-
nomies. Finally, in order to raise revenue for the public treasury and/or to 
economise on scarce foreign exchange by discouraging 'non-essential' imports, 
developing countries generally levy high import duties on consumer goods. 
Equivalent taxes are not usually levied on domestically produced consumer goods 
because such taxes would conflict with the policy of providing encouragement 
for domestic industries over imports. Domestic industry requires, at least 
initially, a subsidy to overcome lack of experience and capital. Such a subsidy 
is usually given in the form of high tariffs on competing imports with low taxes 
on domestic output and low tariffs on imported capital and industrial inputs. 
It has been pointed out, first by Power [14] and Khan [4] and more recently 
by Radhu [15] that Pakistan's tariff structure has indeed given substantially 
more protection to consumer 'non-essential' industries than to intermediate and 
capital-goods industries. However, Lewis and Qureshi [5], and also Radhu [15], 
have argued that the relative profitability of investment in different industries is 
affected as much by other government policies such as import licensing and the 
export-bonus scheme as by indirect taxes, and that these other factors have pro-
bably outweighed the tariff-created profit differentials. Lewis and Soligo [6] 
have more recently analysed the available data on the production, imports, and 
exports of manufactured goods and have concluded that over the period 1954/55 
to 1963/64, import substitution has been equally important in both consumer 
goods and investment-and related-goods industries. In terms of percentage 
rates of growth, investment and related-goods industries have grown faster than 
both intermediate-and consumer-goods industries. Intermediate-goods indus-
tries have apparently grown more rapidly than consumer-goods industries. 
While the work done by Lewis and Soligo [6] shows that import substitution 
and growth of output have taken place more or less equally in consumer, inter-
mediate and capital-goods industries, the question still remains: has import 
substitution proceeded too far in consumer-goods industries ? Has Pakistan used 
her scarce capital efficiently ? 
Power [14] and Khan [4] have argued that import substitution in con-
sumer goods is not always a good thing. So long as consumer goods must be 
imported, the extreme scarcity of foreign exchange acts as an effective constraint 
to the expansion of consumption. Once consumer-goods industries have been 
established domestically, the discipline enforced by the supply of foreign ex-
change is to some extent removed. As the indigenous production of consumer 
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goods increases, consumption is 'liberalized' and savings do not increase as 
quickly as tliey otherwise might, Ultimately, the rate of growth in real income 
will be lower when import substitution in consumer goods is permitted. 
A second possible danger of import substitution is pointed out by Johnson 
[3] who notes that: 
. . . . the excess cost of import substitution may be high, appreciably 
higher than is implied by the tariff rates or the excess of domestic over 
foreign prices. Progressive import substitution could therefore easily 
absorb or more than absorb the potential increase in real income that 
would normally accrue f rom technical improvements and capital accu-
mulation, and permit a country to accumulate capital at a substantial 
rate without achieving a significant increase in real income or in real 
income per head. 
Import substitution, insofar as it departs f rom the principal of comparative 
advantage, may saddle a country with high cost industries which can only 
survive behind a high protective wall. In fact, these industries may turn out to 
be so inefficient that the amount of protection that has to be provided to them 
is greater than their contribution in terms of value added. 
In order to examine the issue raised by Johnson we must compute the 
implicit subsidy given to manufacturing industries in Pakistan by means of the 
tariff structure. As a country's tariff structure normally extends protection to 
intermediate products and raw materials as well as to final goods, the tariff acts 
as both a subsidy and a tax on domestic production. The tariff on competing 
imports of an industry allows the producer to raise the price of his product and in 
this respect the tariff is a subsidy to domestic production. On the other hand, 
the tariff on competing intermediate and raw-material inputs allows the domestic 
suppliers of such products to raise their prices and in this sense the tariff is a tax 
on domestic production. The implicit subsidy is the amount of protection a 
producer gets f r o m the tariff structure after allowing for the fact that tariffs act 
as both a subsidy and tax on domestic production. The residual obtained by 
subtracting this subsidy f r o m the current value added in the industry measures 
the value added (the amount which could be paid to the domestic factors of pro-
duction) if tariff protection were removed and assuming that foreign exchange 
was valued at its real opportunity cost. 
If the new value added, computed in the above manner, is less than what 
would be neccssary to pay capital and labour inputs their real scarcity price, we 
may conclude, excepting those cases in which the ' infant ' industry argument is 
applicable, that investment in that particular industry is inefficient, at least at 
the margin. Real income could, therefore, be increased by transferring iv 
sources f rom this industry to some other industry where factors of production 
are receiving their scarcity price. 
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where Si and Sj are the scarcity margins on the i-tlx and j-th commodity, 
respectively. 
In what follows we have computed Vi and Ut using Equation (5), and on this 
basis draw some conclusions about the relative ranking of Vi and Uj as if they 
had been calculated by Equation (5"). 
We feel that there is some justification for making the j ump f r o m Equation 
(5) to Equation (5") because a) the data we use give imported inputs at c.i.f. 
prices. This means that for these intermediate inputs we do not need to know 
either t j or Sj to compute their value at world prices (at the official rate of ex-
change); and b) domestic intermediate deliveries are predominantly either com-
modities which are also exported, such as raw cotton and jute, and for which the 
scarcity margin is zero, or services which cannot be traded in the international 
markets and, hence, for which 'world' prices are irrelevant, 
The net result of a) and b) is that the proportion of intermediate inputs for 
which we need to know the value of the scarcity margin is small and that the 
bias in the value of Vi and Ui; computed on the basis of Equation (5), is primarily 
determined by Si, the scarcity margin on the output of the industry. Since Pal 
[12] shows that as a group the scarcity margin is the same for consumer goods 
and investment goods, our comparison of these two groups of industries, using 
Ui, is reasonable. Within groups, the ranking of industries on the basis of the 
computed Vi and Ui will differ f r o m the 'true' ranking, that is to say the ranking 
which we would derive f r o m our results if we had all the required data, depend-
ing on the extent to which the scarcity margins on the output of these industries 
differ. 
Data on the interindustry relationships in Pakistan are available f rom 
the Tims-Stern input-output tab le 4 prepared for the Planning Commission 
[10]. Explicit rates of tariff, ti and t j , have been derived f rom [15]. These 
estimates were modified in the following way 5 . First, Radhu's estimates are 
simple arithmetic averages of duties for all commodities within a group. Rather 
than to accept these broad averages, we have i) in the case of outputs taken the 
duties on only those commodities which are actually produced in Pakistan, and 
ii) in the case of intermediate inputs, we have taken the rates of duty only on the 
specific inputs used in any given industry. Rates of duty on specific commodities 
have been taken f r o m [9], while detailed information on the composition 
of outputs and inputs for each industry is available f rom [8]. Secondly, 
The framework of the Tims-Stern input-output table and the equation used to calculate 
the results are shown in the Appendix. 
5 W e wish to express our appreciation to Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Radhu for assisting 
us in revising some of the average rates of duty and for guiding us through all the manifold 
intricacies pf the indirect tax structure. Although we have tried to take account of all the duties 
and taxes, inclusions and exclusions, the responsibility for any remaining errors rests exclusively 
with the authors. 
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Radhu's estimates include sales taxes in addition to import tariffs. Since we are 
working with output at factor cost, we have added the sales taxes only in those 
cases where domestic production is exempted f rom them. In those cases, the 
sales tax acts as additional tariff protection since it is levied only on competing 
imports. Finally, Radhu 's data deal with the tariff structure as of '962/63. 
We have incorporated the few changes in import duties and sales taxes which 
have become effective in '963/64. 
IV. ESTIMATES OF TARIFF PROTECTION AFFORDED TO VALUE ADDED 
In this section, we discuss the significance of our computed Ui coefficients, 
compare them to other variables and parameters, and suggest some possible 
qualifications of our results. 
We have computed Uf (the ratio of net subsidy f r o m tariffs to value added) 
for some forty-eight manufactur ing industries. These are shown in Table I. 
In three industries, grain milling, rice milling, and printing and publishing, 
the protection given to value added is negative, or, what is the same thing, the 
net effect of the tariff structure is to tax the output of these industries. This is 
not surprising in view of the fact that in all three cases the explicit rate of tariff 
protection given to the output of the industry is zero while tariffs are levied on 
inputs used in these industries. 
In all other cases, Ui is greater than zero; that is, the rate of tariff on output 
is sufficiently high to more than offset the addition to cost which arises f rom 
the protection given to the suppliers of inputs. For these industries, the net 
effect of the tariff structure is to subsidize their value added; to permit them to 
pay a higher return to labour and capital than they would be able to pay if ex-
posed to unfettered world competition. 
There are considerable interindustry differences in the rates of protection 
given to value added. In general: i) consumer goods are much more heavily 
protected than either intermediate or investment and related goods; ii) within the 
consumer-goods industries, nonessentials, such as beverages and cigarettes, are 
much more heavily protected than essential industries such as grain and rice 
milling, salt and tea; iii) textiles are the most heavily protected group of industries, 
although the protection is approximately the same for all components of the 
group; and /V) the least protected industries are those producing heavy machinery, 
both electrical and nonelectrical, and transport equipment other than motor 
vehicles and cycles. Fertilizer is also among the least protected group. 
In twenty-three industries, the coefficient Ui is greater than unity. For 
these industries, the net subsidy received through tariff protection exceeds the 
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TABLE I 
IMPLICIT RATE OF PROTECTION OF VALUE A D D E D 
Consumer goods Ui Intermediate goods Ui 
Food, beverages and tobacco Jute textiles 1.52 
Dyeing and finishing 1.38 
Canning and preserving 3.11 Thread and threadball 1.45 
Grain milling —0.27 Saw milling 1.52 
Rice milling —0.10 Tanning 2.11 
Bakery product 1.21 Rubber products 0.81 
Sugar 1.15 Fertilizers 0.18 
Edible oils and fats 2.02 Paints and varnishes 0.46 
Tea 0.45 Pharm., and chem., n.e.c. 0.33 
Salt 0.78 Petroleum and coal products 1.01 
Beverages (non-alcoholic) 1.08 Paper products 0.59 
Cigarettes 1.30 
Textiles, wearing apparel Investment and related goods 
and footwear 
Metal furni ture 2.53 
Cotton textiles 1.52 Non-metallic products 0.46 
Woollen textiles 1.46 Cement 0.58 
Silk and art silk 1.41 Basic metals 0.58 
Knitting 1.30 Metal products 0.98 
Footwear 1.04 Nonelectrical machinery 0.11 
Wearing apparel 2.17 Sewing machinery 0.78 
Electrical appliances 0.67 
Other consumable goods Electrical machinery 0.25 
Other transp. 0.33 
Wood products (furniture) 1.84 Motor vehicles 3.96 
Printing and publishing —0.15 Cycles 1.61 
Leather goods 1.12 
Soaps, perfumes and 
cosmetics 0.64 
Matches 0.92 
Optical goods 0.31 
Plastic goods 0.77 
Sports goods 0.48 
Pencils and pens 0.39 
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total value added! These results are surprising particularly because these indus-
tries are i) primarily consumer-goods industries, and ii) include very large indus-
tries (in terms of value added) such as cotton and ju te textiles, sugar, tobacco, and 
coal and petroleum products. 
What is the meaning of Ui greater than unity ? From our definition of Ui, 
it is readily apparent that U, >1 implies that Vi is negative. From Equation y) 
we have: 
Wi—Vi 
Ui = 
Wi 
or 
Vi 
U; = 1 
W 
Vi measures the amount which could be paid to capital and labour if output was 
sold and those inputs which can be traded were purchased at 'world' prices when 
converted at the official rate of exchange. A negative Vi means that the total 
cost of intermediate inputs valued at their 'world' prices, or at their domestic 
price, if they cannot be t raded 6 , exceeds the value of output when expressed in 
'world' prices. Vi could then be negative for two reasons: i) intermediate inputs 
are used more inefficiently in Pakistan than in other countries. There may be 
more wastage of raw materials and services in Pakistan due to poor maintenance 
of machinery, inefficient quality control or lack of alternative uses for scrap, 
waste and some by-products because transport costs may be too high.to permit 
these to be disposed off profitably, ii) The price of domestically produced services, 
which cannot be imported, may be higher than the price of similar services in 
other countries. Electricity and motorized transport are two particular exam-
ples where cost per unit output is probably higher than in other countries 7 . If 
this be so, then our conclusions would indicate that Pakistan should not invest 
in those industries which are intensive users of these inputs. 
Whatever factors are the cause, a negative Vi is nevertheless surprising 
for it is equivalent to saying that the average revenue product of capital and 
labour is negative. 
6We a s s u m e that at the given supply, the current domestic price of these inputs is equal 
to their scarcity price. 
7At least this is often alleged to be the case by industrialists. An international com-
parison of these costs, although not within the scope of this paper, would be extremely interest-
ing and would throw considerable light on our findings. Although we have not attempted to 
make any international comparisons, we have made an interindustry comparison of these costs. 
The rank correlation coefficient between Ui and the cost of electricity, gas, water, and all 
other services was insignificant. Nevertheless, for some specific industries, the cost of electri-
city, gas, water, and services may be a contributing factor to the negative Vi. 
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Efficient resource allocation (in the static sense) requires that the marginal 
revenue product of capital and labour, when measured in terms of 'world' prices, 
be equal in all industries. In our study, we have computed only the average pro-
duct of labour and capital and hence, we cannot make interindustry compari-
sons of the marginal productivities. We can, however, draw some important 
conclusions for those industries where the average product of labour and capital 
is negative and f rom these conclusions make some broad inferences about the 
remaining industries as well. 
Figure 1 shows the conventional diagram of average and marginal revenue 
product curves for a given industry measured in terms of world market prices. 
The curves represent long-run curves with capital as well as labour a variable 
factor. On the horizontal axes, we plot the composite of capital and labour 
which is the optimum, given the wage and interest rates, for the corresponding 
scale of output. 
There are two distinct cases where the average product of capital and labour 
is negative: Case (i), if output is less than OA, the average revenue product is 
negative but the marginal product is positive-. Industries which fall into this 
category are 'decreasing-cost' industries or are at least in the decreasing-cost 
portion of their cost curves, so that both marginal and average productivity would 
increase as output increased. Case (ii), if output is greater than OB, both average 
and marginal products are negative. These industries have clearly been over-
expanded. A third case may also be distinguished. The standard 'infant-
industry' argument is that even if an industry has a sufficiently large market to 
allow it to operate efficiently in the short run and has potentially a comparative 
advantage, the industry will need a subsidy to enable it to acquire experience and 
knowhow, to train its labour force and to establish markets. Essentially, the 
argument is that the industry needs time to get on to the long-run curves shown 
in Figure 1. At first the industry is operating at points below the curves, re-
gardless of the scale of output, but with experimentation and experience the 
industry will eventually be able to raise productivity of capital and labour to 
that achieved in other countries. 
The ' infant-industry ' argument can be applied to industries with both 
increasing and decreasing marginal products. Hence, if the average product of 
capital and labour is negative, the marginal product can be either positive or 
negative. 
Wherever the marginal revenue products of capital and labour are below 
their opportunity costs, resources have been misallocated. If the industry falls 
into Case (i) then the establishment of the industry was premature. Investment 
8 Marginal product must be either positive or zero; otherwise it would pay to reduce out-
put to zero. 
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should have been postponed until the size of the market was sufficiently large to 
permit an efficient scale of operation. Real income could presently be increased 
by abandoning the industry and importing the final products f rom abroad. If 
the industry falls into Case (ii), the industry has been over expanded. Real 
income could be increased by shifting resources at the margin out of this industry 
into other uses. In both cases, real income would increase even if the displaced 
capital and labour were not re-employed elsewhere. 
Only in the case of the "infant industries" can one argue that the past 
allocation of investment was in any sense efficient. 
The data in Table I suggest that the following industries are cases of either 
over-expansion, premature investment, or of an infant industry: 
i) all food, beverages, and tobacco except grain and rice milling, tea and 
salt; 
ii) textiles, footwear and wearing apparel; 
iii) leather and leather goods; 
iv) wood and wood products; 
v) motor vehicles, cycles and metal furniture. 
Some of these industries may be genuine cases of ' infant industries' and our 
conclusions should be modified accordingly. On the other hand, looking at the 
list of industries in Table I, it is clear that most of the industries with negative 
average product of labour and capital, that is with U j > 1 are not likely candi-
dates for the ' infant-industry' argument. Most of the largest industries in 
Pakistan are in this group while many of the investment-goods industries which 
are relatively very small compared to other industries in Pakistan and to their 
counterparts in other countries have positive average product for capital and 
labour. 
In terms of general categories of industries, investment has been either 
premature or over-extended, primarily in consumer-goods industries. 
Power [14] and Khan [4] have criticised tariff, tax,, import licensing and 
other policies which affect the pattern of investment on the grounds that they 
have permitted a too-rapid expansion of consumer-goods industries which in 
turn has led to 'consumption liberalization', and reduced savings and growth 
in real income. Our results indicate that in addition to the effects on real income 
growth through reduced savings, the investment in consumer-goods industries 
has reduced growth in real income because, at world market prices, the marginal 
productivity of domestic capital and labour is below their opportunity cost and 
may even by negative. 
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Our data also indicate that the most productive use of capital in the fu ture 
lies in the investment- and related-goods industries. These industries have been 
able to survive, and indeed grow rapidly, with only relatively modest tariff 
protection. It is clearly in these industries in which Pakistan has a comparative 
advantage, which she should now go on to exploit. Our study, of course, has 
only compared the tariff protection given to different manufactur ing industries. 
We have not compared the manufacturing sector as a whole with other sectors 
such as agriculture or mining. Our conclusions refer only to the relative 
profitability of different industries within the manufactur ing sector. It may 
well be that investment in manufactur ing as a whole is less productive than in 
other sectors. 
Some Qualifications 
In what follows we will try to anticipate some of the objections of the 
skeptics. We discus some of the characteristics of the data and methodology 
which may have biased our results. 
The equation used to compute Vi can be expressed as follows: 
. y . ii -v.. xt _ yi i1 
Vi~ (1+t i ) (1-t-ti) w 
and Ui is given by: 
, i . W i - V L _ , „ ) 
As we have pointed out in Section III, the results, as computed f rom Equation (5), 
assume that i) the official exchange rate is an equilibrium rate or, ii) if the official 
rate is not an equilibrium rate then the scarcity margin is equal on all commodities, 
and iii) that the domestic price of each commodity is at least equal to the c.i.f. 
price of a competing import converted at the official exchange rate plus import 
taxes. 
We accept assumption iii) as being reasonable; we know, however, that both 
i) and ii) are incorrect. We have already pointed out the bias in our results 
because we fail to take account of the scarcity margin on the outputs of each 
industry and on the domestically produced intermediate inputs which can be 
traded. If we knew what the scarcity margins were, and include them in our 
calculation, the computed value of Vi would be affected as follows ; 
a) the higher the scarcity margin on the output of the industry, the lower 
would be the computed value of Vi; and 
b) the higher the scarcity margin on the domestically produced inputs, 
the higher would be the computed value of Vi. 
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We have previously pointed out that the proport ion of total intermediate 
inputs which are both domestically produced and receive protection through 
import licensing is very small. Hence, unless the scarcity margin on these inputs 
is substantially higher than the scarcity margin on output, it is clear that it is 
the latter which will be the major determinant of any bias in our measured values 
o f V i and Uj. 
If in fact the bias in our Vi is primarily the result of neglecting the scarcity 
margin on the output, then our Vi will be, in general, too high, that is, if we 
could take the scarcity margin into account, the elfect would be that our com-
puted Vi would be smaller than the one we now have and the new Ui would be 
greater than those we have calculated. Some Vi which were previously positive 
would now become negative and the whole ranking of the industries by Vi and 
U; would change depending on the relative magnitudes of the scarcity margin. 
We should mention again, however, that Pal's study [12] does indicate that the 
average scarcity margin on consumer goods is the same as that on capital goods. 
Hence, the ranking of these two groups of industries with respect to each other 
would not change. Consumer-goods industries would still be more heavily 
protected than investment- and related-goods industries. 
Ui will be biased upward if the actual value added, Wj, is underestimated. 
The underestimation of value added has been a consistent problem in the Cen-
suses of Manufactur ing Industries. Tims-Stern [10] have made some estimates 
of the downward bias in the magnitude of value added and have adjusted the 
data to allow for this. Their correction may, however, be insufficient, although 
there is no reason to believe that their figures would understate value added in 
such a way as to give U i >l primarily for consumer-goods industries. 
We conclude, therefore, that our estimates of Vj and U; can be taken as a 
first approximation given the paucity of data on scarcity margins, interindustry 
relations, and the value added by industries. It will only be in the light of fur ther 
informat ion on these variables that a final judgement on the questions raised in 
this study can be made. 
v . . S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N S 
The conclusions which can be drawn f r o m this study are as follows. First, 
we have found that the implicit rate of protection to value added inherent in the 
present tariff structure is higher for consumer-goods industries than for invest-
ment- and related-goods industries. In this regard, our finding reconfirms what 
Radhu [15] found when he examined the explicit tariff structure. Apparently, 
the effect of tariff protection on the inputs of intermediate goods is not suffi-
ciently different for consumer- and investment-goods industries to affect the 
relative amount of protection afforded these industries when measured by 
explicit and implicit rates. Our second conclusion refers to those industries for 
262 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
which we obtain Ui > 1. This implies that the amount of protection exceeds the 
contribution to value added that the industry makes. We have argued that this 
may occur for three reasons: 1) the domestic market for the output of an indus-
try may be so small that the industry cannot avail itself of the internal economies 
of scale and it, therefore, operates with high per-unit costs. It may also be that 
the investment in certain industries is ' lumpy' in the sense that even the minimum-
size plant has a minimum cost output greater than what the domestic market 
can absorb. Here again the industry will exhibit a high per unit cost. In either 
case the implication is that the industry was established before it was economi-
cally warranted; 2) the industry may still be an ' infant industry' and, thus, the 
observed U , > 1 is a short-run phenomenon which will persist until the industry 
can avail itself of external economies; and 3) protection may have made invest-
ment in some industries so profi table that there has been exccss investment in 
some industries. 
Our data do not allow us to make a clear choice between these three alter-
natives. However, the fact that U i > l is observed for many of the consumer-
goods industries, which one would feel reluctant to classify as either infant 
industries or industries suffering f r o m too small a market lead us to conclude 
that allocation of investment has been too much in favour of consumption. 
Thus, although investment in investment- and intermediate-goods industries 
has kept pace with investment in consumer-goods industries, there has been 
relatively too much investment in consumer-goods industries. At the margin 
these industries are contributing nothing to the domestic economy and indeed 
are probably a drag on the growth of real income since: 
/) not only are they using resources which could be used with greater 
marginal products elsewhere; but 
ii) they may also have negative marginal products! 
Our results lend strong support to the point of view expressed in [11 j that 
the time has come to give priority to investment in intermediate-goods 
and capital- and related-goods industries. Further, the investment in con-
sumer-goods industries should be encouraged only where it is clear that 
the industry can be reasonably efficient compared to alternative investment 
projects. In order to achieve tho kind of investment allocation which is 
most desirable, a thorough overhaul of the tariff and tax policies is 
called for. Reforms are particularly urgent because the recent trend toward 
liberalization of imports, if continued, will increase the importance of tariffs 
in determining relative prices and the pattern of resource use. We have shown 
that even in the past, when the potentially distorting cffects of the tariff structure 
were neutralized by import licensing and other direct controls, the pattern of 
investment has been wastefully biased towards consumer-goods industries. 
When the neutralizing influences of direct controls are removed and the existing 
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i a riff structure becomes one of the major determinants of relative prices and 
relative profitabilities, Pakistan could be subjected to a period of wasteful and 
inefficient investment in additional consumer-goods industries. 
The conclusions which emerge f r o m this study must of course be viewed in 
the context of the simplified model used and the data available. We have 
pointed out the major biases in our results which can be ascribed to our simpli-
fying assumptions. It has been noted that our conclusions are not likely to be 
significantly affected if we were able to take into account the effects of the import-
licensing system. 
The issues which our results raise are, however, of sufficient importance to 
warrant further discussion and investigation of whole matter of investment 
strategy and the comparative efficiency of investment in various domestic indus-
tries. Too often, investment choices in developing economies are made on the 
basis of the simple yardstick of how much such investment will contribute to 
import substitution. To do so runs the risk of neglecting industries in which the 
country has a comparative advantage. The results may be growth in manufac-
tured output without growth in real income. Our results indicate that this may 
in fact have been the result in Pakistan. 
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Appendix 
The equations in Section III have been developed for expositional purposes. 
The actual data available differ slightly f rom what is usually available f r o m an 
input-output table and, hence, the particular equations we use to compute Ui 
will also differ. In what follows we derive the equations which have been used to 
calculate Ui. 
The Tims-Stern input-output model for the year 1963/64 [10], which we 
have used as the basic data source, is of the following fo rm: 
£ Xji 4- Mi + T«m + Wi = Xi (1) 
where Xji is the domestic deliveries f rom industry j to industry i, measured in 
current domestic prices; 
Mi is the total imported inputs into industry i, measured at c.i.f. prices; 
Tmi is the total indirect taxes paid on imported inputs into industry i; 
Wi is the value added in industry i, measured in domestic prices; 
and XI is the gross value of output of industry i at factor cost, measured in 
domestic prices. 
Imports are already given in world market prices but the value of output 
and domestic intermediate deliveries must be converted f rom domestic prices to 
international prices. The assumption which we have used to convert flows in 
domestic prices to world prices is that the domestic price for any given com-
modity is equal to the world pricc of a similar commodity plus Pakistan import 
taxes ' . This assumption can be formalized as follows: 
Xi = Y, (1 + ti) (2) 
where Yj is the gross value of output at factor cost of commodity i measured 
in international prices, and ti is the explicit rate of protection given to industry i. 
Similarly: 
Xji = Yji (1 + tj) (3) 
where t is the tariff rate on commodity j, and Yji is the value of deliveries f rom 
industry j to industry i, measured in international prices. 
'The assumption is discussed fully in Section tit. 
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S u b s t i t u t i n g E q u a t i o n s (2) a n d (3) i n t o E q u a t i o n (1) , w e h a v e : 
n n 
2 Yjj + £ Yjitj + Mi + Tmj + Wi = Yi + Yiti (4) 
We define: r u Vi = Yi - E Yh + Mi (5) 
LJ 
where Vi is the amount which could be paid to domestic factors of production in 
industry i if all tariffs were reduced to zero. Vi is the residual when total inter-
mediate deliveries are deducted f r o m gross value of output, both expressed in 
international prices. 
Substituting Equation (5) into Equation (4) and transposing some terms, 
we obtain: 
The expression: Y j t i — _ _„t j -f Tnu J measures the net subsidy given to 
domestic value added by the tariff structure. The first part of the expression, 
(Yiti) is the additional revenue which the domestic manufacturer receives as a 
result of the higher prices for his output, made possible by the tariffs levied against 
/ n competing imports. The second part Yjj tj +Tm, ) is the additional cost to 
V ^ i 
domestic manufacturers due to tariffs on imported inputs and to the higher 
prices of domestic inputs which result f rom the tariff protection given to domestic 
producers of competing inputs. The amount paid to domestic factors of pro-
duction Wi is the sum of the payments which would be possible in the absence 
of trade barriers plus the net subsidy received as a result of the tariff structure. 
To make interindustry comparison of the degree of protection implicit 
in the tariff structure, we compare the net subsidy given to each industry with 
Wi. We define: 
Wi—Vi 
U i = (7) Wi 
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Export Potential of 
Fine Rice From Pakistan 
Sayed Mushtaq Hussain 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, rice has emerged as an important foreign-exchange earner 
for Pakistan. All the rice exports since 1958/59 were supplied by West Pakistan, 
a surplus rice area under the present price and procurement policies. In spite 
of an overall rice deficit, due to deficiency of production in East Pakistan, high-
priced fine varieties were exported at the same time that PL-480 foodgrains were 
being imported. 
'The current thinking in and outside the government is to raise substantially 
the production and exports of fine rice (especially basmati rice). In order to 
examine the rationality of increasing the production and exports of fine rice, 
certain basic information on world supply and demand is essential. 
This paper attempts to provide and build up some of the necessary infor-
mation on the supply of and demand for Pakistan's fine rices. Moreover, the 
rationality of increasing the production and exports of fine rice and of continuing 
the present policy and institutional f ramework for the procurement and export 
of rice, is examined. The paper is divided into four parts (in addition to 
the introduction and conclusion): i) supply potential of fine rices; ii) potential 
world demand for fine rices; iii) policy and institutional f ramework for the pro-
curement and export of fine rice; and iv) rationality of increasing the production 
and export of fine rice. 
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II. SUPPLY POTENTIAL OF FINE RICESi 
There are many varieties of rice grown in the former Pun jab and Sind areas 
that can be labelled as fine 2. Rice is fine if it has slender kernels, and, after 
cooking, the grains maintain their slenderness and do not brust or stick together 3 . 
Among the fine rices, Basmati, Mushkan, Bara (Hansraj) and Permal in the 
former Pun jab areas, and Sugdeshi group (J. J. 77, Bengalo, Snnhari, Ghulab, 
etc.) and Dokri Basmati in the former Sind areas, are well known. However, 
Basmati rice (particularly Basmati Lahore 370) is very well known in Pakistan, 
India, and Middle East, for its extra fineness and unique flavour when cooked. 
It is estimated that at present, the production of fine rices is about 2,50,000 
tons, mainly concentrated in the Districts of Gujranwala , Sheikhupura, Lahore 
and Sialkot (Appendix Table A-2b). 
Since Basmati rice has a good-cooking quality and has the largest production 
among all the fine rices grown in West Pakistan, it is desirable to discuss its 
supply potential in detail. 
(A) Areas of West Pakistan Suitable for Basmati Cultivation 
Basmati and other slender type rices require fertile clay or clay loam'soils, 
abundant water supply, and mild climate at the ripening time of the crop 4 . 
Mild climate at the ripening time is the most crucial requirement. Poor soils 
and/or inadequate water supply can affect the crop yield to varying degrees, 
but without suitable climatic conditions, Basmati rice cannot acquire its charac-
teristic fineness and good-cooking qualities. Hot and comparatively dry climatic 
conditions at the time of ripening make the kernels chalky or cause abdominal 
whiteness. Moreover, hot and dry climate will /) reduce the moisture content of 
the kernels and cause cracks in them, leading to a high proportion of broken 
grains when husked, ii) cause air cavities which make the grain burst when put 
in boiling water and distort the shape of the cooked grains, iii) cause the develop-
ment of dextrine and some maltose in the starch of the grain which make the 
grains stick together when cooked, and iv) prevent the synthetic chemical reac-
tions that lead to the formation of aromatic compounds which are responsible 
for the special Basmati flavours. Since the water supply can be increased through 
canal and tubewell irrigation in most cases, the climatic conditions are the most 
important limiting factors for Basmati rice cultivation. 
iThe author wishes to thank M/s Rasul Bux A, Abbasi and Mohammad Shafi, Botanist 
Inchargc, Dokri Rice Farm (Distt. Larkana) and Assistant Botanist, Kala Shah Kaku (Distt. 
Sheikhupura), respectively, for the enlightening discussions which he had with them at the 
Farms in October 1964. 
2The former Punjab areas include four Divisions: Rawalpindi, Sargodha, Lahore, and 
Multan. And the former Sind areas include two Divisions: Khairpur and Hyderabad. 
3Rice Trade Glossary defines a slender kernel as having a length-breadth ratio of 3 or more 
in husked form [15, p. 54], 
For a detailed introduction to Basmati rice, see [23, Appendix A], 
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The climatic requirements are temperatures ranging between 68-100 degrees 
Fahrenheit during the growing season, and mild temperature ranging between 
60-80 degrees Fahrenheit during the ripening season, Moreover, for good 
Basmati cultivation, a relative humidity range of 40-60 per cent, during the 
ripening season, is equally important . 
Basmati is a time-fixed variety which means that it is ready for harvest after 
a fixed number of days (110-115) f rom the time of transplantation. Appendix 
Table A- la shows average monthly temperature f rom May to December for 
11 centres in West Pakistan. All the 11 centres show mild temperatures either 
during October-November or during November-December. In areas where 
the mild weather occurs in October-November, the transplantation time falls 
during July-August and when mild weather occurs during November-December, 
the transplantation season is August-September. In the former Sind areas, 
late sowing is essential in order to take advantage of mild weather, but late 
sowing involves lower yields, as early sowing followed by comparatively high 
temperatures will give comparatively high yields. 
Table I summarises the areas where the temperature and humidity conditions 
seem to be suitable. Areas around Lahore (where, at present, Basmati is widely 
grown) have the ideal climatic conditions necessary for the ripening season of 
Basmati rice. However, areas around Hyderabad are only suitable if Basmati 
rice is transplanted la te 5 . Parts of Lyallpur, Montgomery, and Sukkar, where 
the necessary climatic conditions prevail, might be found suitable. 
Two important points should be noted: A) when the ideal temperature and 
humidity conditions do not prevail, Basmati could be grown, though the cooking 
quality of the grains will be adversely affected to varying degrees; and ii) areas 
shown as suitable in Table I will always include some patches of land where the 
ideal climatic conditions are missing, and the vice versa. 
(B) Soil and Water Conditions in Suitable Areas 
Basmati rice can be successfully grown in fertile clay or clay loam soils. 
Since one of the most important requirements is abundant water supply (to have 
standing water in the fields), an impervious subsoil is needed to make an econo-
mical use of water. 
In the fine rice-growing areas of former Punjab (Lahore Division, parts of 
Lyallpur and Montgomery) , the soil is fairly fertile and an impervious subsoil 
is available or is made available by the process of "puddl ing" fields. In the rice 
growing areas of former Sind (Hyderabad, Dadu, Sukkur, Thatta), the soil is 
as good as in the former Punjab areas and, during the cultivation season, the 
5 La to transplantation is not ncccssary if some early maturing variety of Basnwtl (<'.g., 
Dokri Baimnli) is cultivated. 
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TABLE I 
AREAS SUITABLE FOR BASMATI RICE CULTIVATION 
Area 
Temperature and humidity conditions (ripening season) 
Suitable transplantation season 
Most productive sowing season 
Sowing late or early 
Effecl on yields 
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Croup A 
1. Lahore 
Division 
2, Hyderabad 
Group B 
L Lyallpur 
Suitable 
(October-
November) 
Suitable 
(November-
December) 
Suitable for 
small areas 
where humidity 
is high 
(October-
November) 
2, Montgomery Suitable for 
small areas 
where humidity 
is low 
(October-
November) 
July-Au gust 
August-September May-June Late 
July-August 
Adverse 
July-August June-July Little late Slightly 
adverse 
3. Sukkur Suitable for 
small areas 
where humidity 
is low during 
November-
December 
August-September May-June Late Adverse 
Source: Based on information contained in Appendix Tables A-la and A-lb. 
Note; Lahore Division consists of districts; Lahore, Sheikhupuva, Gujranwala and Sialkot. The districts with comparatively moderate climate in Hyderabad Division are Hyder-abad, Thatta, and southern portion of Dadu, 
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underground watertable rises close to the surface which minimizes the leaching 
of surface water. Thus, the soils in all the areas sorted out in Table I are reason-
ably suitable for Basmati cultivation, though poor in certain cases. 
Slender rices require more water than do coarse rices. It is estimated that 
under normal circumstances, the water requirements for Basmati are 70 to 75 
acreinches 6 . The rainfall during monsoon season is roughly 20 inches in areas 
around Lahore and 8-10 inches in areas around Hyderabad, neither of which 
is sufficient. Canal irrigation is the main source of water supply. 
Canal water is in acute shortage in areas around Lahore, however, and water 
requirements for rice cultivation are not adequately met. In these areas, canal 
water is supplied for one-fourth of the area owned, at the rate of one cusec for 
64 acres [1, p. 93]. It should be noted that the regularity and adequacy of water, 
especially at the time of flowering, affect the slender rice yields significantly. 
Therefore, the use of tubewell irrigation is increasing rapidly to ensure water 
with more certainty. 
(C) Maximum Potential Acreage/Production of Basmati Ricc 
It is not possible to estimate, precisely, the potential acreage that could be 
brought under Basmati rice cultivation. However, there are certain indicators 
that can help to form some idea. There are four ways of increasing the present 
production of fine rices: i) by shifting the present area under medium and coarse 
rices to fine rices; ii) by shifting the area under the alternate kharif crops (cot-
ton, sugarcane, maize, etc.) to fine rices; iii) by increasing total acreage for kliarif 
cultivation; and /V) by raising the yield of fine rices through regular and adequate 
water supply, use of fertilizers, pest control, etc. 
i) Shifting the Present Area under Medium and Coarse Rice to Fine Rice 
From 1961/62 to 1963/64, in Lahore Division (Region A), nearly 51 per cent 
and in the districts of Hyderabad, Dadu, Thatta and Sukkur (Region B), nearly 
5 per cent of the rice acreage was under fine rices (see Appendix Table A-4). In 
Region A, if water supply and economic incentives are sufficient, it is estimated 
that 90 per cent of the present rice acreage can be shifted to line rices. However, 
a complete shift may not be possible due to water inaccessibility. On this basis, 
8,00,000 acres could be transferred to fine rices, and on the basis of an assumed 
yield of 11 maunds per acre, the production could be raised to 3,20,000 tons 8 . In 
Region B, however, the maximum possible shift is roughly estimated to be 70 per 
cent, as there are some low-lying areas (some 20 per cent) where cultivation is not 
fThe information is based on a personal communication with Mr. Mohammad Shaft, 
Assistant Botanist, Rice Farm, Kala Shah Kaku (District Sheikhupura). 
'The kharif season approximately runs through May to November. 
"Eleven maunds per acre was the average yield of cleaned rice in the Districts of Gujran-
wala and Sheikhupura (major fine rice-growing areas) during 1961/62 to 1963/64. 
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possible. Thus, the potential area is 6,75,000 acres and production at 5.5 
maunds per acre could be 1,24,850 tons*. There are some areas in Lyallpur, 
Montgomery, Guj ra t , etc., where fine rices could be grown successfully.* By 
making an allowance for such areas, the maximum potential production is in-
creased to about 4,80,000 tons. This is almost twice the present estimated pro-
duction of fine rices. 
ii) Shifting the Present Area tinder Alternate Kharif Crops to Fine Rice 
Among many crops, cotton, sugarcane, and maize are the important ones 
competing with rice. Appendix Table A-3 summarises the average area under 
these crops, for the years 1961/62 to 1963/64. The total area under the compet-
ing crops in Regions A and B, is 8,17,000 acres, out of which 63 per cent is in 
Region A. By assuming the average yield of 11 maunds in the former Punjab 
areas and 5.5 maunds per acre in the former Sind areas, sufficient water supply, 
and economic incentives, the potential increase in the production of fine rices is 
estimated to be 2,70,000 tons. Sources /) and ii) combined could raise fine-rice 
production to 7,50,000 tons, three times the present level. 
iii) Increasing Total Acreage for Kharif Cultivation 
It is difficult to say how many acres of land can be usefully cultivated with 
improved water availability and land development. It is certain, however, 
that the actual kharif area under cultivation is much lower than the cultivable 
area. In the Nor the rn Zone, about 41 per cent of the kharif cultivable area was 
reported to be cultivated in 1960/61 kharif season. It is assumed that the pro-
portion can be raised to 60 per cent or higher in future>» However, the future 
area under sugarcane, rice, cotton and foodgrains (jowar, bajra and maize) is 
calculated to be 77 per cent higher than the present. For the same crops 
in the Southern Zone, the assumed fu ture area is supposed to be 50 per 
cent higher. 
Noth ing precise can be deduced f rom these facts except that the total area 
available for kharif season can be tremendously increased through improved 
water supplies and land reclamation and development. Roughly a 50-per-cent 
increase can take place in the present culturable kharif acreage. With this 
assumption, the potential production of fine rices estimated under i) and ii) can 
be increased by 50 per cent. This would raise the maximum production poten-
tial to 11,25,000 tons (4.5 times the present production). 
»In the former Sind areas, with late sowing of Basmati rice, it is estimated that the yields 
are reduced to one-half to one-tliird due to groundwater, pest and rice stem borer attack condi-
tions. We use 5.5 maunds per acre (one-half of former Punjab areas) for estimating production. 
On the basis of the present proportion of production in areas of former Punjab, except Lahore 
Division, an allowance is made for the potential production in the suitable areas of Lyallpur, 
Montgomery, Gujrat, etc., at 10 percent of the production in Region A, 
"'For the reported and assumed future intensity of cropping, refer to Harza Supporting Studies [21, Chapter II, Tables 11.7 and 11.8], 
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iv) Raising the Average Yield of Fine Rice 
The prseent rice yields are obviously low, because of untimely and inade-
quate water supplies and pests, inadequate use of fertilizers and manures, im-
proper seeds, improper and exhaustive crop rotation, etc. It is estimated that 
rice yields as a result of the above inputs and measures can increase by 50 to 100 
per cent [22 ; 34], By making an allowance for the potential increases in rice 
yields, the potential production of fine rices can increase to 16,88,000— 
22,50,000 tons. 
The above estimates of potential supply (summarised in Table II) are based 
on several assumptions: a) that the water supply can be increased to any required 
quantity; b) that the necessary economic incentives can be created and made 
effective; c) that the programmes of land reclamation and development will 
increase the kharif cultivable area to the assumed extent; and cl) that the 
measures and economic incentives will be available to make the assumed increase 
in rice yields feasible and profi table. 
The estimates of maximum production potential serve no other purpose than 
to assure us that any plan to increase the production of fine rices two to three 
times is feasible, though serious efforts will have to be made to increase acreage 
and yields, and the increase may be at high economic costs. 
(D) The Required Economic Incentives 
By economic incentives we mean a shift in the price of fine rice relative to 
that of the competing crops including coarse rice. The required strength of 
economic incentives can only be determined by a reference to the relative cost 
and earnings per unit of land, water, and other resources in the various at 
Some of the factors that make the costs of producing fine rice higher than the 
coarse rice, are the fol lowing: 
/) Production of fine rice is more water intensive than coarse rice>>. 
ii) Fine rices usually have longer maturing periods compared to those of 
the coarse and medium varieties [1, Pp. 125-131], The differences range 
f r o m 15 to 45 days. This means higher water and labour costs. 
iii) Fine rices, in general, require water with more certainty and regularity. 
iv) As line rices have longer maturing periods or have to be transplanted 
late, the sowing of the rabi (winter) crop is delayed or becomes impossi-
ble. When the sowing of rabi crop is delayed in areas of low rainfall 
nit is experienced that the total water requirements of late maturing line rice are about 
72 acre inches and that of early maturing coarse rice varieties about 60 acreinches (footnote 6). 
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TABLE II 
ESTIMATES OF POTENTIAL SUPPLY OF BASMATI RICE 
Estimated potential production 
Source of production Existing 
conditions 
Adequate 
water 
supply 
Increase 
in rice 
yields by 
100% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
( 000 tons. ) 
(1) Estimated present production 250 375 
(2) Increased production through 
i) Shifting the medium and coarse 
rice acreage to fine rice: 
R e g i o n A 323 485 646 
R e g i o n B 125 187 2 5 0 
448 672 896 Plus allowance for other areas 
in Region A 32 48 64 
Total: i) 480 720 960 
Shifting the acreage under alternate 
kharif crops to fine rice: 
Region A 209 314 418 
Region B 61 91 122 
Total: //) 270 405 540 
Total: /') and ii) 750 1,125 1,500 
increasing the kharif acreage by 50% 375 563 750 
Total : i), ii) and iii) 1,125 1,688 2,250 
Source: As explained in the text, Column (3) is 
computed from Column (2) on the assump-
tion that with adequate water supply the 
rice yield will increase by 50 per cent. 
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(during October-December) and/or of nonperennial canal networks 
(such as the former Sind), the normal rabi yields fall due to low moisture 
content in the soil and lack of adequate water supply. Such lower rabi 
yields mean an additional opportunity cost for fine rices. 
v) Even in the case of early maturing varieties of fine rices, the transplantation 
sometimes is done late so that mild climate prevails at the time of ripening. 
With late transplantat ion, the fine-rice yields fall in some areas. For 
instance, in the former Sind areas, the ideal time for rice transplantation 
is May-June, and late sowing (July-August) will reduce yields to one-half 
to one-third of the potential if t ransplantation could have taken place in 
June, due to less ideal climatic and water conditions and the more active 
attack of rice stem borer (during July-August) on young plants. 
vi) The coarse riccs are more nearly impervious to less than ideal conditions, 
and the probability of loss in the normal yield on account of untimely and 
inadequate water supply and disease is much more in the case of fine 
rices. 
Clearly, the change in the relative price of fine rices (Basmati) should bo 
sufficient to make the area shift f r o m medium and coarse rices to fine, profitable. 
The main costs to be compensated are: water, loss in yields in the rabi crops, 
loss in yield due to late transplantation, and the risks of loss in normal yields. 
In the former Sind areas, the change required in the relative price of fine rice will 
be much larger than that in the former Punjab areas, as the loss in yields due to 
late transplanting, late sowing of rabi crops, and rice stem borer attack are much 
higher. To make the hypothetical maximum acreage under fine rices effective 
(as estimated under (C), Subsection /)), an increase of f rom 50 to 100 per-
cent in the price of fine rices, relative to medium and coarse rice, is essent ia l 1 2 . 
Turning to the case of a shift of the area under the alternate kharif crops to 
the cultivation of fine rices, a substantial increase in the price of fine rice is 
a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. The water supply will have to be 
increased to an enormous extent, since the water requirements for fine rice are 
more than double that required for cotton, and more than three times that of 
maize [2, p. 32]. 
Cotton yields are low on land with a high watertable (0-10 feet) and in future , 
with land-reclamation projects which will lower the watertables, cotton yields 
v/ill rise. Therefore, the increase in the price of fine rice relative to cotton will 
have to be much higher than that necessary at present. The exact magnitude of 
the changes in the relative price of fine rice depends on factors like cotton and 
"Based on Appendix Table A-5b, in which we have shown the estimated opportunity 
cost of fine-rice cultivation through delayed rabi crop. 
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other crop yields in particular areas and how they will change with land recla-
mation and development. 
Finally, it should be noted that for an effective shift f rom coarse rice or/and 
alternate kharif crops, substantially increased and regular water supply is crucial. 
With limited water supplies, it is not advantageous (in terms of foreign exchange) 
to use water for more rice cult ivation! 3 . 
Before discussing the rationality and desirability of increasing the production/ 
export of Basmati rice, we wish to analyse the international demand potential 
for fine rices. 
lit. WORLD POTENTIAL D E M A N D FOR FINE RICE (BASMATI) 
In this section, we will discuss the world demand for fine rices in general 
and Basmati rice in particular. As a background, some facts regarding the 
world rice economy and international trade are presented first. 
(A) Main Features of World Rice Economy and Trade 
/) Rice is the most valuable primary product, surpassing not only other 
crops, such as wheat, maize, cotton, and sugar, but also coal, crude petroleum and 
pig iron [29], During 1959/60 to 1961/62, the average production of paddy was 
236.4 million metric tons, equivalent to an estimated figure of 153.4 million 
metric tons of milled r i ce 1 4 . Over 90 per cent of the world production is con-
centrated in Asia (including Mainland China), 
ii) The great bulk of the world rice is consumed in countries where it is 
grown, and only 3.6 per cent of the production (very low compared with other 
cereals) enters into the international t r ade 1 5 - Absolute trade quantities range 
f rom 5 to 6 million metric tons (see Appendix Tabic B-3). 
iii) The number of countries that could be regarded as the major participants 
in rice trade is small. Nearly 70 per cent of the rice exports come f rom three 
countries: Burma, Thailand and the USA 1*'. Nearly 63 per cent of the rice 
imports are in the Far East, concentrated in Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Ceylon 
and Hong Kong. 
iv) Since few countries participate in rice trade and since rice production 
can vary significantly as a result of the changing weather conditions, the quanti-
ties traded and the prices fluctuate substantially. 
usee, Ghulam Mohammad [20, Pp, 512-513]. 
"Converted at the average milling rate of 65 per cent (see Appendix Table B-l) . 
isFor computing the percentage of rice traded, the average for the years 1951-53 is used, 
as data were easily available for these years (see Appendix Table B-3). 
6The relative shares of the market are, roughly, Burma 30 per ceni, Thailand 25 per cent, 
and the USA 16 per cent [17], 
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v) Rice is a differentiated commodity, as the various kinds traded inter-
nationally differ very widely in shape, colour, cooking characteristics, type and 
degree of milling, and the proport ion of broken grains. Consumer preferences 
vary f rom country to country. Moreover, there is no international market on 
which a large number of varieties are traded fairly continuously. Along with 
other factors, changing conditions of trade contracts, barter deals and other 
linked business (security of markets or fur therance of foreign policy, etc.) make 
it extremely difficult to compare rice prices or even to measure their movements. 
ri) Most of the principal exporting countries sell through a national mono-
poly, while in the remaining cases, governments play an important role. Among 
the leading importing countries, nearly half have single purchasing agencies 
118, l'p. 4-10], 
(B) Availability of Relevant Statistics 
Our main interest is to analyse the world potential demand for a particular 
group of rices called fine rices and a special variety in this group called Basmati 
rice. Statistical data of all sorts are lacking. There are no published statistics 
showing the world production, trade, and prices of fine rices. Moreover, there 
is tto available information about the income and/or price elasticities of demand 
for fine rice. 
Therefore, we will not be able to carry out any comprehensive and precise 
analysis of the shape of the demand curve for hire rice and the potential shifts 
in it. Nevertheless, we propose to discuss the shape and shift problems in 
general terms with available data and information. The discussion will help us 
to understand some economic characteristics of the international rice market 
and their implications for the fine group. It will be of particular use in assessing 
the sense of various projections made in connection with the exports of Basmati 
rice f rom Pakistan. 
(C) Potential Demand for Fine Rices including Basmati Rice 
As indicated above, there are two main questions to be answered: a) what 
does the demand curve for fine rices and Basmati rice look like? (Or putting 
the question in another fo rm: how much would the price fall if Pakistan should 
try to sell more Basmati rice in the world market ?) And b) how would the 
demand curvc shift through t ime? 
/) The Shape of the Demand Curve (Price-Quantity Relationships) 
In the absence of data on quantities of fine rices produced and traded, and 
on their prices, we are forced to adopt some indirect method to estimate the 
quantities of various groups of rice traded and the range of prices. 
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The first problem to be solved is the basis for classifying the rice traded inter-
nationally into groups. There are many physical characteristics like the 
length of kernels, length-breadth ratio, colour, type of processing, degree of 
processing, flavour, cooking time, water absorption, etc., that could serve as the 
basis for classification. However, it will be impossible to use any single characte-
ristic as a basis, because the rice traded has many different combinations of 
characteristics that affect the value of rice in the market. Moreover, since 
we do not possess detailed data about the physical, cooking, and other 
characteristics of the rices traded internationally, it becomes necessary to discard 
such characteristics as the basis for classification. 
Instead, we propose to use four price ranges (less than SI 10, §110 - $130, 
$130-8150, and $150-8210) as the basis for classifying the quantities traded 
internationally into groups. The procedure is chosen on the assumption 
that rice is a highly differentiated commodity and the quality differentiation is 
reflected in prices. Such an assumption is substantiated by international price 
data indicating that a high-price rice is the one which has, comparatively, a low 
proport ion of brokens, more slenderness, and non-s t ickness 1 7 . Since Pakistan 
Basmati rice is slender and non-sticky, it is assumed that only other high-price 
varieties of rice are substitutes is. We assign names to our four price groups of 
rice. They are : 
(A) Coarse rice (below Si 10) 
(B) Low medium rice ($110-1130) 
(C) High medium rice ($130-5150) 
(D) Fine rice ($ 150 - $210) 
On the basis of unit values, countries have been classified into the above-
mentioned four groups; and taking a three-year average (1960-1962) for imports, 
an estimate has been made of the quantities imported in these groups. Table III 
summarises the average quantities imported in each group, during the period 
1960-1962. 
The method of classifying countries into the four price groups, on the basis 
of unit values, is a very crude one. It neglects the possibility that each country 
may not be buying exclusively one or the other type of rice, but some mix of 
nprice differentials within the group may depend on colour, type and degree of milling, 
water absorption, etc., and the markets in which sold. However, slenderness and non-stick-
ness are assumed to be the basic qualities responsible for high price. 
International prices (1959 to 1961) for some of the varieties of rice appear in [11, Table 4, 
p. 32], 
isThe price of Pakistan Basmati nc& ranged from $ 168 to $ 210 (average $192) during the 
period 1959-61. As Basmati rice has some special characteristics like a typical flavour and 
fineness of cooked grains, it commands some premium over other slender and non-sticky rices 
in the traditional markets (mainly Middle East and Persian Gulf countries). 
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TABLE III 
AN ESTIMATE OF WORLD RICE IMPORTS (AVERAGE 1960-62) 
Average Proport ion 
Name assigned Price range quantity of total imported imports 
($ per ton) (000 m. tons) (percentage) 
A. Coarser ice below $110 2,186 37.3 
B. Low medium rice $110 - S130 2,456 41.9 
C. High medium rice S130 - $150 709 12.1 
D. Fine rice $150- $210 509 8,7 
Source: Computed from [17], 
them. In order to check the above estimate and to consider the possibility of 
rice imports of the mixed type, we use a slightly different method. 
Taking the main geographical regions of the world, and classifying average 
imported quantities into our four price groups, on the basis of unit values of 
imports, we get: 
Rice group imported Rice group S p o S 
(000 m. tons) (000 m. tons) 
A. Coarse 3690 C. High 601 
B. Low medium 1633 D. Fine 228 
In Group A, it is highly unlikely that line rice is mixed. However, in Groups 
B, C, and D, the possibility is present. Assuming that only coarse and fine rices 
are imported at the average price of §108 and §180 per ton, respectively, the 
coarse and line rices must be mixed in the ratio of 5:1 in case of Group B, 1:1 
in case of Group C, and 1:2 in case of Group D to obtain the average price of 
§120, $140 and $180'9. On the basis of the mixture ratios, we have split the 
quantity of fine rice among each group (i.e., fine rice content: 272 (Group B), 
155 (Group C), and 152 (Group D) thousand metric tons). Wo arrive at a total 
of 579 (compared to 509, estimated in Table III) thousand metric tons. 
19TO split Group D, we have taken the price of super fine rice as $210 per ton 
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For our purposes, we will use the average of both the estimates, that is 540 
thousand metric tons. We also know f rom Table III that the quantity imported, 
in the next group (high medium) of rice, is 700 thousand metric tons. 
On the basis of the estimated imported quantities of rice in Groups D and 
C, we can say that if the price of fine rice is reduced f rom the average level for 
fine group $180, to the average level of the next lower group $140 per ton, 
an additional quantity of 700 thousand tons could be sold if consumers prefer 
to buy fine rice at the high prices of medium rice. This implies the value of price 
elasticity of demand for fine rice to be 3.14 between $140-$180 a ton. 
Pakistan Basmati rice earns a premium of §20 - $30 per ton over the aver-
age fine rice, in its present markets (mainly Middle East), due to its extra fine-
ness and special flavour. Therefore, one should expect the demand elasticity 
for Basmati rice to be comparatively more elastic than that of rices within the 
f i n e g r o u p 2 0 . 
Pakistan's exports of fine rices (Basmati and Permal) averaged 87 thousand 
tons during 1960-62, or 16 per cent of the world trade in fine rice group (see, 
Appendix Table C-2a). Plans to increase the exports of fine rices f rom Pakistan, 
in the short run, will raise Pakistan's share in the fine rice market . Other things 
being equal, Pakistan's increased share of the market will cause a loss of markets 
for other countries (the USA, Thailand, Madagascar, Australia, etc.) which ex-
port some high-price rice, and increased competition can necessitate a price cut. 
However, as noted earlier, the price cuts will increase the foreign-exchange 
earnings more than proportionately, as the world demand for Basmati rice within 
a certain price range is quite elastic. 
To say, in precise terms, how much exports will increase with a specific price 
cut is very difficult. However, Table V-b shows the estimated off- take of 
Pakistan Basmati and fine rices, at various prices, on the assumption of constant 
world market share for Pakistan. Nearly 11 per cent price cut is accompanied by 
an increase of 45 thousand tons of Basmati and 56 thousand tons of all fine rices 
(Basmati and Permal). A price reduction of 22 per cent increases the exports 
of Basmati and of fine rices by 91 and 112 thousand tons, respectively. 
Assuming that Pakistan's fine rice is superior to other fine rices and the 
Pakistan's share in the market can be increased, the increases in the quantities 
MWhen Basmati rice Buds way to markets other than Middle East, it might not letch any 
premium. In fact, it might have to be sold at a discount, since in most European and other 
countries, the special flavour is not liked or appreciated, Clean, well polished and packed 
slender rices with short cooking time might be more popular. Therefore, it is quite possible 
that Basmati rice would have to be sold at a discount. 
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exported, as a result of price cuts, could be much more than those indicated 
abovezi. 
In short, three conclusions emerge f rom the above analysis. /) The demand 
for fine rice group is quite elastic and the crude price elasticity is 3.14. The 
quantity sold in this group could be more than doubled if the average price for 
this group is reduced by 22 per cent, ii) We should expect, in general, the demand 
for Pakistan Basmati rice to be comparatively more elastic than that of the entire 
fine rice group, iii) The market for fine rices is a differentiated one, hence, non-
price factors are important. They might make Basmati rice a premium rice 
in certain markets and a discount rice in other markets. 
ii) Shifts in the Demand Curve through Time 
Due to the lack of data, it is not possible to estimate, for fine rice, income/ 
consumption elasticity and the effect of population growth on consumption. 
However, we deal with the problem in three steps: i) concentrating on the world 
market for fine rice, and estimating the probable growth rate of potential 
demand; ii) estimating the "off - take" for Pakistan Basmati and other fine rices 
on some special assumption (i.e., constant, world market share); and iii) 
examining some of the projected/planned quantities of fine rice for exports, 
a) Probable Growth Rate of Potential Demand: To begin with, we make two 
assumptions: the consumers' tastes and the price of fine rice, relative to the 
substitutes, will remain constant. With these general assumptions, we are left 
with income and population growth as the main factors that will influence the 
potential demand. 
Table I V-a depicts the estimated quantities of fine-rice imports in the various 
continents/regions, and on this basis, weights are given to the six continents/re-
gions of the world. Table IV-b shows the FAO-assumed growth rates of 
population and G N P per capita [3, Table M-l , p. A-2), By using the income 
elasticities of demand for cereals (given by the FAO), we have calculated the 
average weighted growth rate of potential demand on the basis of low and high 
assumed growth rates of G N P per capita. For potential demand, we used 
the formula (1 + P) where Y= growth rate of GNP/caput , £ - = income 
elasticity of demand for , in this case, cereals, and P=popu la t ion growth rate. 
The average of low and high growth rates of potential demand is 1.21 per cent 
per a n n u m » . 
21 If, for Pakistan, selling more means selling outside Middle East and in markets where 
Basmali rice does not command premium, non-price measures like replacing Basmati with other 
suitable slender rices, proper cleaning and packing, good milling or parboiling and advertise-
ment could aid in assuring competitiveness with other fine rices. 
- S i n c e the income elasticity of demand for cereals is negative in the case of Western 
Europe, Mediterranean Europe, North America and Oceania, we have neglected the effect of 
income growth, Population growth is assumed to be the only factor influencing the demand 
for fine rice. 
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TABLE IV-a 
ESTIMATED QUANTITIES OF WORLD FINE RICE IMPORTS 
(Average: 1960-62) 
Continent/Region 
Estimated 
quantity of 
fine-rice 
imports 
Proportion 
of total 
imports 
(000 metric tons) (percentage) 
Western Europe 98 17 
Africa 78 14 
USSR 48 8 
Eastern Europe 48 8 
Near East 135 24 
Oceania 20 24 
North America 31 5 
Latin America 121 21 
579 100 
Source: [171. 
Since rice is thought to be a superior cereal, in most cases, there is a need 
for using a higher income elasticity of demand than that for other cereals. To 
meet this end, we picked the highest income elasticity for cereals in any conti-
nent/region of the world, and that is 0.5 for Asia and the Far E a s t " . Using the 
income elasticity of 0.5 and following the above procedure, we have calculated 
an average growth rate of potential demand for fine rice, that is 2.5 per cent 
per annum. 
World import trade quantities of 540 and 1,240 thousand metric tons (at 
average prices of §180 and §140, respectively) are projected for 1970 at the 
rates of 1.21 per cent (Estimate 1) and 2.5 per cent (Estimate 2) per annum. The 
results are summarised in Table V-a. 
b)'Off-Take' of Pakistan Basmati and All Fine Rices: On the assumption 
that Pakistan's share in the international market (during 1960-62: 13 percen t 
• T h e main cereal in Asia and the Far East is rice. 
TABLE IV-b 
ESTIMATED GROWTH RATE OF POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR FINE RICE BY 1970 
§5 
Continents/Regions 
[ i Estimated 
: quantity 1 imported 
Assumed rate of 
Assumed rare of GNp/capui growth 
Assumed income elasticity of 
Estimated growth rate of potential demand 
Assumed income elasticity of 
Estimated growth rate of potential demand 
1 2 
; (rough weights) (population growth) 
demand for cereals 
demand for fine rice 
(9) 
Low High Low j High Low ' High 
a ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) ( U ) 5* I 
§ >t 1. Near-East, Africa (S. Africa) 38 2.5 ' 1.5 2.8 0.2 1.05 1.96 0.5 2.63 4.90 
2. Latin America (Argentine) 21 
2.7 2,0 2.8 0.14 L04 1.45 0.5 3.70 5.18 
3. Western Europe 17 0.4 2.3 3.3 —0.4 0.40 0.40 — 0.40 0.40 
4. Mediterranean 16 1.0 3.9 5.2 —0.3 LOG 1.00 — 1.00 LOO 
5. N. America and Europe 5 1.8 1.3 2.5 —0.5 1.80 1.80 _ 1.80 1.80 
6. Oceania 3 2.0 1.0 2.0 —0.5 2.00 2.00 — 2.00 2.00 
Average weighted growth rate of potential demand .99 1.43 
Average of high and low rates 1.21 
2.15 2.95 
2.5 
Sources: Column (2) is based on Table I V-a; Columns (3) to (5) are based on [3, Table M-l , p. A-2]. 
K> 
<30 O 
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for Basmati and 16 per cent Tor Basmati and Permal), will remain constant, 
we project the 'off-take' for Basmati in Table V-b a n d for all f ine rices in Table 
V-c. If Pakistan's share in the international fine-rice market cou ld be raised, 
the 'off-take' w o u l d be more than those indicated in Tables V-b and V-c* 4 . 
However , the projected 'off-take* helps us to examine the c o m m o n s e n s e of s o m e 
of the project ions and plans to export Basmati rice during the Third Five Year 
Plan. 
T A B L E V-a 
PROJECTED QUANTITIES OF FINE RICE, TRADED INTERNATIONALLY 
Price per ton 1961 
1970 (Potential) 
Estimate 1 Estimate 2 
1, S 180 5.40 6.20 6.70 
2. $ 170 7.15 8.10 8.90 
3. S 160 8,yu 10.00 11.10 
4. $ 150 10.65 11.90 13.30 
5. $ 140 12.40 13-80 J5.50 
Source : Computed on the basis of growth rates of potential demands calculated in Table III. 
T A B L E V-b 
PROJECTED 'OFF-TAKE* OF PAKISTAN FINE RICE (BASMATI) AT 
CONSTANT MARKET SHARE 
Price per ton 1961 
1970 (Potential) 
Estimate 1 Estimate 2 
1 • $ 180 0.70 0.81 0.87 
2. $ 170 0.93 1.05 1.16 
3. $ 160 1.15 1.30 1.44 
4. $ 150 1.38 1.54 1.73 
5. $ 140 1.61 1.79 2.02 
Source; Computed from Table V-a by taking 13 per cent of the quantities shown against the price: $180 - $140. 
2*There are indications for an increase as well as a decrease in Pakistan's share of the world fine-rice market. The factors that can reduce Pakistan's share of the market are: possibility of India and UAR's entry into the fine-rice market; USA's plans to increase exports of high-price rice; need for Pakistan to sell outside the shallow market of Middle East; and the possible emergence of economic and/or political trade partnerships adverse to Pakistan's trade interests. 
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TABLE V-c 
PROJECTED 'OFF-TAKE' OF PAKISTAN FINE RICE (BASMATI) 
AND (PERMAL) AT CONSTANT MARKET SHARE 
price per ton 1961 
1970 (Potential) 
Estimate 1 Estimate 2 
i, $ 180 0.86 0.99 1.07 
2. $ 170 1.1 1.29 1.42 
3. S 160 1.42 1.60 1.77 
4. $ 150 1.70 1.90 2.12 
5. $ 140 1.98 2.21 2.48 
Source: Computed from Table V-a by taking 16 per cent of the 
quantities shown against the prices: $180 - $140. 
c) Examination of Some of the Projected or Planned Quantities of Fine Rice 
for Exports (1970): We would like to examine three figures: a) 1,75,000; b) 
2,50,000; c) 6,00,000 tons, which have been put forward as the targets for fine-
rice exports till 1 9 7 0 ^ 5 . Comparing these figures with the projected 'off-take', 
shown in Table V-c, it is obvious that export of quantities of 1,75,000, and per-
haps of 2,50,000 tons, seems reasonable, though at reduced prices. Table VI 
TABLE VI 
ESTIMATED VALUE OF FINE RICE 'OFF-TAKE —1970 BASED ON 
PAKISTAN'S WORLD MARKET SHARE: 1960-62 
Quantity 
(torn) 
(a) 1,75,000 
(b) 2,50,000 
(c) 6,00,000 
Estimate 1 
Price Earnings 
(Rs\ per ton) 
714 
(million Rs.) 
125 
Estimate 2 
Price j Earnings 
(Rs. per (on) (million Rs.) 
761 133 
667 167 
Source: Computed on the basis of Table V-c. 
Note: For quantity (a), the price per maund is Rs. 26.25 (Estimate 1) and Rs. 27.98 (Estimate 2). For quantity (b), the price per maund is Rs. 24.52 (Estimate 2). 
2 'Some of these projected /planned quantities for exports are published, others unpublished. For example, the Planning Commission has envisaged 1,75,000 tons of Basmati-r'\c<s exports (out of a total of 3,00,000 tons) at Rs. 1,000 a ton during the Third Five Year Plan (see [26, p. 70]). 
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indicates the estimated price and the total earnings f rom the export of the above 
quantities. 
A quantity of 1,75,000 tons of fine rice exported is shown to earn 125-
133 million rupees. Assuming that the Pakistan fine rices will earn a premium of 
about 10 per cent over other fine rices, the earnings f rom the export of quantity 
(a) increase to 138-146 million rupees 2* 5. 
Quantity (b) would earn 167 million rupees, compared to others' estimates 
of 186 million rupees. 
Whole of the quantity (c) could not be sold at or above $140 per ton. At 
the price of $140, an excess supply of 3,52,000 to 3,79,000 tons is created. In 
order to sell the excess quantities, either the price will have to be cut below 
$140 per ton or/and Pakistan's share in the international market will have to 
rise f rom its present level of 16 to the order of 23 to 28 per cen t 2 7 . 
It must be understood that our projected 'off-take' does not rule out the 
possibility of exporting more than those quantities that we have indicated. 
However, it implies that this can only happen, provided: i) Pakistan's share in 
the world fine-rice market is raised to a level higher than its present level; and/or 
ii) with increased quantity exported, the new markets enable the Pakistan rice 
to earn a higher premium over other rices; and iii) tastes and the price of fine 
rice relative to substitutes change in a way that the world demand for fine rice 
exceeds our estimates, and that Pakistan gets a share. 
Provision ii) is highly unlikely, because new consumers' tastes are not 
believed to be as favourable as they are now in Middle East and Persian Gulf 
countries. But efforts in the direction of provisions i) and iii) will definitely help 
to sell more with or without price reductions. 
IV. POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROCUREMENT A N D 
EXPORT OF FINE RICE 
We divide the discussion into two subsections: A) procurement of fine rices; 
and B) export of fine rices. 
(A) Procurement of Fine Rices 
The rice procurement scheme was first enforced in the former Sind on ist 
October, 1949 and in the former Punjab on 1st October, 1952. The policy was 
pursued intermittently and was designed to secure food f rom the surplus pro-
ducing areas in order to supply areas where food shortage was acute. 
A Planning Commission envisages the export earnings from 1,75,000 tons of fine rice to be 
175 million rupees, which exceeds our estimate by 27 to 29 million rupees. 
27 See footnote 24. 
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More recently (Ist October, 1958), the Monopoly Procurement Scheme was 
introduced in some of the areas of former Punjab and Sind with a double ob-
jective : to secure rice for shipment to East Pakistan and to secure fine- and 
medium-quality rice for exports. For the year 1964/65, the areas controlled 
for the procurement of quality rice are: Districts of Gujra t , Gujranwala , Sial-
kot and Sheikhupura, Jaranwala Tehsil (of Lyallpur District) and the prescribed 
Revenue Estates of Lahore Dis t r ic t 2 8 . Procurement operations are carried 
out by the Provincial Government of West Pakistan on behalf of the Central 
Government of Pakistan. 
About May each year, the Government of West Pakistan announces the 
targets of procurement for the various varieties of rice and fixes procurement 
prices for each variety. Announcement is also made about the quantity which, 
after the completion of procurement, will be given pro rate as free release to 
the millers for sale anywhere in West Pakistan in the free market. 
In order to procure rice, the government puts a ban on the movement of 
rice f rom the controlled areas to a place outside, and fixes the price at which the 
desired quantities could be sold to the authorised rice dealers. Essentially, 
the procurement operations prevent dispersal of production by localization and 
encourage the flow to the procurement centres. 
After the harvest, the farmer brings paddy to the market where the rice mil-
ler/middleman, keeping in mind the procurement target, the free quota, and the 
procurement price, purchases the paddy at a certain price. 
Then the rice miller enters into a contract with the provincial government 
to supply a certain quantity of rice through the authorised agents. Ninety per 
cent of the price is paid at the rail heads. The rest of the payment is made after 
the results of samples are received f rom the Provincial Food Laboratory, Lahore. 
If the quality of the rice purchased is up to the specifications, the supplier gets 
the full payment (Rs. 28 per maund, for Basmati). 
From the economic point of view, the procurement operations in no way 
force the farmers to cultivate certain area or to surrender a certain quantity of 
rice. The farmers make their own choice about acreage, quantity to retain and 
to sell freely; however, the farmers cannot choose their market and, therefore, 
the price at which the produce could be sold. Thus, when the free-market prices 
outside the controlled areas are higher than the government-fixed procurement 
prices, the farmers are deprived of the gains which could accrue to them. Lower 
prices tend to put brakes on increased production. Consumers pay a price 
MThe Revenue Estates of Lahore district include: Shahdara, Kot Mohibbu, Kot Begum 
Nain Sukh, Saggian Kalanwar and Shahdara Parao of Lahore Tehsil. 
For coarse rice, the controlled areas are: Larkana, Jacobabad, Sukkur, and Dadu districts 
(see [31]). 
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higher than that which should prevail if there was no monopoly procurement 
and exports of rice. 
Hence, the groups that lose are rice producers and consumers. Moreover, 
since the fine- and medium-quality-rice exports get an export bonus (bonus 
vouchers in the amount of 20 per cent of the value of rice exported) against 
which imports of various goods are made, fur ther distribution implications 
follow. 
Appendix Table C-l depicts the average prices of fine and coarse rice (for 
the harvest season, November-February) both in the procurement and non-
procurement areas, for the period 1953/54 to 1963/64. Procurement prices for 
Basmati rice have gone up f rom Rs. 24 (1960/61) to Rs. 25 (1961/62), Rs. 26 
(1962/63), and Rs. 28 (1963/64 and 1964/65), but the procurement price for 
coarse rice has remained unchanged. The increase in the free-market prices of 
fine rice outside the procurement areas is notable since 1959/60, and as the 
proport ion of quantity procured in the production of fine rice increased, the 
difference between the free-market price and the procurement price increased. 
During the period 1960/61 to 1962/63, it is estimated that the everage free-mar-
ket price was higher than the procurement price by 70 per cent in the case of fine 
rice, and 25 per cent in case of coarse rice. 
Appendix Table C-2b shows the estimated production, marketable surplus, 
and the absorption of fine rice into the non-procurement areas of West Pakistan, 
Marketable surplus is taken to be three-fourths of the production, as one-fourth 
is estimated to be the requirement for seeds and farmers ' consumption. The 
absorption of fine rice in the non-procurement areas is calculated by deducting 
the quantities of Basmati and Permal rice that were procured f rom the market-
able surplus. 
The extent of export surplus of fine rice is mainly influenced by three factors: 
the actual production of fine rice, the effectiveness of the localization of sale 
through the procurement operations, and the price at which the rice is purchased 
by the procurement authority. 
(B) Exports of Fine Rice 
Until the recent past, the procedure was that an exporter who had taken 
the contract (to export rice at a certain agreed price) purchased the rice f rom 
the Ministry of Food, which arranged loading when the ship was available to 
the exporter. When the ship left the port, payments were made to the Food 
Ministry. 
More recently, the government have entered into a three-year agreement 
with Messrs. Pakistan Rice Merchants Syndicate Limited, Karachi, for the 
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export of Basmati rice and settled both export prices and the quantities to be 
exported as follows: 
i) £74/5/- + Rs. 150 per ton f.o.b. Karachi for 86,000 tons for the 
first year. 
ii) £75/5/- 4- Rs. 150 per ton f.o.b. Karachi for 1,05,000 tons for 
the second year. 
Hi) £77/5/- + Rs. 150 per ton f.o.b. Karachi for 1,17,000 tons for the 
third year. 
The exporters get a 20-per-cent bonus on the value of rice exported which 
they can sell in the free market for bonus vouchers at a premium (currently 140 
to 150 per cent). 
At the present contract export price for Basmati (£ 74/5/--}- Rs, 150 per ton), 
the exporter earns (and pays) Rs. 41.90 per maund, and with a 20-per-cent export 
bonus (if sold at 150-per-cent premium), he earns Rs. 10.42 per maund more. 
From the export of one maund of Basmati, the government and the exporters 
s h o u l d be earning Rs. 52.32 per maund. At the procurement price of Rs. 28, 
this implies a gross profit of Rs. 24.32 per maund, ignoring the procurement, 
carriage, storage, and export expenses, and u n d e r s e l l i n g ^ . The net profit to the 
government and exporter depends on the extent of expenses and of underselling. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be quite a profitable business. 
Could the present quantity of Basmati rice exported be secured in the free 
market? Since the present contract export price (Rs. 41.90) is close to the free-
market price in non-procurement areas (Rs. 42,38) and well above the price 
in procurement areas (Rs. 28), there is no reason to prefer procurement opera-
tions to the free market. The usual agrument that the free Basmati rice market 
will not be able to create the existing level of exportable surplus is inconsistent 
with the existing prices for the three segments of the market. 
When the free-market price exceeds the procurement price, the farmers will 
be able to secure higher prices for their produce, resulting into: /) increased 
production; ii) reduced absorption in procurement areas; and in) increased 
absorption in non-procurement areas (if price is less than Rs. 42.38 per 
m a u n d ) 3 0 . Factors /) and ii) will increase the potential exportable surplus, and 
factor in) will reduce it. It is likely that the free Basmati rice market will 
29The gross profit for the government is the difference between the procurement price (Rs. 28.00) and the contract export price (Rs. 41.90), that is Rs. 13.90 per maund. 
30The rice acreage and yields will respond to price increases, see [20]. Since Basmati rice is not the staple food of the areas under reference, and the farmers cultivate Basmati as a commercial crop, there is every reason to believe that the marketed surplus will increase with the increase in the price for (he farmers. 
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ensure increased or at least the existing exportable surplus at a price not exceed-
ing Rs. 42.38 per niaund. Currently, the export prices are fixed by the contract 
though the actual sale price can vary somewhat, as the export bonus enables the 
exporter to sell below the contract price within a certain range. In case the con-
tract price is fixed at a level higher than that necessary to export some specific 
quantity, there could be shortfalls in quantity exported. A built-in rigidity of 
export prices causes a national loss of foreign-exchange earnings when the de-
mand for Basmati rice is elastic. 
In order to achieve flexibility in the export prices, private trade with export 
bonus would be more suitable than the present system. However, it is com-
monly argued that with private export trade the quality of Basmati rice will 
deteriorate as a result of the mixing of some low-priced varieties of rice. Such 
an argument holds only when the profit margin for the exporter is very wide, 
as it could be the case when the rice is procured f rom the farmers at low prices 
and is sold at high prices in the international market by the private t r aders A ' . 
The problem arises because of high profit per unit and closed entry which en-
courages some persons to do the business for a short time to make money and not 
to care about their own goodwill. If all the varieties of rice permitted for export 
carry the same export bonus and the domestic as well as the international trade 
is run by private trade (with free entry), then, in the long run, only the genuine 
traders will participate and there will remain no special incentive for mixing 
the low-priced varieties with high-priced ones. 
Whenever there are restrictions to export trade regarding prices/quantity 
or persons, the chances of bad practices increase because of high short-run 
profitability. 
To summarise, some of the benefits of free Basmati market and open private 
export trade are: domestic prices move in line with the international prices, 
higher farm prices and higher production, flexible export prices and lower pro-
fit margin on export which in the long run limits the entry to genuine traders 
who would be interested in improving the quality of the product and the cultiva-
tion of the international market. 
Moreover, with free entry and flexible prices, the profit-maximisation motive 
on the part of the private traders would help to make the best use of the domestic 
resources to earn foreign exchange. 
Since, the level of export bonus influences the profitability of exporting Bas-
mati rice, the quantity exported can be manipulated through the export bonus. 
As a next step, we would like to discuss the economically desirable level of 
exports and the level of export bonus. 
3'Another similar situation could be when the government procures rice at low prices 
and though sells some limited quantities at high prices to a few private traders for export, yet 
allows a percentage of export bonus which makes the business highly profitable. 
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V. RATIONALITY OF INCREASING THE P R O D U C T I O N 
A N D EXPORTS OF FINE RICE 
Iii the light of our discussion in the previous two sections, it seems obvious 
that the question about the economic desirability of increasing the production 
and exports of fine rice to various levels can be answered by a reference to the 
relative costs and benefits involved. 
Starting f rom the world market side, we estimated in Table VI that the price 
for exporting a quantity of 1,75,000 tons is Rs. 26.25 to Rs. 27.98 per maund. 
Supposing the carriage, storage, handling, etc., charges for moving the rice to on 
board ship are Rs. 5.00 per maund and allowing Rs. 1.00 as the profi t to the 
exporter, the price that could be paid to the farmer would be Rs. 20.25 to 
Rs. 21.98. These prices are lower than those the farmers get at present. With-
out a subisdy, such quantities of fine rice cannot be exported. 
At present, rice exports are subsidised through an export bonus of 20 per cent. 
With 20-per-cent export bonus, the exporter should be able to receive Rs. 34.12 
to Rs. 36.37 per maund, and allowing for export expenses and profits, the farmer 
could be paid up to Rs. 28.12 to Rs. 30.37. If the price necessary to create an 
exportable surplus of 1,75,000 tons falls within the range of Rs. 28.12 to 
Rs. 30.37, the rice export needs no more subsidy than its present level. 
However, in order to create an exportable surplus of 1,75,000 tons, the pre-
sent estimated production of fine rice (2,50,000 tons) must increase by roughly 50 
per cent on the assumption that three-fourth of the increase in product ion is 
cxported32. The crucial question is whether the present production level of 
fine rice could be increased by 50 per cent with a price increase of Re. 0.12 
to Rs. 2.37 per maund or through other factors. 
It is currently estimated that during the third-five-year-plan period, the 
water supply in the Nor thern Zone will be increasing by 50 per cent as a result 
of the development of surface and groundwater. Assuming that the water sup-
ply increases by 50 per cent, the fine rice acreage or yields in Region A can be 
supposed to increase proport ionatelyA. A 50-per-cent increase in fine rice 
acreage or yields, due to the increased water supply, will be sufficient to create 
an exportable surplus of 1,75,000 tons without any change in the present price 
paid to the farmers. Therefore, it can be said that the Planning Commission 's 
target of 1,75,000 tons of fine rice exports seems feasible in the light of the as-
sumed supply and demand conditions by 1970. 
320ne-fourth of the production is assumed sufficient to meet seed requirements and farmers' 
consumption. 
33It is believed that adequate and controlled water supply (alone) can raise the average 
rice yields by roughly 50 per cent in Region A. 
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However, for any fine-rice export target substantially higher than the Plan-
ning Commission's target (i.e., 2,50,000 and 60,000 tons) to be feasible f rom the 
supply side, the present price paid to the farmers must increase. If our pro-
jected 'off- take ' of Pakistan fine rice is of the right orders of magnitude, it 
would not be possible for the exporters to pay the farmers even the present 
procurement price. For example, to dispose off 2,50,000 tons of fine rice, the 
international price is estimated to be Rs. 24.52 (Table VI). Allowing Rs. 6.00 
for carriage, handling, and other expenses, and profit , the exporter will be able 
to pay the farmers a maximum price of Rs. 24.08 per maund at 20-per-cent: 
bonus (assuming the premium on bonus vouchers to be 150 per cent). 
On way of enabling the exporters to pay the farmers more than the present 
price could be to raise the export bonus f r o m its present level of 20 per cent. 
A bonus of 30 per cent will enable the exporter to pay the farmers, Rs. 26.85 and 
a bonus of 50 per cent, Rs. 32.41. The ability of the exporter to pay more and 
more to the farmer increases as the export bonus is increased. 
Whether it is desirable to increase the production and export of fine rice 
to a level higher than 1,75,000 tons depends upon the maximum export-bonus 
percentage that could be offered, and this depends upon the shadow price of 
the foreign exchange. At present, the rupee is estimated (crudely) to be over-
valued by from 50 to 55 per cent, and it may be argued that this justifies an export 
bonus of 33.3 to 36.6 per cen t " . But the important thing to know is how much 
the rupee will be overvalued by 1970? So long as the economic cost of creating 
exportable surplus is equal to or falls short of the economic benefits f rom the 
additional foreign-exchange earnings, the increased production and export are 
just if ied. 
We have discussed the planned quantity of 1,75,000 tons. Our discussion 
can be extended to levels higher than that, however. Quantities much larger than 
the above level are bound to be enormously costly in terms of domestic and 
foreign-exchange resources. Therefore, the aim of exporting higher quantities 
seems unjustified at our present level of knowledge. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The information presented in this paper shows that the production of line 
rices could be raised substantially through creating adequate water supply and 
sufficient economic incentives. However, it was noted that the costs of increasing 
the production of fine rices to levels more than two to three times the present 
level will be very high in terms of water, foreign exchange, and other crop 
alternatives. i 
3< See [28, p. It], 
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TABLE A- lb 
AVERAGE RELATIVE HUMIDITY 
Centre 
Average 
(September-
November) 
Range 
(September-
November) 
Remarks 
Suitability for the ripening 
season of Basmati rice 
( per 
Hyderabad 60 53-69 Suitable but more humid 
Sukkur 63 58-71 Not suitable, too humid 
Jacobabad 61 57-70 Not suitable, too humid 
Multan 36 33-40 Not suitable, dry 
Khushab 32 30-36 Not suitable, dry 
Dera Ismail Khan 65 61-69 Not suitable, too humid 
Lahore 42 37-47 Suitable 
Lyallpur 37 35-43 Not suitable, little dry 
Montgomery 64 60-69 Not suitable, (oo humid 
Source: [2, Table 6J. 



TABLE A-4 
ACTUAL AND THE MAXIMUM POTENTIAL ACREAGE UNDER FINE RICES* 
Region 
! 
Rice acreage (Average: 1961/62— 1963/64) Proportion of fine rice 
i ( 
i Estimated | potential j proportion I of fine rice j 
j 
Potential acreage 
Cel. (2) x Col. (5) 
Approxi-mate yield per acre 
j 
j 
i 
i 
Potential production 
] 
Total potential production with an allowance for other 
j AHkhds Fine varieties 
! t i 
areas 
(1) ; (2) (3) (4) (5) (fi) (7) ! (8) I (9) 
( .fifi acres. ( ner cent. (00 acres) 
7995 
(mawids) 
11 
( nn tnrv;. . 
Region A 8884 4531 51 90 3233 3556 
Region B 8821 441 5 70 6175 5.5 1248 1248 
Total: 17705 4972 28 80 14170 _ 4481 4804 
*The maximum potential acreage is estimated on the assumption that a shift from medium and coarse rice will be feasible to the extent as to make the proportions of fine rices in the total acreage equal to those shown in Column (5). 
Source: Acreage data are from the bulletins issued by the Department of Marketing Intelligence and Agri-cultural Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agricul-ture, Rawalpindi. 
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Appendix B 
TABLE B-l 
WORLD RICE ACREAGE AND PRODUCTION 
(Average: 1960-62) 
Region/Continent Acreage Production 000 acres Percentage 000 metric tons | Percentage 
World total 292,732 100.00 236,367 100,00 
Far East 193,257 66.01 134,150 56.75 
China (Mainland) 77,594 26.51 84,300 35.66 
Latin America 10,914 3.72 7,953 3.36 
Africa 6,358 2.17 2,960 1.25 
Near East 2,256 0.77 2,567 1.09 
North and Central America 1,137 0.39 2,457 1.04 
Europe 865 0.30 1,580 0.67 
USSR 247 0.08 230 0.10 
Oceania 74 0.02 153 0.07 
Source: [10], 
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Appendix C 
TABLE C-l 
PRICES OF FINE AND COARSE RICE (AVERAGE FOR HARVEST 
SEASON: NOVEMBER-FEBRUARY) 
(1953/54 to 1963/64) 
FINE RICE COARSE RICE 
Year 
(1) 
(Procurement 
areas) 
average of 
Sheikhupura 
and Gujranwala 
districts 
(2) 
(Non-
procurement 
areas) average 
for West 
Pakistan 
excluding 
Col. (2) 
(3) 
(Procurement 
areas) 
average for 
Sheikhupura 
and Gujranwala 
districts 
(4) 
(Non-
procurement 
areas) average 
for West 
Pakistan 
excluding 
Col. (4) 
(5) 
1953/54 22.31 26.60 16.25 16.28 
1954/55 24.20 24.94 16.70 11.61 
1955/56 24.35 26.30 13.41 13.14 
1956/57 — 27.07 — 16.16 
1957/58 26.56 29.81 19.92 18.77 
1958/59 25.75 26.63 14.31 16.86 
1959/60 25.50 32.24 17.34 20.01 
1960/61 24.16 44.79 16.00 21.43 
1961/62 24.94 42.82 16.00 20.22 
1962/63 25.95 43.39 16.00 18.44 
1963/64 28.00 42.38 16.00 21.18 
Source: [271. 
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A study of interregional trade in Pakistan affords an interesting case study 
of the working of an economic union as well as of the development of trade 
relations between a relatively more and a relatively less developed region. The 
central purpose of this paper is to construct a number of basic statistical series 
bearing on interregional trade in Pakistan and to attempt statistical tests, 
insofar as it is feasible on the basis of available data, of a number of hypotheses 
relating to the pattern of interwing trade as well as to movements in the terms of 
trade of East and West Pakistan vis-a-vis the outside world and between each 
other. 
VOLUME AND PATTERN OF INTERWING TRADE 
The movements of goods between East and West Pakistan prior to 1947/48, 
i.e., prior to the establishment of Pakistan when both were parts of a bigger 
economic union, are not recorded. However, f rom what is known about the 
state of their economic development during that period as well as the nature of 
products produced within each, it seems a legitimate inference that the flow 
of trade between them was very meagre. Since 1948, there has been a consider-
able increase in the absolute volume of interwing trade. Moreover, there has 
been an increase in the relative importance of interwing trade vis-a-vis foreign 
trade. The ratio of interwing trade to the total of interwing and foreign trade 
increased f r o m 6.2 per cent in 1948/49 to 17.8 per cent in 1959/60. The average 
ratio during the years 1955-60 was 11.2 per cent [9, December 1960, Pp. 1137 and 
1674], The increase in interwing trade combined the effects of both "trade 
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creation" and "trade diversion". There was very little or no trade creation 
in the sense of new trade created as a result of a redirection of the pre-existing 
pattern of economic activities or a reallocation of productive resources away 
f rom existing employment in each wing, as dictated by their respective com-
parative advantages. Both wings were very poor in terms of industrial develop-
ment and were each producing mainly agricultural commodities based on their 
peculiar climatic conditions and characteristics of soil. The development of 
interwing trade relations did not involve either wing in restricting or abandoning 
any of its pre-existing lines of production and substituting imports f rom the 
other wing. However, with the growth of population and income in both 
wings, there was additional demand created for each other's goods and con-
sequently the development of a new interregional trade depending upon 
a) the relative income elasticities of demand of each for the goods of the 
other and b) the degree of restrictions on imports f rom abroad as a source of 
supply. 
The volume and pattern of interwing trade represent, therefore, the com-
bined effects of a) a progressive substitution of imports f rom abroad by means of 
quantitative restrictions and tariffs, b) the pattern of economic development and 
industrialization of both wings, and c) their lelative rates of growth of income and 
population. While total imports f rom abroad have increased, especially in the 
field of raw materials and investment goods, domestic production in the field of 
consumer goods has partially, or in some cases completely, substituted for 
imports f rom abroad. The combined markets of the two wings were large 
enough for the establishment of new industries on the basis of import replace-
ment. In such industries as paper, newsprint, cement, chemicals, metal products 
and engineering, economies of scale are important and a large size of the market 
is a necessary condition for an efficient production. The evolution of the pattern 
of interwing trade, especially in manufactured goods, has been governed by 
the choice of location of new economic activities as between the two wings. 
Ideally, within an economic union or a free-trade area, regional specialization 
should follow the lines of comparative advantage. As between areas at different 
stages of economic development, it is the dynamic rather than the static concept 
of comparative advantage that is important. The application of the static 
concept of comparative advantage places East Pakistan, in a number of fields, at 
a disadvantage in terms of current costs because the basic social and economic 
overhead facilities such as roads, transportation and communications, supply of 
power and skill, etc., are yet undeveloped so that the present cost ratios of 
various industries in East Pakistan do not reflect their long-run relative efficiency 
vis-a-vis similar industries in West Pakistan. This initial disadvantage tends 
to have cumulative effects. New industries in the private sector have tended 
to concentrate in West Pakistan with all its advantages and also with its 
nearness to the seat of government which administer the commercial and 
industrial licensing of imports as well as the control of capital issues. 
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The pattern of economic development of the two wings in the last few years 
reveals a number of characteristics relevant to the composition of interwing 
trade. East Pakistan is relatively less industrialized than West Pakis tan . As 
late as 1957, East Pakistan 's share in large-scale manufactur ing industry, as 
revealed in the Census of Manufac tur ing Industries, was very low. She had 18 
per cent of the total number of establishments covered in the census in 1957, 
and shared about 30 per cent of their average daily employment and 26 per cent 
of their gross value of products , respectively [4], The differences in the pattern of 
industrialization in the two wings govern the nature of manufactured goods 
traded between them and are shown in Table I [4]. 
TABLE I 
DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDUSTRIES BETWEEN TWO WINGS 
Industry 
% of total 
establish-
ments in East 
Pakistan 
% of total 
gross output 
originating 
in East Pakistan 
Basic-metal industries 4 2 
Electrical machinery 6 2 
Other machinery 8 5 
Footwear, etc. 7 4 
Non-metallic minerals 15 13 
Rubber products 12 15 
Metal products 15 21 
Transport equipment 16 not available 
Tobacco 18 not available 
Textile 11 24 
Chemicals and chemical products 20 26 
Printing and publishing 34 19 
Beverages 29 20 
Food 40 23 
Leather and leather products 43 37 
Wood and cork 41 51 
Paper and paper products 50 84 
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Except in food, beverages, wood, printing, paper, and leather industries, 
an overwhelming proport ion of the output of many ma jo r branches of industry 
originates in West Pakistan with the result that with increases in the scale of 
production many such products tend to replace imports f r o m abroad and are 
exported to the East Wing. The location of a number of industries is raw 
material-oriented, such as cotton textiles and certain metal products in West 
Pakistan and paper products and ju te goods in East Pakistan. However, 
because of long distances, high costs of transport and handling of finished 
products in interwing trade, the local market is large enough to allow the pro-
duction of certain products on the basis of raw material imported f rom the 
TABLE II 
R E L A T I V E I M P O R T A N C E O F I M P O R T E D R A W M A T E R I A L S 
% ratio of 
Improted imported 
raw raw mate-
materials rials to 
total 
( in million rupees. ) 
Food and beverages 632.8 25.5 4.0 
Tobacco/cigarettes 83.0 7.2 8.7 
Textiles 729.0 89.5 12.3 
Footwear and apparel 42.0 negligible — 
Leather and leather products 35.5 6.5 18.3 
Rubber products 8.5 7.2 8.5 
Pulp, paper and paper products 30.4 8.6 28.3 
Printing and publishing 28.5 8.0 28.1 
Chemicals and petro-chemicals 88.8 54.8 61.7 
Non-metallic minerals 31.2 4.8 15.4 
Basic metals 64.5 45.0 69.8 
Metal goods 57.0 43.0 75.4 
Machinery 28.5 16.0 56.1 
Electric machinery, etc. 29.5 19.0 64.4 
Transport equipment 36.0 31.0 86.1 
Miscellaneous industries 1,142.5 9.0 0.8 
Total raw Industry group materials 
Source: [8], 
Islam: Interwing Trade in Pakistan 323 
other wing at a cost which does not compare unfavourably with the import price 
f r o m the other wing, as in the case of cotton textiles in East Pakistan. There 
are many industries which are heavily dependent on raw materials imported 
f rom abroad so that nearness to the source of raw material does not weigh as an 
important factor in their location. Nevertheless, built-in advantages emanat-
ing f rom a greater state of development in West Pakistan tend to attract them 
there. The relative importance of imported raw materials in some important 
industries is shown in Table II . 
As is evident f rom above, many industries such as chemicals, petro-chemicals, 
basic metals, metal goods, machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment, 
etc., are heavily dependent upon imported raw materials; and f r o m the point of 
view of efficient and economical production, their location in either wing is 
dictated by the availability of overhead facilities and by import and licensing 
TABLE III 
TOTAL VALUE OF IMPORTS: ANNUAL AVERAGES 
West East 
Imports from Overseas* (... .in million rupees....) 
1948/49 \ 
1951/52 J 1,182 471 
1952/53 \ 
1954/55 / 875 327 
1955/56 \ 1959/60 / 1 , 3 2 5 5 5 3 
Interwing Trade*" Imports of Imports of 
West East 
1948/49 \ 49 225 1951/52 f ^ 
1952/53 \ 3 0 3 
1954/55 / 
1 9 5 5 / 5 6 \ 2 7 7 5 6 3 
1 9 5 9 / 6 0 / 2 7 7 5 6 3 
*[9,December 1960], The period upto 1951/52, when Open General Licence (O.G.L.) was 
suspended, may be considered a period of liberal imports from abroad and is taken as the 
base period for comparison with subsequent developments. The five years, 1955-60, are the 
years of the First Five Year Plan and, hence, may be considered another benchmark for 
comparison. (See Appendix Tables A-t and A-2 for more detailed data). 
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policy of the government. Insofar as interwing trade in agricultural commo-
dities is concerned, it is based upon distinctive climatic and physical or natural 
characteristics or endowments of both the regions leading to a specialization of 
West Pakistan in cotton, wool, and wheat and of East Pakistan in jute, tea, 
and rice. 
The relative growth of the total value of imports of East and West Pakistan 
f r o m overseas and f r o m each other is shown below. However, f r o m year to 
year, imports f r o m abroad have been subject to varying and fluctuating quantita-
tive restrictions depending upon the level of export earnings, foreign-exchange 
reserves and availability of foreign aid and loans. 
The imports f r o m abroad of Eas fPak i s tan are substantially less than those 
of West Pakistan and the absolute difference between them has increased over 
time. The rate of increase of West Pakistan's imports f r o m East Pakistan has 
been higher than that of the imports of East f rom West ' , but the absolute value 
of East Pakistan's exports to West was very small in the initial stages. However, 
average imports of East f r o m West during the first-live-year-plan period were 
85 per cent greater than in the period between the suspension of OGL and the 
beginning of the plan while the increase was only 70 per cent in the case of West 
Pakistan's imports f rom East. Moreover, the absolute deficit of East's inter-
wing trade has considerably increased over time. 
It is difficult f r o m available data to separate the effects on interwing trade 
of trade diversion f r o m those of the growth of income and population. An 
attempt is made, however, to obtain a measure of the extent of trade diversion 
on the basis of a) changes in the percentage of total imports of each wing coming 
f rom the other and b) changes in the percentage of total exports of each wing 
going to the other. More specifically, one can also consider the changes in the 
share of imports of particular commodities originating in the other wing, as 
well as new commodities, formerly imported f rom abroad, which are now 
imported f rom the other wing. Generally speaking, the importance of West 
Pakistan as a source of imports for East is not only significant but also has grown 
over time. The percentage of total imports of East which is derived f rom 
West has grown f r o m 34.2 per cent (average of the years 1948/49 to 1952/53) to 
47.6 per cent (average of the years 1955/56 to 1959/60) whereas the comparable 
percentage in the case of West has gone up f rom 5.8 per cent to 17.7 per cent in 
the same period. The percentage of total exports of West Pakistan going to 
East has increased f r o m 21.8 per cent during 1948/49 to 1952/53 to 47.9 per cent 
during 1955/56 to 1959/60, whereas the precentage of total exports of East going 
to West has increased f rom 8.2 per cent to 22 per cent in the same period, 
(see Appendix Tables A-l and A - 2 ) . It is clear that East Pakistan as a market has 
i 
iln the interest of brevity and avoiding repetition, the author has used the words East 
and West for East Pakistan and West Pakistan, respectively. 
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been consistently and considerably more important for West Pakistan than 
West as a market for East. Thus, the diversion of the source of E a s f s imports 
f rom overseas to West Pa ki sUfT has been o fpar t i cu la r importance. 
An attempt is made to examine how the substitution of imports into East 
Pakistan f rom overseas by imports f r o m West Pakistan has worked in the case 
of specific commodities. A study of East Pakistan's imports f r o m West Pakistan 
and abroad of specific item or items which are very similar or are close substitutes 
reveals that in the case of a number of commodities there has been an absolute 
decline in imports f rom abroad accompanied by a large compensating increase 
in imports f r o m West Pakistan during the period between 1948/49 and 1959 
(Appendix Table A-3). The examples of such commodities are boots and shoes, 
leather, metals and ores (of certain types), rape and mustard seed oil, provisions 
and oilman's stores, spices, salt, seeds (rape, mustard and other nonessential), 
soap, sugar (including molasses), cotton twist and yarn, cotton piecegoods, and 
manufactured tobacco. In the case of a number of other commodities such as 
drugs and chemicals, gums and resins, nonessential and non-vegetable oils, 
other textiles, cement, etc., imports f rom both sources have gone up, while those 
f rom West have gone up faster. Of course, in the case of capital goods and 
semi-finished raw materials, the increase in imports f rom abroad considerably 
exceeded that f r o m West. 
An examination of the trends of a few East Pakistani export commodities 
which are important in interwing trade such as tea, tobacco, seeds, spices, drugs 
and medicines, etc., also shows that the proportion of total exports going to 
West has increased (Appendix Table A-4). In addition to the changes in the 
destination of exports and imports, a number of new commodities have been 
introduced in interwing trade. In most cases, these commodities were either 
wholly exported to or imported f rom abroad. To illustrate, the proport ion of 
new commodities (i.e., not exported in 1948/49) in East Pakistan's exports to 
West Pakistan constituted 15 per cent of total exports to West in 1955/56 and 
19.4 per cent in 1959/60. Similarly, the proportion of new commodities in the 
imports of East f rom West was 9.2 per cent of total in 1955/56 and increased to 
13.5 per cent in 1959/60 (Appendix Tables A-5 and A-6). 
The considerable extent of diversion of imports f rom overseas to regional 
sources resulted f rom restrictions on imports f rom abroad. This can be 
illustrated with reference to the case of imports of East Pakistan f rom West 
Pakistan. Let U represent the ratio of East's imports f rom West to East 's 
imports f r o m abroad, and let Z represent the overseas imports of the whole of 
Pakistan. Since both the variables reveal trends over time and are serially auto-
correlated, a first-difference t ransformat ion is used in the regression analysis. 
Accordingly, the following equation has been estimated2; 
The June-July figures (instead of calendar year) for the years 1948/49 and 1959/60 
have been used. 
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A U = 63.16 0.61 A Z 
(0.19) 
R = —0.73 
The relationship postulated in the above equation is statistically very 
significant. The composition of East's imports f rom West also lends support to 
this hypothesis. Industrial imports constituted 50.3 per cent of the value of 
total imports of East f r o m West as early as 1950/51 and the relative importance 
of industrial goods has recorded an increase reaching 62 per cent in 1953/54 
and around 60 per cent in 1959/60. The substitution for foreign imports has 
taken place mainly in the field of manufactured consumer goods. 
I N T E R W I N G T E R M S O F T R A D E 
The analysis of gains f rom interregional trade has two important aspects. 
First, there is the effect of the diversion of trade f r o m overseas to the other wing 
in terms of the cost and price of interregional imports, i.e., the extent to which 
impoits f r o m the other wing are higher priced than similar imports f rom over-
seas. Secondly, given the development of trade between the two wings, there 
is the movement over time of export and import prices in interwing trade. As 
for the first problem, it is widely recognized that in many areas of import replace-
ment domestic product ion has involved higher cost of production and price. 
It is not only the effect of tariff rates in diverting imports f rom low-cost foreign 
sources of supply to higher-cost domestic source located in the other wing, but 
also the comparison of the prices of imports f rom the other wing with the prices 
of similar imports f rom abroad, inclusive of high tariff rates which are relevant. 
In many cases, it is the existence of stringent quantitative restrictions which 
makes imports f rom other wing worthwhile since domestic prices of overseas 
imports under the ' 'quota" restrictions are higher than "landed costs plus 
tar iffs" . No attempt has been made here to make any comparison of cost and 
price of interregional imports with foreign imports at a static level. On the 
other hand, the problem under study in this paper concerns itself with the extent 
and nature of the movements in import and export prices of either wing in 
international as well as in interwing trade, given the initial price structure of 
interregional as well as foreign imports and exports. It is to be noted that 
while the movements of export and import prices in interwing trade have taken 
place in an environment of common monetary and fiscal policies and in the 
absence of exchange and trade restrictions, some of the characteristics of inter-
national trade are also present such as great distance, inadequate and slow 
transport and communications, and high costs of movement as well as immo-
bility of factors, especially of labour, between the wings. Moreover, the different 
stages of economic development of the two wings provide scope for a case study 
of the movements of terms of trade between a more and a less developed region, 
as well as of the terms of trade of each with the outside world. In addition, the 
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movements of relative prices of groups of commodities such as agricultural and 
industrial commodities are examined. East Pakistan, West Pakistan, and trad-
ing partners of both in the outside world may be arranged in an ascending order 
of levels of income or stages of development. The movements of interwing 
commodity terms of trade have important implications for real income in both 
wings. The income terms of trade reveal how the purchasing power of exports 
of each wing iii terms of imports f r o m the other has changed. Under these 
conditions, the usual presumptions or hypotheses about terms of trade may be 
stated as follows: 
1) The terms of trade of both East and West Pakistan with the outside world 
should tend to deteriorate and the terms of trade of East should tend to deter-
iorate more than those of West; 2) the terms of trade of East with West should 
tend to deteriorate over time. It has also often been suggested that the terms of 
trade of agricultural commodities vis-a-vis industrial commodities tend to move 
against the former. In the following pages, available data are examined or 
analysed in order to test the above hypotheses. 
In the first place, a large number of indices relating to the export and import 
prices of each wing in interregional trade as well as in foreign trade are cons-
tructed. In addition, an attempt is made to explain such movements. As is 
evident f r o m below, two sets of terms of trade, one with base in 1950/51 and 
another with base in 1953/54, were estimated. A number of new commodities 
such as gunny bag, hessian or gunny cloth, and paper and pasteboard, etc., 
were introduced in the export trade of East Pakistan only since 1953/54. Simi-
larly, in the same year began the import of cement f r o m West Pakistan. For 
comparison with subsequent years, an index with 1953/54 as a base seems 
more representative. The commodities included in this index constituted 80 per 
cent of total imports and 90 per cent of total exports in 1953/54. Similarly, the 
index based on 1950/51 represented 78 per cent of total imports and 99 per cent 
of total of the year 1950/51. 
The movements in the terms of trade of East with West Pakistan are shown 
in Table IV. 
The change in weights f r o m base-year to end-year in both the sets of indices 
is intended to examine the effects of changes in the relative importance of different 
commodities on the terms of trade. As is evident f rom the moving averages, 
the first set of terms of trade (with 1950/51 as base i.e., Columns (A) and (B)) 
moved in favour of East Pakistan until 1956/57 and then went down. A linear 
trend fitted to the series A shows the following results: A = 99.9+7.19t, indica-
(3.66) 
ting a favourable trend. However, the second set of terms of trade (with 1953/54 
as base) moved against East Pakistan (Columns (E) and (F)). The linear trend of 
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E is given by E = 126—2.82t (4.21). The statistical reliability of this trend is 
doubtful , especially in view of the shortness of the series. The change in weights 
does not alter the above conclusions but corroborates the trends revealed in the 
indices based upon base-year weights. 
The separate movements in export and import prices of East Pakistan which 
lie behind the movements in terms of trade are given in Table V3. 
TABLE IV 
INTERWING TERMS OF TRADE 
Year (A) .(B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
1950/51 100 100 
1951/52 100 100 88 94 
1952/53 99 105 93 99 
1953/54 115 128 116 116 100 100 
1954/55 171 157 138 135 129 121 115 III 
1955/56 186 185 151 165 134 135 117 129 
1956/57 199 175 206 159 142 126 154 122 
1957/58 139 152 120 142 102 109 96 112 
1958/59 119 141 101 122 83 100 85 97 
1959/60 166 146 115 110 
Notes: 
(A) —terms of trade with quantity weights of the year 1950/51, which is the base-year. 
(B) —three-year moving averages of (A). 
(C)=terms of trade with same commodities as (A) but with weights based on the quantities 
of the year 1959/60. 
(D)- three-year moving averages of (C). 
(E) —terms of trade with base-year 1953/54 and with quantities of 1953/54 as weights; the 
quantities of (E) include a number of new commodities introduced in interwing 
trade only since 1953/54. 
(F)=three-year moving averages of (E). 
(G)=terms of trade including same commodities as (E) but weights are the quantities 
of the year 1959/60. 
(H)=three-year moving averages of (G), 
3The weights are ail base-year quantities. 
(A) and (C)=the export-price indices with two different base years and their respective 
commodities 
(E) and ( G ) = t h e import-price indices with two different base years and their respective 
commodities 
(B) = m o v i n g averages of (A) 
(D) = m o v i n g averages of (C) 
(F) = m o v i n g averages of (E) 
(H) = moving averages of (G). 
The figures in the brackets below the coefficients in various equations are standard errors 
of estimate. 
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Year 
Export price Import price 
(A) (B) ( Q <D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
1950/5 J 100 100 
1951/52 91 93 91 93 
1952/53 88 98 89 94 
1953/54 116 119 100 101 94 100 
1954/55 152 142 119 112 89 92 92 93 
1955/56 158 (71 118 129 85 92 88 95 
1956/57 203 177 149 131 102 103 105 106 
1957/58 169 172 126 130 122 115 124 122 
1958/59 145 130 115 127 121 116 137 127 
1959/60 176 139 106 121 
As is evident from the moving averages of import-price index (with 1950/51 as 
base) it remained more or less stationary except in the last few years while the 
export-price index was recording a continuous rise until 1956/57. The fall in 
export price in the last few years was more severe than the rise in import price 
and was mainly responsible for Hie deterioration In terms of trade ia the latter 
years. However, over the period as a whole, there are positive linear upward 
trends in both (A) and (E) series given respectively by the equations A = 82.30 -f 
10.45t and (E) — 86.4 + 2.58t, A higher trend in export-price index than in 
(2.70) (1.67) 
import-price index explains the upward trend in the terms of trade for the whole 
period. The deterioration ia the second set of terms of trade is mainly due 
to a steeper rise of import price. Though both export and import-price indices 
show upward trend as revealed by the equations (C) — 107 + 4.18t and 
(2.80) 
(G) 82,6 -f 6.75t, a greater rise in import price caused a decline in terms of (2.23) 
trade. If the first set of indices is converted to a new index with 100 in 1953/54, 
the same conclusion emerges as from the second set. In other words, in the 
last two or three years of the period, whichever set is used to indicate the price 
movements, there has been an adverse movement in the terms of trade. The 
second set being a shorter series, the impact of decline in the last few years 
affects the trend in the whole series whereas in the first longer set the rise in 
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terras of trade in the earlier years is sufficiently high to more than offset the 
decline in the later years. 
Insofar as the volume of trade is concerned, there was an increase in the 
quantum index of both expoxts and imports of East Pakistan, even though the 
terms of trade in t he latter years moved against East Pakistan, Ail the indices 
reveal clear upward trends. This is shown in Table VI. 
The income terms of trade of East Pakistan, which is the index of pur-
chasing power of exports or of capacity to import, shows an improvement owing 
both to an increase in quantity of exports as well as an improvement in the 
terms of trade except in the last three years. In the last three years, the fall in 
commodity terms of trade (with 1950/51 as base) has been more thaa offset by 
TABLE VI 
VOLUME INDEX OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF EAST PAKISTAN 
Year (A) (B) (C) (*>) (E) <F> (G) (H) 
1950/51 100 100 
1951/52 92 114 91 97 
1952/53 151 132 89 97 
1953/54 154 129 100 101 93 100 
1954/55 182 184 126 124 89 92 90 100 
1955/56 217 188 145 135 85 92 109 120 
1956/57 165 228 135 153 102 103 160 162 
1957/58 30! 270 179 172 122 115 217 184 
1958/59 346 310 202 180 121 116 174 176 
1959/60 284 161 106 136 
Notes'. 
(A)=quantity index of exports with base 1950/51 
(B)=three-year moving averages of (A) 
(C)=quantity index of exports with base 1953/54 
(D)=three-year moving averages of (C) 
(E)=quantity index of imports with base 1950/51 
(F)<= three-year moving averages of (E) 
(G)=quantity index of imports with base 1953/54 
(H)=three-year moving averages of (G) 
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the increase in the quantity of exports with the result that income terms of 
trade {i.e., quantity of exports x terms of trade) have improved. However, the 
second index of the income terms of trade (with 1953/54 as base) shows a weaker 
upward trend because the rise in the quantity of exports is partly offset by the 
fall in the commodity terms of trade, This is given in Table VII, 
TABLE VII 
INCOME TERMS OF TRADE OF EAST PAKISTAN 
Year (A) | (B) ( Q fl>) 
1950/51 100 
1951/52 92 114 
1952/53 149 139 
1953/54 117 212 100 
1954/55 311 297 163 152 
1955/56 403 347 194 183 
1956/57 328 383 192 190 
1957/58 418 386 183 181 
1958/59 412 433 168 179 
1959/60 471 185 
Notes: 
(A)= in come terms of trade with 1950/51 as base 
(B)=moving averages of (A) 
(C)—income terms of trade with 1953/54 as base 
(D)--moving averages of (C) 
The linear trend in (A) and (C) is as follows: 
(A)--38.6+45.0t (5.3) 
( C ) = l 33.00+9.07t (5.4) 
The movements of export and import prices and of the terms of trade are 
expected to be governed by the reciprocal supply and demand of both the wings 
for the traded commodities. The facts analysed above reveal that it is not always 
that an underdeveloped region suffers from a deterioration in its terms of trade 
with a more developed region nor does its export price show any consistent 
downward trend. The variations in export and import prices depend upon 
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supply and demand of the specific commodities in both the wings. An attempt 
was made to explain the movements of export and import prices in terms of 
supply and demand in both the regions. However, paucity of data has been a 
serious limitation. An index of production of the items exported to the other 
wing is expected to indicate the amount of export supply taking into account 
the extent of absorption within each wing. However, an index of production of 
only a few of the items entering into interwing trade can be constructed f r o m 
available data. The indices of production of exportable items as well as some 
indirect indices of income or growth of demand in both the wings are shown in 
Table VIK«: 
TABLE VIII 
(S B) (YE) (Siv) (Yiv) 
1951/52 100 100 100 100 
1952/53 108 105 120 103 
1953/54 116 120 145 112 
1954/55 118 111 177 123 
1955/56 130 98 205 126 
1956/57 112 127 221 133 
1957/58 108 122 238 143 
1958/59 102 110 250 147 
1959/60 106 131 258 154 
Sj; is the index of production in East Pakistan and consists only of such items 
as tea, rape and mustard seed, tobacco, masur, matches, indigenous cloth, 
hessian cloth and gunny bags. Sjp, indicating the index of production in West 
Pakistan, consists of medium, fine, and coarse cloth, cement, cigarettes, kerosene 
oil, cotton, wheat, rice, gram, tobacco, and rape and mustard seed. These com-
modities are fairly representative of the commodities entering into trade but do 
not include all of the latter. Only to the extent that changes in the p roduc t ion 
of these commodities are highly correlated with the changes in the excluded 
commodities can these indices represent the variations in the domestic supply 
in each wing of exportable commodities. Moreover, these indices do not reveal 
4 Production indices are based on the data given in [3 ; 7] as well as some unpublished 
price data from C.S.O. The indices of growth demand or income are obtained from [2]. 
The production indices are combined indices of agricultural and industrial commodities in 
West and East Pakistan, weights being the ratio of the value of agricultural to industrial 
goods in the exports of East Wing to the other. Ideally, the quantity of each individual 
item should have been weighted by its relative importance in interwing trade. 
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anything about the changes in costs of production of the exportable items which 
influence the terms of trade. The indices of income or growth of demand used 
in Table VIII (YE and YR/) are different f r o m national income data since the 
latter include income f rom the government, service, and trade sectors. How-
ever, regional income data for East and West Pakistan separately are not 
published. The quantity indices used here represent the absorption of a large 
number of commodities, i.e., both consumption and investment goods. There-
fore, they represent a large part of regional expenditure which takes place in East 
and West Pakistan separately and reveal the combined effects of growth of 
population and income on expenditure and demand. They may, therefore, 
be taken to act as indicators, not so much of absolute magnitude of regional 
demand as of changes over time in the relative magnitudes of regional demand. 
However, reciprocal demand for each other's goods is not only a funct ion of a 
growth of income but also of a diversion of demand f r o m extraregional to intra-
regional sources. It is difficult to quantify the extent of diversion of demand by 
means of a single variable. Attempts have been made to obtain an indirect 
measure of the diversion by means of such variables as the ratio of the quantity 
index of imports f rom West Pakistan to the quantity index of imports f r o m over-
seas or the ratio of the quantity index of imports f rom overseas to the index of 
regional demand or expenditure. The higher is the former ratio or lower is the 
latter ratio, it is plausible that the greater will be the extent of diversion of trade. 
This factor, i.e., diversion of import demand f rom foreign to regional sources, 
is more important in the case of East Pakistan. 
A number of equations involving various combinations of these variables, 
such as income or expenditure in each region, supply of exportable items and 
some indirect measure of the diversion of trade, etc., were fitted to the avail-
able data in an attempt to quant i fy the magnitude of these diverse influences 
in the determination of the export, and import prices and hence of terms of trade 
of East Pakistan in intervving trade. A preliminary examination of data reveals 
that the index of regional demand or expenditure as well as the supply of ex-
portable items has shown a greater increase in West than in East Pakistan. 
Given a relatively slow increase in supply of East Pakistani exports and a large 
increase in demand in West Pakistan, export price of East Pakistan is expected 
to show a relatively more favourable trend than the import price of East f rom 
West. However, the prices of imports of East f r o m West in the latter years 
have been subjected to the influences of other factors such as the diversion of 
West Pakistani exports to foreign markets under the inducement of export bonus 
scheme creating a scarcity of commodities exported to East and, thus, raising 
the import price of East. Even though there has been a relatively slow growth 
of income and expenditure in East Pakistan, it has been more than adequately 
reinforced by an increasing diversion of demand f rom abroad to West Pakistan 
which has added to the upward pressure on import prices of East Pakistan. 
Again, the export-price index of East Pakistan, heavily influenced as it is by the 
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export price of tea, and in later years by the prices of paper and ju te products, 
has been affected by a varying export quota on tea which affects the internal 
price of tea and, hence, export price to West Pakistan as well as by export bonus 
scheme which affects the price of ju te manufactures . Moreover, the movements 
of the prices in interwing trade cannot be isolated f r o m the movements of prices 
of imports f r o m abroad . This is true of both agricultural and industrial prices 
since imported commodities, including imports under foreign-aid programmes, 
consist of all kinds of goods. Larger imports of a particular kind f rom abroad 
augment domestic supply and, thus, exercise a downward pressure on domestic 
prices. Again, the prices of some of these commodities have been subjected to 
varying degrees of government control and, hence, have not been very responsive 
to changes in supply and demand. Many of these influences cannot be quanti-
fied and, hence, have not been taken into account in the equations which have 
been estimated. 
No attempt has been made to estimate the coefficients of an elaborate and 
large model consisting of a number of simultaneous equations. Instead, 
experiments are carried out to estimate directly the influences of a number of 
easily quantifiable price-determining factors in order to explain or assess 
historically the relative magnitude of price-determining factors in interwing 
trade. A number of equations explaining the price of imports into East Pakistan 
have been fitted to the available data and the results are shown below. No 
satisfactory results are obtained by an equation which seeks to explain price of 
imports on the basis of total expenditure in East Pakistan and supply in West 
Pakistan. The better equations estimated by least-squares method seem to be 
the following: 
A I V - 1.29+.03 A R b + -32 A A 
(.03) (.09) Sw 
R = . 8 9 
where all the variables, i.e., P,„ (price of imports of East f r o m West), (supply 
of such commodities in West Pakistan), Q,„ (quantity of imports of East f rom 
West Pakistan), Mg (quantity of imports of East f r o m overseas), R , ( ra t io of the 
value of imports f r o m West Pakistan to imports f rom overseas) are expressed in 
the form of index number. and R„ are used to quantify the extent of trade M e 
diversion, i.e., diversion of import demand f rom overseas to West Pakistan. 
The following alternative equations do not improve the results. 
A P m = 29.42 + .05 A — .62 A Sw ( 2 ) 
(.03) (.67) ( 2 ) 
R = .61 
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and A P , „ = 5.31 + .07 a R , - .25 A S , (3) 
(.04) (.65) 
R = .55 
The correlation coefficients of the last two equations are not significant even at 
20-per-cent probability level while the first equation is significant at 5-per-cent 
level. 
In the case of East Pakistan, the extent of trade diversion is likely to be a 
more important indicator of demand for imports f r o m West Pakistan, especially 
since the introduction of the variable indicating income or expenditure does not 
yied any plausible results. The first-difference t ransformation of the variables 
tends to produce better results than the untransformed variables in terms of the 
expected sign and significance of the coefficients. As it appears f rom Equations 
(2) and (3), an increase in supply in West Pakistan is inversely related to the price 
of imports of East Pakistan while an increased diversion of import demand to 
West, increasing the demand for the products of the latter, puts an upward 
pressure on the prices. The magnitude of the influence of the latter factor on 
price does not appear to be appreciable whereas that of variation in supply on 
price is of a greater magnitude. However, neither of the coefficients are statis-
tically very significant. The first equation seems to give a best fit to the data in 
view of a very high multiple correlation coefficient. The variable Q„/S(v 
represents the ratio of the quantity of imports to the total production of impor-
ted goods. This variable may be assumed to represent relative importance of 
exports of West Pakistan (i.e., imports of East Pakistan) in the total domestic 
production and availability of such items in West Pakistan. Changes in this 
variable will depend upon the relative changes in domestic production and in 
exports to East Pakistan. The greater is the ratio the greater is the pressure on 
domestic supply exerted in West Pakistan and the greater will be upward pressure 
on price. This will happen if domestic supply increases at a lower rate than 
export or if domestic supply falls while export remains the same or falls or 
increases at even a slower rate. The coefficient of this variable is very reliable 
in view of its very low standard error compared with the magnitude of the 
coefficient. 
It has been found more difficult to explain the behaviour of export price of 
East Pakistan by means of the type of equations which have been used to explain 
import price. The price-determining equation, i.e., P„ = Aj + AYw + foSs 
does not give good results. The coefficients estimated by least-squares 
method are 5 : 
5P« = change in price of exports. 
change in aggregate income or expenditure in West Pakistan, 
SB = index of supply of traded commodities in East Pakistan. 
Qx = change in quantity of exports. 
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A P K = - 7 .95+2.9 A Y F F - .0006 ASg 
(4.5) (1.45) 
R = . 2 8 
Q . The substitution of M^ f in place of Yw does not improve the results where Q* 
is the quantity index of exports of East, i.e., imports of West, and Mjy is the 
quantity index of imports of West Pakistan f rom overseas. 
A Px = 15.4 - .099 A + .05 S . 
(.037) M » ' (.96) 
R = .77 
The coefficients are neither reliable nor plausible. The correlation coefficient 
of the first equation is not significant even at 20 per cent whereas that of the 
second equation is significant only at 20 per cent. In the absence of the direct 
estimation of the influences affecting price, an attempt was made to estimate 
the demand for East Pakistan's exports in West Pakistan by means of a simple 1 
demand equation as follow: 
A Q i — a„ + a j A?x 4- a 2 A Y , , 
= 26.12—1.98 A P * + 6.77AYr/ 
(.45) (4.65) 
R = . 8 9 
The correlation coefficient is significant at 5-per-cent level. 
The response of demand to change in income and price is important both 
in terms of reliability and its magnitude. The increase in demand for East 
Pakistan's exports to West has been the result of not only a greater increase in 
total expenditure or income in West Pakistan but also of a considerable res-
ponsiveness of demand for East Pakistani goods to increase in income in West. 
This has been confronted by an inelasticity of production or of supply of expor-
table items in East Pakistan, as evidenced by the index of production, i.e., Sjjj. 
The ratio of the quantity of exports of East Pakistan to the quantity of production 
of exportable items has shown an upward trend during these years, as shown in 
Table IX. 
This implies that the rate of increase of exports has been higher than the 
rate of increase of production and that the pressure of an increasing demand 
has not been matched by a proport ionate increase in supply over the period. 
The equations explaining the movements of export and import prices have also 
been fitted in their logarithmic t ransformat ions but results are neither plausible 
nor statistically satisfactory. 
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Q? 
Sb 
1951/52 1.00 
1952/53 1.52 
1953/54 1.44 
1954/55 1.68 
1955/56 1.82 
1956/57 1.60 
1957/58 3.00 
1958/59 3.60 
1959/60 2.92 
where Q* = quantity index of exports f rom East Pakistan, and 
Sb = index of production of exportable items. 
The behaviour of the terms of trade between agricultural and industrial 
commodities which enter into interwing trade is shown in Table X. For this 
purpose, the agricultural exports and imports were combined as were the total 
industrial exports and imports. 
The terms of trade, as revealed in the above indices, have moved in favour 
of agriculture over time. The trend is more pronounced in (C) than in (A). The 
linear trend of (A) is given by (A) — 80.5 -f 4.86t and that of (C) is given by 
(1.27) 
(C) = 97 + 5.96t. The change in weights f rom base-year to end-year (as in (E) 
(1.81) 
and (G)) reinforces the conclusion derived f r o m (A) and (C). The behaviour of the 
prices of the specific agricultural and industrial commodities included in these 
indices does not lend support to the traditional presumption that terms of trade 
usually move against agricultural commodities. It is to be noted, however, 
that the indices do not include a few of the most important agricultural commo-
dities in Pakistan such as rice, sugarcane, and raw jute. Accordingly, the in-
dices presented here do not reflect the movements of the relative prices of agri-
cultural and industrial commodities in general. 
The separate movements of agricultural and industrial prices which lie 
behind the movement of terms of trade are shown in Table XI. 
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TABLE X 
TERMS OF TRADE BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL 
COMMODITIES 
Year (A) (B) (C) 0>) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
1950/51 100 100 
1951/52 81 88 85 97 
1952/53 82 85 106 92 
1953/54 91 92 100 84 91 100 
1954/55 104 106 106 108 98 93 114 111 
1955/56 122 118 119 113 97 100 119 120 
1956/57 127 125 115 125 104 109 128 132 
1957/58 126 122 140 132 125 118 149 142 
1958/59 112 122 140 135 124 116 149 140 
1959/60 127 126 98 124 
(A)=Terms of trade with weights of the year 1950/51. 
(B)=Three-year moving averages of (A). 
(C)=Terms of trade with new commodities and with weights of the year 1953/54. 
( D ) = M o v i n g averages of (C). 
(B)=The same prices as in (A) but with weights of the year 1959/60. 
( F ) = M o v i n g averages of (E). 
( G ) = T h e same prices as in (C) but with weights of the year 1953/54. 
( H ) = M o v i n g averages of (G), 
TABLE XI 
INDICES OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL PRICES 
Year (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
1950/51 100 100 
1951/52 88 90 109 103 
1952/53 83 91 101 107 
1953/54 101 96 100 111 104 100 
1954/55 104 104 104 104 100 100 98 96 
1955/56 107 115 107 113 88 98 90 100 
1956/57 133 127 128 127 105 102 111 102 
1957/58 142 135 147 143 113 112 105 108 
1958/59 131 135 153 114 118 111 109 109 
1959/60 131 142 103 113 
tural commodities and quantities of 1950/51 and 1953/54 and (B) and (D) are, respectively, 
their three-year moving averages. (E) and (G) are indices of industrial commodities based on 
commodities and quantities of 1950/51 and 1953/54 and (F) and H are their moving averages. 
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The indices based on the commodities of 1950/51 reveal that while agricultural 
prices have a consistently rising trend (B), the industrial prices do not have any 
perceptible trend in any direction (E). The industial prices fluctuated up and 
down through all the period. The second set of indices starting f r o m 1953/54 
which includes a number of new commodities, however, reveals that both agri-
cultural and industrial prices have risen over time but the increase in the agri-
cultural prices has been greater than that in the industrial prices. Even though 
the terms of trade have moved against industrial goods in interwing trade, the 
adverse movements in price ratio have been accompanied by an increase in quan-
tities of such goods traded between the wings as well as in the total supply of 
these specific industrial goods in the economy as a whole, i.e., in both the wings 
taken together. The quantity indices of agricultural and industrial goods 
moving in interwing trade are given in Table XII. 
TABLE XII 
VOLUME INDICES OF TOTAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES 
Year (A) (B) (Q (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
1950/51 100 100 
1951/52 118 116 66 82 
1952/53 131 131 80 121 
1953/54 143 129 100 217 186 100 
1954/55 113 131 76 83 260 266 123 122 
1955/56 138 139 74 55 321 332 144 153 
1956/57 167 189 106 110 417 453 192 196 
1957/58 261 266 152 140 622 490 252 215 
1958/59 271 260 163 152 432 449 202 300 
1959/60 248 142 292 146 
Note: (A) and (C) are indices of total trade in agricultural commodites. (B) and (D) are their 
respective three-year moving averages. (E) and (G) are indices of total trade in manufactured 
goods, and (F) and (H) are their respective moving averages. All indices have base-year weights. 
The increase in the volume of trade in industrial commodities has been at a 
much faster rate than the increase in that of agricultural commodities. How-
ever, in the case of agricultural commodities, the ratio of increase in the volume 
of trade has been much greater than the increase in total supply or product ion. 
In the case of manufactured goods, the rate of increase in production has kept 
in step with the increase in the volume of trade in them. 
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The indices of product ion of agricultural and industrial goods are given in 
Table XIII . 
TABLE XIII 
INDICES OF P R O D U C T I O N OF AGRICULTURAL A N D 
INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES 
Year (SI) Moving Moving (Y) (M) average average 
1951/52 100 100 100 100 
1952/53 152 161 94 92 104 75 
1953/54 231 219 81 92 116 55 
1954/55 275 291 100 94 117 56 
1955/56 367 351 101 100 112 46 
1956/57 411 411 100 101 130 69 
1957/58 455 459 103 101 133 57 
1958/59 511 513 101 103 128 43 
1959/60 568 104 142 67 
Note.i: 
(Si) — index of production of industrial goods: includes oigarettes, medium, fine, coarse 
and indigenous cloth, cement, kerosene oil, hessian cloth, gunny bag, matches. 
($A) — index of production of agricultural goods: includes tea, tobacco, rape and mustard 
seed, masur, gram, rice (West Pakistan), wheat and cotton. The source for this 
data is the same as for the production indices of East and West Pakistan, quoted 
earlier. 
(Y) = index of total national expenditure, as measured by the absorption of commodities 
in Pakistan, is indicated in [2], 
(M) = value of Pakistan imports from abroad deflated by import-price index based on 
C.S.O. data. 
As is generally known, agricultural production has suffered f rom a stagna-
tion in the past, as is corroborated by its index of production. The manufactur-
ing sector has recorded a considerable progress. An increasing demand for 
agricultural commodities originating f r o m growth of income and population 
has impinged upon a relatively inelastic supply of agricultural commodities 
resulting in a relative rise in their prices. 
A number of equations are fitted in an attempt to explain and quantify 
the factors determining the prices of agricultural and industrial commodities 
in interwing trade. The equation for agricultural prices is as follows: 
P,1 = a, + a 1 S A _ , + a ,Y 
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where PA is the price index of agricultural commodities, Sa 1 is the index of 
production of agricultural commodities' with one-year lag, and Y is the index of 
total expenditure indirectly purport ing to measure the influence of demand. 
The coefficients estimated by least-squares method are the following: 
P„=132.40—1.02 i + l .80Y 
(. 76) (.31) 
R = .93 
The equation is statistically quite satisfactory in view of the relatively small 
standard errors of the coefficients. The correlation coefficient is significant at 
1-per-cent level. Since the variables are expressed in [terms of indices, the 
coefficients of and Y can be treated as some sort of elasticities of response 
of prices to changes in production and demand. In the case of manufactured 
goods, no such lag in the influence of supply on price can be postulated and price 
and supply in the same period are expected to be interrelated. The equation, 
p, = a i + a 2 S j + a 3 Y , does not yield good results. The estimated coefficients 
are Pi = a(—.044S, + .62Y. The results after a first-difference transformation 
(.20) (.74) 
show no improvement. 
A P ! - a , - , 1 1 A S , + .40 A Y 
(.26) (.51) 
R = . 4 2 
In addition to the effects of income changes, demand for manufactured goods 
in interwing trade has also been influenced by a diversion of demand f rom abroad. 
It is difficult to take both these factors into account in terms of one variable. 
The ratio of interwing trade to import f r o m overseas imports as a variable does 
not improve the result either. The ratio of quantity index of overseas imports 
to the index of expenditure, i.e. A is also tried as an explanatory variable with 
the following results: 
ap , = 0 . 6 - - . 1 9 a S , + . l i a M 
(.26) (.31) y 
R = , 3 2 
A fur ther step in the search for a satisfactory explanation of the movements of 
the prices of manufactured goods is to test a nonlinear relationship between 
the variables of the form Pi = AS, "iY«». The equation is estimated in its 
logarithmic transformation so that 
log P , ~ I o g A + a( log Si + a 2 logY 
= a o + a , l o g S i + a j l o g Y 
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where log A = a „ 
and the results are 
log P, = .425 —.27 log Si +1 .50 log Y 
(.10) (.51) 
R = . 7 7 
The relationship, as indicated by the coefficients and their standard errors, is 
statistically quite satisfactory. The correlation coefficient is significant at 
10-per-cent level. The total national expenditure representing an index of 
demand for manufactured goods, as indicated by Y, has an important influence 
on price. This is plausible in view of the fact that a large and increasing amount 
of excess demand emanating f rom urbanization changes in the distribution of 
income and in the structure of demand faced relatively a much slower or no 
increase on the supply side. The large coefficient of Y can be said to include also 
the influence of trade diversion since the index of trade diversion, i.e., —" 
appears to be highly correlated with Y. E 
EXTERNAL TERMS OF TRADE 
The next step has been to calculate the terms of trade of East and West 
Pakistan with the outside world separately. The terms of trade have been 
calculated f r o m two different sources. One set has been computed f rom the 
indices of unit values of individual export commodities and f rom indices of the 
unit values of three different groups of import (food, drinks, and tobacco, raw 
materials, manufactures) as available f rom published sources [9, January and 
December 1960]. The exports of East Pakistan included in the index are jute, 
tea, and hides and skins and those of West include wool, cotton, and hides and 
skins. The indices of unit values have been weighted by the respective values 
of exports and imports of these commodities in 1948/49. Another terms-of-
trade series have been computed directly f rom the published data on values 
and quantities of exports and imports for the calendar years 19 5 5-60 6. 
The first set of terms of trade along with the indices of export and import 
prices is shown in Table XIV. 
It appears f r o m the table that the terms of trade of both East and West Pak-
istan have deteriorated. Compared with the base year, the terms of trade of West 
Pakistan, though declining over time, have been at a higher level than those of 
East Pakistan in each of the years. The extent, i.e., absolute magnitude of 
deterioration in the terms of trade of East Pakistan over the years has been 
greater than that of West Pakistan. Though indices of import prices of both 
<>5, for years 1955-60], The 1960 figures relate to six months, January-June 1960. 
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T A B L E XVI 
INDIRECT ESTIMATE OF TERMS OF TRADE OF EAST A N D 
WEST WITH OUTSIDE WORLD 
Year 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Terms 
of 
trade 
Index 
of 
export 
price 
Index 
of 
import 
price 
Terms 
of 
trade 
Index 
of 
export 
price 
Index 
of 
import 
price 
1949/50 100.0 100 100 100 100 100 
1950/51 98.3 104 106 150 158 106 
1951/52 98.6 117 119 124 148 119 
1952/53 63.6 62 98 106 104 98 
1953/54 60.0 64 106 88 94 106 
1954/55 68.5 69 101 .92 92 100 
1955/56 56.0 86 149 72 106 148 
1956/57 56.0 98 176 65 115 178 
1957/58 54.0 100 187 57 107 190 
1958/59 50.0 94 189 48 93 193 
1959/60 47.0 90 191 52 101 195 
East and West Pakistan have gone up and indices of export price of both have 
declined, index of export price of West Pakistan has consistently stayed at a 
higher level than that of East Pakistan, i.e., decline has been less in West than 
in East. This difference in the movement of export prices occurs inspite of the 
fact that exports of both are nonindustrial goods. The quantity of exports, 
however, has recorded an increase in East Pakistan whereas in the case of West 
Pakistan there is no discernible clear trend in exports, as is seen below in 
Table XV: 
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TABLE XV 
Year 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
Quantum 
index of 
exports 
Income 
terms of 
trade 
Quantum 
index of 
exports 
Income 
terms of 
trade 
1949/50 100 100 100 100 
1950/51 185 182 38 58 
1951/52 148 146 110 137 
1952/53 165 105 148 156 
1953/54 160 96 121 106 
1954/55 204 140 94 87 
1955/56 192 112 124 81 
1956/57 147 83 107 70 
1957/58 157 85 72 41 
1958/59 149 74 84 41 
1959/60 191 90 118 61 
Note: The value of exports is obtained from [9, November 1960, p. 1471], avid has 
been deflated by respective price indices to arrive at quantity indices. The quantity index 
cannot be directly calculated in the absence of quantity data. The value of exports of East 
and West Pakistan has been deflated by export-price index of East and West Pakistan (as given 
in the previous table) in order to obtain the value in constant prices, i.e., volume of exports, 
and this has been used as the basis of quantity index of exports. 
The increase in the quantity of exports of East Pakistan has partially offset 
the declining commodity terms of trade with the result that income terms of 
trade have fallen less in the case of East Pakistan than in the case of West Pakistan. 
The linear trends in income terms of trade of East and West Pakistan are given 
by the following equations: Yi = 148-6.30t (East) and Y a = 126—6.80t.(West). 
(2.54) (2.97) 
Even though the quantity index of exports of West Pakistan does not have any 
discernible trend, in many cases the nature of fluctuations in commodity terms 
of trade and in the volume of exports is such that often years of severe decline 
in the volume of exports arc accompanied by a sharp rise in commodity terms 
of trade and vice versa so that downward trend in income terms of trade is not as 
great as it will otherwise be. 
The second set of terms of trade which has been directly estimated has 
been available only for the calendar years 1955-60 (see Table XV). 
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T A B L E X V I 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT ESTIMATES OF TERMS OF TRADE 
WITH OUTSIDE WORLD 
Year 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
(A) (B) (A) (B) 
1955 100 100 100 100 
1956 85 76 83 70 
1957 84 73 77 74 
1958 73 82 60 92 
1959 69 68 59 95 
1960 85 97 
Notes: (A)=Indirect estimate explained above. Weights are volume of exports and imports 
of 1955 [5, for 1955]. 
(B)=Direct estimate with weights of 1955. Direct estimate includes a large number of commodities and uses a different set of weights. 
While the indirect estimate of terms of trade shows a consistent downward trend 
in the case of both, the direct estimate reveals that in the case of East Pakistan 
there is no strong trend one way or the other, and that in case of West Pakistan 
the terms of trade fell in 1956 and since then they have been slowly but conti-
nuously rising. The indices in any case are too short to allow the derivation of a 
statistically meaningful trend. Moreover, the fact that the index of 1960 is 
based on price data for only six months of 1960 vitiates its comparability with 
earlier years. 
The above analysis of the behaviour of terms of trade demons!rates that it 
is difficult to generalize, irrespective of time periods or of nature of commodities, 
about the movements of the aggregate terms of trade between any two regions 
or between one region and the rest, of the world on the basis of their stages of 
development or levels of income. It is equally difficult to generalize about the 
movements of terms of trade between groups of commodities such as agricultural 
and industrial commodities. It all depends upon the nature as well as the 
extent and elasticity of demand and of supply of specific commodities which 
move in trade or are included in the particular indices of terms of trade in ques-
tion. With a change in number and nature of commodities included in the 
indices and with a change in base-year, there are corresponding changes in the 
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trends of terms of trade. East Pakistan — a relatively underdeveloped and less 
diversified economy — experienced an upward trend in her interregional terms of 
trade over the period, 1950/51 to 1959/60 as a whole, but suffered a decline in the 
last three years or so. If a number of new commodities which were introduced 
in interwing trade in 1953/54 are included in a new set of index beginning 1953/54, 
the new index of the terms of trade reveals a downward trend. In overseas 
trade, East Pakistan's terms of trade suffered a steady and continuous decline. 
Compared with the base year, East Pakistan's terms of trade fell more and stayed 
at a lower level than those of West Pakistan throughout the whole period. 
Export prices of both wings in overseas trade rose and then fell but compared 
with the base year the magnitude of fall was greater in East than in West. The 
changes in the volume of exports sometimes partially offset the changes in terms 
of trade as it has happened in the case of both East and West Pakistan in foreign 
trade and sometimes such changes reinforce those in terms of trade as illustrated 
in th© case of East Pakistan in interregional trade. 
It is to be noted, however, that the period covered in this study has been 
rather short. The longest series did not exceed 12 years. It is not easy to look 
for a meaningful trend in many of the shorter series so that a generalization 
about long-term movements in terms of trade is severely handicapped. In 
both the cases of international and interregional terms of trade there have been 
year-to-year f luctuations—sometimes considerable fluctuations at that. The 
explanation of variations in export and import prices in interregional t rade has 
been sought by means of a number of factors which govern short-run demand 
and supply of the commodities in question. It has not been always possible to 
obtain satisfactory explanation in the absence of data on a number of factors 
and in view of the inherent limitation of the statistical methods employed. 
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Appendix A 
TABLE A-l 
EAST PAKISTAN'S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
Year Total imports 
Imports 
from West 
Pakistan 
% ratio 
of 
(3) to (2) 
Total 
exports 
Exports 
to West 
Pakistan 
% ratio 
of 
(6) to (5) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(. .000 rupees..) (percent) (. .000 rupees.. ) (perce 
1948/49 421,536 139,230 33.0 448,183 19,100 4.3 
1949/50 619,916 235,070 37.9 678,458 49,580 7.3 
1950/51 724,701 271,760 37.5 1,272,861 61,790 4.9 
1951/52 1,017,375 253,920 25.0 1,152,801 65,870 5.7 
1952/53 584,820 218,460 37.4 791,115 148,650 18.8 
1953/54 680,556 386,790 56.8 794,662 149,600 18.8 
1954/55 625,177 304,960 48.8 928,131 196,560 21.2 
1955/56 694,476 333,890 48.1 1,277,946 236,660 18.5 
1956/57 1,350,388 531,850 39.4 1,152,134 242,760 21.1 
1957/58 1,437,316 701,690 48.8 1,267,149 269,090 21.2 
1958/59 1,238,918 685,120 55.3 1,165,204 284.250 24.4 
1959/60 1,218,700 563,430 46.2 1,432,476 352,900 24.6 
First five-years' average: 34.16 8.20 
Last five-years' average: 47.56 21.96 
Source: [9, December 1960]. 
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T A B L E A - 2 
WEST PAKISTAN'S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
Year Total imports 
Imports 
from East 
Pakistan 
% ratio 
of 
(3) to (2) 
Total 
exports 
Exports 
to East 
Pakistan 
% ratio 
(6) to (5) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(. .000 ritpees..) (percent) (000 riipees) (per cent) 
1948/49 1,195,877 19,100 1.6 667,739 139,230 20.9 
1949/50 961,799 49,580 5.2 800,252 235,070 29.4 
1950/51 1,228,843 61,790 5.0 1,614,242 271,760 16.8 
1951/52 1,539,761 65,870 4.3 1,175,847 253,920 21.6 
1952/53 1,165,912 148,650 12.7 1,085,853 218,450 20.1 
1953/54 973,882 149,600 1.4 1,027,763 386,790 37.6 
1954/55 969,610 196,560 20.1 ,' 96,348 304,960 38.3 
1955/56 1,201,113 236,660 19.7 1,076,304 333,890 31.0 
1956/57 1,758,798 242,760 13.8 1,230,068 531,850 43.3 
1957/58 1,583,433 269,090 17.0 1,135,284 701,690 61.8 
1958/59 1,303,858 284,230 21.7 1,129,497 685,120 60.7 
1959/60 2,158,607 352,900 16.3 1,326,565 563,430 42.5 
First five-yesirs' average 5.76 21.76 
Last five-ye.its' average 17.70 47.84 
Source: same as Table A- l . 
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T A B L E A - 3 
IMPORTS INTO EAST PAKISTAN FROM WEST PAKISTAN AND FROM 
OVERSEAS 
Commodities 
1948/49 
West 
Pakistan Over-seas 
1955 1959 
Apparel 50 189 
Books and printed matter 96 45 
Boots and shoes 40 10,306 
Chemicals and drugs 4,735 11 107 
Dyeing and tanning substances 582 156 
Fruits and vegetables 1,986 6 9 Grain, pulses and flour 40,613 176 
Gums and resins 49 
Hardware 1,406 602 
L e a t h e r 2 556 
Machinery and mill work 267 
Matches 3,108 086 
Metals and ores 1,550 467 
Rape and mustard seed oil 5,282 604 
Other vegetables, nonessential 
oils 2)322 12 222 
Provisions and oilman's stores 2,937 3 252 
Salt 8,185 14 913 
Seeds 19,409 84 
Soap 52 545 
Spices 1,950 5 837 
Sugar including molasses 2,084 2 511 
Cotton, raw 6,585 1 373 
Cotton, twist and yarn 8,941 106 110 
Cotton piecegoods 3,204 10 960 
Other textiles 437 1 748 
Tobacco manufactured 67 5 423 
Tobacco unmanufactured 55 
Cement 
Instruments 194 
Liquors 597 
Oils, nonvegetables 020 
Paper and pasteboard 767 
Stationery 398 
Rubber manufactures 291 
Dyes and colours 582 509 
10,319 
3,483 
5,467 
33,973 
3,304 
1,129 
956 
15,621 
118,946 
27,090 
35 
15,133 
12,385 
31 
2,383 
263 
398 
77 
760 
1,856 
1,345 
2,429 
12 
242 
552 
675 
3,974 
to,141 
4,144 
13 
3,503 
220 
33,800 
2,284 
530 
1,395 
5,017 
26,471 
6,083 
7,492 
59,785 
8,311 
2,208 
11,600 
45,102 
70,881 
86,669 
1,655 
24,447 
22,408 
7,918 
3,360 
256 
3,005 
2,817 
7,461 
1,254 
1,870 
West Over- West Over-Pakistan seas Pakistan seas 
. ill thousand rupees. 
14 278 312 134 616 1,321 5,037 7,874 5,451 16,872 17,479 27,403 
608 74 2,486 140 13,976 4 137,680 59,856 421 126 2,065 901 6,215 2,998 3,164 11,090 168 282 617 1,322 60,185 4,128 97,357 70 
737 30 5,089 78 7,612 24,663 
31,111 
2,795 
2,276 
5 
3,134 
7,631 
2,631 
1,128 
2,143 
161 
8,152 
451 
60,967 
2,708 
905 
3,006 
7,986 
Sources: [1 Vol, I; 5, for 1955and 1959; 9, May 1959, September 1959, and March 1960], 
TABLE A-4 
DISTRIBUTION OF SOME EXPORTS OF EAST PAKISTAN IMPORTANT IN INTERWING TRADE AS BETWEEN WEST PAKISTAN 
AND ABROAD 
Commodities exported from East Pakistan to West Pakistan and abroad 
1948/49 1955 i 1959 1948/49 1955 1959 
To West Pakistan value (a*> 
To abroad 
value 
(b , ) 
To West Pakistan value {a2> 
1 To abroad ] To West j To abroad value ; Pakistan i value 
(b2) | value 1 (b 3 ) CO © © 
Drugs and medicines 16,000 3,000 61,000 3,68,417 17,43,000 64,707 5.333 .166 26.936 
Fruits and vegetables 27,000 3,000 21,85,000 8,92,753 15.33,000 19,437 9.000 2.447 78.870 
Hardware and cutlery 2,000 28,000 1,32,000 7.644 3,467,00 3,89,356 .071 17.268 8.904 
Hides and skies 1,000 1,81,27,000 4,43,000 1,51,28,261 8,00,000 3,47,03,891 .00005 .029 .023 
Leather 75,000 77,43,000 2,76,40,000 14,22,958 
Matches 69,000 53,26,000 2,40,49,000 
Paper and pasteboard ,88,98,000 3.15,22,000 57,714 
Provisions and oilman's stores 4,000 51,000 60,000 13 ;93.000 2,27,197 .129 6.131 
Seeds 12,18,000 5,35,000 14,41,000 26,54,642 1.06,69,000 6,71,721 2.277 .543 15.883 
Spices 30,37,000 60,56,000 96,63,000 44,302 1,96,23,000 30,10,361 .501 . 218.117 6.513 
Jute manufactures 2,37,000. 9,000 5,24,01,000 6,33,69,897 5,67,08,000 20,40,58,107 26.333 7.82 .27S 
Tea 1,05,73,000 4,42,42,000 7,09,88,000 3,16,88.350 8,81,46,000 2,64,70,678 .239 2.240 3.330 
Tobacco 2,03,000 4,47.000 31,38,000 6.988 32,75,000 .454 449.056 
Note: The values of experts of the above items to West Pakistan for 1948/49 are obtained from [6], Exports abroad for the same 
year are obtained from [1, Table 95]. The figures for 1955 and 1959 are obtained from [5]. 
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TABLE A-5 
INTRODUCTION OF NEW COMMODITIES IN INTERWING TRADE 
(Export of East Pakistan to West Pakistan) 
Commodities exported 
from East Pakistan to 
West Pakistan in 1948/49 
(Pakistan merchandise) 
Value 
in 
'000' 
rupees 
New commodities 
exported from 
East Pakistan to 
West Pakistan in 
1955/56 (Pakistan 
merchandise) 
Value 
in 
'000' 
rupees 
New commodities 
exported from 
East Pakistan to 
West Pakistan in 
1959/60 (Pakistan 
merchandise) 
Value 
in 
'000' 
rupees 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Grand total: 
Drugs and medicines 
Dyeing & tanning substances 41 
salted or preserved 27 
Hardware & cutlery 2 
Hides & skins, raw 1 
Leather (hides, dressed 
and tanned) 75 
Matches 69 
Coooanut oil 16 
Groudnut oil 1,027 
Provisions & oilman's 
stores 4 
Seeds, essential 20 
Seeds, nonessential 1,198 
Betelnets 2 
Chillies 3,018 
Ginger 3 
Turmeric 9 
Other spices 5 
Tea 10,573 
Cotton piecegoods 1,393 
Gunny bags 237 
Other textiles 23 
Tobacco manufactured 
(including cigarettes) 2 
Tobacco unmanufactured 201 
Wood and timber 35 
All other articles 188 
18,185 Grand total: 
16 
219,312 Grand total: 
Fresh fruits 
Fresh vegetables 
Pulses 
Mats & mattings 
Paper & paste-
board 
Gunny cloth 
Rope & twine 
Coil manufactured 
(including rope) 
Cordage & rope 
of vegetable fibre 
(excluding jute & 
cotton) 
Other grain 
Other jute 
manufactures 
592 
629 
773 
64 
15,085 
11,224 
3,910 
161 
129 
28 
48 
Total: 32,643 
= 14.9% 
Cardamoms 
Other cotton 
Total 
315,597 
1,118 
94 
337 
325 
42,932 
7,733 
6,916 
18 
114 
5,820 
2,155 
7 
546 
68.115 
19.4% 
Source: The source of data is the same as those for Appendix Tables A-3 and A- 4. 
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T A B L E A - 6 
INTRODUCTION OF NEW COMMODITIES IN INTERWING TRADE 
(Imports of East Pakistan from West Pakistan) 
Commodities imported 
into East Pak. from 
West Pakistan in 
1948/49 (Pakistan 
merchandise) 
Value 
in 
'000' 
rupees 
New commodities 
imported into 
East Pakistan 
from West Pak. 
in 1955/56 
(Pakistan 
merchandise) 
Value 
in 
'000' 
rupees 
New commodities 
imported into 
East Pakistan 
from West Pak. 
in 1959/60 
(Pakistan 
merchandise) 
Value 
in 
'000' 
rupees 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Grand total: 1,36,490 
Apparel 50 
Books & printed matter 96 
Boots & shoes 40 
Chemicals & chcmical 
preparations 
Drugs & medicines 
Dyeing & tanning sub-
stances 
Fruits & vegetables, dried 
salted or preserved 
Other sorts 
Pulses 
Rice 
Wheat & wheat flour 
Gums & resins 
Grand total: 3,05,047 Grand total: 
Hardware 
Leather 
Matches 
Metals & ores 
Rape and mustard seed oil 
Other vegetable non-
essential oils 
Ghee 
Other provisions 
Salt 
Rape & mustard seeds 
Other sorts 
Soap 
Chillies 
1,657 
3,078 
582 
1,046 
358 
742 
38,986 
885 
49 
1,406 
2 
3,108 
1,550 
5,282 
2,322 
98 
2,839 
8,185 
18,695 
714 
52 
26 
Giam 
Other sorts of 
grains 
Machinery and 
mill works 
Other textiles 
Tobacco un-
manufactured 
Instrumen ts 
Liquors 
Mineral oil 
Other kinds of 
oil 
Paints & colours 
Paper & paste-
board 
Other cotton 
manufactures 
Tallow & stcaring 
Cement 
1,041 
298 
1,401 
293 
19,260 
2,178 
150 
117 
65 
1,620 
68 
820 
780 
Stationery 
Rubber 
manufactures 
Total: 28.091 Total: 
- 9 . 2 % 
5,21,171 
5,210 
4,713 
6,070 
946 
25,358 
3,537 
255 
233 
902 
2,391 
2,691 
4,257 
61 
10,588 
2,177 
1,213 
70,602 
13.5% 
Source: The source of data is the same as those for Appendix Tables A-3 and A-4. 
TABLE A - 7 
WEST PAKISTAN TERMS OF TRADE WITH OUTSIDE WORLD 
r j Average indices of unit values I of exports I (April 1948-March 1949=100) 
Period 
Cotton Wool 
1949/50 1950/51 1951/52 1952/53 1953/54 1954/55 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 
I j Average indices of unit values , , f i of imports index oi j (April 1948-March 1949=100) unn values 
of exports 
101.8 102.4 31.9 100.0 158.7 205.5 124.4 158.4 154.7 128.4 99.3 147.6 101.2 151.2 91.5 103.6 88.5 159.7 94.1 93.8 87.8 149.3 86.3 91.8 101.3 186.5 97.4 106.5 108.3 222.4 101.2 115.0 201.6 579.5 107.5 107.4 84. S 160.0 111.5 92.6 86.7 182.9 165.7 101.5 
Index of unit values of imports 
90.0 98.4 
108.2 91.5 106.8 121.0 179.5 173.7 176.4 176.6 166.5 
Terms of trade 
85.3 76.2 100.0 100.0 86.3 80.7 105.7 149.9 100.4 90.5 118.S 124.2 81.0 74.3 97.7 108.0 77.0 81.6 106.2 88.3 72.2 73.3 99.9 91.9 93.0 111.5 148.2 71.9 98.2 143.7 177.9 64.6 99.8 156.0 189.9 56.6 96.2 159.9 192.9 48.0 101.6 163.1 195.2 52.0 
Note: T £ f n - , n d i c e S a f u n i t v a l u e s o f individual exports and of three categories of imports are taken from [9, January 1960 and December lyb U]. 
«» wcigQib as avauaoie in statistical Aostract for East Pakistan, (Cioveroment of East Board and the Bureau of Commercial and Industrial Intelligence), Vol. II, 1955, Table 95, Pp. 340-344. 
Export weights: April 1948 to March 1949 ('000' rupees) Cotton Wool Hides & skins 
4,45,418 33,622 57,271 
Import weights: April 1948 to March 1949 
Food, drinks and tobacco Raw materials Manufactures 
0000'rupees) 1,12,041 1,26,978 6,45,860 
TABLE A-8 
EAST PAKISTAN'S TERMS OF TRADE WITH OUTSIDE WORLD 
1949/50 
1950/51 
1951/52 
1952/53 
1953/54 
1954/55 
1955/56 
1956/57 
1957/58 
1958/59 
1959/60 
Note: same as in Appendix Table A-7. 
Export weights: 
Jute 
Tea 
Hides & skin 
(000 rupees) 
13,87,100 
44,242 
18.127 
import weights: 
Food, drinks & tobacco 
Raw materials 
Manufacture 
Period 
Average indices of "unit values of exports (April 1948-March 1949=100) 
Index of unit values of exports 
Average indices of unit values of Imprts (April 1948-March 1949=100) 
Index of unit values of imports 
Terms of trade 
Jute Tea Hides & skins 
Food, drinks & tobacco 
Raw material Manu-facture 
82.9 104.3 81.9 100.0 90.0 85.3 76.2 100.0 100.0 
85.9 100.9 124.4 103.9 98.4 86.3 89.7 105.7 98.3 
98.3 82.0 99.3 117.1 108.2 100.4 90.5 118.8 98.6 
50.4 84.3 91.5 62.2 91.5 81.0 74.3 97.8 63.6 
51.4 91.7 94.1 63.6 106.8 77.0 81.6 106.2 59.9 
54.8 144.0 86.3 69.3 121.0 72.2 73.3 101.2 68.5 
69.1 158.1 97.4 86.4 179.5 93.0 111.5 149.2 57.9 
90.1 135.0 101.2 98.2 173.7 98.2 143.7 175.7 55.9 
81.4 151.1 107.5 100.4 176.4 99.8 156.0 186.6 53.8 
75.7 171.2 111.5 93.8 176.6 96.2 159.9 189.1 49.6 
71.6 146.6 165.7 89.9 166.5 101.6 613.1 190.8 47.1 
(000 rupees) 
41,853 
44,461 
1,66,217 
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Some Comments on the Export 
Bonus, Export Promotion and 
Investment Criteria 
R o n a l d S o l i g o a n d J o s e p h J . S t e r n 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
One of the principal elements in the third-five-year-plan strategy is to shift 
the pattern of investment in favour of export-oriented industries [6]. Accord-
ing to the Plan targets, exports are to increase at a rate of 9.5 per cent per annum 
over the period 1964/65 to 1969/70, a rate of growth which exceeds the target 
rate of growth for GNP, estimated at 6.5 per cent per annum. Furthermore, 
the increase in exports is expected mainly in manufactured goods and in non-
traditional items such as rice and fish [6]. Put in other terms, the Plan targets 
propose to divert to exports 10 per cent of additional manufacturing output 
produced during the third-plan period. This target contrasts sharply with 
the actual experience of the Second Five Year Plan, when only 3 per cent of the 
additional output of the manufacturing sector was exported. 
Numerous policies have been used to stimulate exports. Some of these 
are tax incentives and export-performance licensing which entitle certain export 
industries to additional import licences on the basis of their export performance. 
The key instrument in the export-promotion strategy, however, and the one 
which has received the .most attention f rom economists, is the Export Bonus 
Scheme. The scheme, first introduced in 1959 and scheduled to run till the 
end of the second-plan period, has now been extended to cover the Third Plan 
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as well. Tlie main features of the scheme can be briefly summarized as follows: 
for those commodities for which bonus vouchers are given (practically all manu-
factured goods, but only some raw materials) the exporter, upon surrendering 
his foreign exchange to the State Bank at the official rate of exchange, receives a 
voucher that entitles its owner to purchase foreign exchange equal in value to 
a specified percentage, depending upon the commodity exported, of the amount 
earned. The voucher is, therefore, a ration coupon honoured by the State Batik 
for obtaining foreign exchange for use in importing a wide range of goods ' . 
The voucher is freely transferable and may be sold in the market at a price 
determined by the market. 
The proport ion of the foreign exchange earned by the exporter and given to 
him in the form of bonus vouchers is called the bonus rate. Currently, there are 
two basic rates under the bonus scheme: 20 per cent and 30 per cent2. With 
the notable exception of jute textiles, practically all manufactured goods are 
given the 30-per-cent rate. The market price of the bonus voucher, called the 
premium, has fluctuated, depending on the supply of vouchers available, which 
reflects the level of the bonus rates and the amount of export earnings under the 
scheme, and the demand for vouchers, which is a funct ion of the number of 
items for which vouchers can be utilized and the demand that exists for such 
items in excess of the supply available f rom domestic production and licensed 
imports. In recent years, the bonus premium has fluctuated between Rs. 135 
and Rs. 170, i.e., vouchers which would permit the owner to purchase Rs. 100 
in foreign exchange at the official rate could be purchased for a price ranging 
between Rs. 135 to Rs. 170 [5], 
The export bonus scheme has been subject to some criticism by economists. 
The criticism centres around the fact that, the export bonus system is, in effect, 
a multiple exchange rate system where exports are subject to a more favourable 
exchange rate ( f rom the viewpoint of exporters) than the official rate at which 
the bulk of goods are imported. Further, exports are subject to different rates 
depending CM. the commodity involved. It is argued that the bonus system dis-
torts the pattern of resource use towards a less efficient allocation and reduces 
foreign-exchange earnings. 
Ghulani Mohammad |3| has shown that the introduction of the bonus 
scheme for rice has led to a shift in the relative acreage f rom cotton to rice even 
through foreign-exchange earnings per acre of land and per cusec of water are 
'For a more detailed discussion of the operation of the Export Bonus Scheme, see 
11; 21 
This implies, of course, three rates; 0, 20 and 30 per cent. 
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higher for cotton than for rice-1. Mallou [4] has considered the relative advan-
tages of exporting raw cotton and jute as compared with their manufactures . 
He c o n c l u d e s that foreign-exchange earnings are higher when the former are 
expor ted but that the pattern of exports has been biased in favour of cotton 
and jule textiles since the export of these commodities is subject to a bonus 
whereas the exports of raw cotton and raw jute receive no bonus and, in addi-
tion, are subject to an export tax. 
The essence of the arguments put forth by Ghulam Mohammad and Mallon 
is that the differential rates of bonus cause a loss in foreign exchange because they 
distort the pattern of exports and resource use in favour of commodities which 
earn relatively less foreign exchange. 
Thomas [9] has speculated fur ther that the bonus system could have the 
effect of losing foreign exchange in a much more direct sense. In his argument, 
foreign exchange is lost v/hen the total imported inputs, direct as well as indirect, 
embodied in the exported goods, exceed the foreign-exchange earnings of the 
exported goods. Such a loss of foreign exchange is compatible with a rupee 
profit to the exporter because the bonus system in effect converts earnings at 
the rate of roughly Rs. 12.00 per US$ 1.004, whereas imported inputs are priced, 
except for those purchased with bonus vouchers at the official rate of exchange 
of Rs, 4.76 per US dollar. 
In calculating the foreign-exchange loss, Thomas, unlike Mallon and 
Ghulam Mohammad , does not consider the opportunity costs of those domestic 
resources which, like land and water, could be used to produce other exportable 
commodities or which, in the case of cotton and jute, could be exported directly 
without conversion into some other product, As a result, Thomas test of 
"export profitabili ty" will be "weaker" than the Mallon-Ghulam Mohammad 
test in the sense that some industries which, according to the Thomas measure, 
have large net foreign earnings, might have negative earnings when alternative 
uses of domestic resources are taken into account. On the other hand, if there 
is a foreign-exchange loss according to the Thomas test, then there will also be 
a loss by the Mallon-Ghulam Mohammad measure. 
The largest divergence between the results of the two tests of "export pro-
fitability" will be in those industries the output of which embodies a high com-
ponent of domestically produced inputs having a ready export alternative. The 
3 We omit here all other considerations which might make a change in the cropping pattern in the Punjab more or less desirable. Thus, for example, Ghulam Mohammad notes that rice is important for reclaiming saline lands in the irrigated portions of West Pakistan but that continued cultivation of rice leads to a rise in the ground watertable because seepage from rice fields tends to be much higher than watertable from fields under other crops f3], 
••The actual conversion rate depends, of course, on the premium for bonus vouchers prevailing in the market at the time the vouchers are sold. 
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best examples are those industries in the cotton-jute textile group. Indeed, these 
are probably the only manufacturing industries for which there is likely to be 
any significant divergence. The domestically produced input component in 
most other industries in Pakistan consists chiefly of such "nat ional" sectors as 
trade, banking, government services and transportation which have no export 
alternative. 
Another criticism of the export bonus scheme put forth by Thomas is that 
export bonuses may not be successful as a means for increasing the level of 
exports because of uncertainties regarding the life span of the scheme, changes 
in the bonus rates, and fluctuations in the bonus p remium 5 . With respect to the 
latter, he says: 
.. .The bonus voucher price can fluctuate within wide limits, 
so that the exporter, at the time he contracts his sale, cannot 
know what his gross revenue, including bonus, will be. 
Further, the government has changed the rate of bonus, 
and even though commitments were honoured at the pre-
vious rate, this raises serious questions about the fu ture 
policy and future export profitability [9], 
In this paper, we have calculated net foreign-exchange earnings as defined 
by Thomas for forty-three manufactur ing industries. Although this measure 
excludes the export alternative of domestically produced inputs, it nevertheless 
will be an approximation to the net foreign-exchange-earnings concept of Mallon 
and Ghulam Mohammad , except for those industries which are intensive users 
of raw cotton and jute. We have also compared the total import component, 
direct and indirect, of exports under the bonus scheme with the degree of export 
subsidy afforded by the bonus scheme. 
To evaluate the sensitivity of the export earnings of exporters to changes 
in the bonus rate and bonus premium, we have derived the relevant elasticity 
concepts and have computed their value for currently prevailing values of the 
bonus rate and bonus premium. 
In the last part of the paper, we raise the question of what should be the cri-
teria for determining the industries in which investment should be encouraged 
and more specifically for determining which industries should be given priority 
f r o m the point of view of meeting the export and foreign-exchange earning targets 
of the Third Five Year Plan. 
sThis aspect of the bonus scheme is not necessarily a disadvantage. If, in fact, there is 
a foreign-exchange loss on commodities exported on bonus, the constraint imposed on the 
expansion of bonus exports by these uncertainties has the beneficial effect of limiting the ex-
tent of the foreign-exchange loss. , 
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TABLE I 
•s 
NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
(As a Percentage of Export (F.O.B.) Value) 
Rank Industry (percent) 
1. Jute pressing 99.75 
2. Cotton ginning 97.07 
3. Chemical fertilizers 96.04 
4. Tea 89.25 
5. Rice milling 75.73 
6. Sugar 69.30 
7. Sports goods 68.42 
8. Dyeing, printing and finishing of textiles 67.28 
9. Jute textiles 67.43 
1.0. Knitting 64.32 
11. Thread and thread ball making 62.08 
12. Wood, cork and furniture 61.84 
13. Pens, pencils and related products 59.61 
14. Footwear 59.38 
15. Tanning and leather finishing 58.60 
16. Printing and publishing 57.15 
17. Cotton textiles 55.62 
18. Bakery products and confectionary 55.31 
19. Articles of paper and board 54.74 
20. Non-metallic mineral products 53.26 
21. Pharmaceuticals and miscellaneous chemicals 52.71 
22. Cigarettes and tobacco products 51.96 
23. Manufacture of paper and board 50.71 
24. Optical goods 49.75 
25. Matches 49.71 
26. Coal and petroleum products 49.64 
27. Silk and artsilk 49.58 
28. Transport equipment 47.64 
29. Woollen textiles 47.37 
30. Non-electrical machinery 46.21 
31. Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables 45.86 
32. Salt 45.32 
33. Leather goods 45.28 
34. Rubber and rubber products 44.94 
35. Alcoholic beverages 44.19 
36. Metal goods 43.27 
37. Electrical machinery and appliances 43.22 
38. Wearing apparel 42.64 
39. Plastic products 41.88 
40. Paints and varnishes 39.04 
41. Non-alcoholic beverages 33.67 
42. Basic metals 32.28 
43. Perfumes, cosmetics and soaps 25.13 
'For p = 150 per cent 
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bodied in the exported good, does not seem to be relevant** with the present level 
and composition of exports. Conceivably, the problem would become a real one 
if Pakistan tries to expand her exports for commodities where the foreign 
demand is inelastic. In order to expand exports of these commodities, fur ther 
subsidies, whether in the form of increased bonus or some other form, must be 
given to permit Pakistani exporters to lower their export price. However, this 
situation is extremely unlikely given any reasonable assumption about foreign 
demand elasticities and the kind of export subsidies which are likely to be given. 
Although we find that there is no foreign-exchange loss in the "Thomas" 
sense there may be a substantial loss in the "Mal lon" sense. As we have already 
pointed out above, our analysis has only considered the alternative uses of im-
ported intermediate inputs. In order to analyze Mallon's thesis fully, we would 
also have to consider the alternative uses of domestically produced intermediate 
inputs. These could be either exported directly, as in the case of raw cotton or 
raw jute, or be used to produce manufactured goods. Although we have not 
attempted to answer Mallon's proposition fully, we believe that for many indus-
tries the inclusion of alternative uses of domestically produced intermediate 
inputs probably would not change our results significantly. 
Another consideration which we have also neglected is the import com-
ponent of capital inputs. Our analysis has only included imported inputs of 
intermediate goods. Unfortunately, we do not know what the capital coefficients 
for each industry are, let alone the coefficients of imported capital. One thing 
we can say, however, is that the inclusion of capital inputs would increase the 
foreign-exchange cost and decrease the net foreign-exchange earnings for all 
industries. We are inclined to believe that heavy industries such as fertilizers, 
basic chemicals, basic metals and machinery industries, tend to be relatively 
capital intensive and would be affected by the adjustment more than the con-
sumer-goods-oriented industries and raw-material-processing industries. 
III . T H E ELASTICITY O F E X P O R T V A L U E S A N D E X P O R T E A R N I N G S 
In order to get some idea of the sensitivity of the export value of one rupee 
worth of output and of the rupee earnings to the exporter to changes in the 
bonus rate and bonus premium, we have calculated the relevant elasticities. 
The exporter, in setting the export value of a rupee worth of output, must 
take into account some average premium for the bonus vouchers he will earn. 
This average premium will reflect past performance of the voucher market and 
the exporter's expectation as to future behaviour. Thus, the manufacturer 's 
9 O u r analysis is confined to net earnings after taking into account the effect of the 
Export Bonus Scheme. No attempt has been made to include the effects of export-perfor-
mance licensing and other incentives to exporting industries which are mentioned by 
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The argument that Thomas puts for th that the Export Bonus Scheme may 
not succeed in increasing the level of exports because of uncertainties introduced 
by changes in the bonus rate and fluctuations in the bonus premium must be 
qualified. Given a reasonable assumption about the fluctuations in the bonus 
voucher market and the elasticity of export earnings with respect to changes in 
the bonus premium, it seems unlikely that the small losses or gains resulting f rom 
such fluctuations will have a great effect on the development of the export market . 
On the other hand, the fact that changes in the bonus rate tend to be relatively 
large and consequently have a more serious effect on the returns on investment 
of the exporter leads us to conclude that frequent changes in the bonus rate will 
hinder the orderly development of the export market. 
IV. EXPORT B O N U S AND IMPORT COEFFICIENTS 
The Export Bonus Scheme is in effect a partial devaluation of the rupee. By 
maintaining several different rates of bonus, the government is able to maintain 
what is in effect a multiple exchange rate system. 
The devaluation of the rupee was a necessary step since the official rate of 
exchange was substantially below the real scarcity price and exports were less 
than optimal. Differential bonus rates were set to increase foreign-exchange 
earningsA and presumably were set to reflect f) differences in the elasticity of 
foreign demand for different exports and ii) differences in the elasticity of export 
supply of Pakistani goods. 
The argument for discrimination against those exports facing an inelastic 
foreign demand is well known and needs little discussion here. If exports of 
these goods were increased, foreign-exchange earnings would decline; hence, 
these goods should be given no export subsidy. Such is the case with raw jute . 
Since Pakistan is the only ma jo r exporter of raw jute, it is clear that the foreign 
e'emand for this commodity will be inelastic. Exports of raw jute do not receive 
ui export subsidy and are in fact subject to an export tax. Similar treatment for 
exports of raw cotton, however, cannot be justified simply in terms of the elas-
ticity of foreign demand. 
Differentials in the export subsidy may also be set to reflect differences in 
the supply elasticity of various export items which is a weighted average of the 
elasticities of domestic supply of and domestic demand for the particular goods 13. 
Those commodities for which the supply and/or the domestic demand is inelastic 
will also possess an inelastic export supply curve. The export subsidy necessary 
to increase exports of any commodity by a given amount will be greater, eeterus 
paribus, the more inelastic is the export supply curve. 
USee [2, p. 87] for a derivation of the export supply elasticity. 
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TABLE II 
TOTAL IMPORT REQUIREMENTS BY BONUS RATE 
Bonus rate Industry 
Total rupee imports/ 
rupee unit of final 
demand 
(percent) 
0 
20 
30 
(rupees) 
Tea 0.01115 
Salt 0.00982 
Chemical fertilizers 0.03960 
Coal and petroleum products 0.09182 
Cotton ginning 0.02348 
Jute pressing 0.00252 
Sugar 0.00946 
Rice milling 0.01189 
Jute textiles 0.04392 
Dyeing, printing and finishing of textiles 0.09635 
Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables 0.23113 
Barkery products and confectionary 0.12268 
Alcoholic beverages 0.02888 
Non-alcoholic beverages 0.07961 
Cigarettes and tobacco products 0.04830 
Cotton textiles 0.05354 
Woollen textiles 0.19298 
Silk and artsilk 0.17206 
Knitting 0.05553 
Thread and threadball making 0.07786 
Footwear 0.06047 
Wearing apparel 0.25227 
Wood, cork and furniture 0.05434 
Manufacture of paper and board 0.12420 
Articles of paper and board 0.07721 
Printing and publishing 0.11822 
Tanning and leather finishing 0.10370 
Leather goods 0.12191 
Rubber and rubber products 0.21020 
Paints and varnishes 0.21403 
Perfumes, cosmetics and s o a p s / 0.27898 
Matches ' / 0.02288 
Pharmaceuticals and miscellaneous chemical products 0.14590 
Non-metallic mineral products 0.05601 
Basic metals / 0.36073 
Metal goods 0.24600 
Non-electrical machinery\ 0.22760 
Electrical machinery and appliances 0.21126 
Transport equipment 0.21222 
Optical goods 0.14800 
Plastic products 0.25529 
Sports goods \ 0.01450 
Pens, pencils and related products \ 0.06012 
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products to be exported can be attributed to the fact that for these products 
"incentives on the supply side generated by the scheme were not strong enough" 
[2, p. 62]. As we have pointed out above, if one were to judge the scheme in 
terms of net foreign-exchange earnings rather than in terms of gross earnings, 
the scheme would be viewed as being even less successful in terms of these 'other' 
manufactured goods. The incentives necessary to increase net earnings will, 
of course, be greater than those required to increase gross earnings by an 
equivalent amount. 
In the short run, supplies are relatively inelastic and the effect of the bonus 
scheme is essentially to divert a larger proportion of a given supply of goods to 
the export market . 
In the long run, however, capacity can be expanded and the effect of differ-
ential bonus rates will be to increase investment in those industries with the higher 
bonus rates relative to those industries with lower bonus rates. 
The long-run effects of differential bonus rates need not lead to an inefficient 
use of resources. Manufactur ing industries which now have the highest bonus 
rates may well be those industries in which Pakistan has a long-run comparative 
advantage and the encouragement of these industries relative to others might be 
optimal f rom the long-run point of view. On the other hand, there is no evidence 
to suggest that bonus rates have in fact been set according to the comparative-
advantage principles, so that the effect of the present export policies may very 
well have an adverse effect on the long-run growth rate of Pakistan. 
V. THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT AND E C O N O M I C EFFICIENCY 
In actual planning procedures, it is often very difficult to select a simple 
criterio n for determining what the pattern of investment in industry should be. 
Often, there are many conflicting goals, each of which implies a different criterion. 
The planners, of course, are free to choose their own particular set of goals and 
criteria. One might disagree with these goals but the least one should expect is 
that the investment p rogramme be consistent with the targets set and the criteria 
chosen. The Third Five Year Plan states, in regard to investment criteria, that : 
the overriding principle is to create a structure for the 
industrial sector which is well-balanced internally and in rela-
tion to other sectors of the economy, through efficient utiliza-
tion of investment and manpower resources and with the 
minimum strains for the balance ofpayments [6, p. 464], (Italics 
added). 
One aspect of the industrialization strategy that is consistent with the aim 
of minimizing the strain on the balance of payments is the reorientation of in-
vestment toward "additional capacity primarily for export" [6]. Import sub-
stitution, which was a dominant theme during the Second Five Year Plan, is 
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to be continued but will be stressed primarily with respect to investment and 
related goods industries and other 'heavy' industries. 
The two strategies of export promotion and import substitution are con-
sistent with the "balance-of-payments" criterion for investment. One serves to 
increase foreign-exchange earnings through increased exports and the other 
serves to economize on the use of foreign exchange by producing domestically 
what is currently imported. 
The balance-of-payments criterion may not lead to an optimal investment 
pattern f rom the point of view of alternative investment criteria. The Third Plan 
does point out that "the composition of new industrial investment must be deter-
mined by assigning the maximum weight to scarce factors, which at the present 
stage of the country's development are foreign exchange and capital" [6J. The 
investment criteria should, therefore, at least reflect the desire to maximize the 
net foreign exchange saved or earned while taking full account of the scarcity 
of capital. This modified criterion would favour those industries for import sub-
stitution which are characterized by relatively low ratios of imported inputs and 
capital to output and those industries for export promotion which have a relative-
ly high ratio of net foreign-exchange earnings per unit of exports and a low 
capital-output ratio. 
The principal emphasis in import substitution in the Third Plan is to be 
placed on the establishment of capital and related goods industries. These same 
industries are also cited as containing export possibilities. It is interesting to 
ask whether this investment programme is consistent with the goals and scarce 
factors enumerated in the Plan. As far as we know, the investment programme, 
as posited in the Third Plan, has been formulated without reference to the kind 
of calculations undertaken in this paper. 
Table III shows the total, direct and indirect requirements of intermediate 
imports per rupee unit of final demand for forty-three industries, grouped into 
consumer, intermediate and capital and related goods industries. The average 
total import requirements for these three broad groups are shown below and 
compared to their average net foreign-exchange earnings. 
The capital and related goods industries have the highest import component 
and the lowest net foreign-exchange earnings, suggesting that investment in 
capital and related goods industries is not consistent with the modified balance-
of-payments criteria. However, the interpretation of these results must be 
subject to the following qualifications: 
/ W e t foreign-exchange earnings~have\l3een calculated on the basis of 
current inputs only. If capital/and related goods industries have a lower capital-
output ratio I ban other indmtries, the disadvantage of a low value for the net 
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TABLE III 
RUPEE IMPORTS PER RUPEE UNIT OF FINAL DEMAND 
Total Direct Indirect industry 
A. Consumer Goods 
.rupees, 
1. Sugar 0.00946 0.00388 0.00558 2. Salt 0,00982 0.00612 0.00370 3. Tea 0.011J5 0.00416 0.00699 4. Rice 0.01189 0.00566 0.00623 5. Sports goods 0.01450 0.00732 0.00718 6. Matches 0.02288 0,01334 0.00954 7. Alcoliolic beverages 0.02888 0.01481 0.01407 8. Cigarettes and tobacco products 0.04830 0.04064 0.00766 9. Cotton textiles 0.05354 0.03592 0.01762 10. Wood, cork and furniture* 0.05434 0.01291 0,04143 11. Knitting 0.05533 0.03183 0.02370 12. Pens, pencils and related products 0.06012 0.03167 0.02845 13. Footwear 0.06047 0.03329 0.02718 14. Non-alcoholic beverages 0.07961 0.07505 0.00456 15. Printing and publishing 0.11822 0.11643 0.00179 16. Leat her goods 0.12191 0.09896 0.02295 17. Bakery products and confectionary 0.12268 0.02612 0.09656 18, Optical goods 0.14800 0,08645 0.06155 19. Silk and at'tsilk 0.17206 0,17180 0.00026 20, Woollen textiles 0.19298 0.18728 0.00570 21. Canning and preserving of fruits ancl vegetables 0.23113 0,21635 0.01478 22. Wearing apparel 0.25227 0.24000 0.01227 23. Plastic products 0.25529 0.20776 0.04753 24. Perfumes, cosinctics and soap 0.27S98 0.26668 0.01230 
B. Intermediate Goods 
1. Jute pressing 0.00252 0.00005 0,00247 2. Cotton ginning 0,02348 0.00213 0.02135 3. Chemical fertilizers 0.03960 0.00446 0.03514 4. Jute textiles 0.04392 0.03136 0.01256 5. Articles of paper and board 0.07721 0.04503 0.03128 6. Thread and thread ball making 0.07786 0,04276 0.03510 7. CoaJ and petroleum products 0.09182 0.06957 0.02225 8. Dyeing, printing and finishing of textiles 0.09635 0.05662 0.03973 9. Tanning and leather finishing 0.10370 0.08108 0,02262 10. Manufacture of paper and board 0.12420 0.01065 0.11355 11. Pharmaceuticals and miscellaneous chcmicals 0.14590 0.08369 0.06221 12. Rubber and rubber products 0.21021 0.13436 0.07585 13. Paints and varnishes 0,21403 0.00571 0.20832 
C, Capita! and Related Good.* 
T. Non-metafJic mineral products 0,05601 0.00234 0.05367 2, Electrical machinery 0.21126 0.12257 0.08869 3. Transport equipment 0.21222 0.16835 0.04387 4. Non-electlical machinery 0,22760 0.16640 0.06120 5. Metal goods 0.24600 0,12607 0,11993 6. Basic metals 0.36073 0.30068 0.06005 
^Includes saw nulling and metal furniture. 
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foreign-exchange earnings must be balanced against the advantage of economiz-
ing on capital. 
Industry group 
Total rupee imports/ 
rupee unit of final 
demand 
Net foreign-exchange 
earnings as per cent 
of export value* 
Consumer goods 
Intermediate goods 
Capital and related goods 
"Calculated from Table I. 
0.101 
0.096 
0.219 
53.7 
64.6. 
44.3 
ii) The above calculations are based on the assumption of infinite demand 
elasticities so that average and marginal net foreign-exchange earnings are the 
same. In most cases, the average value may be taken as an approximation to the 
marginal value. However, for those goods facing a downward sloping foreign 
demand curve, the marginal value will be below the average. If the foreign 
demand for the output of Pakistan's capital and related goods industries is more 
elastic than the demand for other goods, then the marginal net value of foreign 
exchange earnings could be higher for capital and related goods industries than 
for other goods even though the average value of this coefficient is lower. 
iii) The computat ions of net foreign-exchange earnings take account of 
imported inputs only. If we had included the export alternatives of domestically 
produced inputs, the relative magnitudes of the net foreign-exchange-earnings 
coefficient may be reversed. The adjus tment to take account of domestically 
produced inputs would, in fact, primarily affect the consumer-goods industries 
which are dominated by the textile industries component. 
iv) Finally, the figures shown for each industry group are the unweighted 
arithmetic mean of the net foreign-exchange earnings for each component industry 
of the group. The relative positions of the aggregates do not necessarily apply 
to every pair of industries; chosen one f r o m each group. 
The first and second qualifications are not likely to be important. It is 
unlikely either that capital and related goods industries are less capital intensive 
than other industries or that the foreign demand for these goods is significantly 
more elastic than for other manufactures. 
/ The third and fourth qualifications are important. In an earlier study [8], 
I we found evidence which supports the investment programme as stated in the 
Plan; namely, that many consumer-goods industries already established have 
negative value added when their outputs and inputs are valued at 'world prices'. 
\ Of course, not all industries within the consumer industries group could be so 
\ characterized. Some consumer-goods industries did show a positive value 
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added while a few capital and related goods industries showed a negative value 
added. Also, the study referred to past investment. Clearly, caution must 
be exercised in extending the conclusions to predict the effect of future invest-
ment. 
The Third Plan also makes provisions for export expansion in "industrial 
products based on raw materials which are available in the country in adequate 
quantities, such as cement, fertilizers, petro-chemical products and paper" [6]. 
These industries, while they may have a high capital coefficient, have among the 
lowest total imported intermediate input requirement see (Table III). Hence, 
they should be given a much more prominent role in the export strategy. Sur-
prisingly they are not. Almost the entire increase in production of fertilizers 
and cement expected during the third-live-year-plan period will be absorbed 
by the expanding domestic demand for these commodities. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have examined two propositions regarding the Export 
Bonus Scheme, namely /) that the scheme permits manufactured goods to be 
exported at a price, in terms of foreign exchange, which is less than the foreign-
exchange cost of direct and indirect imported inputs used to produce the com-
modity, and ii) that the effectiveness of the Export Bonus Scheme may be seriously 
reduced because of uncertainties regarding the bonus rate and bonus premium. 
With respect to the first point, we have shown that while there is a large 
range in the net value of foreign exchange earned for different exported com-
modities, all commodities earn more foreign exchange than is embodied in their 
production. As for the second point, we have shown that the receipts of ex-
porters are affected to a greater extent by changes in the bonus rate, because 
these changes tend to be quite large when they are made, than by the day-to-day 
fluctuations in the bonus premium. 
The large dispersion in the net foreign-exchange earnings for manufactured 
goods raises the question of what commodities should be exported, and in the 
longer run, in what industries should Pakistan invest in order to increase its 
exports. These questions of investment criteria go beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, we have pointed out that the present investment targets of the 
Third Five Year Plan emphasize those industries which are likely to have a high 
import cost, both in terms of capital and intermediate inputs. This pattern of 
investment may well be inconsistent with the criteria enumerated in the Plan 
although our results are subject to a number of qualifications. 
We have also found that the present structure of the bonus rate is such 
that those industries which have the highest import component are receiving 
the largest export subsidy through the bonus scheme. In other words, the 
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Export Bonus Scheme provides incentives for the expansion of industries which 
have a large import component without adequately taking account of other 
"efficiency" criteria for investment. 
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The Operation of the Export 
Bonus Scheme in Pakistan's 
Jute and Cotton Industries 
Qazi K h o l i q u z z a m a n A h m a d 
INTRODUCTION 
The author 's intention is essentially to extend the Bruton and Bose study 
of the Pakistan Export Bonus Scheme [1], in terms of both time and com-
modity. However, in this paper we examine the operation of the scheme in 
jute and cotton industries only. 
Very briefly, the scheme works in the following way 1 . The exporter of a 
"bonus commodity" surrenders his foreign-exchange earnings to the State Bank 
of Pakistan and receives, in addition to the rupee equivalent, a voucher that 
entitles its owner to purchase foreign exchange equal in value to 20 or 30 per 
cent (depending on the commodity exported) of the amount earned. The 
voucher can be utilised for obtaining foreign exchange for use in a) importing a 
wide range of goods, b) business travels, and c) opening and maintaining com-
mercial offices abroad. Vouchers are issued for all goods except raw jute, raw 
cotton, hides and skins, raw wool, and rice. The voucher is freely transferable, 
and its price (which is commonly known as the premium) is d e t e r m i n e d by the 
market. Imports permissible under bonus vouchers inc lude a large number of 
items — both capital and consumer goods. 
Our analysis is based on the analytical framework developed by Bruton 
and Bose [1, Section I]. We do not reproduce it here. However, our basic 
assumption is that, for jute and cotton goods, both domestic and foreign demand 
iFor a detailed discussion, see [1]. 
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curves are downward sloping and the marginal cost curve is rising upward to the 
right. The introduction of the scheme will lead to an increase in the export of a 
commodity, the magnitude of which depends on the elasticities of its demand 
curves and the marginal cost curve. 
Bruton and Bose [1] covered three years, i.e., 1959 to 1961. However, to 
view the scheme f r o m a longer-run perspective and to emphasize certain points, 
we examine the operation of the scheme f rom 1959 through December 1964 and, 
where possible, June 1965. 
In this paper, we shall be mainly concerned with the following points: 
a) to examine the estimate made in [1] of the "loss" of foreign exchange 
during 1959 to 1961 due to reduction in the export of raw jute and raw 
cotton consequent on the bonus scheme, and to figure out the position 
during the whole period under review, taking into account the stock 
position, and relating exports to more appropriate production figuresZ; 
b) to examine the estimate made in [1] of the foreign-exchange "gain" f rom 
increased export of jute and cotton manufactures during 1959 to 1961, 
and to make an estimate for the whole period under review; 
c) to explain the year-to-year developments in all cases; and 
d) if it is found that the export (of ju te and/or cotton manufactures) has 
not increased enough to mean a good response to the incentives provided 
by the scheme than try to locate the bottleneck. 
II. THE JUTE INDUSTRY 
Exports* of jute manufactures have earned a 20-per-cent bonus since the 
inception of the scheme. Hessian cloth and gunny bags are the two main types 
of jute manufactures and their export constitutes all but a very small proport ion 
of the total export of j u t e manufactures, We shall confine our discussion to 
these two products. Production and export of other jute products are too 
small to make an individual study of any value, while at the same time their 
prices lack comparability and, therefore, make aggregation of their values 
meaningless. 
There has never been any bonus on the export of raw jute, so it may be 
suspected that the scheme has had some adverse effects on the export earnings 
f rom raw jute. It has been estimated [I, p. 22] that the scheme was responsible 
2For example, in [1], the production of 1956/S7 has been taken to be the production of 
1956 and related to the export of 1956. As the crop year is on July-June basis, the export 
during January-June 1956 could have no relation to the production of 1956/57. 
AThroughout this paper, by the word "exports" we mean physical quantity of exports; and 
when we say "foreign exchange earned" we mean value of exports. 
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for the "loss" of between Rs. 48 million and Rs. 84 million of foreign-exchange 
earnings in the years 1959-61 by causing a reduction in the export of raw jute . 
It has also been estimated [1, p. 30] that the scheme, during the same period, 
a c c o u n t e d for an increase of Rs. 372 million in the foreign-exchange earnings of 
jute manufactures. The resultant "gain" of foreign-exchange earnings f r o m 
the jute industry, as a whole, is between Rs. 324 million and Rs. 288 million. 
A. Raw Jute 
The relevant data on raw ju te are presented in Table I. The ceiling on jute 
acreage, which was operative until 1959/60, appears to have had little effect on the 
acreage actually cropped, which varied between 83 and 139 per cent of the 
licensed area [2]. It appears, therefore, that if the farmers wanted to crop more, 
they did so notwithstanding the ceiling regulation. The variation in acreage 
actually cropped was largely due to changes in expected prices. Hussain [3] 
has found that Pakistani farmers growing cash crops were quite responsive to 
price changes. 
Production, however, is also a funct ion of yield per acre. In 1959/60, the 
low production was due to low acreage, and low acreage appears to have been 
caused mostly by low prices in the previous year. In 1961/62, both acreage 
(2.061 million acres) and product ion (1.244 million tons) reached the maximum 
so far attained due to unusually high prices in the previous year. Prices were 
falling in the following three years resulting in lower and lower acreage, but the 
fall in production of 1962/63 and that of 1964/65 was more than proport ional 
because of very low yield per acre. 
We do not mean to imply that the supply 4 of raw ju te has been perfectly 
elastic. What we wish to emphasize is that the supply has been fairly elastic 
throughout the period under review, as in the years in which product ion was 
low due to low productivity, carryovers f r o m previous years were large enough 
to ensure reasonably elastic supplies. A glance at the supply and stock series 
makes it clear that, with the prevailing domestic and foreign demands, the two 
markets did not have to compete for limited supplies — with the possible excep-
tion of 1960/61. In that year too, the large stock of 214.4 thousand tons sug-
gests that the rather keen competition was not so much for the limited supply 
but probably more due to the fact that carryover was comparatively low, leading 
to speculative restriction of sales. 
In 1958/59, there was a decline in the absolute quantity of raw jute exported 
as well as in the proport ion of the total supply and of the total crop exported. 
There was, however, a rise in the absolute quantity of raw jute used in domestic 
mills as well as in the proport ion of the total supply and of the total crop used in 
domestic mills. As the supply was definitely not the bottleneck, the decline in the 
4 Quantity supplied is defined here as production plus carryover from the previous year. 
T A B L E I 
STATISTICAL. POSITION OF RAW JUTE (1955/56 — 1964/65) 000 tons) (iquantity in 
1 
! i 
1 ! Total 
j i i Foreign j Average Domestic Export as Export 
i Farm 4 ' distri- Stock exehan- value of wholesale percent- as per-Year Produc- Carry- Total I Domestic; consu- bution (4)—(8) ge earned exports price age of out- centage tion over supply Export mill use 1 mption (5)+(6) =(9) put of supply (2)+ (3) I +(7)=(8) \{mil. Rs.) (per ton) (per ton) (per cent) (per cent) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) i 
(11) (12) (13) (14) 
1955/56 1,161.0 71.4 1,232.4 1,015.0 331.1 47.5 1,193.6 38.8 829.2 817 87 82 
1956/57 985.0 38.8 1,023.8 726.4 154.6 59.7 940.7 S3.1 705.9 972 74 71 (—28.4) (+17.9) (+19.0) 1957/58 1,107.0 S3.1 3,190.1 * 854.3 168.0 46.3 1,068.6 121.5 853.6 1,000 823 78 71 (-1-17.6) (+8.7) (+2.9) 1958/59 1,071.0 121.5 1,192.5 729.8 215.9 34.1 979.S 212.7 654.8 897 731 68 61 (—14.6) (+28.5) (—10.3) (—11.2) 1959/60 992.0 212.7 1,204.7 860.3 274.1 29.5 1,163.9 40.8 729.1 848 906 S7 71 (+17.9) (+27.0) (—5.6) (+23.9) 1960/61 1,004.0 40.8 1,044.8 526.8 259.9 43.7 830.4 214.4 848.1 1,610 1,683 43 50 
1961/62 (-38.8) (—5.2) (+89.9) (+85.7) 1,244.0 214.4 1,458.4 719.4 283.9 19.7 1,023.0 435.4 349.6 1,181 1,132 58 49 
1962/63 919.0 (+36.6) (+9.2) (—26.6) (—32.7) 435.4 1,354.4 774.4 311.4 45.7 1,131.5 222.9 792-9 1,024 893 84 57 
1963/64 (+7.6) (+9.7) ( - 1 3 . 3 ) (—21.1) 1,049.0 222.9 1,271.9 768.3 346.8 28.2 1,143.3 128.6 753.6 980 926 71 60 
1964/65 (—8) (+11.4) (—4.3) (+3.8) 951.0 128.6 1,079.6 697.1 304.1 35.2" 1,036.4 43.2 837.7 1,202 1,239 74 65 ( -9 .3 ) (—12.3) (+22.7) (+33.8) 
Source: CSO Statistical Bulletins. Figures within brackets are percentage changes relative to the previous year. 
aThe carryover in 1355/56 has been taken from [5]. The rest are calculated. Themethodofcalculationisevidentfromthetable. 
_ &Tfce farm consumption figures have been calculated from the "Home Consumption" figures given in the table referred to in footnote a "which includes both domestic mill consumption and farm consumption. The mill consumption figures have been taken from CSO Statistical Bulletins and were found to tally with mill consumption figures given in [5, Table IV]. 
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export is explained by slack foreign demand — as evidenced by a 10-per-cent dec-
line in the average value of exports, and by the low total world export of only 
780 thousand tons (of which Pakistan's share was 93 per cent). The bonus 
scheme was introduced in January 1959 and so a breakdown of 1958/59 is to 
be considered. There was a decline in exports in January-June 1959 f r o m those 
of July-December 1958 5. This small decline in exports can confidently be attri-
buted to a weak foreign demand as the foreign price fell to Rs. 876.00 per ton 
f rom Rs. 917.00 per ton during the previous six months. 
In the year 1959/60 also, the scheme did not cause a reduction in raw-jute 
exports as the supply was large enough to cater to the slightly increased domestic 
demand, leaving enough even to call for a reduction in the export price for in-
creasing exports. A reduction of the export price by 6 per cent was accompanied 
by an increase of 18 per cent in the export, still leaving a stock of 40.8 thousand 
tons at the end of the period. Any further increase in the export would probably 
not have been possible without a drastic cut in the export price as the total world 
export in that year was about 937 thousand tons (of which Pakistan's share was 
92 per cent). 
With domestic demand rising and the small carryover, wholesalers appear 
to have become speculative f r o m the beginning of the next year, 1960/61. The 
domestic price rose to Rs. 1683.00 and the export price to Rs. 1610.00 per ton 
f rom Rs. 906.00 and Rs. 848.00, respectively in the previous year — the percentage 
increases being 85.7 and 89.9, respectively. If we look at the breakdown of that 
year, we shall see that the domestic price rose f rom Rs. 1024.00 in January-June 
1960 to Rs. 1433.00 in July-December 1960 (40 per cent) and to Rs. 1933.00 in 
January-June 1961 (35 per cent); and the corresponding increases in the export 
price were f rom Rs. 860.00 to Rs. 1361.00 (58 per cent) and to Rs. 2028.00 (49 
per cent). Prices are not likely to j u m p like this in response to the rather mild 
changes experienced in domestic demand for raw jute. In fact, the year ended 
up with a lower mill consumption than the previous year. The price behaviour, 
therefore, seems to indicate that there was a speculative force in operation. The 
result was a 39-per-cent reduction in the export and a 5.2-per-cent reduction in 
the domestic mill consumption. The contention that speculation was mainly 
responsible for low exports can be backed up by the fact that the year ended up 
with a huge stock of 214.4 thousand tons. 
However, it has to be recognised that the speculation leading to high prices 
was induced, among other things, by the acceleration of the domestic mill 
consumption, as the export market for ju te manufactures became comparatively 
more lucrative due to the bonus scheme. Hence, in the ultimate analysis, it seems 
'Breakdown of the export of raw jute in 1958/59: 
July-December 1958 378,000 tons 
January-June 1959 351,000 tons 
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certain that the bonus scheme was responsible for some "loss" of foreign ex-
change f rom raw-jute exports in 1960/61, as the export market appears to have 
been strong enough to absorb a larger quantity of raw ju te at favourable prices. 
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that the scheme was responsible for a cut in the 
export of raw ju te to the extent to which the (already rising) domestic mill 
consumption was accelerated. A look at the stock figures will make our con-
tention clear. Hence, it is rather difficult to determine quantitatively the true 
"loss" of foreign-exchange earnings f rom raw ju te due to the scheme. Accord-
ingly, no attempt is made at such determination here. 
In the following three years (i.e., 1961/62, 1962/63, and 1963/64) the increases 
in the domestic mill consumption were 9.2 per cent, 9.7 per cent, and 11.7 per 
cent, respectively. Supplies were large enough in all these years to allow larger 
increases in both domestic mill consumption and exports than those which 
actually occurred; so the question of any bidding away of raw ju te by the domes-
tic market f r o m the export market can be rejected. In view of the large stocks 
carried in these years, the failure of raw-jute export to increase fur ther should be 
sought elsewhere, and not attributed to the bonus scheme. 
In the year 1964/65, both domestic and export prices rose significantly — the 
former by 34 per cent and the latter by 23 per cent—and, in the same year, domes-
tic mill consumption and export of raw ju te declined by 12.3 per cent and 9.3 per 
cent, respectively. The fact that domestic mill consumption declined relatively 
more than the export of raw ju te in the face of a substantially greater relative 
price increase clearly indicates that there was no bidding away of raw ju te f r o m 
the export market by the domestic market in this year. If anything, the opposite 
was the case. 
From the above analysis, it is now clear that with the possible exception of 
1960/61, the bonus scheme did not shift the domestic demand curve for raw ju te 
to the right enough in any year to lead to a bidding away f r o m the export market. 
After meeting domestic demand, there has always been enough to meet export 
demand. It is obvious that the already rising domestic mill consumption was 
accelerated by the scheme, but it can be said confidently that the acceleration 
only reduced the stocks which would otherwise have been carried. Looking at 
the stock and domestic mill consumption series, we feel that not only did the in-
creases in domestic mill consumption that actually took place in various years 
not bid away raw ju te f r o m the export market but that considerably higher incre-
ases would not have done so; and, in fact, more could have been supplied to both 
markets if "other things" had worked well. 
Our conclusion, then, is that only in 1960/61 was there any significant "loss" 
of foreign exchange f rom the export of raw ju te due to the scheme. 
Bruton and Bose estimated the trend value of domestic mill consumption 
and attributed the excess of the actuals over the trend values to the scheme and 
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c o n t e n d e d that this "excess" of raw ju te used in domestic mills could have been 
e x p o r t e d without price reductions or with slightly reduced prices, had not the 
bonus scheme been in operation. However, as we have seen, the contribution 
of the scheme to the acceleration of domestic mill consumption of raw ju te has 
not been large enough in any year to require bidding away of raw ju te f r o m 
the export market. Furthermore, the trend values of mill consumption of raw 
jute they have arrived at seem to be an underestimate, as a number of other 
measures were strengthened after the introduction of the scheme which definitely 
had an effect on the "excess" attributed to the bonus scheme. Some of these 
measures are discussed below. 
B. Jute Manufactures 
In any attempt to isolate the export-promotion effect of the bonus scheme 
by examining the trend and extent of export performances, one should take into 
account other important export inducements such as a) increased agricultural 
and industrial production, in general, and the export orientation of the pattern 
of growth in particular, b) diversification of export markets, c) strengthening 
of institutional f ramework for export promotion, d) bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements, and e) fiscal concessions such as excise rebates, the sales tax 
exemption, and the exemption of customs duties on the imported materials that 
go into the production of exportables. 
It is to be noted that an upward trend in both ouptut and export of jute 
manufactures existed before the bonus scheme was introduced. To repeat, 
Bruton and Bose assumed trend values of exports and attributed the "excess" of 
actual export over trend values to the bonus scheme. It may be acceptable that 
the trend, under certain assumptions, will take care of a) above and some of the 
.other measures mentioned above which were introduced well before the scheme 
came into effect and have remained unchanged since. If any new measures were 
introduced, or any measures effective before the scheme were strengthened along 
with or after the introduction of the scheme, then these will definitely have their 
share in the "excess". It is not possible to estimate quantitatively the effects 
of all the various measures which were put into force or strengthened af ter the 
introduction of the scheme. But one should keep in mind that such additional 
measures existed. Having noted this, we shall also, for simplicity, fit a trend to 
export performances and attribute the "excess" of actual export over trend values 
to the bonus scheme. But unqualified reliance on our estimate of foreign 
exchange "gain" due to the scheme is not warranted. 
It is clear f r o m Tables II and III that upward trends in output and export of 
both sacking and hessian were in force well before the bonus scheme came into 
effect. Now, if the scheme were to have any impact, we would expect an accele-
ration of the already rising exports. Increases in 1958 over 1957 in output and 
export of sacking were (rounding) 13 per cent and 28 per ccnt, respectively, while 
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those of hessian were 16 per cent and 5 per cent; the corresponding increases 
in 1959 over 1958 were 34 per cent and 145 per cent in case of sacking, and 38 
per cent and 71 per cent in case of hessian. It seems doubt fu l that such great 
acceleration could have occurred but for the bonus scheme. In both cases, 
increases in exports were much larger than those in outputs and were made 
possible by a large release f r o m the domestic market . After 1959, the outputs 
of both, in general, increased at a declining ra te 6 and the reasons for this appear 
to have been a) the big j u m p in foreign demand in 1959 was not followed by 
equally big j umps in later years and/or b) limited capacity. Accordingly, and for 
the added reason that between 1959 and 1960/61 there was little or no reduction 
and thereafter there was an upward trend in the domestic consumption of both 
sacking and hessian, the rate of increase of export in both cases was, in general, 
declining. All this is consistent with the straightforward funct ioning of the 
scheme. 
1) Sacking 
In Bruton and Bose monograph [1, p. 24], it was assumed that there was 
a 12-per-cent trend effect for 1959 and 10 per cent for both 1960 and 1961 in the 
export of sacking. Our estimated trend effects are different for these years (as 
can be seen f rom Table IV) and, having been based on regression analysis, may 
be better. We have estimated the trend effects in the following fashion. 
We have fitted a time trend to export performances f rom 1956 to 1964. 
The equation found is 
X = 28.52 + 15.43T R2 = .81 
(2.78) 
where X stands for exports in thousand tons 
and T for time (1956 = 1, 1957 = 2, 1964 = 9) 
We have then calculated the expected values of exports and the rate of 
growth of exports for different years. These are the rates which we have accep-
ted as the trend effects on exports for different years and have applied them to 
calculate the trend values of exports. The results are shown in Table IV. 
Thus, we obtain an estimate of foreign-exchange earnings f r o m exports of 
sacking due to the operation of the scheme during 1959-61 of Rs. 201.9 million 
as against the Bruton and Bose estimate of Rs. 236.3 million [1, p. 25]. The 
total estimate during 1959 through 1964 amounts to Rs. 344.9 million. We 
shall now try to explain the year-to-year developments. 
AOutput of sacking and hessian registered actual declines in 1961 and 1964. 

TABLE I I I 
HESSIAN PRODUCTION AND EXPORT (1956-1964) 
1 i Production | 1 
Export i i Foreign exchange Average value earned of exports 
(000 tons) ; (000 tons) (million Rs.) (j>er ton) 
i 0 ) j (3) | (4) 1 (5) 
1956 35.0 24.7 35.0 1417 
1957 37.2 (+5.2) 
26.7 (+8.1) 37.6 
1408 
1958 43.1 (—15.8) 
28.0 (+4.9) 46.4 
1657 (+17.7) 
1959 59.4 (+37.8) 
47. S (+70.7) 74.0 
1548 ( -6 .6) 
1960 69.7 (+17.3) 57.8 (+20.9) 
97.8 1691 (+9.2) 
1961 67.8 (—2.7) 
61.3 (+6.1) 114.1 
1862 (+10.1) 
1962 79.2 (+16.8) 63.0 (+2.3) 
109.9 1743 (—6.4) 
1963 90.2 (+33.8) 
65.2 (+3.5) 117.9 
1807 (+3.7) 
1964 79.1 (—12.3) 
61.2 (—6.1) 
123.5 2018 (+11.7) 
Note: Figures within brackets are percentage changes relative to the previous period. Sources. Where necessary, yards of cloth have been converted into tons on the assumption that 3.750 yards weigh one ton. ^Domestic prices are for 50 x 10 02, of hessian. "Narayanganj. 
Domestic prices* : Percentage of (wholesale) output exported (per ton) 
(6) ! (7) 
71 
2317 72 
2189 65 
2218 80 (+1-4) 
2744 83 (+23.7) 
2897 90 (+5.6) 
2856 79 ( -1 .5) 
2552 72 (—11.0) 
2590 77 (+1-6) 
CSO Statistical Bulletin for produc-tion and domestic prices. CSO Foreign Trade Statistics for export upto 1961 and for export after 1961 office records of CSO. 
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T A B L E I V 
EFFECTS OF THE EXPORT B O N U S SCHEME ON SACKING EXPORTED 
AND FOREIGN-EXCHANGE GAIN THEREFROM, 1959-1964 
(quantity in thousand tons and value in thousand rupees) 
Year 
(1) 
Actual 
exports 
(qty.) 
(2) 
Estimated 
trend rate 
of growth 
(per cent) 
(3) 
Computed 
trend 
( < w ) 
(4) 
Due to 
bonus 
(2)—(4) 
(<ity-) J(S) 
Foreign 
exchange earned 
due to bonus* 
(value) 
(6) 
1959 127.9 20.6 62.97 64.93 67,007.76 
1960 114.4 17.1 73.74 40.66 49,198.60 
1961 138.4 14.6 48.51 53.89 85,685.10 
1962 J45.7 12.7 95.28 50.42 64,184.68 
1963 144.3 11.3 106.05 38.25 45,594.00 
1964 146.0 10.2 116.81 29.19 33,276.60 
344,946.72 
* Values have been calculated by multiplying the quantities in Col. (5) with the average value of export in respective years. 
In 1959, output increased by 34 per cent and exports by 145 per cent, while 
the foreign price declined by 12 per cent and the domestic price by 5 per cent. 
The declines in both the foreign and domestic prices suggest that bonus incen-
tives supplemented by a weak domestic market caused the impressive j ump in 
exports. The increase of 34 per cent in output can probably be attributed fully 
to the bonus scheme. 
In 1960, exports dropped by 11 per cent in the face of 17-per-cent j u m p in 
foreign prices and a 14-pcr-cent rise in output. This seems to be a bit un-
expected. The explanation may be that the pressure of domestic prices (which 
shot up by 64 per cent) caused the reduction of tonnage exported and thereby 
induced rise in export prices. With consequent fur ther decline in exports, the 
export prices would probably have risen further , had it not been for the bonus 
scheme. 
In 1961, sacking exports rose by 21 per cent, the foreign price by 31 per cent, 
and the domestic price by 3 per cent, while output declined by 8 per cent. The 
decline in output seems to have been due to limited capacity and to 31-per-cent 
rise in the price of raw jute. The increase of 21 per cent in exports and the 
31-per cent j u m p in the foreign price suggest that the foreign demand for sack-
ing was quite strong in 1961. But, as Bruton and Bose have pointed out, the 
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domestic market in that year was strong enough to prevent as large a shift as 
the foreign market would have accepted at favourable prices. 
The idea behind the bonus scheme is to enable the exporters to increase 
exports by reducing export prices and still make a profit . However, in 1962 
export of sacking increased by only 5 per cent, while its export price was lowered 
by 20 per cent. Supply was no constraint, because output rose by 16 per cent. 
Also, the domestic market was relatively weak, as evidenced by a 7-per-cent 
decline in domestic prices. All this suggests that the foreign demand for Pak-
istani sacking was rather weak in that year. In 1963 and 1964, foreign 
demand was probably even weaker, as evidenced by the fact that exports dec-
lined by 1 per cent in 1963 (even though the export price was lowered by 6 per 
cent) and then rose by only 1.2 per cent in 1964 (in the face of the export price 
being lowered by another 4 per cent). Supply does not seem to have been any 
constraint in any of these years, as output rose by 9 per cent in 1963 while domes-
tic price fell by 10 per cent, indicating a weak domestic market ; and in 1964, 
though there was a decline of 11 per cent in the domestic prices, sizeable 
stocks were carried forward f rom previous years (see [5]) making supply 
quite large. 
Stocks of sacking increased after 1962 [5], even though the exporters lower-
ed export prices significantly in response to bonus incentives, so it appears 
that in the years 1962-64 the foreign demand for Pakistan sacking was inelastic. 
The decline in output of sacking in 1964 seems to have been largely due to 
flagging of its foreign demand. 
2) Hessian 
Bruton and Bose assumed [1, p. 24] that the trend growth rates for hessian 
exports were 10 per cent in 1959, and 8 per cent in both 1960 and 1961. We 
have again used a simple regression equation for estimating trends. 
The equation found is 
X -- 19.66 + 5.75 T R2= ,84 
(0.98) 
Notat ions are the same as those used on page 388. 
The results are shown in Table V. 
Thus, our estimate of foreign-exchange earnings f rom hessian export due 
to the bonus scheme during 1959-61 is Rs. 97.1 million, as against the 
Bruton and Bose estimate of Rs. 120.9 million [1, p. 25], The estimate for the 
whole period, 1959-64, is Rs. 169.6 million. 
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T A B L E I V 
EFFECTS OF THE EXPORT B O N U S S C H E M E ON HESSIAN EXPORTED 
A N D FOREIGN-EXCHANGE GAIN THEREFROM, 1959—1964 
(quantity in thousand tons and value in thousand rupees) 
Year 
Actual 
exports 
(<70') 
Estimated 
trend rate 
of growth 
(per cent) 
Computed 
trend iflty.) 
Due to bonus 
(2)—(4) (qty.) 
Foreign 
exchange earned 
due to bonus 
(value) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1959 47.8 15.6 32.37 15.43 23,885.64 
1960 57.8 13.5 36.74 21.06 35,612.46 
1961 61.3 11.9 41.10 20.20 37,612.46 
1962 63.0 10.6 45.46 17.54 30,572.22 
1963 65.2 9.6 49.82 15.38 27,791.66 
1964 61.2 8.8 54.18 7.02 14,148.36 
169,622.74 
We shall now try to explain the year-to-year development in hessian. The 
general picture seems to be much the same as that we have seen in case of sack-
ing. In 1959, output rose by 38 per cent and physical volume of exports by 70 
per cent. The domestic price rose by 1.4 per cent while the foreign price declined 
by 6 per cent. Stocks carried f r o m 1958 were decidedly small. The small 
rise in the domestic price in the face of 24-per-cent decline in the quantity avail-
able for domestic use f rom current output suggests a weak domestic market . 
The 70-per-cent increase in exports in the face of only a 6-per-cent decline in the 
foreign price suggests that the foreign demand was such that even larger ex-
ports could have been sold at favourable prices, had a larger quantity been avail-
able. Thus, the failure of actual output to increase was the immediate bottleneck 
in 1959. 
In 1960, the absolute increase in output of about 10 thousand tons was 
matched exactly by the absolute increase in exports. The domestic price went 
up by 24 per cent and the foreign price by 9 per cent. In that year, supply 
appears to have been limited both by failure of output to increase sufficiently 
and by refusal of the domestic market to release output. As is pointed out in 
11, p. 27], it is not possible to say definitely whether the bottleneck was in raw 
ju te or in mill capacity. However, the comparatively small stock of raw jute, 
at the end of June 1960, and the 50-per-cent rise in the domestic price of raw 
ju te in July-December 1960 over January-June 1960 suggest that raw jute was 
largely responsible. 
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In 1961, output dropped by 3 per cent while exports rose by 6 per cent, the 
domestic price fell by 4 per cent and the foreign price by 10 per cent. In that 
year, the supply of raw ju te was very large, and the large stock of raw ju te at the 
end of the year proves that ju te was not in any way responsible for the limited 
supply of hessian. So, the drop in output in the face of rising domestic and 
foreign prices seems to imply that the bottleneck in that year was mill capacity. 
Both domestic and foreign demand in 1961 seem to have been strong enough to 
just i fy a much larger increase in output. 
In 1962, output rose by 17 per cent and exports by 3 per cent while the 
domestic price declined by 1.5 per cent and the foreign price by 6 per cent. In 
this year, the average yearly premium rose to Rs. 157.00 f rom Rs. 119.00 in 1961. 
This seems to have induced exporters to increase exports by reducing the export 
price. But a 6-per-cent reduction in the export price resulted in an increase of 
only 3 per cent in exports indicating that in that year foreign demand was not 
strong. Another , perhaps more important, reason for the small increase in ex~ 
ports was the rather strong pull of the domestic market which was willing to 
continue to olfer very high prices to keep hessian at home. 
in 1963, output rose by 14 per cent and exports by 3.5 per cent while the 
domestic price fell by 11 per cent and the foreign price rose by nearly 4 per cent. 
The big drop in the domestic price indicates a relatively weak domestic demand 
and the possibility of easy shifting away f rom it. It seems clear that foreign de-
mand was such that the foreign market would have accepted a larger quantity 
of exports at favourable prices. Further, the premium was higher in that year 
than that in 1962, making it more lucrative for the exporters to increase exports. 
Why was it, then, that exports did not increase to the extent apparently justified, 
while stocks were building up? Stocks amounted to about 9 thousand tons at 
the end of June 1963 and continued growing thereafter to rise to 15 thousand 
tons by the end of June 1964 [5]. It seems difficult to provide a suitable answer 
to the above question, However, we believe that, having known that because of 
limited mill capacity for hessian output would not increase much, if at all, in the 
following year, traders preferred to carry stocks rather than to increase exports 
as perhaps they could have, by reducing export price, because they expected 
thereby to get a better price the following year. 
In 1964, output dropped by more than 12 per cent. The apparent reason 
for this drop was a rise in the cost of production as an 18-per-cent increase in the 
domestic price of raw jute superimposed itself on a limited mill capacity. The 
physical volume of exports declined by 6 per cent while the export price rose 
by 12 per cent and the domestic price by 1.6 per cent. An increase of only 1.6 
per cent in the domestic price suggests that the domestic market was not suffi-
ciently strong in that year to offer keen competition with the foreign market ; and 
only a 6-per-cent decline in exports in the face of a 12-per-cent increase in the 
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export price suggests that foreign demand in that year was strong enough to 
accept a larger quantity of exports at favourable prices. One discouraging factor 
for the exporter was the fall of the premium to Rs. 145.00 f r o m Rs. 163.00 in 
1963. This, together with the decrease in output, prompted traders to raise 
the export price and prefer to carry stocks which, as noted above, went up 
to 15 thousand tons by the end of June 1964, and were still at about that level at 
the end of 1964. 
The conclusion that emerges with respect to hessian is that, after the 1962 
level of output, mill capacity remained so limited as to be the most important 
single factor responsible for the failure of exports to increase to the level that 
would have been justified by the foreign demand. It is because of the limited 
mill capacity that in both 1963 and 1964 traders preferred to carry stocks rather 
than export at lower but favourable prices. So the incentives provided by the 
20-per-cent bonus do not seem sufficient, in the case of hessian, to induce tra-
ders to increase exports. 
3) Motion's Two Points 
We now turn to two points raised by Richard Mallon [4], First, he sug-
gested that a specific subsidy would be superior to the acl valorem bonus scheme 
in providing incentives to expand exports at lower prices. This appears to be 
correct a priori. The exporters will know how much subsidy they are going to 
get by exporting one more unit and a lower export price will not mean a reduc-
tion in the subsidy. In the case of an ad valorem bonus scheme, a lower price 
means a lower subsidy per unit. Thus, exporters are likely to expand export 
at relatively lower prices if the subsidy were specific. But empirically this does 
not seem to be so straightforward. For hessian, the export demand after 1962 
was probably elastic enough to just i fy the lowering of prices and so a specific 
subsidy would probably have been better in this case. But in the case of sacking, 
the export demand during the same period appears to have been inelastic, so that 
any fur ther lowering of prices would not bring about a justifiable increase in 
exports. If the bonus on sacking during this period had been specific instead 
of ad valorem, it would, by inducing the exporters to lower prices fur ther , have 
led to a lower foreign-exchange earning than the earnings actually realized. 
Therefore, an ad valorem subsidy seems to be better than a specific subsidy in 
the case of a commodity with inelastic foreign d e m a n d 7 , as this will minimise 
the foreign-exchange "loss" (should there be any). It is, therefore, relatively 
more risky to allow specific subsidy on a commodity when one does not have 
a fairly good knowledge about the export-demand elasticity. 
7Ideally, there should be no bonus on a commodity with an export demand elasticity 
less than unity. 
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Secondly, Mallon calculated that in the year 1960/61 every unit of ju te 
manufactures, exported due to the bonus scheme, resulted in lower foreign-ex-
change earnings (to the extent of Rs. 110.00) than would have been attained if 
raw jute had been exported. But his conclusion can be questioned, because the 
stocks of raw ju te at the end of 1960/61 were over 214 thousand tons. These 
stocks, or at least the excess of these stocks over a traditional stock position of, 
say, 40 to 50 thousand tons, ought to have been cleared before the possibility 
of putting those extra few tons used by domestic mills due to the scheme into 
the export market could be thought of. It is doubtful that the export of raw 
ju te would or could have been expanded to that extent. And, if exports were to 
be expanded to that extent, the apparently low-price elasticity of export demand 
for raw ju te suggests that to do so would require a drastic reduction in prices. 
Hence, the Mallon way of calculation of net foreign-exchange benefit f rom the 
export of jute manufactures does not seem to be justified in the year 1960/61. 
Our contention is that the scheme, by inducing an increase in the export of ju te 
manufactures, caused a foreign-exchange "gain" in 1960/61. In fact, as we can 
see, in none of the years under review, would there have been any justification 
for using the Mallon concept in calculating net foreign-exchange benefit f rom 
the export of jute manufactures. 
O. Conclusions 
The preceding analysis is not rigorous, and the data are of questionable 
quality. We believe, however, that the results are sufficiently accurate to war-
rant attention. The following conclusions may be stated: 
i) We have found that there was practically no "loss" of foreign exchange 
f rom the export of raw ju te due to the bonus scheme. There were "gains" in 
both sacking and hessian exports due to the scheme. The total "gain" of foreign 
exchange due to the scheme f rom the ju te industry as a whole, on the assump-
tions made, amounted to Rs. (344.9+169.6) million, i.e., Rs. 514.5 million 
during 1959 through 1964. If it is believed that the effect of other export promo-
tion measures was not fully taken care of by the trend values, and even if it is 
thought reasonable to reduce the "gain" of Rs. 514.5 million by, say, 20 or 25 
per cent, we would still have foreign-exchange earnings sufficiently increased in 
the ju te industry due to the scheme. 
ii) The question of competition for raw jute between hessian and sacking, 
discussed in [1, p. 29], does not seem to be important in any of the years under 
review because of the large stocks of raw jute carried in all the years. 
iii) We have seen that mill capacity was more of a restraint in the case of 
hessian than in the case of sacking for last few years of the period under review. 
We have also seen that the export of hessian did not increase after 1962 because 
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exporters preferred to carry stocks rather than expand exports at lower prices, 
while the export of sacking did not increase after 1962 even though the export 
price was being lowered and, hence, stocks were carried. In the case of hessian, 
then, the foreign demand in these years was elastic, while in the case of sacking 
it was inelastic. Hence, the conclusion that emerges is: export of hessian can be 
increased justifiably by lowering prices while the export of sacking cannot be so 
increased. Thus, the contention put forward by Bruton and Bose [1, p. 29] that 
"the bonus scheme would be more effective if it were supplemen-
ted by a tax or subsidy programme that countered the elasticities which resulted in 
less than maximum foreign-exchange earnings" seems to be more important now 
than it was in 1961. The simplest programme that may be suggested is: 
different bonus rates for hessian and sacking — higher for hessian and lower for 
sacking, As it was found that 20-per-cent bonus was not providing enough 
incentive to increase hessian exports, a 30-per-cent bonus on hessian may be 
tried, leaving 20-per-cent bonus on sacking unchanged. 
iv) We have concluded that Mallon way of calculation of net foreign-ex-
change benefit f rom the export of jute manufactures could not be justified. 
HI. THE COTTON INDUSTRY 
As is the case with raw jute, there has never been any bonus on raw cotton. 
The bonus on cotton cloth was 20 per cent up to June 1963. It was raised to 30 
per cent on July 1, 1963 and to 40 per cent on January 1, 1964. Since June 12, 
J964, the date on which only two bonus rates came into effect, the bonus on 
cotton cloth has been 30 per cent. The bonus on cotton yarn was 20 per cent 
until January 1960, 10 per cent until February 1961, and thereafter none until 
July 1962. A 10-per-ccnt bonus was reintroduced in July 1962. It was raised to 
15 per cent in December 1963, and has been 20 per cent since June 12,1964. Ex-
port of cotton waste has been entitled to a 20-per-cent bonus since the beginning 
of the scheme. 
It has been estimated in [1, p. 34] that between Rs. 86.4 and Rs. 99.2 
million in foreign exchange were "lost" during 1959-61 as a result of reduction 
in the export of raw cotton due to the bonus scheme. It has also been estimated 
in the same source [1, p. 45] that an increase of Rs. 175.8 million in the foreign-
exchange earnings of cotton manufactures took place during the period due to 
the scheme resulting in a net "gain" of between Rs.76 and Rs. 89 million in 
foreign exchange f rom the cotton industry as a whole. 
A. Raw Cotton 
Unlike the jute industry, which is important only in East Pakistan, the cotton 
industry is divided betweer the two wings — though predominantly located in 
the West. During the period under review, East Pakistan exported negligible 
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amount of cotton yarn and practically no cotton cloth, and so the bonus scheme 
had little to do with the expansion of the cotton industry in East Pakistan. 
Moreover, it seems reasonable enough to assume that the position will remain 
virtually the same for a number of years to come. Therefore, in our attempt to 
see what adverse effects, if any, the bonus scheme had on the export of raw 
cotton, we shall consider the developments in West Pakistan only. The relevant 
data on raw cotton in West Palcistn are presented in Table VI. It is clear f rom 
the table that output remained virtually stagnant f rom 1955/56 until 1960/61. 
It is also clear that there was steady progress f rom 1959/60 up to 1963/64 in 
which year output was the highest so far attained. In 1964/65, output declined 
to 371 thousand tons f rom 412 thousand tons in the previous year—a 10-per-cent 
decline. The reason for this was a decline in cultivated area to 3624 thousand 
acres f rom 3672 thousand acres in the preceding year, and a decline in yield per 
acre to 2.8 maunds f rom 3.1 maunds. If the plan target of over 600 thousand 
tons during 1970 is to be attained, incentives appear to be called for with respect 
to both acreage and yield. 
Prior to 1952/53, over 85 per cent of cotton output was customarily exported. 
In succeeding years, exports of raw cotton declined in both the absolute amount 
and as proport ion of output. Thus, there was a declining trend in exports which 
steepened after 1955/56, well before the bonus scheme came into force. The 
reason is not far to seek; availability of raw cotton for export was down sharply. 
There has been a strong response f rom the domestic textile industry to the 
heavy protection against foreign competition which it has enjoyed since 1953. 
This resulted in increasing consumption of raw cotton in West Pakistan mills 
and increasing shipment to East Pakistan for use in mills there, and, thus, with 
virtually stagnant output during the 1950's, restricted supply to the export 
market. 
Looking at the stock series, we note that it was not possible to obtain a 
reliable figure for stocks of raw cotton in West Pakistan on the 1st of July of any 
year, which is necessary as data on export and mill consumption are on July-
June basis. In the absence of this information, we have assumed a stock of V 
thousand tons at the end of 1957/58, and, by subtracting total distribution f rom 
current output, have arrived at the net addition to or depletion of the stock in 
each of the subsequent years. If 'x' was not very large and available in-
format ion suggests that it was not, then, by examining the stock series, we can 
conclude not only that the supply of raw cotton has not been sufficiently elastic 
to rule out the possibility of competition between the domestic and export 
markets, but also supply has been so limited in most of the years under review 
that the bonus scheme, by accelerating the already rising domestic mill con-
sumption, actually caused a reduction in the export of raw cotton. The quantity 
of raw cotton that would have been available for export, if the bonus scheme had 
not been in operation, is assumed to have been the "excess" of actual mill con-
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sumption of raw cotton in West Pakistan over its trend values. We have esti-
mated the trend rates of growth of mill consumption of raw cotton, using the 
s a m e method as was used in case of jute manufactures . The equation is 
M = 133.98 + 10.5 T R> = .68 
(2.56) 
where M stands for mill consumption of raw cotton in West Pakistan and T 
for time (1955/56 = 1 , 1956/57 =2 , 1964/65 =10) . The results are 
shown in Table VII. 
We have calculated, though crudely, the foreign-exchange "loss" under two 
assumptions as to the price effect of the increased exports. First, it seems fairly 
realistic to assume that the foreign price of raw cotton would not have been 
affected by the increased quantity exported. Secondly, we have assumed that 
if the increased quantity was to be exported a moderate price decline, say, 2 per 
cent, was necessary. Thus, the estimated "loss" of foreign exchange resulting 
f rom reduced raw cotton exports due to the scheme was between Rs. 118.2 
million and Rs. 95.5 million during the period f rom January 1959 to June 1965. 
Our estimate of the "loss" during 1959-61 is between Rs. 84.1 million and 
Rs. 74.4 million as against the Bruton and Bose estimate of between Rs. 99.2 
million and Rs. 86.4 million, calculated under similar assumptions about the 
price effect of increased exports [1, Pp. 33-34]. 
As can be seen f r o m Table VI, domestic mill consumption started growing 
quite rapidly well before the bonus scheme came into effect. It seems quite 
reasonable to assume that if the scheme had not been introduced, the textile 
industry, with the heavy tariff protection which it has been enjoying since 1953, 
would have continued to grow rapidly. However, the bonus scheme, as can be 
seen, gave a thrust to the already rising domestic mill consumption, and the 
impressive level of 200.8 thousand tons domestic mill consumption was attained 
in 1959/60. Virtually no fur ther growth was achieved during the following three 
years. Thus, we see that the estimated trend has caught up with the actual per-
formance in 1961/62; and in the following year the trend value exceeds the 
actual. Although the "excess" of actual over the trend values may be attributed 
to the bonus scheme, if the actual falls short of the trend that cannot be similarly 
attributed. Accordingly, in both 1961/62 and 1962/63 decreases in the export 
of raw cotton due to the scheme are assumed to be zero. The following two 
years again saw acceleration of domestic mill consumption under the impetus 
of the bonus scheme. 
We now try to explain the behaviour of raw cotton exports f rom year to year. 
As pointed out earlier, a keen competition was going on between the domestic 
and foreign market for the limited supply of raw cotton in most of the years under 
review; and, as a result, the export of raw cotton was a function of the strength 
TABLE V I I 
EFFECT OF THE BONUS SCHEME ON RAW COTTON EXPORTS, 1957 - 1964/65 
{quantity in thousand tons and value in million rupees) 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1957/58 166.0 & s 
1958/59 17S.6 6.2 172.0 6.6 34.3 40.9 78.3 95.4 93.5 17.1 15.2 
J 959/60 200.6 5.8 182.0 18.6 78.4 97.0 183.9 227.4 222.8 43.5 38.9 
1960/61 201.0 5.5 192.0 9.0 51.3 60.3 134.2 157.7 154.5 23.5 20.3 
1961/62 202.0 5.2 202.0 0 47.6 47.6 120.6 120.6 120.6 0 0 
1962/63 209.8 4.9 211.9 0 109.8 109.8 261.3 261.3 261.3 0 0 
1963/64 229.9 4.7 221.9 8.0 155.2 163.2 336.9 354.1 347.1 17.2 10.2 
1964/65 239.0 4.5 232.0 7.0 118.7 125.7 283.5 300.4 294.4 16.9 10.9 
118.2 95.5 
Columns: 
(1) Actual domestic consumption of raw cotton. (2) Expected rate of growth of domestic consumption in the absence of the scheme. (3) Expected domestic consumption in the absence of the scheme. (4) Additional amounts of cotton that would be available for export in the absence of scheme (Col. (1) — Col. (3>). (5) Actual export of cotton. (6) Expected cotton export in the absence of the scheme (Col. (4)+ Co-. (5)). (7) Actual foreign exchange earned. (S) Expected foreign-exchange earnings if no price reduction necessary. (9) Expected foreign-exchange earnings if a 2-per-cent price reduction was necessary. (10) Estimate of "loss" of foreign-exchange earnings if no price reduction is necessary (Col. (8)—Col. (7)). (11) Estimate of "loss" of foreign-exchange earnings if a 2-per-cent price reduction is necessary (Col. (9)—Col. (7)). 
"Breakdown of actual export and actual foreign-exchange earnings in this year is: Qty. Value 
July-December 1958 46.0 109.0 
January-June 1958 34.3 78.3 
In Cols. (5), (6) and (7). the figures are for January-June, 1959. As the bonus scheme was introduced in January 1959, the whole of 
bonus-induced domestic mill consumption in 1958/59 occurred in the seccr.d half of the year, i.e., during January-June 1959. 
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of the two markets. The following explanation of raw cotton exports is, thus, 
mostly in t erms of the strength of the two markets. In 1958/59, exports rose by 
only 2 per cent in the face of a 13-per-cent decline in the foreign price, while do-
mestic mill consumption increased by 10 per cent in the face of a 10-per-
cent decline in the domestic price. In that year, both domestic and foreign 
markets seem to have weakened; but the domestic market was decidedly stronger 
than the foreign market . The foreign market was weaker in January-June 1959 
than in July-December 1958, as in the former exports were 25 per cent lower, 
even though the export price was 4 per cent lower. 
In 1959/60, the export price rose by 1 per cent and raw-cotton exports fell 
by 2 per cent, while domestic mill consumption rose by 11 per cent in the face 
of a 20-per-cent increase in the domestic price. Thus, in that year, the domestic 
market was very strong and actually bid away raw cotton f r o m the export 
market. In 1960/61 also, the domestic market was stronger than the foreign 
market. The result was a 12-per-cent rise in the export price and a 35-per-cent 
reduction in the quantity exported. 
In 1961/62, the export price fell by 3 per cent and exports by 7 per cent; 
the domestic price fell by 7 per cent with domestic mill consumption rising by 
a fraction of 1 per cent. The failure of domestic mill consumption to increase 
was possibly due to the low premium and low bonus rate on cotton manufactures 
prevailing in that year. But the decrease in exports in the face of a decrease in 
the export price is difficult to explain. 
In 1962/63, the foreign market seems to have been very strong. A 131-per-
cent increase in exports occurred in the face of only 6-per-cent reduction in the 
export price. The domestic market was weaker, as domestic mill consumption 
rose by only 4 per cent (in the face of a 6-per-cent decline in the domestic 
price). The bonus scheme does not appear to have made the domestic 
demand for raw cotton much (if any) stronger than what it would have 
been in its absence. 
In 1963/64, again, the foreign market was quite strong as a 41-per-cent rise 
in exports took place while the export price fell by 9 per cent. But the domestic 
market was stronger in this year relative to 1962/63, as a 10-per-cent increase 
in domestic mill consumption occurred in the face of 1-per-cent rise in the domes-
tic price. This seems to have prevented a fur ther increase in exports. 
In 1964/65, output fell by 10 per cent; exports fell by 24 per cent, while the 
export price rose by 10 per cent; and domestic mill consumption increased by 4 
per cent in the face of a 13-per-cent rise in the domestic price. The domestic 
market appears to have been relatively stronger. This, together with the decrease 
in output, constituted the export constraint in that year. 
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B. Cotton Manufactures 
Besides the bonus scheme, there are many other measures (several of which 
we have noted in connection with ju te manufactures) which have been in force, 
and which worked to promote the export of cotton manufactures. As was 
mentioned in case of jute manufactures , in any attempt to isolate the export pro-
motion effect of the bonus scheme one should make some attempt to "net o u t " 
the effects of these other measures. 
Since East Pakistan does not export any cotton cloth and a negligible 
amount of cotton yarn, the bonus scheme does not seem likely to have contributed 
to the growth of these sectors in that province. As her production of both cotton 
yarn and cotton cloth is too small, she has to import both f rom West Pakistan to 
meet domestic demand. So, combined demand of both the wings for these two 
commodities has to be taken into consideration for any study of their export 
performance. To the extent that East Pakistan produces yarn and cloth, her 
claim on West Pakistan's production of the goods is less. Therefore, the com-
bined production of both the provinces has to be taken into account. Hence, 
the analysis for these two sectors will be made on the basis of the country as a 
whole. 
1) Cotton Yarn 
The relevant data on cotton yarn have been presented in Table VIII. The 
behaviour of the export series is so irregular that it is not possible to estimate 
expected values of exports (in the absence of the bonus scheme) in different 
years by method that was used in the case of ju te sacking and hessian. Some 
other device has to be used, and so it seems necessary that we have a look first 
at the behaviour of the export series over the period under review. 
The bonus on yarn, as mentioned earlier, has been changed many times. 
This changing bonus on yarn seems to have influenced to a large extent the 
behaviour of yarn exports. Another closely related factor which seems to have 
been influential in this regard is the behaviour of the premium. Traders of 
cotton yarn appear to have reacted strongly to a change in the bonus and/or 
premium. Thus, in general, lower export has been associated with lower bonus 
and lower premium. 
Column (1) of Table VIII requires an explanation. The "surplus" yarn during 
a period is total production of yarn during that period minus consumption of 
yarn in the weaving sheds of the mills which produce yarn for the product ion of 
cloth. But this "surplus" is not identical with the surplus available for export. 
Out of this "surplus", the demand of those mills which only do weaving — the 
handloom industry, the thread ball industry, the net-making industry and the 
hosiery industry—has to be met. Since no data are available on the consump-
tion of yarn by these industries, it is not possible to isolate the exportable surplus. 
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The development in cotton yarn up to 1961 has been clearly explained in 
[1, Pp. 38-40). The introduction of the bonus scheme at a time when there was 
supply of yarn available for export resulted, as expected, in an expansion of 
exports at lower prices. Then, as the bonus rate was reduced accompanied by 
a falling premium, exports declined and the export price rose. Nevertheless, 
supply does not seem to have been a constraint and when, in February 1961, the 
bonus was completely withdrawn, the export of yarn fell to negligible amounts. 
The reason for such a drastic decline was not limited supply available for export, 
nor was it the unwillingness of the domestic market to release output (as stocks 
appear to have been increasing). The reasons, as pointed out in [1, p. 41], were 
complete absence of artificially created incentives for the first time since 1956, 
preference of the traders to carry stocks of yarn in anticipation of some change 
of export policies affecting yarn, and probably the fact that the export of cloth 
was still earning bonus. Up to June 1962, there was no bonus on yarn and the 
reasons for the low export of yarn in the period January-June 1962 are similar 
to the ones listed above. 
In August 1962, a 10-per cent bonus on yarn was reintroduced. During July-
December 1962, the export price went up by 8 per cent over that of the previous 
shipping period and yet export declined to 2,075 thousand pounds in the face of 
a weak domestic market (domestic price fell by 3 per cent). The reason for this 
negative response seems to be that the 10-per-cent bonus did not provide enough 
incentive to expand exports at lower prices. The premium at that time stood at 
Rs. 148 — near enough to the six-year mean not to be a significant factor. 
During the next two shipping periods, the domestic market was relatively weak, 
as domestic prices declined slightly in January-June 1963 and rose by about 4 per 
cent in the following period. The premium picked up was Rs. 166.00 
and Rs. 159.00, respectively. During January-June 1963, the export price 
declined by 11 per cent, but rose by 3 per cent in the following period. Exports 
were only 6,260 and 8,619 thousand pounds, respectively. It appears that traders 
were still not happy with a 10-per-cent bonus of these two periods; otherwise 
there seems to be no reason why prices were not lowered to increase exports. 
The export market appears to have been strong enough to accept larger 
quantities of exports at favourable prices. 
/ 
In January 1964, the bonus on cotton yarn was raised to 15 per cent and on 
June 12, 1964, to 20 per cent. In the January-June 1964 period, exports rose 
to 48,930 thousand pounds at a price which was 17 per cent lower. The traders 
responded to the incentive provided by the increased bonus by lowering ex-
port price to increase exports. In the following two shipping periods, July-
December 1964 and January-June 1965, the bonus rate was 20 per cent and the 
premiums were Rs. 144.00 and Rs. 150.00, respectively. But exports declined by 
16 per cent and 10 per cent in the two periods, respectively. The domestic price 
rose slightly in July-December 1964, and by about 4 per cent in the following 
406 Commercial Policy ancl Economic Growth 
period. The 4-per-cent rise in domestic prices during January-June 1965 appears 
to be due to deliberate restriction of supply to the domestic market for speculat-
ive purposes. This conclusion is suggested by the fact that the supply avail-
able for domestic use f r o m the current output was the same as that in the previous 
period, because the fall in "surplus" in this period was matched by the fall in 
exports. 
Domestic demand for yarn may also have been rising, but the domestic 
market does not seem to be the constraint. The low premium in these two 
periods had some depressing effects, but this cannot explain the total variations. 
Another factor that seems to have been responsible for falling exports is the exis-
tence of a lower bonus on yarn than on cloth. During these two periods, the 
bonus on cotton cloth had been 30 per cent. The 20-per-cent bonus on yarn 
during these periods provided comparatively less incentive than was provided 
by the 30-per-cent bonus on cloth. 
Similarly, during January-June 1964 when the spread between the bonus 
on yarn and that on cloth was even larger, the export of yarn did not increase, 
while the supply was sufficient and foreign demand was such as would allow 
larger exports at favourable prices. All this, however, boils down to speculation 
and expectation on the part of traders, because the supply of yarn does not 
appear to have been so limited in any year under review to make it necessary 
for either the domestic market or the export market to have to bid away yarn 
f r o m each other. If it was necessary for the two markets to compete with each 
other for a limited supply, then the spread between the bonus allowed on yarn 
and on cloth would have been of importance. 
Our conclusion, then, is that a changing bonus on yarn, a changing pre-
mium and, above all, speculation and expectations on the part of traders are the 
factors responsible for the erratic behaviour and unsatisfactory performance of 
the export of yarn. 
The question raised in [1, p. 41] about the extent to which yarn and cloth 
were exported at the expense of each other does not seem to be relevant if we 
use the definition of "surplus" yarn which was given at the beginning of this 
section, and note that only a small percentage of total production of cloth has 
to use yarn f rom the "surplus". We shall make an attempt to quantify the 
effects of the scheme on yarn exports in subsection 3). 
2) Cotton Cloth 
The relevant data are presented in Table IX. The nature of the export series 
does not allow estimation of trend values by fitting a time trend. It is necessary 
to use some other device to estimate trend values, and so it seems better to 
examine first through the year-to-year developments. 
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The developments up to 1961 have been explained in [1, Pp. 35-37], Never-
theless, it seems necessary to start f rom 1959, as certain points need emphasis. 
There was a very good response f r o m the traders immediately after the scheme 
was introduced and exports j umped in 1959 by about 308 per cent over the 1957 
level despite a 34-per-cent fall in the export price (comparison is made with 1957 
rather than with 1958 as the condition of textile trade was unusually depressed 
in the latter year). Even though the increase in the export was matched by an 
increase in production, there was a rise in domestic prices, which may be attri-
buted to increased domestic demand and/or to deliberate reduction in the supply 
to the domestic market for the building up of stocks for fu ture exports. How-
ever, exports accounted for only 6.8 per cent of production and supply does not 
appear to be much of a barrier to fur ther expansion of exports in this period. 
Foreign demand also appears to be such as would jus t i fy fur ther lowering of 
prices for expanding exports. It appears, therefore, that speculation and ex-
pectation have had much to do with restricting any fur ther expansion of exports 
in 1959. 
In 1960, exports rose by 79 per cent in the face of a 17-per-cent rise in the 
export price. This means that the foreign demand in that year was very strong. 
But fur ther increase in exports was prevented by failure of output to increase 
more than 2 per cent, and strong competition by the domestic market for the 
limited output. The failure of output to rise has been attributed to limited raw 
cotton [1, p. 37]. Raw cotton was limited, no doubt, but as, we have seen, stocks 
of cotton yarn were increasing. Why were these stocks of yarn not used to pro-
duce cloth? The answer cannot be found without reference to speculative 
demand on the part of yarn holders. Thus, it seems that unwillingness of yarn 
traders to make yarn available for the production of cloth was the more important 
barrier. 
In 1961, output increased by 11 per cent (70 million yards) but exports 
declined by 29 per cent (22 million yards), with the export price going up by 
6 per cent. The domestic market was not a very strong competitor, as domestic 
prices rose by less than 1 per cent. The decline in exports was, therefore, 
probably due to the falling premium and speculative restrictions. The foreign 
market appears to have been strong enough to accept a larger quantity at favour-
able prices, and the supply was not a barrier in that year. 
In 1962, output rose by about 4 per cent (26 million yards) and exports by 
17.5 per cent (10 million yards) through a 12.5-per-cent reduction in export prices. 
Of the total exports of 63.1 million yards in that year, over 41 million yards were 
exported during July-December 1962. As was noted earlier, the bonus on cotton 
cloth was raised to 30 per cent in July 1962. The j u m p in exports in July-Decem-
ber 1962 seems to have been primarily due to this. If we looked at the six-
monthly exports f r o m January-June 1961 to January-June 1962, we can conclude 
that after the initial impetus the 20-per-cent bonus was probably not providing 
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sufficient incentive. Otherwise there seems to be no reason why exports were 
not expanded at lower prices, while the domestic market was not a strong com-
petitor, as evidenced by domestic prices. Thus, with the bonus raised to 30 per 
cent there was a good response. But the supply would definitely allow, and the 
foreign market would surely accept, at favourable prices, a larger quantity of 
exports. A low bonus in the first half of the year and a low premium in the 
second half seem to have had depressing effects on exports. 
In 1963, exports rose by 48 per cent (30 million yards), with export price 
falling by 8 per cent. Foreign demand in this year also appears to have been 
strong enough to allow fur ther expansion of exports at acceptable prices. But 
output increased by less than 1 per cent, and the failure of output to increase 
prevented a fur ther increase in exports, while a weak domestic market was con-
ducive to such an increase. Why did output fail to increase? Mill capacity 
was surely not the barrier as both the number of looms and the number of spind-
les increased in that year. The reasons, again, seem to have been /) limited raw 
cotton (as the export of raw cotton jumped by 131 per cent in 1962/63), and ii) 
speculative withholding (by yarn holders) of yarn f rom the production of cloth. 
In 1964, output rose by 4 per cent (24 million yards) and exports jumped by 
112 per cent (105 million yards), while the export price rose by 5 per cent. The 
domestic market was very weak in that year, as in the face of 80 million yards 
reduction in the supply to the domestic market f rom the current output, the 
domestic prices declined by more than 1 per cent. The foreign market, however, 
was obviously very strong. Therefore, 1964's excellent export performance was 
largely due to the strong foreign demand. 
During January-June 1965, exports were 96 million yards and the export 
price was 12.5 per cent higher than that prevailing during the previous six months. 
Only a 4-per-cent reduction in exports in the face of 12.5-per-cent j u m p in the 
export price seems to indicate that the foreign demand was quite strong. In 
the domestic market, on the other hand, domestic prices rose by only 2 pet cent 
in the face of a 2-per-cent reduction in quantity taken f rom the current output. 
We can argue that the excellent export performance was possible because of 
strong foreign demand in the face of relatively weaker domestic market. 
If we look at the six-monthly export figures, we shall see that both exports 
and export prices had been rising f rom January-June 1963 up to July-December 
1964; and then in January-June 1965, exports declined by only 64 per cent with 
the export price shooting up by 12.5 per cent. The conclusion that emerges is 
that the foreign demand for Pakistani cotton cloth has been rising for the past 
two and a half years and larger exports probably would have been attained if, 
in keeping with the idea behind the bonus scheme, expansion of exports was 
sought at lower prices. It is true that production did not keep pace with the 
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increase in exports, but supply does not seem to have constituted much of a bar-
rier, as the domestic market was weak, and so an easy shift of output f r o m the 
domestic market was possible. Speculation, expectations, and a falling pre-
mium, are probably the factors which prevented any fur ther increase in exports. 
3) Quantification of Exports 
We shall now make an attempt to quantify the export promotion of yarn 
and cloth due to the bonus scheme. It is, strictly speaking, impossible to do so, 
as what the situation would have been in the absence of the bonus scheme is not 
known, and the behaviour of the export series in both cases is so irregular as to 
make it impossible to use a simple statistical method for the estimation of 
export performances in the absence of the scheme. However, we make an esti-
mate below on the basis of some rather arbitrary assumptions, as has been done 
i n [ l , p . 43). 
We shall make the same assumptions as have been done in [1, p. 43] up to 
1961 for both yarn and cloth. Thus, in the case of cotton cloth, we shall assume 
that exports in 1959 would have been the same as in 1957 and that they would 
have increased by a mere 2 per cent annually up to 1961, and that the export 
price would have been Re. 0.73 per yard throughout. We shall also assume a 2-
per-cent increase in exports and an export price of Re. 0.73 per yard in 1962. 
In view of the strong foreign demand in the face of a weak domestic demand pre-
vailing during 1963 through June 1965, we shall assume a 50-per-cent increase 
in exports in 1963 over the small export of 1962 and, then, a 50 per cent increase 
in 1964 as well as a 50-per-cent increase in January-June 1965 over half of 1964's 
exports. For these years we shall, however, continue to make the same assump-
tion about the export price, i.e., Re. 0.73 per yard. The results are shown in 
Table X. 
The estimate of foreign-exchange "ga in" f r o m cotton cloth exports during 
January 1959 to June 1965 due to the bonus scheme is, on the assumptions 
made, Rs. 335.6 million. 
In the case of cotton yarn, we shall also assume that exports would have 
remained at the 1959 level (roughly 40 million pounds) f rom 1959 through 1961 
and that the export price would have been Rs. 1,82 per pound throughout . The 
developments after 1961 are, as we have seen, very complicated, and we do not 
know what assumptions about exports and the export price would be reasonable. 
Under the circumstances, we think we can do no better than to assume that ex-
ports would have been maintained at 40 million pounds in 1962,1963, and 1964, 
and 20 million pounds in January-June 1965 and that the export price would 
have remained Rs. 1.82 per pound throughout this period also. The results are 
shown in Table XI. 
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TABLE X 
C O N T R I B U T I O N O F THE B O N U S S C H E M E T O C O T T O N - C L O T H 
EXPORT, 1959-1965 (January-lone) 
(quantity in million yards and value in million rupees) 
Year 
Actual export Presumed export Export attirbutable to the bonus scheme 
Qty. Value Value Qty. Qty. Value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1959 42. t 25.5 10.2 7.5 31.9 18.0 
1960 75.5 53.2 10.4 7.6 65.t 45.6 
1961 53.7 40.0 10.6 7.8 43.1 32.2 
1962 63.1 41.1 10.8 7.9 52.3 33.2 
1963 93.3 55.8 16.2 11.8 77.1 44.0 
1964 197.9 124.4 24.3 17.7 173.6 106.7 
1965 
(January-June) 
96.0 69.2 18.3 13.3 77.7 55.9 
520.8 335.6 
TABLE XI 
C O N T R I B U T I O N OF THE B O N U S S C H E M E TO C O T T O N - Y A R N C L O T H 
E X P O R T , 1959-1965 (January-June) 
(quantity in million pounds and value in million rupees) 
Year 
Actual export Presumed export Export attributable t the bonus scheme 
Qty. Value Value Qty. Qty- Value 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1959 82.5 122.9 40.0 72.8 42.5 50.! 
1960 89.5 136.7 40.0 72.8 49.5 63.9 
1961 15.3 28.0 40.0 72.8 24.7 44.8 
1962 5.1 10.4 40.0 72.8 34.9 62.4 
1963 16.5 31.9 40.0 72.8 23.5 40.9 
1964 89.9 150.! 40.0 72.8 49.9 77.3 
1965 36.8 71.8 20.0 36.4 16.8 35.4 
(January-June) 
75.6 78.6 
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The estimate of foreign-exchange "gain" f r o m cotton-yarn exports during 
January 1959 to June 1965, due to the scheme is, on the assumptions made, 
Rs. 78.6 million. 
One point that needs emphasis is that the assumptions on the basis of which 
the effects of the bonus scheme on cotton cloth and cotton yarn have been quanti-
fied are surely arbitrary and one can question them. But we believe that by 
changing the assumptions one can change the magnitude of the result only, but 
cannot change the direction; and so the conclusion, in general, will remain valid. 
Another point that calls for explanation is the apparently negative effect of the 
bonus scheme on cotton-yarn exports. It has been emphasized that the supply 
of yarn was not the bottleneck. The reasons for the negative effects on yarn 
exports seem to have been uncertainties in regard to the rate of bonus and the 
premium which led to speculative restriction of exports. In our view, if the 
scheme had never been put into effect, speculation and expectation would not 
have run so high and cotton-yarn exports would have been maintained in or 
about the manner we have assumed above. 
4) Cotton Waste 
As mentioned in [1, p. 44], there was an upward trend in the export of cotton 
waste before the bonus scheme came into effect. It seems likely that its export 
would have continued to grow normally without the scheme. It is clear f rom 
the data that there was an acceleration of the normal growth after 1959, and that 
this acceleration was probably due to the scheme. A detailed discussion of the 
development in cotton-waste export is not necessary. The story is clearly told 
in Table XII. 
For the calculation of the effects of the scheme on cotton waste exports, we 
shall make the following rather arbif rary assumptions. We assume that the 
export in the absence of the scheme would have been 196.0 thousand cwt., in 
1958/598 and would rise by a mere 5 per cent in the following year and there-
after , in view of the stronger foreign demand, as evidenced by increased exports 
in the face of high export prices, by 10 per cent annual ly ' . As regards the 
price, instead of assuming a constant price for every year as done in [1, p. 44], 
it seems more reasonable to assume that export prices would have been the same 
as those actually prevailed, and we shall do the latter. The data and estimates 
are shown in Table XII. 
"Breakdown of quantity exported in 1958/59: 
July-December 1958 96.0 thousand cwt. 
January-June 1959 109.7 thousand cwt. 
We have assumed that if the bonus scheme had not been operative, the export in 
January-June 1959 would have been 100.0 thousand cwt. 
f in 1963/64, the increase in export took place at a substantially reduced price but the 
increase is an indication of a strong foreign demand. 
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TABLE XII 
EFFECT OF B O N U S SCHEME ON COTTON-WASTE EXPORTS 
1959-1965 (January-June) 
(quantity in thousand cwt., and value in million rupees) 
Actual exports Presumed exports Bonus-induced exports 
Year Qty. value 
average 
value of 
export qty. 
value qty. value 
0) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) CO (8) 
1958/59 205.7 10.0 48.6 196.0 9.5 9.7 .5 
1959/60 373.5 17.1 45.8 205.8 9.4 167.7 7.7 
1960/61 286.0 15.0 52.4 226.4 11.9 59.6 3.3 
1961/62 377.0 24.2 64.2 248.9 16.0 128.1 8.2 
1962/63 460.4 28.3 61.4 273.8 16.8 186.6 11.5 
1963/64 499.2 24.4 48.9 301.2 14.7 198.0 9.7 
1964/65 460.6 28.3 61.4 331.3 20.3 129.3 8.0 
48.9 
The estimated gain of foreign exchange f rom cotton-waste exports due to 
the bonus scheme is, on the assumptions made, Rs. 489 million during the 
period under review. 
5) Earnings of Raw Cotton Vs. Cotton Yarn 
In this section, we refer to the quest ion: would not foreign-exchange earnings 
have been greater if raw cotton had been exported rather than cotton yarn. 
We have seen that only in 1959, 1960, 1964, and 1965 (January-June) could 
the bonus scheme have caused the export of yarn to rise above what it would 
have been otherwise. Hence, we shall take only these years into account. 
Estimates have been shown in Table XIII . We have found that in each of 
the four years, yarn was a better foreign-exchange earner than raw cotton. 
The total foreign-exchange "ga in" due to yarn export rather than raw cotton 
during the four years under consideration has been found to be Rs. 52.2 million. 
The export price of raw cotton, which we have used for computations, how-
ever, needs clarification. Mallon [4] assumes an export price of raw cotton 
equal to its domestic price plus export duty. We consider his assumption un-
realistic, as it does not reflect the foreign demand. We have taken the export 
price of raw cotton in each year as being equal to the average value of the export 
of raw cotton in that year. Furthermore, given the foreign demand for raw 
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cotton prevailing in the years under consideration, export prices would probably 
have been affected adversely if additional stocks were to be exported. A modifi-
cation of the export price to this effect would show that yarn was a still better 
foreign-exchange earner. If the foreign-exchange earnings of cotton waste 
are taken into consideration, "ga in" f rom yarn exports will be still larger. 
Furthermore, one may question the wisdom of thinking that raw cotton would 
be a better foreign-exchange earner than cotton yarn by asking if all the raw 
cotton used in the production of yarn for export would or could be exported. 
C. Conclusions 
It seems in order to state again that data used are of questionable accuracy 
and that the estimates have been made on rather arbitrary assumptions. Heavy 
reliance on the estimates as such is not warranted. However, we believe that 
reasonable alternative assumptions would not affect the results significantly. 
The conclusions will, therefore, in general, remain the same. The following con-
clusions have emerged f rom our analysis. 
i) We have estimated that between Rs. 118.2 million and Rs. 95.5 million 
in foreign exchange were "lost" during 1959 through June 1965 due to the reduc-
tion in the export of raw cotton, caused by the bonus scheme. Also, we have 
estimated that during the same period the "gain" in foreign exchange f r o m the 
export of cotton manufactures due to the bonus scheme amounts to Rs. (335.64-
78.6 -f- 48.9) i.e., Rs. 463.1 million. Thus, the "gain" in foreign exchange f rom 
the industry as a whole during the period is between Rs. 344.9 million and 
Rs. 367.6 million. 
ii) The Bruton and Bose conclusion, that the scheme was less effective in 
the case of cotton industry than for jute industry in terms of the impact on 
foreign-exchange earnings, is still an important one. The reasons for this seem 
to be : 
a) unlike the case with raw jute, more often than not supply of raw cotton 
appeared to be an important constraint; 
h) while the bonuses on ju te products were not changed at all, the bonuses 
on cotton products were being changed frequent ly; 
c) with the changing bonus rates, the impact of the fluctuating premium 
was much stronger in the case of cotton than for jute products ; 
d) expectations and speculative motives also appeared to be stronger for 
cotton products ; and 
e) the behaviour of the domestic market seems to be more erratic for cotton 
products. 
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iii) Expectations and speculations seem to have sprung mostly f rom the fact 
that with bonus allowed on two stages of production—yarn and cloth — frequent 
changes were being made on the rates of bonus. 
iv) We have concluded that yarn was always a better foreign-exchange 
earner than raw cotton. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The bonus scheme, on the face of the evidence presented, has stimulated 
exports of both ju te and cotton products and increased net foreign-exchange 
earnings. However, our estimates of the foreign-exchange "gain" are "gross" 
in the sense that we have not taken account of the import content of the manu-
factured items. The foreign-exchange component of the cost of production of 
ju te and cotton products is relatively unimportant. Therefore, we believe that 
even if this is taken into account, the conclusion we have reached that 
the scheme was responsible for significant increases in the foreign-exchange earn-
ings, will remain valid. An attempt at finding the "net" foreign-exchange 
"gain" has been made by Soligo and Stern in another study [6]. 
The scheme appears to have functioned differently over time. The failure 
of the scheme to work more smoothly over the years may be attributed to the 
inflexibility and unresponsiveness of the economy. Some flexibility in the 
scheme itself and provision of additional policies (such as taxes, subsidies, etc.) 
to exploit changing conditions are believed to be necessary conditions for achie-
ving better results. We believe that, as opinions differ on various aspects of the 
policy measures involved in the scheme and because of the vital nature of the 
policy measures in affecting Pakistan's balance-of-payments position, the 
research and discussion in this area should continue. 
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Commodity Exports, Net 
Exchange Earnings and 
Investment Criteria 
Nurul Is lam 
Pakistan has experienced in the last decade a significant rate of growth of 
exports, especially of the manufactured exports. The manufactured exports 
have grown at an annual compound rate of 15 per cent during the period 1960-67. 
This significant rate of growth of exports has been associated with a large 
number of export-promotion measures which have ranged f rom a wide variety 
of fiscal concessions to such export-incentive schemes as the export bonus and 
export performance licensing as well as the fixation of compulsory export quotas 
for the individual manufactured exports. The question has been raised f rom 
time to time as to the efficacy of the export-promotion measures in terms of the 
net foreign-exchange earnings, defined as the actual increase in export earnings 
f rom a unit of expoFriSInui the direct and indirect requirements of imports 
necessary for the production of the unit of export. Since one of the important 
criteria for the determination of the investment priorities in the field of industry 
in Pakistan has been the foreign-exchange saving or earning capacity of a par-
ticular industrial project [9, p. 51], it is important to quantify the contributions 
to the net foreign-exchange earnings made by the exports of the different manu-
factured goods ' . Moreover, it is possible to judge how the existing structure of 
the export incentives is related to the net exchange-earning capacity of the 
different industries. 
i However, it is not suggested, as discussed later on, that the maximization of net foreign-
exchange earnings should be the goal of economic policy. 
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The first systematic attempt to estimate the net foreign-exchange earnings 
of the individual manufactur ing industries was made by Messrs, Soligo and 
Stern in their pioneering article [9], This article, however, questions the assump-
tions underlying their method of estimating the net foreign-exchange earnings; 
it presents an alternative set of estimates of the net exchange earnings on the 
basis of the direct evidence which is available on the export prices or the gross 
foreign-exchange earnings of the manufactured exports. The estimates of the 
net earnings of the b road industrial groups often conceal important differences 
within the groups; therefore , supplementary evidence on the intraindustry 
differences in the net earnings is presented for a few selected industries for which 
detailed data are available. Fur thermore, the net exchange earnings are sought 
to be compared with the relative domestic costs, i.e., mainly capital costs, as 
well as with the comparative efficiency, as measured by the degree of effective 
protection, of the different industrial groups. At the end, the relationship 
between the net earnings of the different industries and their actual export per-
formance, in terms of their recent rates of growth or their relative importance 
in the total manufactured exports of Pakistan, is examined, along with some 
tentative observations on the implications of the above findings for the present 
structure of the export-incentive measures. 
Messrs. Soligo and Stern adopt an indirect method for the measurement 
of gross foreign-exchange earnings. They measure the net foreign-exchange 
earnings f r o m export of a unit of final demand of a commodity, which is worth D 
rupees in domestic prices, in terms of (E—M) where E is the f .o .b . export price 
of the same unit and M is the total direct and indirect import requirement. In 
the absence of direct evidence on E, they derive the estimates of E in the follow-
ing way, E is defined as (D—Td) / (1+Pb) where Td is the indirect tax on the 
domestic sales of the unit which is exempted if the unit is sold abroad, P is the 
premium on the bonus voucher and b is the percentage of the export allowed 
as a bonus, Therefore, E is derived f rom the given data on D, Td, and Pb. 
They assume that the receipts per unit of sale are the same in both the domestic 
and export markets and the entire difference between the foreign and domestic 
prices is accounted for by the subsidy originating f rom the export bonus and 
the exemption of indirect taxes on output . 
ON AN APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF GROSS FOREIGN-EXCHANGE 
EARNINGS 
The derivation of the f.o.b. export price on the basis of the above method 
ignores the effect of the additional export-incentive schemes such as a) export-
performance licensing, b) exemption f rom the indirect taxes 011 the domestic 
inputs, c) exemption f r o m the indirect taxes on the imported inputs, and d) rebate 
on the income tax attributable to the exports, etc.*. Even if the effect of these 
additional measures is taken into account, the difference between the f.o.b. 
In an another study on effective export subsidy [2a], the author estimates that the total subsidy originating from the various measures comes to about 100-125 for some of the manufactured exports. 
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export price and the domestic price may, in many cases, be still more than is 
accounted for by the combined subsidy originating f rom all the export-promo-
tion measures because of two important additional factors. First, price dis-
crimination between the home and foreign markets is profitable and possible. 
The two markets are effectively separated because of quantitative restrictions on 
foreign trade. The manufacturer exporter faces a highly elastic demand in the 
export market and a relatively inelastic demand in the domestic market , which 
is not only protected f rom competition f rom without but also is characterized 
by monopolist ic market imperfections within. The consequence of the price 
discrimination and the imperfections in the domestic market is that the domestic 
price is higher than the export price plus the export subsidy. The average re-
ceipts per unit of export, including subsidy, will be lower in the export market 
than the average receipts in the domestic market . 
Secondly, the exporter may be willing to accept a lower profit on the foreign 
sales which is not compensated by a higher rate of profit in the domestic market ; 
in other words, the exporter may not be maximizing profit. The sacrifice of the 
short-run profits may be worthwhile since a good export performance has become 
the hallmark of efficiency in the eyes of the government, which is aggressively 
committed to the policy of export promotion. There are diverse ways in which 
the general controls and regulations exercised by the government in the matter 
of the fiscal treatment and the licensing for the import of capital equipment and 
raw materials for the product ion in the highly profitable domestic market affect 
the profitability of the manufactur ing enterprises. In the past three or four 
years, the Export Promotion Bureau has been in cooperation with the organiza-
tions of trade and industry, laying down specific export quotas for the different 
industries and for the individual enterprises within each industry, non-fulf i lmen t 
of which is a sufficient ground for incurring the displeasure of the government or 
indeed a fall f r o m the good grace of the government. Moreover, the direct 
evidence accumulated so far, and presented in the Appendix on the difference 
between the domestic and world price, confirms this hypothesis [6]. It is 
unlikely that an exporter will be able to sell at a price higher than suggested by 
the price spread between the domestic and world price. On the contrary, it is 
likely that in the critical years, when introducing a commodity for the first time 
in the export market , the exporter will charge a price somewhat lower than the 
ruling world price in order to offset the consumer's preference for the established 
brand names and historical trade connections. Thus, the maximum price at 
which the exporters will be able to sell abroad will be indicated by the "wor ld" 
price for the respective commodity. The data on the world prices, referred to 
above, are in most cases based on the c.i.f. import price and the f.o.b. export 
price is usually less than the c.i.f. price, so that the, f.o.b. export price for the 
purpose of our present inquiry has been obtained by deflating the world price to 
the extent of 5 per cent, to allow for freight and insurance 3 . 
JThis seems to be the practice with the Pakistan Tariff Commission as well. 
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NET ESTIMATES OF NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
It is seen in the light of the above that Messrs. Soligo and Stern over-
estimate gross foreign-exchange earnings whenever the differential between the 
domestic and foreign price exceeds the amount of subsidy originating f rom the 
bonus scheme and the exemption of exports f rom the indirect taxes on output. 
The gross foreign-exchange earnings and, hence, the net foreign-exchange earnings 
have thus been recalculated; E has been defined as D / ( l + p ) where D is the value 
of one unit of final demand in domestic market prices, and p is the percentage 
excess of domestic market price over the world price multiplied by 1.054. Two 
sets of price ratios have been used; they are based on two independent sources 
indicated earlier. Each set is based on an analysis of two independent samples of 
industries for each ma jo r industry group. Each ratio refers to a different com-
position of the ma jo r industry groups and it is an average of the price ratios of 
the constituent industries in each group 5 . Moreover, a number of ma jo r in-
dustry groups covered in one study are not covered in the other. Thus, the use 
of the two independent estimates of price ratios provides a larger sample of 
estimates of foreign-exchange earnings than would otherwise be available. The 
direct and indirect import requirements per unit of final demand for each in-
dustry are the same as those used by Messrs. Soligo and Stern. However, 
some of the industries covered by them have to be omitted f rom the present study 
since the data on world prices for them are not available, as shown in the Appen-
dix. Two sets of revised estimates of the net foreign-exchange earnings are given 
in the Appendix. Both the sets of the revised estimates of the net foreign-ex-
change earnings are less, in almost all the cases, than the Soligo-Stern estimates 
of the net foreign-exchange earnings. Secondly, the higher the price differential, 
i.e., the differential between world price and domestic price, the lower is the net 
foreign-exchange earnings. In other words, there is no compensating variation 
"'•It is important to remember that the domestic prices used in this context are the market 
prices and, hence, include the indirect taxes on output and p, which is the excess of the domestic 
market price over world price, accordingly includes the indirect taxes. Therefore, the domestic 
price deflated by (1 +p) in the above yields the estimates of export price excluding indirect taxes. 
This procedure of estimating the export price and the gross exchange-earnings, therefore, in-
cludes the effects of the exemption of the exports from the domestic indirect taxes. 
The price ratios ace not in any sence exhaustive; they do not represent the averages of 
all the possible products of each industry since data are seldom available in such a great detail. 
In many cases, the prices relating to a few products are used to represent the entire industry. 
This suggests the need for the collection of comprehensive data on the import and export prices 
which are of critical importance for vital decisions in the field of investment programming, 
import substitution and export promotion. In some cases, the estimate of the price differential 
is close to what is suggested by the magnitude of the export subsidy as in the case of the cotton-
textile industry — a n industry which has a relatively more competit ive structure and has 
enjoyed over the years a considerable expansion of capacity and output with a fall in relative 
profits and prices. The high-price differential in the case of the apparel industry, in spite of 
a low-price differential of one of its inputs, i.e., cotton textile, can partly be explained by the 
relative lack of competition in this industry and by the fact that some other inputs in the 
apparel industry, such as the silk and artificial silk, have the domestic prices which are four to 
five times higher than the world price. For possible explanations of inertindustry variations 
in the price differentials, see f2 ; 31. 
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in the import requirements for commodity with a higher price differential so that 
the lower gross earnings are not offset by the lower import requirements. The 
highest foreign-exchange earning in the first set of estimates (Soligo-Stern) is 
0.96 rupee per unit of export, worth one rupee in domestic prices, of the chemical 
fertilizer which also yields the highest earning in the second set; the lowest earn-
ings are 0.25 rupee for perfumes, soaps, and cosmetics in the first set and in the 
second set they are 0.03 rupee provided by the plastic products. The most 
striking differences in the magnitude of the net foreign-exchange earnings 
between different sets of estimates are the following; 
TABLE I 
EXCHANGE EARNINGS PER UNIT OF EXPORT WORTH ONE RUPEE 
IN DOMESTIC PRICES. 
Industry 
Soligo-Stern Revised estimates 
I II III 
Sugar 0.69 0.21 0.20 
Silk & artificial silk 0.49 0.04(--) 0.006 
Transport equipment 0.48 0.06 0.11 
Plastic products 0.42 0.03 0.26 
Rubber products 0.45 0.16 0.12 
In the first set, eighteen out of twenty-eight industries have about 0.50 as the 
foreign-exchange earnings per unit of export worth one rupee in domestic prices, 
whereas in the second set only about nine industries have the net foreign-exchange 
earnings of the same magnitude. Moreover, in the first set there is no industry 
with less than 0,25 as net foreign-exchange earnings, whereas in the second set 
there are nine industries with less than 0.25 as net foreign-exchange earnings 
and four industries with less than 0.10 as net foreign-exchange earnings. 
As between the second and third sets of estimates, the differences in the net 
foreign-exchange earnings of the same industry group are due to the differences 
in the composition of the industry group, as has been explained earlier. In most 
of the cases, the net earnings are lower in the third than in the second set of 
estimates, excepting in the case of paper and board, transport equipment, plastic 
products, cosmetics, soaps and perfumes where the third set of estimates is higher 
than in the second set. In one case, i.e., silk and artificial silk, the third set of 
estimates turns negative. 
It may be interesting to estimate the average foreign-exchange earnings for 
three broad commodity classifications of industrial groups, i.e., consumer goods, 
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intermediate goods and capital goods. The estimates which follow are based on 
the second set of estimates; since they cover a larger number of industry groups 
than the third set of estimates, they are expected to be more representative, if 
such a classification is to be made. The average (simple and weighted) net 
foreign-exchange earnings for the three groups of commodit ies are given be low 6 . 
TABLE II 
AVERAGE NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
Consumer goods 
A. Consumer goods : 
1) excluding ootton textiles and printing and 
publishing 
2) excluding printing and publishing 
B. Intermediate goods: 
1) excluding jute textiles 
C. Capital goods 
Simple Weighted 
0.3608 
0.3123 0.4667 
0.3340 0.5312 
0.4331 0.5938 
0.4202 0.3800 
0,2492 0.2180 
The simple average net earnings are the highest for the intermediate goods; 
this is also true if the earnings are estimated exclusively of the cotton and ju te 
textiles, which were the most important components of the consumer goods and 
intermediate goods, respectively. This is in line with the findings of Messrs, 
Soligo and Stern. The weighted net earnings for the three groups, including 
ju te and cotton textiles in their respective groups, keep their relative position 
unchanged. The weighted average earnings of consumer and intermediate goods 
are higher than the simple average, because the ju te and cotton textiles have 
higher net export earnings than the rest of their respective groups and have also 
very heavy weightage. The weighted average for capital goods is lower than the 
simple average. But once the ju te and cotton textiles are excluded f r o m their 
respective groups, the weighted average earnings are the highest for consumer 
goods; those for intermediate goods are less than that for consumer goods but 
«The weights are the relative importance of the exports of the different industry groups 
in the total manufactured exports of Pakistan during the period 1961-64. The calculation of 
the direct and indirect import requirements and the price differentials between foreign and 
domestic price relate to 1963/64. Sugar, tea, sports goods, printing and publishing, pens and 
pencils, footwear, cotton textiles, silk and artificial silk, matches, wearing apparel, plastic goods, 
cosmetics, and soaps and perfumes constitute the category of consumer goods whereas chemical 
fertilizers, jute textiles, thread and threadball, tanning and leather finishing, articles of paper 
and board, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, manufactures of paper and board, coal and petro-
leum products, rubber and rubber products, and paints and varnishes are intermediate goods; 
capital goods include non-metallic minerals, transport equipment, noneleotrical machinery, 
metal goods, basic metals, and electrical machinery and appliances. Printing and publishing 
is omitted from the weighted average of consumer goods, because data on their exports are 
available. 
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more than those of capital goods. The conclusion reached by Messrs. Soligo 
and Stern that the capital-goods industries rank lowest in terms of foreign-ex-
change earnings remains unaltered. But as between the intermediate goods and 
consumer goods, the consumer goods rank higher than the intermediate goods 
in terms of weighted average earnings. But then number of industries in both 
groups are based on the exportable domestic agricultural raw materials, the 
domestic consumption of which in lieu of export involves a loss of foreign ex-
change which is to be set against their gross earnings as shown below. 
TABLE III 
CONSUMPTION OF DOMESTIC MATERIALS PER UNIT 
OF FINAL D E M A N D 
Industry Direct consumption 
Direct and 
indirect consumption 
Domestic 
materials 
Cotton textiles 0.2882 0.3011 Cotton 
Jute textiles 0.3407 0.3452 Jute 
Woollen textiles 0.1778 0.1904 Wool* 
Tanning & finishing of leather 0.3054 0.3290 Hides and skins* 
* Assuming that the consumption of inputs from the sector "all other agriculture" in the 
input-output table in the case of woollen textiles is wool and in the case of tanning, the hides 
and skins. The input-output table is the one prepared by Messrs Tims-Stern for the year 
1963/64, and which has been used for the estimation of direct and indirect import requirements. 
The inverse of the table was available from Mr. J. J. Stern of the Harvard Advisory Service, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, U.S.A. 
The net foreign-exchange earnings of the above sectors, exclusive of the direct 
and indirect consumption of the exportable domestic materials, are given below 7 . 
'Column (A) of Table IV excludes only direct consumption and Column (B) excludes 
both direct and indirect consumption. For wool, the estimate of gross earnings was 
taken from Messrs. Soligo and Stem which is 0.6667 since no independent price ratio was 
available. 
The industries which are heavy users of agricultural raw materials, which are concurrently 
exported, have been considered in the above estimates. These four industries have resulted in 
an increasing domestic absorption of the most important agricultural raw materials exports of 
Pakistan, i.e., cotton, jute, wool, and hides and skins. The exclusion of the industries other 
than those based on the domestic utilization of the exportable agricultural raw materials may 
be justified on the grounds that the focus of the present paper is on the net foreign-exchange 
earnings of the manufactured exports so that the decline in the foreign-exchange earnings of the 
non-manufacturing sector only are offset against the increase in the foreign-exchange earnings 
of the manufacturing sector. 
The interindustrial deliveries within the manufacturing sector itself are not considered. 
For example, the exchange earnings of the apparel industry are not exclusive of the inputs from 
the textile industry, which might have been exported. The logical extension of this argument is 
that all the intermediate deliveries from the other sectors into any industry are potentially ex-
portable at a price so that the net foreign-exchange earnings are equal to only the value added 
in the particular industry in question, measured in international prices, derived by deducting the 
intermediate inputs in international prices from the value of the gross output in international 
prices. 
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TABLE IV 
NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
(A) (B) 
Jute textiles 0.2677 0.2632 
Cotton textiles 0,2628 0.2499 
Woollen textiles 0.2959 0.2833 
Tanning and finishing of leather 
\ 
0.2014 0.1778 
Note; see footnote 7. 
The averages of the two industry groups, i.e., the consumer and intermediate 
goods, decline when the net foreign-exchange earnings are estimated, exclusive 
of the loss of foreign exchange due to the domestic consumption of exportable 
raw materials. Though the consumer goods still retain the leading position 
as the net foreign-exchange earner, the difference between the two is narrowed. 
TABLE V 
NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS 
Simple Weighted 
Consumer goods (excluding printing and publishing) 0.3082 0.3145 
Intermediate goods 0.3680 0.2709 
FURTHER EVIDENCE ON NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS: 
INTRAINDUSTRY DIFFERENCES 
While the estimates of the average foreign-exchange earnings for such broad 
aggregative commodity classifications such as consumer goods, intermediate 
goods and capital goods, may be useful for certain purposes, it is pertinent to 
emphasize the important intraindustry differences which exist within each of 
these broad classifications. Though most of the above estimates for the con-
sumer-goods industries, for example, credit them with a higher average net 
foreign-exchange earning, it is within this broad group that one finds the indus-
tries such as silk textiles, weaving apparel, and plastics which have the lowest 
net foreign-exchange earnings. While partly the differences between the second 
and third sets of estimates are due to the fact that in many cases the price differ-
entials relate to the different years, the more important reason is the differences 
in terms of the net foreign-exchange earnings between the individual industries 
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which constitute each of the ma jo r commodity groups®. Generalizations based 
on such broad classifications are apt to be misleading. Moreover, within each 
industry group such as machinery, chemicals and basic metals, etc., important 
differences exist between the individual industries. This underscores the need 
for a more detailed study of each of the industry groups in terms of their con-
stituents, before any judgment is rendered as to their relative net foreign-exchange 
earnings. That it is advisable to pursue the investigation in as great a detail 
as the data and the resources for analysis permit is evidenced f rom the following 
analysis of the net foreign-exchange earnings of a number of narrowly defined 
commodities derived f rom an analysis of the Reports of the Pakistan Tariff 
Commission. 
The estimates of net foreign-exchange earnings in the industries shown in 
Table VI do not take into account the indirect import requirements ' . The gross 
foreign-exchange earnings per unit of export for each industry have been esti-
mated by the Tariff Commission on the basis of the actual selling price in the 
export market assumed to be equal to the c.i.f. price and not on the basis of a 
hypothetical export price which is gssurned to be less than the domestic price by 
the amount of export subsidy. To the extent the f.o.b. export price is less than 
the c.i.f. price, the estimate of the gross earnings and, therefore, that of the net 
earnings, suffers f rom an upward bias. The following Table VI reveals the wide 
differences between the individual industries or commodities within each industry 
group, such as metal products, chemicals, and basic metals, etc., in terms of the 
net foreign-exchange earnings. Within the group of chemicals, for example, 
the net foreign-exchange earning per unit of export, worth one rupee in domestic 
rupees, varies f rom 0.87 to 0.18; in the pharmaceuticals industry, it ranges f r o m 
0.96 to 0.03 but in the case of seven products, the net earning is negative. Simi-
larly, in the case of the electrical machinery, it ranges f rom 0.51 to 0.02 while in 
the case of metal products, it ranges f rom 0.83 to 0.10. 
8Consumer goods, intermediate goods, and capital goods. 
s>Moreover, the direct and indirect import requirements for forty-three industry groups, 
analysed in the Appendix, are derived from an input-output table (54 x 54), the direct import 
requirements in the case of industries given in Table VI are derived from the Reports of the 
Tariff Commission on the individual industries. 
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TABLE VI 
Industry group 
Range of net 
foreign-exchange 
earning for a selected 
sample in each group 
Average of the industry group 
Basic metals 
(3 cases) 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
Chemicals 
(7 cases) 
Pharmaceuticals 
(24 cases) 
Pharmaceuticals 
(7 cases) 
Metal products 
(10 cases) 
Nonelectrical machinery 
(1 case) 
Electrical machinery 
(6 cases) 
Non-metallic minerals 
(3 cases) 
Transport equipment 
(1 case) 
Rubber and rubber products 
(2 cases) 
0,74-0,67 
0.87-0.18 
0.96-0.03 
(—)0.03-(—)0.2l 
0.83-0.10 
0.63 
0.51-0.02 
0.47-0.18 
0.31 
0.54-0.52 
0.31 
0.29 
0.43 
0.35 
0.45 
0.16 
0.20 
INVESTMENT CRITERIA AND EXPORT EARNINGS 
The contribution to the improvement of balance of payments is one of the 
criteria in use in Pakistan affecting the selection of industrial investment projects. 
If the contribution of an industry to an improvement in the balauce of payments 
is measured in terms of the gross foreign-exchange earning, it is not only thai 
its contribution is overestimated but also its contribution relative to the other 
industries is liable to be misjudged since the relative ranking of the industries in 
terms of the net earnings is different from that in terms of the gross earnings, as 
seen in the Appendix. It is in addition relevant to enquire whether the criterion 
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of net foreign-exchange earning is consistent with the criterion conceived in 
terms of the most economical use of the other scarce factors such as capital or 
in terms of the overall efficiency of the manufacturing industries in Pakistan. 
Reliable and meaningful data on the capital-output ratios of the Pakistani 
industries are difficult to come by. However, an attempt is made to use the 
capital-output ratios estimated by Messrs. Khan and MacEwan [5] in order to 
test whether the ranking of industries by the capital-output ratios is significantly 
different f rom the ranking by the net foreign-exchange earnings. The capital-
output ratios are not available for all the industries for which the net foreign-
exchange earnings are available. Hence, the comparison was restricted to a 
smaller sample for which data on both the variables are available, as shown in 
the Appendix. A second set of data is available on capital-output ratios in 
an I B R D study [1] which has been used alternatively to test the similarity or 
otherwise of ranking of industries by the two criteria of the net foreign-exchange 
earnings and the capital-output ratio. 
There does not seem to by any significant correlation between the ranking 
of industries by any of the two sets of the capital-output ratios and by foreign-
exchange earnings. The rank coefficient is 0.348 on the basis of the first set of 
capital coefficients and —0.073 on the basis of the second set of capital coeffi-
cients. They are not, however, statistically significant at 5-per-cent level. Thus, 
an industry which yields large net foreign-exchange earnings may involve either 
low or high capital requirements. In the former case, the industry meets both 
the criterion whereas in the latter case the advantage of high foreign-exchange 
earnings is offset by a greater use of another scarce factor, i.e., capital. There 
are, on the one hand, such industries as cotton, ju te textiles, and chemical fertili-
zers, which have high foreign-exchange earnings and high capital-output ratios, 
and, on the other, there are such industries as pharmaceuticals and miscellaneous 
chemicals, basic metals and metal goods which have low foreign-exchange 
earnings and low capital-output ratios. There are, of course, industries like 
sugar, other textiles (silk and artificial silk), transport equipment, rubber and 
rubber products, which have high capital-output ratios and low net foreign-
exchange earnings. The above conclusion about basic metals and chemical 
fertilizer would not be valid if the second set of capital-output ratios is used. 
However, if the competitive efficiency of an industry is judged by the degree 
of effective rate of protection, then the net foreign-exchange saving is negatively 
correlated with the degree of effective protection. In other words, an industry 
which is internationally more competitive earns more net foreign-exchange per 
unit of exports. The lower the degree of effective protection, the lower usually is 
the excess of t he domestic price over the world price and, hence, the higher is the 
magnitude of gross foreign-exchange earnings. The negative rank correlation 
coefficient between the degree of effective protection and net foreign-exchange 
earnings is —0.444 and it is significant at 5-per-cent level. Thus, the choice of 
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industries by the criterion of net foreign-exchange earnings would imply or 
involve the choice of industries with a lower degree of effective protection. 
However, it does not necessarily involve the choice of industries which involve a 
smaller use of domestic resources such as capital per unit of foreign-exchange 
earnings. In other words, the relevant question regarding the appropriate 
criterion for the selection of industries is whether an industry which earns per 
unit of export the highest amount of net foreign exchange and has at the same 
time the lowest effective degree of protection, also yields the highest returns in 
international prices to the scarce factors like capital. In other words, an industry 
may require a low degree of effective protection in the sense that its value added 
in domestic prices very nearly equals its value added in international prices but 
it may still fail to provide adequate returns to scarce factors, measured in inter-
national prices. This leads to the conclusion that the calculation of the rate of 
return on capital industry-wise has to be made in international prices, to decide 
whether the rate is adequate and then to make interindustry comparison in terms 
of rates of return. In this calculation, capital equipment, etc., itself would also 
be valued in international prices [8]. 
NET EXCHANGE EARNING, EXPORT GROWTH AND EXPORT 
INCENTIVES 
It may be interesting to enquire whether the export performance of the 
various industries is correlated with their ability to earn foreign exchange, defined 
as the net foreign-exchange earnings per unit of export. There is no significant ' 
correlation between the net foreign-exchange earnings of a manufactured export 
and its rate of growth over time or its relative ranking or importance among 
the manufactured exports of Pakistan, defined as the proportion of the total 
manufactured exports earned by the particular industry. The rank correlation 
coefficient between the net foreign-exchange earnings and the rate of growth of 
exports during the period 1960-67 is negative and is —0.287 but it is not signi-
ficant at 5-per-cent level. The rank correlation coefficient between the net 
foreign-exchange earnings and the ratio of the particular export to the 
total manufactured exports of Pakistan during the period 1961-64 is 0.362 but 
it is not significant at 5-per-cent level, even though it is significant at 10-per-cent 
level. Thus, there is no evidence that the exports with a higher net foreign-
exchange earnings per unit are growing faster or that they provide higher pro-
portion of the total exports of Pakistan. 
A suggestion has sometimes been made that the magnitude of export 
subsidy to the individual exports should be proportional to their net foreign-
exchange earnings [7], While it is readily granted that the magnitude of export 
subsidy should not be proport ional to the gross foreign-exchange earnings, the 
reverse is believed to be the appropriate policy insofar as net foreign-exchange 
earnings are concerned. In other words, the higher the net foreign-exchange 
earnings per unit of export, the higher should be the magnitude of subsidy. 
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Under this policy, it is suggested, the foreign-exchange earnings would be maxi-
mized. In the first place, there is an obvious and a simple limitation to this 
policy insofar as the average net foreign-exchange earnings are different f r o m 
the marginal earnings. In the case of the export commodities with a very low 
elasticity of export demand, the marginal earnings would be considerably lower 
than the average so that an export commodity with a low average earning but 
with a high elasticity of export demand may contribute a larger foreign-exchange 
earnings at the margin than the former and, thus, deserves the same subsidy as 
the one with a higher average but a lower marginal earning. In Pakistan, the 
ma jo r distinction in the case of the manufactured exports is between the jute 
and cotton textiles, on the one hand, and the newer manufactures, on the other. 
The latter receives a larger bonus than the former, even though there are items 
within the second category of exports, some of which earn, on the average, higher 
and some other, which on the average, earn lower foreign-exchange earnings 
per unit of exports than the cotton and textile industries. There is a presump-
tion that the price elasticity of export demand for cotton textiles, even though 
Pakistan supplies a small share of the world market, is low because of the quota 
restrictions on Pakistan's exports to her major importers under the Intern-
ational Textile Agreement. In the case of the jute textiles, Pakistan operates in an 
oligopolistic market dominated by India so that the possibility of a retaliatory 
action in response to a considerable price-cut by Pakistan is ever present. Thus, 
one may suggest that newer manufacturers which suffer neither f rom the limit-
ation of quotas under an international agreement nor f rom the danger of oligo-
polistic market, face a competitive world market as they constitute a very small 
share of world trade iu the individual commodities. Thus, the newer manu-
facturers, even when their average earnings are lower than the ju te and cotton 
textiles, justifiably receive a higher bonus with a view to accelerating the rate of 
expansion of the export earnings per unit of subsidy. The newer manufacturers 
with higher average earnings are justified in receiving a higher subsidy. But if 
the maximization of exports or net foreign-exchange earning is to be accepted 
as the objective, then one would not expect the same rate of bonus with a few 
exceptions, as it now prevails, for all the newer manufacturers who face a 
highly elastic export demand but between which there is a considerable differ-
ence in terms of the average export earnings, ranging f rom 0.90 to 0.02 per unit 
of export. The same rate of subsidy is justified if these wide differences in the 
average earnings, in fact, imply very similar or roughly equal marginal earnings. 
In order to just i fy such a presumption, the differences between their elasticities 
of demand would have to be much larger than appears plausible or realistic, 
especially since all of them presumably face a higher elastic demand at the ruling 
world price. 
This brings us to the second limitation to the policy of fixing rates of export 
subsidy in proport ion to the amount of net foreign-exchange earnings. The 
maximization of foreign-exchange earnings or exports is by itself not the objective 
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of economic policy. In a developing economy like Pakistan, the objective of 
economic policy, with reference to which the instruments of policy such as the 
export-promotion measures are used, is the increase in national income, subject 
to such restraints among other things as the expansion of employment, socially 
tolerable distribution of income and equilibrium in the balance of payments, 
including foreign capital flow. It is in respect of the last mentioned restraint 
that the net foreign-exchange earning assumes a critical importance. Foreign 
exchange is a necessary input in most income-generating activities as the latter 
require imported inputs; at the same time, the exporting activity generates foreign 
exchange and requires the inputs of the scarce domestic inputs such as capital, 
skill and natural resources. The relevant question under consideration is how 
to devise or orient the export-subsidy schemes in terms of an appropriate differ-
entiation, if any, between the individual exports. The requirements of the 
scarce domestic resources differ as between the different exports so that the cost 
in terms of the domestic resources of the marginal net foreign-exchange earning 
differs between the different exports. The principle of the cost minimization for 
a given output suggests that the exports of which the marginal net exchange 
earning involves lower costs should expand faster. Moreover, as on the demand 
side, so also on the supply side, there are differences between the individual 
exports in terms of the elasticity of supply so that while the average domestic 
cost of an export may be lower than that of another, the marginal cost may be 
higher than or equal to that of the latter. 
If MC, and MCB are the marginal domestic costs of exports A and B, and 
MRA and MRB are the net marginal foreign-exchange earnings per unit of 
exports, then M R A / M C R and M R B / M C B are respectively the marginal exchange 
earnings per unit of marginal domestic costs of A and B. If ( M R A / M C A ) > 
(MR I , MC,), an additional unit of foreign exchange f r o m the export of A costs 
less than that f r o m export of B. So long as ( M R A / M C A ) . E < 1 where E is the 
effective rate of exchange, including the export subsidy, there will be no export 
of A since the marginal cost exceeds the marginal r evenue 1 0 . Under these 
circumstances, there will be no exports of B either; the effective exchange-rate 
which equates the domestic currency equivalent of MRB and MC B is higher than 
that which equalizes the domestic currency equivalent of MR a and MCA, It 
is possible to argue, however, that for a country like Pakistan which has a small 
share in the world trade of most commodities, both agricultural and manufac-
tured, excepting in the case of raw jute, the elasticity of demand for most of her 
exports is likely to be high and is unlikely to be greatly different as between 
different commodities so that discrimination between them in terms of effective 
exchange-rate on the basis of differential demand elasticities is unlikely to result 
in economic gain and, in absence of detailed and reliable information regarding 
the elasticity of demand for the individual commodities, may in fact result in a 
'°E is the amount of local currency per unit of foreign currency. 
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random selection of effective exchange-rates for different commodities. There-
fore, if one assumes high and roughly equal elasticities of demand for most 
commodities then discriminatory exchange-rates based on differential costs and 
elasticities of supply of different exports can be justified on the grounds that an 
exchange rate which would bring for th the supply of higher costs but more 
elastic exports would result in high rents being earned by the low cost but in-
elastic export sector. A low exchange rate for the latter sector which would 
mop up the excess rents without adversely affecting supply can then be introduced,. 
In terms of our previous example, as exports of A expand, MCA increases so that 
there is an increase in the effective rate required to enable its exports to take 
place. As this happens, at some points exports of B become profi table. If 
the exports of A are not adequate at the previous rate of exchange to meet the 
total foreign-exchange requirements of the economy, the exports of B take place 
as the effective exchange-rate increases. Thus, under a system of unified rate of 
exchange, A earns excess rents. 
Whether in the situation outlined above, the effective exchange rate of A 
should be distinguished f rom that of B and be set at a lower level is a matter of 
value judgement regarding the appropriateness of the distribution of income 
between the two sectors, A and B; it also depends upon other macroeconomic 
implications, including the effects on savings in the context of economic growth, 
of the differential rents in the different sectors. The possibility of such a suc-
cessful discrimination between the individual export commodities is partly limited 
by the lack of a detailed knowledge of the elasticities of supply of the individual 
export commodities. But in one instance there is a clear case for discrimination, 
i.e., when the elasticity of foreign demand is less than one so that the marginal 
revenue is negative with the result that an expansion of export would involve a 
fall in the total foreign-exchange earnings of the commodity, or that its elasticity 
of demand is significantly lower than the rest so as to yield a discernible gain 
f r o m discrimination. Thus, on the basis of static allocative criteria, the occa-
sions when the departures f r o m a unified exchange rate for exports are justif ied 
are not many. 
On dynamic grounds one may argue that if some sectors generate higher 
rates of saving and thus contribute more to investment and growth than others, 
they should receive a higher effective exchange rate than others. A higher 
effective exchange rate which would enable higher profits to be earned in the 
"growth-promot ing" sectors may, therefore, be justified as a second-best method. 
While the distinction often made between the agricultural and the manufac tur ing 
sectors on the basis of the latter's higher propensity to save and invest may or 
may not be appropriate, depending upon the particular circumstances of a 
country, an argument for discrimination between the individual manufac tur ing 
industries on this basis appears far-fetched. However, a strong case for discri-
minatory exchange-rates for the different exports can indeed be made out on 
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the basis of the infant industry argument, i.e., the existence of differences in the 
degree of infancy between the different industries. The manufactur ing indus-
tries in Pakistan are at different stages in the process of growing up into maturity. 
The "infancy" of an industry and its process of "learning by doing" is related 
not only to the manufactur ing operations and selling in the domestic market 
but also to the field of the export marketing, which involves problems and costs 
different in kind and degree f r o m that of the domestic marketing. The newer 
manufacturers are likely to face higher costs and greater obstacles in the pre-
sence of the established producers operating in the world trade and in the face 
of the consumers' preference for the brand-names with which the latter are 
already familiar. While a broad distinction between the old and newer manu-
facturing industries, as is made in Pakistan between the ju te and cotton textiles, 
on the one hand, and the rest of the new manufacturers, on the other, seems 
defensible, any attempt at a detailed discrimination between the individual 
industries on the basis of "differential infancy" would require an amount of 
knowledge of the individual industries which is not easily available in practice; 
such discriminatory treatment is often liable to be based on other extraneous and 
apparently plausible but logically untenable arguments. 
An illustration of this is the argument for the higher subsidies for the 
industries suffering f r o m an excess capacity. This is based on the reasoning 
that since the fixed costs in the short run can be neglected because the already 
installed capacity which is unutilized involves no social costs, the marginal vari-
able costs of expanding the exports of the industries suffering f r o m an excess 
capacity are low compared with those with no excess capacity operating on the 
upward rising slope of the average cost curve. But then if the reasoning is 
correct, what is necessary for the individual industries is to follow the principle 
of the marginal cost pricing in the export market . If the firms with excess 
capacity maximize profits, they would produce and sell so long as marginal re-
venue exceeds marginal cost. While in the domestic market they would earn 
excess profits because of the monopolistic market structure, the export price 
may just cover marginal cost in the highly competitive export market under a 
unified exchange rate; the firms with excess capacity will sell more than those 
without excess capacity since their marginal costs are low and decline as output 
and sales expand. If the excess capacity is due to the shortage of imports, such as 
the imported raw materials and spare parts, the appropriate policy is an increase 
in the supply of the necessary imports at a uniform price which represents then 
social opportunity costs equally to all the firms or industries. In any case, there 
does not appear any justification for a discriminatory export subsidy in favour 
of the firms with excess capacity. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
At present, the ma jo r focus of the export-incentive schemes and the exchange-
rate policy in Pakistan is on a rapid expansion of the manufactured exports. An 
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appropriate measure of their gross and net foreign-exchange earnings is of con-
siderable significance in this context. The alternative estimates of the net foreign-
exchange earnings of the individual manufactured exports, which are presented 
above on the basis of a direct and new evidence on their export prices and then-
gross earnings, are less, in some cases substantially less, than the earlier estimates. 
They are fu r the r reduced if the loss of exports of the agricultural raw materials 
necessary for the production of the manufactured exports is taken into account. 
Furthermore, the relative ranking of the individual manufactured exports in 
terms of the gross exchange earnings is different f rom that in terms of net earn-
ings. The net foreign-exchange earnings of the different industries are correlated 
neither with their capital costs per unit of output nor with such an overall index 
of efficiency as measured by the "effective rate of protection". A discriminatory 
promotion of the industries with large net foreign-exchange earnings may 
involve the encouragement of the inefficient industries or the industries with the 
higher capital costs unless sufficient care is taken to examine the costs of earning 
the foreign exchange in\terms of the scarce domestic resources. The manufac-
tured exports with a higher net foreign-exchange earnings per unit of export 
do not necessarily enjoy higher rates of growth nor do they contribute a larger 
proportion of the aggregate foreign-exchange earnings f r o m the manufactured 
exports, as judged by the recent experience. 
The design of an appropriate export-incentive scheme or of an exchange-
rate policy, which seeks to distinguish between the individual manufactured 
exports 011 the basis of their differential elasticity of supply and/or demand and 
011 the basis of their differential " infancy", involves a difficult exercise, partly in 
view of the lack of adequate knowledge about the relevant variables and partly 
because these criteria for differentiation are not always rigorously defined and 
closely examined in each case. It is necessary that the considerations, if any, 
underlying the departures f r o m a unified exchange rate fo r the exports within 
the manufactur ing sector itself are clearly spelled out ; the considerations of 
static allocative efficiency and the dynamic considerations of growth need be 
kept separate and be carefully identified in the particular cases of differentiation. 
In the absence of such an examination, the danger of an inefficient or more costly 
industry receiving a higher rate of export incentives, thus contributing to a mis-
allocation of resources, cannot often be avoided. This article does not provide 
an exhaustive analysis of all the relevant factors in the particular circumstances 
of Pakistan; it offers a few observations on some of the often-discussed con-
siderations fo r the multiple exchange rates for exports in Pakistan. 
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Appendix 
NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS PER UNIT OF FINAL DEMAND 
(Worth One Rupee in Domestic Prices) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Soligo-Stern Price Price exchange differen- Revised differen- Revised earnings tial estimate tial estimate Industry 1 I II U III 
Net Gross Nol Gross Net 
Jute pressing 99.75 
Cotton ginning 97.07 
Chemical fertilizer 96,04 1.15 0.82816 0.7886 
(1) (23) (1) 0 ) l e a 89.25 1.39 0,68516 0.6740 
(2) (21) (3) (2) Rice milling 75.53 
Sugar 69.30 4.27 0,22304 0.2135 
(3) (2) (25) (21) Sports goods 68.42 1,60 0.59523 0.5807 
(4) (18) (6) (5) 
Dyeing, printing and finishing of textiles 67.28 
Jufe textiles 67.43 1.46 0.65231 0.6084 (5) (20) (4) (4) 
Knitting 64.32 
Thread and threadbatl 
making 62.08 1.73 0.55051 0.4726 
(6) (15) (10) (10) 
Wood, cork and furnitine 61.84 
Pens, pencils and related products 59.61 2.55 0.37348 0.3134 
(7) (6) (20) (12) Footwear 59.38 1.66 0.57372 0,5132 
(8) (16) (9) (8) Tanning and leather 
finishing 58.60 1.56 0.61050 0.5068 
(9) (19) (5) (9) Printing and publishing 57.15 1.23 0.77429 0,6561 (10) (22) (2) (3) 
4.55 0.20931 0.1998 
i .64 0.58072 0.5202 
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NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS PER UNIT OF FINAL DEMAND 
(Worth One Rupee in Domestic Prices) 
CContd.) 
Industry 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sciligo-Stern exchange earnings 
Price differen-tial Revised estimate 
Price differen-tial Revised estimate 
I I n II m 
Net Gross Net Gross Net 
Cotton textiles 55.62 1.56 0.61050 0.5510 (11) (19) (5) (7) 
Baking products and confection 55.31 1.03 0.92464 0.8019 
Articles of paper and board 54.74 (12) 1.94 (12) 0.49092 (14) 0.4137 (H) 1.57 0,60661 0,5294 
Non-metallic mineral products 53.26 
(13) 
2.54 
(7) 
0.37495 (19) 0,3190 (16) 2.10 0,45351 0.3975 
Pharmaceuticals and mis-cellaneous chemicals 52.71 (14) 1.81 (14) 0.52618 (12) 0.3820 J (13) 1 ' i . 9 6 \ r 1 1 . 5 8 / 1 
0,60277 \ / 0.3400 0 . 4 8 5 9 0 / \ 0 . 4 5 6 8 
Cigarettes and tobacco products 51.96 
Manufacture of paper and board 50.71 (15) 1,94 (12) 
0.49092 (14) 0.3667 (15) 2.35 
0.40526 0.2811 
Optical goods 49.75 
Matches 49.71 (16) 1.62 (17) 0.58789 (7) 
0.5650 
(6) 
2.45 0.38872 0.3658 
Coal and petroleum pro-ducts 
Silk and artificial silk 
49,64 
(17) 
49.58 (18) 
2.07 
(9) 
4.50 
0 ) 
0.46009 
(16) 
0.2116 
(23) 
0.3683 
(14) 
0.0395 
(27) 5,75 0.16563 —0.0065 
Transport equipment 47,64 (19) 3.49 (3) 0,2729 (24) 0.0607 (25) 2.94 0,32393 0,1117 
Woollen textiles 47.37 
Non-electrical machinery 46.21 (20) 1.89 (13) 0.5039 (13) 0.2762 (18) 1.59 
0.59898 0.3712 
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NET FOREIGN-EXCHANGE EARNINGS PER UNIT OF FINAL DEMAND 
(Worth One Rupee in Domestic Prices) 
(Concld.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry 
Soligo-Stern exchange earnings 
I 
Price differen-tial 
1 
Revised estimate 
II 
Price differen-tial 
II 
Revised estimate 
III 
Net Gross Net 
i 
Gross | Net 
Canning and preserving 1.60 0.55371 0.3226 of fruits and vegetables 45.86 1.72 Salt 45.32 
Leather goods 45.28 
Rubber and rubber pro- 44.94 2.53 0.3764 0.1662 2.89 0.32954 0.1193 ducts (21) (8) (18) (23) 
Alcoholic beverages 44.19 3.25 0,29304 0.2641 
Metal goods 43.27 (.95 0.4S84 0.2424 2,30 0.41408 0.168i (22) 0 0 (15) (20) 
Electrical machinery and appliances 43.22 a) 1.60 0.5952 0.3839 2.01 0.47382 0.2625 (23) (18) b) 4.08 (6) (12) 
Wearing apparel 42.64 3.25 0.2930 0.0407 (24) (5) (21) (26) 
Plastic products 41.88 3.36 0.2834 0.0281 1.95 0.48840 0.2553 (25) (4) (22) (28) 
Paints and varnishes 39.04 2.02 0.4715 0.2575 1.70 0.56022 0.3462 (26) (10) (15) (19) 
Non-alcoholic beverages 33.67 
Basic metals 32.28 1.66 0.5757 0.2130 1.55 0.61444 0.2537 (27) (16) (8) (22) 
Perfumes, cosmetics and soaps 25.13 1.94 0.4335 0.1545 
(28) (12) (17) (24) 1.07 0.89007 0.611? 
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(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) ( i n 
Rate of effective protection 
Capital income ratio 
1 
Capital income ratio 
11 
Capital income j atio 
i n 
Rate of growth of exports (1960-67) 
Proportion of total manufactured exports (1961-64) 
95 0,04 
4 0.26 1.92 0.635 1,0073 50 0.037 (10) (19) 
122 2.07 2,039 3.7437 20 0.34 (5) (9) (10) (17) (16) 157 0,065 
133 1,92 1,256 2,2611 30 0.74 
(3) (10) (16) (15) (12) 
47 2.09 •1.915 *3,2009 56 0,48 (22) (8) (11) (4) (15) 
127 52 0.53 
(4) (7) (13) 
87 66 0.05 (10) (3) (22) 72 53 0.25 (17) (6) (18) 
84 3.41 1.564 2.7526 47 0.08 (12) (3) (14) (9) (20) 
64 91 0.32 (19) (2) (17) 
Notes' and sources 
*Could only get figures for machine total arid they are used for electrical arid non-electrical machinery. 
Capilal-incom© ratio 14]. Rate of growth and relative importance of trade computed from C.S.O. Foreign Trade Statistics and Monthly Statistical Ballet ins for various years and E.P.B. Foreign Trade of Pakistan. 
Price differential I [6J. 
Price differential H [4j. 
Effective rate of protection [4]. 
Capital-income ratio II [1]. 
Capital-income ratio III ~ adjusted from capital-income ratio II, 
The figures with brackets under each column indicate the rank. 
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